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Amnesty International (AI) was founded as a movement for the liberation of
prisoners of conscience in the middle of the Cold War and advocates for the
respect of all human rights as defined in the UN Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR). Over the years, it has focused on the defense of people’s
rights to be free from states’ arbitrariness. As one of the most internationally
important human rights organizations and an institution with a large grass-
roots membership, AI has also largely shaped the popular understanding of
human rights as those mainly concerning the respect of one’s individual civil
and political rights. For many years, the organization has promoted aware-
ness of and adherence to the UDHR and embraced “the equal entitlements of
women and men to the rights contained in it.”1 However, its traditional fo-
cus on essentially upholding the International Covenant on Civil and Political
rights has marked AI’s work with a gender bias. Indeed, the gendered pub-
lic-private divide means that addressing mainly civil and political rights and
largely ignoring economic, social, and cultural rights have entailed a dispro-
portionate focus on human rights violations as typically witnessed by men.
Over the course ofmany years, women have comprised a small minority of
the ‘prisoners of conscience’ cases that AI has adopted. Around the 1990s, con-
tinuing transnational women’s activism and networking pressured the UN,
national governments, and major human rights organizations, such as AI, to
recognize Violence Against Women (VAW) in the private sphere as a human
rights violation – a process that transformed the traditional understanding of
human rights. As a result, human rights organizations started to reconsider
their state-focused work and began taking gender-specific human rights vio-
lations into account. AI’s first comprehensive report on violations of women’s
1 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2014, p.3.
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rights,Women in the Front Line:HumanRights Violations againstWomen,was pub-
lished in 1991 andmarked the beginning of AI’s work on violations of women’s
rights. In keeping with the frame of its mandate, the report addressed issues
such as VAW in state custody and female human rights defenders and the
risks they were facing.
Around the time of the fourth World Conference on Women (WCW)
held in Beijing in 1995, AI launched its first major international campaign
on women’s rights, Human Rights are Women’s Rights. The latter focused on
torture, state violence, abuses during armed conflicts, and disappearances
affecting women. While AI’s interest in VAW increased significantly during
the first half of the 1990s, civil and political rights remained its main focus.
Therefore, the organization did not question the gender bias inherent to its
approach. In this context, AI’s decision to make cases of VAW in the private
sphere2 the focus of its first long-term global thematic campaign (the Stop
Violence Against Women or SVAW campaign) appears to be rather astonishing.
The organization approved this decision in 2001, at the same time it took the
decision to adopt a mission including economic, social, and cultural rights.
This book is informed by the theoretical paradigm of feminist construc-
tivism.3 It uses a qualitative case-study4 approach and applies grounded the-
ory research techniques in an effort to show the reasons behind AI’s deci-
sion to make VAW in the private sphere the theme of its first global long-
term thematic campaign in 2001, despite its historically determined gender-
biased vision of human rights. It also enhances our understanding of why
and how AI integrated VAW into its work between the late 1980s and the end
of the SVAW campaign in 2010. By exploring AI’s work on issues of VAW,
this book sheds light on how and why the organization integrated women’s
rights into its overall work. I focus on AI’s inner life and, specifically, on in-
ternational bodies such as the International Secretariat (IS), the International
Executive Committee (IEC), and the International Council (IC), as well as the
Swiss and the German sections as two of the most important Western AI sec-
tions. Together with an emphasis on female activists and officials, this focus
provides previously unknown insights. A broad range of first-hand materials
from AI’s archives and interviews with the main people involved in AI’s work
2 Domestic violence was one of the core issues that AI focused on in this campaign.
3 Locher and Prügl 2001.
4 Lamnek and Krell 2016.
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on women’s rights over the two decades of interest allow me to present a de-
tailed picture of a little-known part of the work of one of the most important
human rights non-governmental organizations worldwide.
In order to account for the changing global and institutional context –
the year 2001 marked the end of AI’s traditional mandate – the book differ-
entiates between two periods: the 1990s and the 2000s. By focusing on the
beginning of AI’s interest in women’s rights issues in the late 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s, my book describes the evolution of AI’s work on VAW
from a minor concern held by individual female activists to a prominent hu-
man rights concern. It also highlights the key role women within AI played
during this transformation. I demonstrate that AI’s willingness to make VAW
the theme of its first global long-term thematic campaign is not sufficiently
accounted for by traditional explanations. The increasing number of women
in AI leadership positions, the support of the Secretary General at the time,
or external favorable factors like the end of the Cold War and its effect on the
nature of human rights violations, which eventually made AI rethink its focus
on the state, the fourth WCW in Beijing in 1995, and, relatedly, the women’s
rights movement’s pressure on the international community to work more
seriously on women’s human rights all fall short of explaining it. Instead, the
decision to launch the SVAW campaign must be seen mainly as the result of
feminist strategizing. Indeed, by adopting a strategy of intersectional network-
ing and analogous framing, female activists and officials succeeded in making
AI significantly increase its work on VAWduring the 1990s.While the decision
to organize a global campaign on VAW in 2001 and the subsequent launch of
the SVAW campaign constituted a great step forward towards more gender-
sensitive human rights work, a review of this campaign also reveals that AI
did not succeed in making women’s rights a part of its DNA.5 By focusing on
the 2000s, the book highlights AI’s attempts to make VAW issues an integral
part of its overall work. It shows that, in contrast to the 1990s, the first decade
of the 21st century saw AI’s leadership as the driving force behind VAW policy
development and in charge of the implementation of the SVAW campaign.
The book lays out the reasons why despite the commitment of its leadership,
AI did not achieve its intended goal of making women’s rights part of the or-
ganization’s DNA. I argue that the factors that best explains this failure are (1)
the fact that the female activists and officials who initiated and pushed AI’s
work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work on
5 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010a.
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VAW issues and (2) activists’ and officials’ important opposition to this ini-
tiative. Furthermore, my analysis of national-level structures shows consid-
erable differences in the extent to which the Swiss and the German sections
managed to integrate VAW into their work in the 2000s.While the Swiss sec-
tion was more successful in making VAW a part of its overall work, similar
achievements were limited in the German section. The important opposition
to the SVAW campaign and to the adoption of a policy on abortion of the
German section’s membership help explain this divergence. I argue that the
German section members’ relative closeness to the Church and their compar-
atively powerful position further account for the difference between the two
sections.
1.1 Purpose and delimitation
As a qualitative research endeavor, the present book centers on one particular
human rights network.6 It thereby relies “primarily on understanding par-
ticulars rather than generalization to universals.”7 AI is made up of a large
number of country sections and activist groups (besides its headquarters) that
comprise an important transnational network. Therefore, answering the re-
search question requires a narrower focus. Based on various criteria (which I
explain in detail in chapter 5), I therefore choose the Swiss and the German
AI sections as my primary units of analysis, from which I extract information
relevant to the functioning of AI as a whole. The study thus uses case studies
as a research approach in the sense that Lamnek and Krell (2016)8 highlight,
and not as a specific technique of empirical social research. Instead, as the
Data andmethods chapter explains, I use various data collection methods from
grounded theory to answer my research questions. By purposefully selecting
two major AI sections as case studies, my book allows for internal generaliz-
ability.9 The Swiss and the German sections reflect AI’s essential character-
istics of a Western human rights organization with a longstanding working
6 Similar to Lake and Wong (2009), the present research considers AI a transnational
network (Lake and Wong 2009). This definition best accounts for AI’s structure as an
organization with a hierarchical center and a large transnational grassroots member-
ship network.
7 Maxwell 2002, p.56.
8 Lamnek and Krell 2016.
9 Maxwell 2002.
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focus on the respect of civil and political rights. This representativeness and
the fact that most of its members, groups, and funding are concentrated in
its Western sections10 make my findings potentially valid for the entire AI
network. Thus, while my research’s primary aim is to gain new insights into
the integration of issues of VAW into AI’s work, the study nevertheless pro-
vides interesting findings useful for other human rights organizations.11 In
addition, the application of grounded theory research techniques for data col-
lection and analysis allowsme to further develop the theory of norm diffusion
and dynamics.
Therefore, the purpose of the study is twofold:
First, by focusing on the 1990s, the study intends to shed light on the
reason AI decided to make VAW in the private sphere the theme of its first
global long-term thematic campaign in 2001, even though its traditional un-
derstanding of human rights did not include this type of violence. My work
first shows that AI’s growing interest in VAW issues and its subsequent de-
cision must be seen primarily as the result of female AI activists’ and offi-
cials’ use of two strategies: parallel networking and analogous framing. Further,
by narrowing its scope to the 2000s, the book demonstrates that, despite the
AI leadership’s commitment to the SVAW campaign, the organization was
not successful in making women’s rights an integral part of its overall work.
This happened because the female activists and officials who initiated the AI’s
work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work in
this realm during the following decade, and part of the organization’s activists
and officials showed important content-related resistance.
Second, this study seeks to contribute to the developing theory of norm
dynamics in International Relations (IR). By defining AI as a transnational
network and by concentrating on AI’s recognition of VAW in the private
sphere as a human rights violation, the study focuses on an international
norm and its dissemination within a transnational network. It illustrates
how “less politically powerful activists”12 can influence the agenda of a
transnational network and shows that the emergence of a new norm does
not always depend on so-called norm entrepreneurs, but can also stem from
the work of comparatively weak actors in a transnational network. At the
same time, the book provides two new insights on why the diffusion of some
10 Hopgood 2006.
11 Cohen and Crabtree 2006.
12 Hertel 2006, p.5.
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norms remains limited within transnational networks. Norm contestation
by differently socialized actors can limit norm diffusion, as can the norm
contesters’ access to decision-making processes.
1.2 Significance
Existing studies have so far concentrated on AI’s initial work on women’s
rights and VAW and its development within the frame of the organization’s
mandate.13More recent publications, such as the Review of the SVAWCampaign
(2010)14 or Kelleher and Bhattacharjya’s 2013 article,15 have analyzed AI’s ap-
proach to the same issues in its post-mandate period. No comprehensive re-
search on this topic has so far covered both periods, encompassed both AI’s
international and national levels, and delivered a comprehensive picture of
the evolution of AI’s work on violence against women. In addition to reveal-
ing little-known aspects of AI’s work by dint of its focus on AI’s inner life and
internal actors, the book gives a voice to AI’s female activists and officials and
makes their agency visible. Highlighting women’s agency is all the more im-
portant, because women have been absent from AI’s leadership positions for
many decades despite comprising the majority of its membership and staff.
The study also highlights the importance of feminist strategizing for
achieving change and the significance of internal opposition in hindering
such internal transformations. In addition, even though considerable aca-
demic research has focused on AI’s formation, the movement’s evolving
work,16 or its role in shaping popular understandings of human rights until
today, neither the Swiss nor the German section have been the focus of
scholarly interest.17 Thus, the present study fills a gap in the literature by
providing a detailed account of AI’s work on issues of violence against women
within the IS and within the Swiss and the German sections.
13 Michel 2009; Watson 1997; Bahar 1996; Fried 1994.
14 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
15 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
16 Here, it is worth mentioning Hopgood’s in-depth study, Keepers of the flames, that fo-
cuses on the inner life of AI’s headquarters (Hopgood 2006).
17 Bahar 1996; Clifford 2002; Brown Thomson 2002; Clark 2001; Mutua 2001; Scoble and
Wiseberg 1974; Steiner 1991; Thakur 1994; Watson 1997; Buchanan 2002; Michel 2009;
Pack 1999; Welch 2001; Hopgood 2006; Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013; Lake and
Wong 2009; Baehr 1994.
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Why it is important to know more about AI’s recognition of VAW in the
private sphere as a human rights violation or, put differently, about the dif-
fusion of norms concerning women’s rights within the AI? First, AI has been
one of the most influential human rights non-governmental organizations18
worldwide since its foundation.19 It has played a prominent role in shaping
the popular understanding of human rights and in influencing the content of
human rights activism internationally over the last fifty-five years.20
Because of its agenda-setting power within the international human
rights regime,21 AI has been identified as “the seed around which the post-
war human rights network crystallized.”22 The organization thus greatly
contributed to the development of new international human rights standards
and to the implementation of existing ones.23 It also succeeded in changing
states’ human rights practices in a number of different countries.24 Further-
more, AI’s work holds a solid reputation and great credibility among other
leading human rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).25 AI can
thus be defined as a gatekeeper or “hub organization”26 as far as the diffusion
of norms is concerned, as its “choices have powerful demonstration effects,
signaling that certain causes are important.”27
Second, as a democratic movement based on its members’ engagement
and contributions, AI lets its activists’ beliefs about the essence of human
rights largely define its work. Thus, because AI has been one of the most in-
fluential human rights NGOs worldwide and because its members play a key
role in defining its policy, when AI members change their collective beliefs,
this normative change can potentially affect the prevailing international dis-
course and practice on human rights.Therefore, it is important to knowmore
about the recognition of women’s rights norms within the AI.
18 Power 2001.
19 AI was awarded with the International Noble Prize of Peace in 1977, which can be in-
terpreted as a sign of its increasing importance for the definition of human rights in-
ternationally.
20 Thakur 1994; Power 2001; Clark 2001; Reilly 2009; Lake and Wong 2009.
21 Schmitz 2010; Ron et al. 2005.
22 Lake and Wong 2009, p.138.
23 Thakur 1994, p.157; Clark 2001.
24 Wapner 1995; Clark 2001.
25 Ron et al. 2005.
26 Carpenter 2011.
27 Clifford 2005, p.6.
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1.3 Theoretical paradigm
The present study is informed by the theoretical paradigm of feminist con-
structivism.28 Constructivists think that social reality is constructed and ex-
plain political and social change with the interplay between agent and struc-
ture. Because of its focus on an international norm and the latter’s spread
within a transnational non-state actor, this study draws on the work of con-
structivist International Relations (IR) scholars and further contributes to the
theory of norm dynamics. My work draws from the constructivist approach
in IR, which sees human individuals as the ultimate constructors of worlds and,
therefore, the primary holders of agency.29 Agency is thus mainly considered
a characteristic of individual actors and not an asset of international organi-
zations, NGOs or states, as is the case in other IR constructivist perspectives.
In this sense, I see AI activists and officials30 as the primary actors detaining
agency. As Reinharz (1992) accurately states, the goal of feminist research is
“making the invisible visible, bringing the women’s lives to the center, ren-
dering the trivial important, putting the spotlight on women as competent
actors, and understanding women as subjects rather than objects.”31 In this
light, women engaged within AI as activists or staff members are of particular
interest to the present research.
The present study is inspired by one of the prominent feminist schools
of thought that considers the dichotomy between men and women a funda-
mental constitutive element of society. As Scott (1994) explains, gender is a
constitutive element of social relations and is based on perceived differences
between the sexes.32 Perceiving the world as something that “is in the process
of becoming,”33 feminist theory sees social reality not as immutable but as
constructed, and the subordinated position of women in society cannot be ex-
plained by essentialist arguments; rather, it is the result of unequal gendered
power relations. Therefore, it is also important to put my research questions
28 Locher and Prügl 2001.
29 Adler 2012, p.133; Wight 1999.
30 In the research, I distinguish between activists (voluntary members of one of AI’s
groups) and officials (people working at the IS or one of the country section’s secre-
tariats as employees).
31 Reinharz 1992, p.248.
32 Scott 1994.
33 Locher and Prügl 2001, p.114.
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into their historical context. Consequently, chapter 2 discusses the develop-
ment of the understanding of human rights in the second half of the 20th
century in detail. In this perspective, “feminism contributes to constructivism
an understanding of power as an integral element of processes of construc-
tion.”34 Even though other categories, such as race, class or sexual orientation,
constitute pertinent structuration for the place and the role of individuals in
a society, the present research considers gender a central social category. Dif-
ferences between men and women are thus primarily seen as socially con-
structed. In this sense, adopting a feminist stance entails using gender as a
central category of analysis and adopting a gender perspective in the analysis
of AI’s work on VAW. Hence, from a feminist point of view, the field of study
is itself fundamentally marked by the category gender. Consequently, as I will
explain in greater detail later, the post-World War II (WWII) understanding
of human rights, which essentially concentrated on civil and political rights,
can be seen as gender biased. This stance explains why the study’s central
question has to do with AI’s decision to make cases of VAW in the private
sphere the central theme of its first global thematic campaign.
Similar to their perception of social or political reality and change,
many constructivists and feminists see knowledge as something socially
constructed.35 Indeed, in these research traditions knowledge is not seen
as something constant and externally observable (unlike the positivistic
view prevalent in quantitative social research). Understanding a social phe-
nomenon is intersubjective and a matter of interpretation. Informed by this
epistemological stance, the present study sees knowledge as grounded in
social contexts.36 The researcher is a subjective and reflexive actor closely
implicated in the production of knowledge.37 As in qualitative research in
general, the interaction between researcher and the research subject is an
integral part of the research process.38 Consequently, as a “real, concrete,
historical individual with interests and desires,”39 I have been closely involved
in the research process.
34 Locher and Prügl 2001, p.113.
35 Adler 2012, p.113.
36 Locher and Prügl 2001, p.121.
37 Calás and Smircich 2009, p.249.
38 Lamnek and Krell 2016, p.34.
39 Calás and Smircich 2009, p.249.
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A feminist constructivist understanding of the world and of the gener-
ation of knowledge entails a methodological approach that accounts for my
reflexive role as a researcher. The specific qualitative research methodology
of Grounded Theory, further detailed in chapter 5, best meets these require-
ments. Furthermore, considering the researcher a part of the research process
entails making my involvement visible. I therefore write the present study in
the first-person voice because bringing the “I” in accounts for the fact that the
researcher brings her own subjective “I” to the production of knowledge, as
Kathy Davis (2013) highlights.40
1.4 Structure of the study
The rest of this book is organized in nine chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the
central question of this study. It starts with a description of the historically
determined gender-biased understanding of human rights that formed in
the post-WWII period. The chapter follows up with an account of the ways
this understanding was contested, specifically focusing on the second wave
of the feminist movement. After long years of transnational mobilizing and
lobbying, the latter finally succeeded in making women’s rights recognized
as human rights by framing VAW in the private sphere as a human rights
issue in 1995. Chapter 2.3 shows how human rights organizations, such as
AI, responded to transnational feminism’s growing critique that mainstream
human rights organizations were largely ignoring human rights violations
witnessed by women. Finally, chapter 2 presents the research questions mo-
tivating this book.
Chapter 3 briefly conceptualizes the notions at the heart of this study.
It defines Human Rights and Women’s Rights as gendered social and his-
torical constructs, rather than something that has emerged naturally and is
unchangeable, once codified. Furthermore, it presents VAW as an issue of
women’s rights rooted in gendered social structures,41 rather than as an in-
dividual and random act. Finally, because the book is interested in AI’s policy
and activities and focuses on the role that activists and officials played in the




I use the expression “violence against women” as an issue area and a social
phenomenon.
Chapter 4 provides a short review of the relevant literature on the nature
and dynamics of transnational norm diffusion. I primarily concentrate on the
first IR scholars who succeeded in anchoring the constructivist approach into
the study of world politics in the early 1990s by showing that norms should
be taken into account if we were to understand global politics. The chapter
then presents the more recent approach to the study of norms in IR, which
emphasized the idea of normative contestation and challenged earlier con-
ceptions of a linear diffusion of norms by showcasing norms that failed to be
internalized or regressed.
The focus of chapter 5 is on data and method(s). It starts with a review of
the origin and the characteristics of grounded theory methods. It goes on to
explain why GroundedTheory techniques are used as the main method of the
study. The chapter then justifies the selection of the Swiss and the German
sections as the two case studies. I describe the process of data collection and
provide a detailed account of the data corpora.The chapter then concentrates
on data analysis using grounded theory techniques and demonstrates how I
arrived at my findings and developed new theoretical insights from the data.
Chapter 6 is the first of three consecutive empirical chapters that, taken
together, constitute the principal part of the study. Since my book requires
accounting for internal structures and power relations, chapter 6 provides in-
sights into AI’s organizational structure and its formal and informal decision-
making processes. It describes AI as a networked organization by first focus-
ing on its international structure before concentrating on the structure of the
Swiss and the German sections. I demonstrate that gender and religion are
two important categories that AI had been built around from its beginnings.
I show that AI has traditionally been a highly gendered organization and that
Christianity was an integral part of AI’s origins.The chapter then provides in-
sights into the decision-making and implementation processes and the power
relations among the IS, the AI’s headquarters, and the national AI sections by
distinguishing between the international and the national levels.
In chapter 7, I explain the beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW in the late
1980s and the 1990s. The chapter starts with a short outline of the evolution
of AI’s work in general before highlighting in detail the changes in AI’s hu-
man rights policy with regards to VAW and providing an in-depth description
of AI’s activities related to violence against women in the 1990. The chapter
demonstrates that AI’s work on VAWmainly focused on violations of women’s
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civil and political rights in the 1990s. I highlight that between the late 1980s
and the end of the 1990s, AI women activists and officials successfully pushed
AI to increase its work on VAW by employing a strategy of intersectional net-
working and analogous framing.The chapter identifies these feminist strategies
as key to understanding the organization’s growing interest in VAW issues
and its decision to make VAW in the private sphere the theme of its first
global long-term thematic campaign in 2001.The chapter also highlights that
large groups within the movement were indifferent or reluctant to intensify-
ing the organization’s work on VAW, despite the important achievements in
the integration of women’s rights into AI’s work.
The focus on the Swiss and the German sections in chapter 7.2 shows the
important role that AI female activists at the sectional level played in initi-
ating the organization’s work on women’s rights in the 1980s and in pushing
the issue further, both within their section and in the wholemovement during
the 1990s. Women in the Swiss section first organized in regional groups and
only formed a national network in their section in 2000. Within the German
section, theMenschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen (MaF) women’s group, which
was composed of women’s rights experts scattered throughout the country,
was already taking a leading role in the section’s activities on women’s rights
during the 1990s. The chapter shows that while the overall objective of the
women’s groups in both sections consisted in increasing the organization’s
work on women’s rights, the Swiss section’s women’s group concentrated its
efforts on their section. Meanwhile, as an active member of the Intersectional
Women’s Network (IWN), the MaF concentrated on actually influencing AI’s
international decision-making process. In contrast to the German section,
where work on VAW largely remained in the hands of MaF activists, the Swiss
section began to professionalize its work on violations of women’s rights in
the late 1990s.
Chapter 8 deals with AI’s work on VAW from the adoption of the mission
in 2001 until the end of the SVAW campaign. In chapter 8.1, I highlight the
elaboration of the AI policy on selected aspects of abortion and show that the orga-
nization used gender equality as a means to enhancing internal governance
and growth. The chapter demonstrates that, in contrast to the previous pe-
riod, it was the AI’s leadership that pushed policy development in the realm
of AI’s work on VAW in the 2000s. Nevertheless, AI did not succeed in making
women’s rights an integral part of its overall work through the SVAW cam-
paign, as it intended. I argue that two reasons are mainly responsible for this
failure: first, because the SVAW campaign was implemented from the top
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down, the women activists and officials who had initiated AI’s work on VAW
in the 1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work on VAW issues.
Second, activists and officials resisted the SVAW campaign and the adoption
of an abortion policy.
Chapter 8.2 describes how the work on VAW trickled down to the Swiss
and the German sections in the 2000s and presents the considerable differ-
ence in the extent to which these two sections succeeded in integrating the
issues of VAW into their work.
In chapter 9, Discussion and outlook, I recapitulate my main findings and
discuss them in light of the existing literature on the integration of women’s
rights into AI’s work. In section 9.1, I briefly recall the study’s general objective
and summarize the main insights. Section 9.2 draws some broader implica-
tions for other human rights NGOs. By relating the empirical findings back
to the literature, section 9.3 discusses the book’s new theoretical insights. It
specifically highlights the study’s contribution to the understanding of the
ways comparatively powerless actors within a transnational network are able
to bring a new norm into existence, and explains the study’s contribution to
our better understanding of the causes of incomplete norm diffusion. Section
9.4 concludes with an outlook focusing on AI’s internal developments in the
realm of women’s rights in the years since the SVAW campaign.

2. Problem and research questions
2.1 A gender-biased understanding of human rights
The public and the private spheres have a history of being defined as highly
gendered spaces. Democratic states reserved citizenship exclusively for men
until the beginning of the 20th century.1 In most countries, women had to
wait until the end of the SecondWorld War to be recognized as equal citizens
of their states (or until 1971 in Switzerland). As Binion highlights, feminist
historians and legal scholars see the dichotomy between the public and the
private spheres as a product of “classical Western liberal thought,”2 which
challenged kings’ divine rights to govern but did not question “patriarchal
family structures.”3 Influential liberal philosophers such as John Locke em-
braced a vision of the role of individuals in society that entailed that gender
roles in the private and the public civic sphere were clearly defined, rendering
women invisible in the public sphere. The liberal ideals of the Enlightenment
reflected a model of “male hegemony over public life,”4 entailed a vision of
women being subordinated to men, and did not consider women beneficia-
ries of these basic rights.5 For example, in his theory of justice, which pro-
foundly influenced traditional liberal ideas of the 18th century, Kant defined
men as active citizens having the rights to freedom of expression, freedom
of action, and legal equality vis-à-vis the state.6 At the same time, Kant only
1 Binion 2006; Romany 1995.
2 Binion 2006, p.76; Chinkin 1999.
3 Binion 2006, p.76.
4 O’Hare 1999, p.367.
5 Callamard 2000.
6 Reilly 2009, p.24.
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regarded women as passive citizens.7This vision entailed women’s “exclusion
from the exercise of public power.”8
The human and civil rights declarations of the end of the 18th century,
including the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citi-
zen and the 1791 United States Bill of Rights, defined a set of universal indi-
vidual and collective rights for all men vis-à-vis the state. These declarations
inspired the 1948 UDHR, which can be considered the foundation of the 20th-
century understanding of human rights. In contrast to its predecessors, this
particular declaration defined human rights broadly, guaranteeing rights and
freedoms without distinction of any kind.9 As Reilly points out, the UDHR
even “pushed the boundaries of traditional liberalism,”10 which prioritized
the public over the private, and condoned women’s “exclusion from the exer-
cise of public power”11 insofar as it recognized the indivisibility of economic,
social, and cultural rights from civil and political rights. Bunch explains that
reading the declaration “from the perspective of women’s lives, many viola-
tions of women’s rights such as rape and battering can readily be interpreted
as forbidden.”12 However, the postWWII human rights discourse (dominated
by the West) reflected the political dynamics of the Cold War and almost ex-
clusively focused on civil and political rights, while marginalizing economic,
social, and cultural rights. As Kelly (2005) highlights, “for much of the twenti-
eth century, human rights discourse has been state centered, reflecting liberal
theories of the social contract, and has focused on how to prevent incursions
of the state against private actors.”13
The establishment of two separate legally binding human rights treaties -
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - shows the international
community’s difficulty in finding a common understanding of human rights
and considering them as indivisible. While the UDHR overcomes the gender
bias inherent to the 18th-century classical Western liberal conception of hu-
man rights by calling for a holistic approach to human rights, the subsequent
7 Reilly 2009, p.24.
8 Reilly 2009, p.24.
9 Bunch 1995.
10 Reilly 2009, p.25.
11 Reilly 2009, p.24.
12 Bunch 1995, p.13.
13 Kelly 2005, p.477.
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interpretation and legally binding codifications rearticulated the public-pri-
vate divide. Whereas at first glance, the priority on civil and political rights
seems to be unproblematic, a careful analysis from a feminist point of view
reveals its inherent gender bias.14 For feminist human rights researchers “this
binary [between the public and the private sphere] is deeply gendered insofar
as it defines human rights priorities according to the criterion of ‘what men
fear will happen to them’ in their relationship with the state, society and other
men.”15Thus, feminist legal scholars considered the traditional human rights
paradigm as gender biased.16 The gender bias becomes especially evident in
cases of VAW, such as rape. Bunch explains that considering women’s rights
uniquely in the civil and political rights paradigm is limited, as “it defines
rape as a human rights abuse only when it occurs in state custody but not on
the streets or in the home.”17
The global political context of the Cold War can be seen as an important
element in the making of the mainstream understanding of human rights
in the second half of the 20th century and explains the focus on the inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, the absence of
women from the highest ranks of the UN and other important international
and regional organizations18 and the fact that human rights organizations
had been dominated and run by men for many years 19 perpetuated and even
enhanced the gender bias of the traditional human rights discourse. Indeed,
feminist scholars show that the gender bias is mainly a consequence of the
non-existent integration of women’s experiences into the practical elabora-
tion of human rights laws, which has focused on human rights violations typ-
ically witnessed by men.20 Alternatively, “the process by which human rights
were conceptualized and defined did not involve significant participation by
women.”21 Charlesworth and Watson argue that the “long-term male domi-
nation”22 of  “the Secretariat of the UN and its specialized agencies, for exam-
ple, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Committee, the Human Rights
14 Reilly 2009; Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993.
15 Reilly 2009, p.32-33.
16 Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993.
17 Bunch 2006, p.65.
18 Ehrenreich Brooks 2002.
19 Hosken 1981.
20 Hausammann 2002; Charlesworth 1994; Watson 1997; Johnstone 2006.
21 Gallagher 1997, p.3.
22 Charlesworth 1995, p.104.
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Committee, and the Committee Against Torture […] means that issues tra-
ditionally of concern to men are seen as general human concerns; ‘women’s
concerns’, by contrast, are regarded as a distinct and limited category.”23 Con-
sequently, by focusing on the state’s responsibility to respect the citizens’ civil
and political rights, the traditional human rights understanding ignored and
condoned the gendered public-private divide and hasmaintained andmasked
the subordination of women characterizing large parts of human societies.24
This gender bias becomes evident in the UN human rights machinery as
well as in the work of important international human rights NGOs. In fact,
the difference in the allocation of resources and the statute of the Commis-
sion of the Status of Women (CSW), established in 1946, compared to that
of the United Nation Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) has reflected
the relegation of women’s rights in the international human rights regime. As
explained by Reilly, “the administration of the CSW was isolated and under-
funded in Vienna, while the rest of the human rights machinery developed in
the key UN cities of Geneva and New York.”25 At the same time, the consid-
eration of violations of women rights as separate concerns vis-à-vis human
rights is reflected in the prevailing parallel existence of two international hu-
man rights regimes: one treating issues on the violations of human rights in
general, the UNCHR, and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women, which monitors the implementation of the Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen (CEDAW).
Furthermore, many international human rights NGOs (most of them were
and still are based in the global North) focused their activities on the respect
of civil and political rights, and they rarely considered women’s rights a pri-
ority. Rather, they treated those rights as special interests.26
Human rights organizations were not the only institutions that priori-
tized the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Organizations such as Hu-
man Rights Watch (HRW) and AI also applied a narrow reading of the broad
language of the Covenant. Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of HRW, em-
phasized the Covenant’s potential ability to combat VAW in the home refer-
ring to Article 6 (1) that declares: “Every human being has the inherent right
to life.This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
23 Charlesworth 1995, p.104; Watson 1997.
24 Chinkin 1999.
25 Reilly 2009, p.28.
26 Bunch 1995, p.12; Quataert 2006.
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of his life,” to Article 7, which posits that “No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,” and to the principle that “Ev-
eryone has the rights to…security of person” codified in Article 9 (1). Despite
these requirements’ potential applicability to the issue of VAW in the private
life, these organizations interpreted them, especially in their early years, as if
they only concerned the victims of politically motivated abuse.27 Thus, Byrne
justifiably concludes that, “[m]any human rights NGOs were simply not in-
terested in exploring the gender dimensions of human rights violations.”28
While its own statute gave AI the mandate “to promote awareness of
and adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
internationally recognized human rights instruments, the values enshrined
in them, and the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and
freedoms,”29 the organization declared that it only opposed a limited number
of civil and political rights, such as the detention of prisoners of conscience,
unfair trials for political prisoners, torture, and the death penalty, as well as
“disappearances” and extra-judicial executions.30 Like other human rights
NGOs founded in the post-WWII period, “activist friends of human rights,
such as Amnesty International, slow to view women as victims of denials of
human rights, have held firm in their view that government must be seen as
the perpetrator of violations in order for their organization to act.”31 Thus,
AI’s mandate was gender biased. It promoted awareness of and adherence
to the UDHR and, in doing so, proclaimed “the equal entitlements of women
and men to the rights contained in it.”32 Nevertheless, it largely ignored
the public-private divide and abuses of human rights that overwhelmingly
victimized women by representing a narrow understanding of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. As I highlight later, AI finally gave its concen-
tration on civil and political rights up in 2001 when it decided to abandon
this mandate and adopt a mission engaging with the respect of all human
rights, as defined in the UDHR. The focus of AI’s mandate was informed
by the global political situation of the post-WWII period. The long-lasting
27 Roth 1994, p.327.
28 Byrnes 1988, p.9.
29 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd Interna-
tional Council, meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995.
30 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd Interna-
tional Council, meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995.
31 Binion 2006, p.78.
32 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2014, p.3.
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male dominance in the organization’s management, however, contributed to
maintaining this narrow working focus, thereby perpetuating the inherent
gender bias in AI’s activities.
The rationale developed above has demonstrated that the mainstream un-
derstanding of human rights that took root after WWII can be considered
gender biased because it focused on the respect of individuals’ civil and polit-
ical rights vis-à-vis the state, thereby prioritizing the public over the private.
I have argued that in addition to the prevailing global political context of the
ColdWar, the absence of women in theUN, in other international and regional
organizations, and in key positions of human rights NGOs has contributed to
a narrow perception of human rights that mainly protects individuals from
state power. The underrepresentation of women in these bodies perpetuated
the gender bias. As a typical Western human rights organization dominated
by men, AI’s working focus, like that of many human rights NGOs, reflected
the inherent gender bias of the traditional understanding of human rights.
This gender-biased perception of human rights dominated the human rights
discourse until the last two decades of the 20th century. As I will illustrate
later, women’s rights activists’ continuous transnational mobilization finally
led to the inclusion of women’s rights into the mainstream discourse on hu-
man rights in the 1990s.
2.2 Contestation of the traditional understanding of human rights
Some feminist historians date the idea of women’s human rights back to the
publication of Le livre de la Cité des Dames (the book of the City of Ladies) by
Christine de Pizan in the early fifteenth century.33 Others view women’s quest
for equal rights as going back to the time of the French Revolution. In her
Declaration of the Rights of Women and the Female Citizen, published in 1791
in response to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the
French playwright and political activist Olympe de Gouge complained about
the existing inequalities betweenwomen andmen and demanded that women
be recognized as citizens equal to men.34 In England, Mary Wollstonecraft
33 Fraser 1999.
34 Olympe de Gouge was shamed and treated as hysterical and irrational. She was guil-
lotined on 3 November 1793 (Callamard 2000).
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similarly demanded women’s equality in her book Vindication of the Rights of
Women, published in 1792.35
The battle for equal rights and non-discrimination continued 150 years
later. In the first half of the 20th century, women of the so-called “first wave” of
the (Western) feminist movement mobilized for equal suffrage. By the end of
WWII, most countries had granted suffrage rights to both men and women.
As a result of the direct pressure of UN women delegates and the NGOs sup-
porting them, the UN established the CSW in 1946 as the principal global
intergovernmental body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender
equality and the empowerment of women.36 In the 1960s/1970s, the “sec-
ond wave” of the feminist movement (in the West) began to organize around
issues, such as equality and gender-based discrimination in academia and
other professions. Western feminist groups called for women’s equal access
to education and women’s self-determination on issues related to birth con-
trol and abortion.37
In contrast, feminists in the “South” deplored imperialism and called un-
derdevelopment out for obstructing women’s advancement.38 The first signs
of change in themainstreamunderstanding of human rights appeared during
the UNwomen’s decade (1975 to 1985), when women’s rights activists launched
a discussion mainly focused on the issues of education, employment, and
health.39 The women’s decade also saw an explosive growth in the number
of women’s organizations until the 1995 Beijing conference.40 As True and
Mintrom point out, “themomentum and organizational buildup to these con-
ferences were the result of efforts by women’s advocates worldwide rather
than solely the agenda setting of the UN.” 41 The female delegates at the UN
and NGOs supported the successful lobbying of the CSW that led to the adop-
tion of CEDAW in 1979.42TheWomen’s Convention contributed to broadening
the traditional concept of human rights as it covered both civil and political
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. It also claimed that “not only
public institutions and practices needed to be changed to ensure women’s
35 Fraser 1999.
36 UNWomen; Fraser 1999; Reilly 2009.
37 Fraser 1999, p.893.
38 Moghadam 2000, p.61.
39 Friedman 1995; Fraser 1999.
40 Fraser 1999, p.896; True and Mintrom 2001; Moghadam 2000.
41 True and Mintrom 2001, p.39.
42 Fraser 1999.
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rights; private or family practices also needed to be addressed, and addressed
by states.”43
Whereas the traditional human rights discourse neglected economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights, these issues were of great concern to the interna-
tional conferences on women in Mexico in 1975, in Copenhagen in 1980, and
in Nairobi in 1985. In fact, education was seen as a priority for development
and for the achievement of women’s equal statute. The final document of the
UNwomen’s conference in Nairobi called education “the basic tool that should
be given to women in order to fulfill their role as full members of society.”44
However, none of the human rights norms codified in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights managed to mobilize
women transnationally. Neither did they have the necessary power to reshape
the traditional understanding of human rights so as to include the violations
of human rights that predominantly concerned women. As Keck and Sikkink
point out, the issues of equality and discrimination were important in fram-
ing the “second wave” of the women’s movement in the North and in the
UN system.45 At the same time, activists in other regions of the world orga-
nized around different issues. In the context of dictatorial regimes in Latin
America, the example of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo showcases women’s
strong opposition to civil and political rights abuses.The struggle of women’s
organizations in the South also prioritized the rights to development, food,
shelter, and work.
In contrast, the issue of VAW and especially domestic violence concern-
ing women regardless of their socio-economic situation united women across
the globe. “The issue transcended race, class and cultures, and united women
worldwide in a common cause”46 and therefore had the power to clearly il-
lustrate “women’s subordinated position as no other issue had.”47 Because of
this, VAW in the private sphere reshaped the mainstream conception of hu-
man rights and lead to the recognition of women’s rights as human rights
in the 1990s. In fact, by framing VAW as a human rights issue, the inter-
national women’s movement managed to put women’s rights on the inter-
43 Brown Thomson 2002, p.105.
44 United Nations 1986, Paragraph 163.
45 Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.168.
46 Fraser 1999, p.903.
47 Fraser 1999, p.902.
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national human rights agenda in the early 1990s.48 Even though they were
absent from the agenda of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vi-
enna when the UN decided to convene the gathering in 1991, women’s rights
“became one of the most discussed topics in the international human rights
community”49 between 1991 and the end of the World Conference on Human
Rights. By framing VAW as a human rights issue, women’s rights organiza-
tions and the Center forWomen’s Global Leadership guaranteed the inclusion
of VAW in the conference agenda.50 Concretely, the Vienna conference can be
seen as the moment of convergence of the human rights movement and the
women’s rights movement. Because of the successful pressuring of women
organized in Transnational Feminist Networks,51 participants there formu-
lated specific demands for a new human rights paradigm that would engage
with women’s rights for the first-time. The Women’s Rights are Human Rights
campaign, launched by women’s organizations as part of the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in 1993, was indicative of the re-thinking of human
rights at the international and the national levels.52
The shift in the human rights paradigm can be observed at a discursive
level in the final document of the Conference - the Vienna Declaration and
Program of Action. A significant text that formally recognized VAW as a hu-
man rights issue, it declared that “[t]he human rights of women and of the
girl-child are an inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of universal hu-
man rights.”53 Furthermore, the declaration claimed “that women’s human
rights should form an integral part of the UN human rights activities.”54 The
networking, pressuring and lobbying of women’s rights activists that culmi-
nated in Vienna encouraged the UN to adopt new international human rights
standards and mechanisms, such as the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence against Women.The latter was adopted by the UN in December 1993
and, for the first, time provided a definition of VAW. Subsequently, all UN
member states agreed to work on eliminating such violence.55 The Declara-
tion indicated the human rights community’s shift towards recognizing the
48 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
49 Reilly 2009, p.73.
50 Joachim 1999, p. 155; O’Hare 1999.
51 Moghadam 2010, p.294.
52 West 1999, p.184.
53 UNHCR 1993, p.4; O’Hare 1999.
54 UNHCR 1993, p.13.
55 Reilly 2009, p.80; Sullivan 1995.
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importance of addressing the link between women’s subordinated positions
in public and private life and the prevalence of VAW.56 Focusing on the is-
sue of violence against women, which is mostly committed by men, feminist
activists demonstrated the role that male violence played in creating and pre-
serving female subordination.57
The women’s rights movement’s pressure to extend the understanding of
human rights to the private sphere finally succeeded at the fourth WCW in
1995. VAWwas the “centerpiece of the platform” there and had become a “com-
mon advocacy position” of both the women’s and the human rights move-
ments.58 Feminist scholars explained that Beijing served to make the new
global women’s rights discourse more concrete and that it embodied the shift
of women’s rights away from the margin to the center.59 With the unprece-
dented number of participants coming from both the North and the South
and the organization of prior preparatorymeetings and parallel regional NGO
forums, the Beijing conference became an environment especially conducive
to the re-conceptualization of women’s rights as human rights.60 According
to Bunch, the Beijing “platform is one that affirms the human rights of women
in all areas - the rights of women to education, to health care, to a life with-
out violence, and to fundamental political participation and to first class cit-
izenship in all countries of the world.”61 In fact, the final document of the
WCW was progressive, as it defined VAW as “any act of gender-based vio-
lence...whether occurring in public or private life.” Furthermore, the docu-
ment considers VAW “violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wher-
ever it occurs.”62 Feminist scholars argue that the success of the Vienna and
the Beijing conferences in the realm of women’s rights is largely attributable
to the continuing pressure of transnationally organized women’s rights orga-
nizations.63
Violence against women, especially forms of it that occurred in the pri-
vate sphere, had been central to the women’s rights movement’s demands
to see women’s rights as human rights. The women’s movement successfully
56 Sullivan 1995, p.132; O’Hare 1999.
57 Goldfarb 2000.
58 Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.166.
59 Brown Thomson 2002; Parisi 2000; Bunch and Fried 1996.
60 Brown Thomson 2002, p.109-110.
61 Bunch 1997, p.7.
62 UNWomen 1995, section 113.
63 Kelly 2005; Coomaraswamy 1997; West 1999.
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used VAW to illustrate that the traditional human rights paradigm did not
protect women’s lives due to its inability to cope with violence in the private
sphere.64 In the process of reconceptualizing human rights around the issue
of VAW, the scope of the state’s responsibility to prevent and punish abuses of
human rights was thus essential. In the traditional human rights discourse,
states were uniquely responsible for acts that had been directly imputable to
them or to their agents but not for abuses of human rights committed by
private individuals. By framing VAW as a human rights issue, the women’s
rights movement thereby broadened the area of states’ accountability for acts
perpetuated by individuals and for states’ failure to prevent and punish vio-
lations of human rights in the private sphere. Thus, “the responsibility of the
state for acts committed by individuals […] is in the center of the integration
of women’s rights”65 into the traditional understanding of human rights. At
the level of the nation state, this transformation signified that governments
had to “transcend the division between what used to be considered public and
private life.”66
In summary, the shift in the traditional human rights paradigm that led to
considering women’s rights human rights, which occurred through the recog-
nition of VAW in the private sphere as a violation of human rights, was a long
process. The issue was absent from the UN’s international political agenda
and ignored by human rights groups as well as by the women’s movement
(in the West) until the mid-1980s. It became a central concern of women’s
rights groups and a subject of the UN’s international political agenda and
of the entire human rights movement in the 1990s. The recognition of VAW
in the private sphere as a human rights violation was mainly accepted due
to continuing international women’s activism and networking at the local,
the national, and the global levels, which put pressure on the UN and na-
tional governments.Women’s rights activists entered the global political space
opened by the UN in order to make their voices heard. They actively partici-
pated in the international UN conferences in the 1990s (World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna 1993, International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo 1994, Fourth World Conference on Women 1995) and
successfully used these places to network and exchange strategies to make
64 Baer 1994; Bunch 1995; Bunch et al. 2000.
65 Benninger-Budel and Lacroix 1999, p.36.
66 Kaplan 2001, p.303.
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their concern visible.67Within a decade, the issue of VAW shifted from being
considered “an exclusively domestic and cultural issue”68 to being recognized
a central human rights issue by the international community.
2.3 Response of human rights NGOs
This shift in the discourse on human rights did not only become manifest at
international conferences and the declarations issued at their end. As actors
of the international human rights regime, human rights NGOs, such as HRW
and AI, absorbed these changes and actively contributed to the rearticulation
of human rights. In fact, many international human rights organizations es-
tablished their first important contacts with the women’s rights movement
at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, were actively involved
in the preparation of the fourth WCW, and participated in the related NGO
Forum. Not only did women’s rights activists strategizing in Transnational
Feminist Networks69 push the UN to recognize VAW in the private sphere
as a human rights violation, they also challenged mainstream human rights
organizations to expand their mandate to include women’s rights issues.70
Ultimately, the shift within the human rights paradigm also affected main-
stream human rights NGOs.These groups, which had long essentially focused
on governments’ abuses of citizens’ human rights, “began to accept the fact
that violations of rights by citizens against each other were equally valid hu-
man rights abrogations.”71 Internal discussions on the integration of women’s
rights into their activities started in the 1980s.72 Later, in the 1990s and the
2000s, these NGOs recognized VAW in the private sphere as a human rights
violation with varying degrees of resistance.73 As Fraser accurately points out,
finally “the private and public spheres began to merge in human rights theory
and practice.”74
67 Friedman 1995, p.19-23; Joachim 1999.
68 Joachim 1999, p.142.
69 Moghadam 2010, p.294.
70 Schmid-Häuer 1998.
71 Fraser 1999, p.903-904.
72 Brown Thomson 2002, p.104; Byrnes 1988.
73 See: Dolgopol 1994;Women in the LawProject 1994; HumanRightsWatch 1992, 1994b;
Lasco 2002; Human Rights Watch 1994a.
74 Fraser 1999, p.904.
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VAW had been largely absent from AI’s working focus until the begin-
ning of the 1990s. The organization published its first report on violations of
women’s rights,Women in the Front Line: Human Rights Violations againstWomen,
in 1991. Even though the publication was significant for its introduction of
VAW in state custody and for emphasizing women human rights defenders
and the risks that they faced, it clearly respected the mandate’s boundary as
it essentially focused on the violations of women’s civil and political rights
committed by state agents. Around the 1995 WCW, AI launched its first ma-
jor international campaign on women’s rights calledHumanRights areWomen’s
Rights.The campaign focused on torture, state violence and abuses committed
during armed conflicts, and disappearances as they affected women. While
AI slowly broadened its working perspective under the mandate - one exam-
ple of this was its work on abuses committed by non-governmental entities
in 199175 - the following statement illustrates that the primacy of civil and
political rights in the organization’s work remained unchanged: “The 1991 for-
mulation did not deny the past evolution.The mandate, before and after 1991,
could be summarized as protecting certain basic rights of people against grave
abuses of political power (whether by governmental or non-governmental en-
tities).”76
Reflecting its restricted mandate, the campaign did not address VAW in
the private sphere. Moreover, it was criticized for reflecting a traditional vi-
sion of gender roles, the relation between the public and private sphere, and
between the state and the family.77 Only nine years later, in 2004, AI seemed
to have completely endorsed VAW in the private sphere as a human rights vi-
olation. In fact, with the first global thematic long-term campaign (the SVAW
campaign) that took place between 2004 and 2010, AI called for action against
human rights violation in the private sphere for the first time in its existence.
In light of the traditional predominance of civil and political rights on
AI’s agenda and the fact that women had largely been absent from AI’s de-
cision-making positions for a long time, it is rather puzzling that AI choose
VAW, and especially VAW in the private sphere, as the theme of its first global
75 The inclusion of non-state actors into AI’s mandate can be seen as a consequence of
the end of the Cold War and the simultaneous increase of domestic conflicts with un-
precedented human rights abuses committed by non-state actors.
76 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Minutes of the fifth meeting of the
standing committee on the mandate (SCM), 16.11.1994, p.3.
77 Bahar 1996.
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thematic campaign. In fact, the opening of AI’s working focus to economic,
social, and cultural rights in 2001 was accompanied by major changes in the
organization’s working methods. From then on, the organization planned to
work for the respect of the UDHR in long-term global thematic campaigns,
and the first of such campaigns wasmeant to introduce this newway of work-
ing.Given the above-mentioned rationale, AI could have chosen another norm
codified in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the
focus of its first global thematic campaign. In fact, as archivematerials reveal,
VAWwas one of several potential topics that AI discussed.The IEC and differ-
ent Standing Committees to the International CouncilMeeting (ICM), AI’s de-
cision-making body, generated a list of issues, such as the death penalty, chil-
dren’s rights, holding economic actors accountable for human rights abuses,
and the protection of refugee rights.78 In addition, the IEC mentioned the
right to medication, indigenous people, land rights, and poverty as possible
campaign topics within the new mission in meetings prior to the 2001 ICM.
Finally, “the IEC decided that VAW should be the topic for the theme cam-
paign”79 and the delegates endorsed the proposition at the 2001 ICM.80
Scholars have identified external and internal factors that help account for
AI’s growing interest in women’s rights issues.81 As previouslymentioned, the
changing global political environment (marked by the end of the Cold War)
changed the nature of human rights violations and made AI rethink its state-
focused mandate. 82 According to Michel (2009), the extension of AI’s man-
date to social, cultural, and economic rights in 2001 and the integration of
non-state actors into its mandate explain why AI gave its gender blindness
up.83The growing international awareness of gender equality stemming from
78 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 25th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 23 All Human Rights for All: An Integrated Approach to Action,Mandate and Organiza-
tion, May 2001, p.26.
79 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin 37,
July 2001, p.13.
80 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin 37,
July 2001, p.13; Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Action Planning Bul-
letin November 2001, November 2001.
81 Michel 2009; Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013; Friedman 1995; Bahar 1996; Watson
1997; Sidhu and Chatterjee 1995.
82 Thakur 1994; Pack 1999.
83 Michel 2009, p.81.
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the UN Decade for Women 1975-1985 and the related WCWs, which culmi-
nated in the fourthWCW inBeijing, did not leave AI unaffected.84 At the same
time, the women’s rights movement also contributed to making AI reexamine
its traditional working focus.85 Thus, the literature commonly acknowledges
that the external political environment and, specifically, the women’s rights
movement influenced AI’s work with respect to women’s rights. As Freitas
highlights, however, the changes in the international environment “do not
fully account for specific policy choices.”86Whereas Kelleher and Bhattachar-
jya (2013) acknowledge the role of the staff, most especially that of the former
SG Pierre Sané, and activists’ lobbying the organization to work more seri-
ously on women’s rights,87 little is known about other factors. First among
them is the role that activists and officials at the IS, within sections, and in
local groups played in this transformation process. Second, we lack a compre-
hensive vision of how VAW in the private sphere became integrated into AI’s
activities and how AI’s policy has changed since the beginning of AI’s interest
in issues of VAW in the late 1980s and until the end of the SVAW campaign.
2.4 Research questions
Because AI’s work had long been characterized by a gender bias prior to the
opening of its mandate to economic, social, and cultural rights, AI could have
chosen another right codified in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights to be the focus of its first long-termglobal thematic campaign.
This poses the following research question:
1. Why did AI decide to focus its first global thematic campaign on the issue of violence
against women and especially on forms of violence in the private sphere?
The rationale developed in chapter 2.3 traces the evolving understanding of
VAW as a human rights violation in theory and practice. While the main-
stream notion of human rights mostly ignored VAW in the private sphere,
84 Bunch 2001.
85 Watson 1997.
86 Freitas 2004, p.133.
87 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
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feminist pressuring led to an expansion of the human rights discourse to en-
compass violations in both the public and the private sphere by themid-1990s.
AI’s approach to VAWmirrored this process, albeit with a delay. As the preced-
ing discussion has demonstrated, the organization started to work on issues
of VAW in the public sphere in the 1990s. The interest in VAW in the private
sphere, which becamemanifest in the SVAW campaign, was thus preceded by
a condemnation of VAW in the public sphere. Because of the connection be-
tween the two human rights approaches, it is pivotal to clarify why and how
AI dealt with the issue of VAW before and after adopting a comprehensive
approach to human rights in 2001. I thus formulate the following research
questions:
2. Why has AI integrated VAW into its activities?
3. How has AI integrated VAW into its activities, how has AI’s human rights policy
changed, and how has this transformation been assimilated and integrated by AI’s
officials and activists?
Aware of the gendered nature of AI’s work and of the role women’s rights ac-
tivists played in the recognition of women’s rights at the international level
in the 1990s, the study is particularly interested in understanding the role
that women activists and officials played within the organization, at the in-
ternational as well as the national levels. Given the long-lasting gender-biased
notion of human rights, the marginalization of women in cases adopted by
AI, and the long-lasting underrepresentation of women in AI’s leadership po-
sitions, I assume that AI’s work on VAW in general, and particularly in the
private sphere, generated some negative reactions among the members and
activists of the organization. It would thus be interesting to examine if this
was the case. If such resistance existed, it remains pivotal to explore who ar-
ticulated it and how they did so. It is therefore key to pose the following sub-
questions:
- What was the role of female activists and officials in the integration process?
- Has there been any resistance from activists and/or from officials and if so, what
kind of resistance?
Given the preceding rationale, AI’s approach to VAWcan be differentiated into
two periods: one starting in the late 1980s, when the organization started to
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discuss the issue of women’s rights at the international level, and ending in
2001, and another lasting from 2002 to 2010, marking the end of the SVAW
campaign. Consequently, 2001 is the central point in time from which my
study looks back and forth.88This differentiation is also reflected in the struc-
ture of the analysis (chapters 7 and 8).
88 In the progress of this research, I became aware of the importance of the 2001 ICM for
AI’s work on VAW. At the beginning of the research project, I formulated three gen-
eral research questions on the issue of AI and women’s rights. These questions guided
the initial stages of the research process and were redefined during the course of the
project. GT research strategy indicates that concurrent data collection and analysis
helps to narrow down the research questions. Thus, over the course of the research
process, based on the concurrent collection and analysis of the data material (written
and oral) by means of theoretical sampling, I modified the original research questions
and formulated sub questions that are more precise. These more detailed research




This chapter defines three important concepts at the heart ofmy study: human
rights, women’s rights, and violence against women.
As chapter 2 has highlighted, the second half of the 20th century wit-
nessed the development of two separate notions of rights: human rights,
which formally includes women and men, but can often be interpreted as
“men’s rights”1 in its concrete applications, and women’s rights, which was
framed separately in its interpretation and application. In fact, the main-
stream notion of human rights reflected women’s subordinate position with
respect to men in most societies, which Bunch explains “as a politically con-
structed reality maintained by patriarchal interests, ideology, and institu-
tions.”2 The parallel development of separate standards for women’s rights
and mechanisms like the CSW, the CEDAW, and the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women3 are the result of women’s subordi-
nation to men.
As demonstrated by previous research, the international women’s rights
movement reshaped the popular understanding of human rights at the end
of the 20th century by illustrating that the traditional human rights paradigm
did not protect women’s lives because of its inability to address violence in the
private sphere. 4 Indeed, as Krook and True (2010) explain, “the meaning of
human rights has been […] challenged to include women’s rights, economic
rights, and access to drinking water and essential medicines,”5 suggesting a
continuing redefinition of the notion of human rights over the course of the
last decades of the 20th century. It is thus worth defining human rights “not
1 O’Hare 1999, p.364.
2 Bunch 1990, p.491.
3 Schmid-Häuer 1998.
4 Baer 1994; Bunch 1995; Bunch et al. 2000.
5 Krook and True 2012, p.110.
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[as] something that somebody gives from on high, […] It is something that
people claim and fight for and struggle for and keep redefining in every era
[…].”6Therefore, human rights and women’s rights cannot be seen as naturally
given or static. Instead, they must be considered gendered social and histor-
ical constructions. AI’s understanding of human rights and women’s rights
changed over the period of the study’s focus (1989 – 2010). Hence, I use the
concepts of human rights and women’s rights as Amnesty International un-
derstood them at the time, which is in turn reflected in the organization’s
policy and activities.
Violence against women remains primarily an issue of women’s rights de-
spite being recognized as a violation of human rights at the beginning of the
1990s, because it “is rooted in gendered social structures rather than individ-
ual and random acts.”7 As the discussion above indicates, the UN Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence against Women provides the first comprehen-
sive internationally agreed-upon definition of VAW.8 It delineates VAW as
“any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, phys-
ical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or private life.”9 The definition further includes the “[p]hysical, sexual
and psychological violence occurring in the family […] within the general com-
munity […] perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.”10 AI’s
policy delimits the organization’s approach and activities concerning VAW.
AI’s policy and activities, in turn, reflect how AI deals with issues of VAW.
The present research is interested in AI’s policy and activities and focuses
on the role of activists and officials in the integration process. Consequently,
the study does not address acts of violence against women. In the present
research, the term ‘violence against women’ therefore refers to AI’s policy that
directly or indirectly concerns the way the organization deals with issues of
VAWand to the activities concerning acts of gender-based violence, as defined
in the UNDeclaration on the Elimination of Violence againstWomen, that the
organization engages in. Because AI’s work on VAW overlapped with internal
efforts and measures seeking to enhance gender equality among staff and
6 Bunch 1997, p.8.
7 UNWomen.
8 Reilly 2009, p.80; Sullivan 1995.
9 UNWomen 1995.
10 UNWomen 1995; UN General Assembly 1993.
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activists (sometimes these efforts were even closely interlinked), the present
study applies a broad reading of “AI’s work on VAW” that encompasses all
policies and activities that directly or indirectly relate to VAW.

4. Focused literature review
This chapter provides a focused review of the literature that my study draws
from and to which it seeks to contribute. I discuss my original theoretical
insights in detail in chapter 9.3.
My study focuses on the integration of issues of violence against women
into Amnesty International’s work; that is, the spread of the norm that recog-
nizes VAW as a human rights violation within a transnational network, both
in the private and the public sphere and regardless of the agent behind this
diffusion. Consequently, the study draws from the work of early and more re-
cent constructivist IR scholars who argued that, in addition tomaterial forces,
norms also matter in international relations. They developed our knowledge
on the diffusion of norms based on this insight.1 The chapter begins with
a brief introduction to the theories of social constructivism in IR (4.1). Sec-
tion 4.2 explains existing theories on the emergence of international norms
and shows that the agency of comparatively powerful norm entrepreneurs is
commonly considered the primary driver of norm emergence. Section 4.3 ad-
dresses what we know about the influence of comparatively weak actors on
norm diffusion. Section 4.4 then provides a short overview of the construc-
tivist IR concepts of norm diffusion and norm dynamics. Finally, section 4.5
builds upon this by explaining my study’s contribution: enhancing our un-
derstanding of how comparatively powerless actors within a transnational
network can cause a new norm to emerge why norms decay.
1 Hoffmann 2010.
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4.1 Social constructivism in International Relations
In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the so-called first wave of constructivist
IR scholarship challenged the dominant neorationalist and neoliberal under-
standings of world politics.2 By highlighting that the international system is
not only steered bymaterial forces but by ideas and beliefs as well, they set out
to demonstrate that norms matter in international relations.3 In doing this,
scholars illustrated the important role non-state actors, such as NGOs and
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs),4 play on the international scene.
Defining norms as “appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity,”5
early constructivist IR scholars developed their own “conceptual tool for op-
erationalizing process of social construction.”6
These early norm scholars distinguished ideas from norms. Whereas
ideas were considered “beliefs held by individuals,” norms were concep-
tualized as “intersubjective beliefs about proper behavior.”7 Consequently,
empirical studies on norms focused on the reason and the ways “beliefs
held by individuals”8 were commonly accepted and gained normative status.
Scholars like Katzenstein (1996), Finnemore (1996), Price (1997), and Risse
et al. (1999) were interested in demonstrating how ideas and norms shape
the interests of international actors and how a norm taken for granted by a
community of states can spread to states outside of the community.9
In contrast to rationalists who are committed to a behavioral logic and
who argue that states adopt norms because it “helps them get what they
want,”10 constructivists think that states adopt a norm mainly because they
2 Hoffmann 2010.
3 Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998.
4 Keck and Sikkink introduced the term ‘Transnational Advocacy Network’ in their
groundbreaking book Activists beyond boarders (1998). These authors explained that
in their networked composition, TANs are similar to other transnational networks,
but they “can be distinguished from other forms of Transnational Networks by [their]
members’ shared principled ideas or values in motivating their formation” (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, p.1).
5 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891.
6 Hoffmann 2010, p.5411.
7 Khagram et al. 2002, p.14.
8 Khagram et al. 2002, p.14.
9 Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996; Price 1997; Risse et al. 1999.
10 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.912.
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perceive “the behavior to be good, desirable, and appropriate.”11This depiction
of the evolution of norms entails a “logic of appropriateness,”12 whereby ac-
tors internalize norms because of their desire to conform to the behavior that
the vast majority of the members of the social system they evolve in consider
appropriate.
Early norm scholars “demonstrated that constructivism consisted of more
than a metatheoretical critique of rational/material approaches and could in-
deed be used to structure rigorous empirical investigations across the spec-
trum of issues in international relations.13The first constructivist IR scholars
succeeded in anchoring the constructivist approach in the study of world pol-
itics. However, they failed to recognize the possibility of a norm regression
and had difficulties explaining normative change because of three factors.
First, they conceived norms as static, meaning that the content of a norm re-
mains the same during the process of diffusion. Second, they mainly treated
norms as independent variables in explaining differing behavior or reaction.
Finally, they defined diffusion as a linear process. In the 2000s, new construc-
tivist scholars argued that norms are dynamic and their meaning experiences
modifications over the course of diffusion.14 As I detail later in this chapter,
this conception allowed them to explain normative change and grasp the pos-
sibility of norm degeneration.
4.2 The role of norm entrepreneurs in the emergence
of international norms
While the first and the second wave of constructivist IR Scholars disagreed
on the nature of norms, both emphasized the role of norm entrepreneurs in
the emergence of a new norm. For both, norm entrepreneurs’ behavior plays
a major part in norm creation. Most studies acknowledged that external fac-
tors, such as major crisis situations, could contribute to the emergence of
new norms or to normative change by offering “windows of opportunities”15
11 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.912.
12 March and Olsen 1989.
13 Hoffmann 2010, p.5412.
14 Sandholtz 2007;Wiener 2007; Hoffmann 2010; Krook and True 2012; Müller andWun-
derlich 2013; Hughes et al. 2015.
15 Wunderlich 2013, p.27.
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for actors’ agency. However, they still stressed the pivotal role of norm en-
trepreneurs as powerful actors behind new norm genesis.
Constructivist IR scholars generally argued that the emergence of a new
norm occurred because norm entrepreneurs succeeded in convincing a criti-
cal mass of actors to embrace the new norm.16 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
define norm entrepreneurs as “agents having strong notions about appropri-
ate or desirable behavior in their community.”17They explain that “new norms
never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested
normative space where they must compete with other norms.”18 Except in
the cases of ideas that are “intrinsically attractive and the social complexity is
low enough such that all the agents can appreciate the attractiveness of the
idea, the idea cannot become a normwithout any entrepreneurial effort.”19 In
contrast to the eradication of murder or cannibalism, which became interna-
tionally accepted as normswithout any entrepreneurial effort, the recognition
of VAW in the private sphere as a violation of human rights had a hard time
finding international acceptance and cannot be considered intrinsically at-
tractive, so as to emerge on its own without any actor’s contribution. Indeed,
as I have previously highlighted, the transnational networking and lobbying
of the women’s rights movement was key in recognizing VAW as a violation
of human rights.
Scholars demonstrated that both individuals and collective actors can ini-
tiate norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identified two cases of individ-
ual norm entrepreneurship: Henry Dunan who introduced the international
norm of the neutrality of medical personnel, persons wounded in war, and
noncombatants; and individual figures in the suffragette movement who led
the international campaign for women’s suffrage.20 Johnstone (2007) demon-
strated that the UN Secretary-Generals are very important in the generation
of new international norms.21 He explained that the Secretary-General can
play the role of a successful norm entrepreneur “when he or she joins emerg-
ing normative trends – usually first promoted by a group of states or pow-
erful non-state actors – rather than trying to generate new norms out of
16 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.895.
17 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.896.
18 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.897.
19 Hoffmann 2003, p.15.
20 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
21 Johnstone 2007.
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whole cloth.”22 Citing the example of the US presidents who, followingWWII,
created the “normative and institutional architecture”23 of the UN, the Bret-
ton Woods Institutions, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Johnstone (2007) explained that leaders of powerful states can also become
norm entrepreneurs.
Other authors concentrated on NGOs and TANs and emphasized how
these collective actors can cause a new norm to emerge. Focusing on en-
vironmental and human rights politics in the 1990s, Keck and Sikkink
(1998) showed that transnational networks of activists could use a so-called
“boomerang pattern” by putting pressure on both states and international or-
ganizations.24 Some authors explained the success of norm entrepreneurship
with entrepreneurs’ use of organizational platforms to promote norms.25 In
these cases, platforms are either constructed for the purpose of promoting
a specific norm (the NGO Red Cross in Henry Dunand’s case) or a specific
NGOs member of a broader TAN uses the latter as a platform to promote
their ideas (such as the TAN on VAW).
Other authors have identified AI, and especially its headquarters, as a
norm entrepreneur. Using a political approach to network theory, Lake and
Wong (2009)26 argued that AI’s international network structure with a power-
ful central node, the International Secretariat, and a large grass-roots move-
ment organized in national sections explained AI’s prominent role in making
individual claims to political and civil rights the dominant norm of the post-
war human rights movement.27 By concentrating on the early days of AI, they
explained that AI’s success “in setting the norms of human rights”28 is a result
of the IS’s (as the central node of the network) ability “to control the content of
the AI human rights agenda and [...] to attract new adherents.”29The authors
further argued that “this staff-based office continues to possess broad author-
ity to set the agenda for the network as a whole.”30 In this approach, the IS
22 Johnstone 2007, p.138.
23 Johnstone 2007, p.126.
24 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
25 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.896.
26 Lake and Wong 2009.
27 Lake and Wong 2009, p.136-141.
28 Lake and Wong 2009, p.149.
29 Lake and Wong 2009, p.149.
30 Lake and Wong 2009, p.138.
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represents the powerful node of the network and acts as a norm entrepreneur
within the AI network.
Many constructivists use the concept of framing developed by social move-
ment theorists, such as Snow et al. (1986)31 and Tarrow (1999),32 in an attempt
to comprehend the successful promotion of norms. Framing refers to “the fact
that the substantive content of particular issues in world politics is not simply
inherent in the issue but is constructed by the participants involved.”33 Keck
and Sikkink (1998) show that an issue’s successful appearance on the interna-
tional agenda depends on how it is framed, or on how the idea is packed and
presented to make it persuasive for a larger public.34 These authors empha-
size the importance of framing when they demonstrate that women’s rights
TANsmade women’s rights part of the definition of human rights in the 1990s
by using frames associated with the prevention of bodily harm. According to
Payne (2001), norm entrepreneurs “frame an issue so that target audiences can
see how well newly proposed ideas coincide with already accepted ideas and
practices.”35 Framing is thus an important approach that norm entrepreneurs
use to transform their ideas into commonly accepted norms.
4.3 Comparatively powerless actors’ strategies
for influencing norm dynamics
Even though they acknowledged that external factors can contribute to the
emergence of new norms by offering windows of opportunities, most first-
and second-wave constructivist norm scholars highlighted the pivotal role
norm entrepreneurs (individual or collective actors) played in the appear-
ance of a new norm. Only few researchers questioned this role. Hertel’s
(2006) study on two transnational advocacy campaigns in the 1990s is the
most prominent example of such cases. The campaigns for child rights
in the Bangladeshi garment industry and for the prevention of gender
discrimination in Mexican border textile manufacturing pointed to two
different ways through which comparatively powerless activists can alter
31 Snow et al. 1986.
32 Tarrow 1999.
33 Clark et al. 1998, p.25.
34 Keck and Sikkink 1998.
35 Payne 2001, p.43.
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the content of a transnational campaign: blocking and backdoor moves.36
Hertel differentiated the senders framing the campaign from the North
from the receivers of the campaign in the South. The US Harkin bill37 called
for the boycott of the Bangladeshi garment export industry because these
manufacturers employed child workers. Local activists were alarmed by the
boycott and the related exclusion of children from the labor market, since the
latter’s participation was essential for the survival of numerous families in
Bangladesh. They started to block the transnational campaign by “organizing
their own press conferences and openly calling for the establishment of a
local ‘movement against the Harkin bill’”38 Thus, local activists at the re-
ceiving end significantly hampered the campaign that harmed their specific
interests by adopting the mechanism of blocking. As a result, the content of
the campaign was significantly altered as “the central normative reference
point of the Child Labor Coalition campaign moved from International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 138 to the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, a standard both Bangladeshi and American activists could embrace.”39
In contrast to blocking, Backdoor-moves can change the content of a
campaign without stopping or altering its substance. Two campaigns against
pregnancy screening on women in Mexico illustrate how local actors at
the receiving end can deploy backdoor moves. One of the campaigns was
launched by Human Rights Watch and focused on women “employed in
the export manufacturing plants along Mexico’s northern border with the
United States.”40 The second was a national-level campaign launched by
feminist groups in Mexico City and concentrated on the situation of women
in different economic sectors. Mexican activists on the US/Mexican border
taking part in the HRW campaign used backdoor-moves to add economic
and social rights issues to the overall campaign frame. In doing so, the local
activists did not challenge the official frame of the campaign; rather, they
brought topics that “resonated with their own priorities” in through the back
doors.41 While border activists framed their local campaign participation by
36 Hertel 2006.
37 The Harkin bill is a Child Labor Deterrence Act first proposed by Senator Harkin to the
United States Congress in 1992, which called for the prohibition of importing products
produced by Child labor. Wikipedia.
38 Hertel 2006, p.40.
39 Hertel 2006, p.50.
40 Hertel 2006, p.55.
41 Hertel 2006, p.83.
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introducing their own human rights issues, the overall HRW campaign “did
keep the focus on civil and political rights issues.”42 Thus, backdoor-moves
did influence the Bangladeshi campaign’s content but did not change it
completely. In contrast, activists using the blocking mechanism significantly
altered the content of the Mexican campaign.
Hertel (2006) thus shows that comparatively powerless actors participat-
ing in a transnational campaign can influence and alter the content of the
campaign,43 thus changing the content of a norm and influencing its dissem-
ination. At the same time, the study demonstrates that comparatively weak
actors might also significantly affect the emergence of a new norm. Similar
to Hertel, my research challenges previous constructivist arguments of the
importance of norm entrepreneurs as the unique actor responsible for giv-
ing ideas a normative status. It also contributes to enhancing our knowledge
about the ways in which comparatively powerless actors within a transna-
tional network are able to cause a new norm to emerge. At the same time,
my findings allow a relativization of the headquarters’ essential role as the
principal norm entrepreneur within AI (as emphasized by Lake and Wong
[2009]).44
4.4 Norm diffusion and norm dynamics
Constructivist IR scholars have not only explained the emergence of an in-
ternational norm, they have also shed light on the process of diffusion. Early
constructivist norm scholars, who perceived norms as static, singled out two
models of norm diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) ‘norm life cycle’
stipulated that norms evolve in a linear, three-stage process of norm emer-
gence, norm cascade and norm internalization.45 Shortly after, building on
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998)46 “boomerang pattern,” Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
42 Hertel 2006, p.85.
43 Hertel 2006.
44 Lake and Wong 2009.
45 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.
46 Keck and Sikkink showed that citizens are able to pressure their governments indi-
rectly by appealing to citizens in other countries through TANs. TANs have commonly
been referred to as networked actors composed of numerous smaller actors sharing
the same values and discourse, exchanging information and services on a regular basis,
and striving to influence political outcomes in principled issues. By documenting the
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(1999) conceptualized norm diffusion as a five-step process and highlighted
the interplay between the national and the transnational/international lev-
els.47 They explained compliance with human rights norms with the action
of TANs that pressured states violating specific norms by using strategies of
naming and shaming.48 Based on a logic of appropriateness, both models
follow a similar mechanisms of international norms diffusion. These mecha-
nisms include coercion, persuasion, learning, and emulation.49 Seeing norms
as static, employing them mainly as independent variables in causal models
of behavior or reaction, and defining diffusion as a linear process have meant
that these two paradigms have neglected the possibility of norm-regression
and have faced difficulties in explaining normative change. More recent con-
structivist scholars have criticized this progress-based explanation of norm
diffusion for ignoring “the interactive aspect of norm dynamics.”50
More recently developed research has argued for a more dynamic concep-
tion of norm diffusion. and the latest approach to the topic emphasizes that
norms’ meanings are modified over the course of diffusion.51 Cases of norms
that failed to be internalized or that have regressed have introduced the idea
of normative contestation and challenged the aforementioned assumption of
linearity. By inquiring when and where norms matter, and searching for the
reasons and the ways through which norms change, these more recent stud-
ies have reconceptualized the relationship between actors and structure.They
have thus placed the interaction between actors and their normative context
in their very hearts.
These latest norm scholars have argued that states do not necessarily
adopt norms because of transnational teaching that follows a logic of appro-
priateness. Instead, they comply with norms because of a dynamic process
of socialization in which different normative systems are opposed to each
other. Acharya (2004) explained that international norms are adapted to
existence and the functioning of transnational networks on violence against women,
these authors have showed the pivotal role of activists in different countries working
together on specific issues for the acceptance of women’s rights as human rights (Keck
and Sikkink 1998).
47 Risse et al. 1999.
48 Risse et al. 1999.
49 Wunderlich 2013.
50 Müller and Wunderlich 2013, p.24-25.
51 Sandholtz 2007;Wiener 2007; Hoffmann 2010; Krook and True 2012; Müller andWun-
derlich 2013; Hughes et al. 2015.
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local contexts by actors who manipulate and modify the content of norms
so as to conform to the local context.52 Similarly, Ba (2006) argued that
norm takers are not passive; they take an active role during the socialization
process and are therefore able to influence norms’ meaning.53 Wiener (2007)
showed that norms and the meaning of norms develop through “interaction
in a context.”54 Interested in the reasons behind “contestation of normative
meanings beyond the state,”55 Wiener (2007) saw norms as social constructs
and argued that, in light of this, norms are also contested by default. Fo-
cusing on the contestation of constitutional norms within a community
of norm adopters, she demonstrated that actors do not adopt a norm as
a result of external influence. Instead, they interpret international norms,
which allows the latter’s transposition into concrete action at the domestic
level. She explained: “It is through this transfer between contexts that the
meaning of norms becomes contested as differently socialized actors, for
example, politicians, civil servants, parliamentarians, or lawyers trained in
different legal traditions seek to interpret them.”56 The social environment
thus influences how actors interpret and implement norms and is pivotal for
comprehending norm contestation and norm diffusion.
Similarly, using a discursive approach to the study of international norm
diffusion, Krook and True (2012) conceptualized norms as processes, rather
than things, noting: “norms do not necessarily remain stable once they have
been constructed.”57 Focusing on two international norms - gender-balanced
decision-making and gender mainstreaming - the authors argued that norms
emerge and spread mainly because of two sources of dynamism. Internal
sources had to do with the continuing discussions about the exact definitions
of the norms among transnational activists and UN gender experts. More ex-
ternal sources come from “changes in broader normative environments.”58
The interaction of these sources of dynamism influence norm dynamics.
Evenmore recently, in their comprehensive study on the transnational dy-
namics of multilateral arms control norms, Müller and Wunderlich (2013) re-
52 Acharya 2004.
53 Ba 2006.
54 Wiener 2007, p.6.
55 Wiener 2007, p.2.
56 Wiener 2007, p.12.
57 Krook and True 2012, p.117.
58 Krook and True 2012, p.123.
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jected the norm scholars’ general belief in progress and criticized that “norm
studies neglected the developments that occur after a norm has been estab-
lished.”59 Also adopting a dynamic approach to the study of transnational
norm diffusion, the authors investigated what happens once a norm has been
established. They argued that contestation is pivotal to understand compli-
ance and non-compliance.60 Even internalized norms may “lose their taken-
for-granted status, or eventually decay.”61 Norm dynamics are characterized
by three phases: establishment, further development, and an eventual norm
degeneration or decay. At each stage, structural and actor-oriented forces in-
fluence norm change. Therefore, like in Wiener’s (2007) account, norm diffu-
sion had better be conceived as a permanent process of negotiation, through-
out which norm entrepreneurs have to continually work to further consolidate
the norms and defend them against norm challengers. This process entails
conflicts that influence how a norm evolves.
Using several case studies of international regimes governing arms con-
trol, Müller and Wunderlich (2013) demonstrated the pivotal role norm en-
trepreneurs play in a norm’s change from its emergence to its regression.
They argued that norm entrepreneurs, such as states, NGOs, and IOs, are
“transmission belts for transforming structural challenges and changes into
political action that results in norm development.”62 Norm change is thus
primarily driven by norm entrepreneurs who can “initiate new norms, con-
firm, maintain, or strengthen a given norm, or alternatively change, amend,
or replace it.”63
By pointing to norms’ dynamic character, this recent approach to the
study of norms has highlighted the interplay of structures and actors in
explaining normative change. According to these second-wave constructivist
norm scholars, the reasons behind incomplete norm diffusion have to do with
a norm’s contestation by differently socialized actors, which occurs when
the norm is transposed to another context, or with the norm entrepreneurs’
incapacity to defend the norm against norm challengers.64While these stud-
ies acknowledge that the context and the norm interpreters’ socialization
59 Wunderlich 2013, p.27.
60 Müller and Wunderlich 2013.
61 Wunderlich 2013, p.28.
62 Müller and Wunderlich 2013, p.351.
63 Wunderlich 2013, p.38.
64 Wiener 2007; Müller and Wunderlich 2013.
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explain norm contestation and, therefore, norm decay, they come short of
accounting for norm interpreters’ power in terms of their access to decision-
making processes. My study departs from this point and demonstrates that
when norm contesters have a relatively good access to decision-making
processes, norm contestation is more effective and the likelihood of norm
diffusion decreases.
4.5 The study’s theoretical contribution
My book offers two main theoretical contributions: first, by concentrating on
the beginning of AI’s interest in violence against women, I show that com-
paratively powerless actors within a transnational network are able to cause
a new norm to emerge. My findings shed light on how this happens by illus-
trating the strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing.65 Second,
by emphasizing the preparation and the implementation of AI’s first global
thematic campaign (the SVAW campaign), I identify three main reasons for
normdecay in the case of a transnational network: norms are contested by dif-
ferently socialized actors; norm entrepreneurs cannot defend the norm from
norm challengers; and the norm contesters’ power in terms of access to the
decision-making processes.
65 I refer to the concept of framing developed by socialmovement theorists such as Snow
et al. (1986) and Tarrow (1999). Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1999.
5. Data and method(s)
The present research borrows techniques of data collection, generation, and
analysis from Grounded Theory. Therefore, this chapter starts by briefly ex-
plaining the origin and characteristics of Grounded Theory (5.1). Section 5.2
justifies my choice to use grounded theory techniques and provides details on
the use of a limited set of grounded theory techniques as proposed by Birks
andMills (section 5.2.1). A detailed report on the used data andmethods and a
meticulous description of the research trail are pivotal for ensuring the trust-
worthiness and the quality of a qualitative research project. Consequently,
sections 5.3 through 5.5 offer a detailed account of the research process and
the applied grounded theory techniques. I start with the case selection (5.3),
follow up with the data corpora (5.4), which details data collection and gen-
eration, before arriving at data analysis (5.5).
5.1 The origin and characteristics of Grounded Theory
The origin of grounded theory dates back to the work of Glaser and Strauss,
who demonstrated the usefulness of “generating new theory from data, as op-
posed to testing existing theory”1 in their groundbreaking 1967 bookThe Dis-
covery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.2 Throughout Glaser
and Strauss’ intellectual accomplishments, which the literature commonly
refers to as the first generation of grounded theorists, scholars conceived of
grounded theory as a single qualitative research method principally aimed at
inductively generating a theory out of existing data. Scholars subsequently
1 Birks and Mills 2011, p.2.
2 Glaser and Strauss 1967.
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developed an initial paradigm, and today one cannot speak about grounded
theory in the singular.
Besides Glaser and Strauss, other authors such as Corbin, Charmaz, and
Clarke contributed to the further refinement of developing an inductively
anchored social research method.3 While the initial inductive paradigm re-
mained unchanged, grounded theory specialists differed in the proposed pro-
cedure of developing a new theory out of the data. Indeed, since the 1960s,
grounded theory has become one of the most popular methods in qualitative
research in social sciences, leading to numerous and sometimes contrast-
ing techniques. Second-generation grounded theorists such as Corbin con-
tributed to filling in the procedural gaps left behind by the texts written by
first-generation grounded theorists such as Glaser.They did so by developing
methodological frameworks. Glaser focused his writings on “what constitutes
a grounded theory itself,”4 while Corbin and Strauss offered a clear set of
techniques describing how to actually proceed when developing a grounded
theory. In their publications, they proposed a coding paradigm with several
concrete steps to best analyze a large amount of data.5
In 2007, Bryant and Charmaz identified the relevant characteristics of a
grounded theory research design.6 In their practical guide, Birks and Mills
consider “the following to constitute a set of essential grounded theory meth-
ods”7 for the production of an integrated grounded theory from empirical
data: initial coding and categorization of data, concurrent data generation or
collection and analysis, writing memos, theoretical sampling, constant com-
parative analysis, theoretical sensitivity, intermediate coding, selecting a core
category, theoretical saturation, and theoretical integration.This process pro-
vides a systematic, inductive approach—from data collection and generation
to data analysis by means of categorization, to the final generation of the-
ory—that explains the phenomenon being studied. Thoroughly applying this
entire set of techniques allows the researcher to study a new or little-known
phenomenon by collecting and generating data and developing a theory from
those data. Over the years, grounded theory methods have increasingly been
used in other research designs. As explained by Birks and Mills, because of
3 Strauss and Corbin 1990; Charmaz 1995; Clarke 2005.
4 Birks and Mills 2011, p.5.
5 Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998.
6 Bryant and Charmaz 2007.
7 Birks and Mills 2011, p.9.
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the value of these techniques in the analytical process, a researcher employs
grounded theory methods “but does not aim to generate theory.”8 Among
these so-called mixed-method studies, concurrent data generation or collec-
tion and analysis, and theoretical sampling are the most widely adopted. 9
5.2 Reasons for the use of grounded theory techniques
In contrast to other qualitative research methods, grounded theory tech-
niques focus on theory development.10 This unique characteristic makes
grounded theory methods appropriate for the present research, as one of
my goals is to enhance theoretical knowledge on the phenomenon of norm
diffusion. Specifically, concurrent data generation (or collection) and analysis
are fundamental to any research using grounded theory methods and is a
distinctive feature of the latter. As little is known about the phenomenon
under investigation (the reasons and the ways AI integrated issues of VAW
into its work), answering the research questions requires the collection of a
large amount of data and analyzing them to make sense of them. Grounded
theory techniques provide the guidelines necessary to proceed with the han-
dling of a large amount of qualitative data. Grounded theory research’s focus
on theory development facilitates a flexible, iterative approach to the study
of phenomena, providing a framework whereby initially broad research
questions are incrementally narrowed down. In contrast to most studies
where “the research question directs how the study proceeds, in grounded
theory, it is the research process that generates the question.”11
I was initially interested in knowing why and how AI integrated women’s
rights into its activities in general. Concurrent data collection and analysis
revealed the significance of VAW in AI’s work on women’s rights and allowed
me to subsequently concretize the research questions. As I show later, while
I initially planned to include three AI sections in order to understand the
national level of the organization, I ended up only analyzing two cases.
As I strive to enhance knowledge about norm diffusion, rather than to
generate a new theory about this particular issue, it is most appropriate to
8 Birks and Mills 2011, p.29.
9 Birks and Mills 2011, p.166.
10 Butler and O’Reilly 2010.
11 Birks and Mills 2011, p.20.
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use a limited set of grounded theory techniques. The study results are based
on the following set of grounded theory methods recommended by Birks and
Mills (2011):12 initial coding and categorization of data, concurrent data generation
and collection and analysis, constant comparative analysis, theoretical sampling, in-
termediate coding, and memo writing. Together, these techniques constitute a
detailed and comprehensive procedure of analyzing a huge amount of differ-
ent types of qualitative data in a systematic manner, and provide new theo-
retical insights. I did not follow the final steps proposed by Birks and Mills
- identifying a core category, advanced coding a theoretical integration, and
generating theory - because I did not intend to develop a new theory.The fol-
lowing paragraphs briefly describe the six grounded theory techniques (based
on Birks and Mills’s selection) used in the present dissertation. While in real-
ity the researcher applies (part of) these techniques simultaneously, I explain
them one by one to facilitate comprehension.
Initial coding and categorization of data is the first step of data analysis and
involves the identification, coding, and categorization of words or sentences
in the data. During this initial analytical step, the corpora are fragmented and
assigned codes and categories that allow a systematic comparison of the data.
The method of concurrent data generation and collection and analysis means
generating and collecting data with an initial purposive sample, which is sub-
sequently coded and categorized before additional data is collected or gener-
ated. Consequently, a category is called saturated when no new codes belong-
ing to the category emerge from the data analysis. At this point, grounded
theorists speak of theoretical saturation. Subsequently, constant comparative
analysis compares new codes and categories to already existing ones, allow-
ing for new insights to emerge from the data.
Theoretical sampling is defined as an iterative process for constant compara-
tive analysis, allowing the researcher to assess the saturation of the previously
developed categories and the need for additional information.13
Whereas grounded theory specialists refer to initial coding as the first step
of data analysis and as a process by which the data are fractured, during inter-
mediate coding the data are reconnected in amore abstractmanner.14 Intermedi-
ate coding is thus the second major step of data analysis after initial coding.The
interplay of these grounded theory methods means that the researcher moves
12 Birks and Mills 2011.
13 Birks and Mills 2011, p.166.
14 Birks and Mills 2011, p.12.
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between initial and intermediate coding throughout the process of concurrent
data generation or collection and analysis, and the constant comparative analysis.15
Lastly, memo writing is an essential analytical process,16 during which
the reflexive researcher records his or her considerations analytical insights,
choices and ideas in relation to a research project.17 This activity trails the
research journey from the very beginning to the end, and it allows the
researcher to record initial thoughts and develop them in a reflexive manner
as the analysis progresses.
5.3 Case selection
Because of AI’s overall structure as a transnational network with an interna-
tional headquarters and representations in numerous countries, scrutinizing
the organization’s interest in women’s rights must occur at both the inter-
national and national levels. I chose the IS and the ICM as representative of
the international level. My case sampling purposefully followed four criteria.
First, the origin of AI as a Western human rights organization founded in
the middle of the Cold War limited the range of potential sections to those
in Western countries. Second, the countries’ official language(s) served as an-
other criterion. I had to select potential cases according to my language skills,
which are limited to German, French, and English. Third, I strove to include
sections that differed in their work on women’s rights. The fourth criterion
concerned the study’s feasibility in terms of accessing archival materials and
contacting potential interviewees.
Based on the first three criteria, I sought to include three European AI
sections in my research: the Swiss, the German, and the Irish or the French
sections. The impossibility of accessing the necessary data at the Irish and
the French sections finally led me to only consider the Swiss and the German
sections. Because it was a Western section, used the languages I am compe-
tent in, and faithfully followed the International Secretariat’s guidelines about
incorporating women’s rights into its regular work, the Swiss section was a
natural choice from the beginning. First, the Swiss section of AI (AICH) is one
15 Birks and Mills 2011, p.11-12.
16 Birks and Mills 2011, p.175.
17 Birks and Mills 2011, p.175.
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of the oldest18 and largest19 AI sections in terms of its members and funding.
Its relatively early foundation meant that the integration of women’s rights
into the organization’s activities could be documented from its very begin-
ning. Second, the necessary data could be collected and generated in German
or French. Third, as a first explorative interview with the former SVAW cam-
paign coordinator revealed, the Swiss section’s attitude towards the integra-
tion of VAW into its activities was comparatively mild. AICH seemed to have
been neither a precursor, nor very reluctant to consider this question.The last
criterion concerns the feasibility of the research project. Due to previous pro-
fessional exchanges with the Swiss section’s SVAW campaign coordinator, I
was certain I could collect and generate sufficient data.
The data generated at the Swiss section allowedme to simultaneously col-
lect the necessary information on how other European sections integrated
VAW into their activities and on the feasibility of data collection and genera-
tion in them. Finally, it helped me to purposefully select the German section
as another case study. In fact, as the fifth largest AI section in terms of its
financial contribution to the IS, only behind the US, the UK, the Netherlands,
and France, the German section is representative of other Western AI sec-
tions.20 It has remained one of the most powerful sections from the time of
its founding. As I mentioned before, applying the technique of concurrent
data collection, generation and analysis allowed me to identify differences in
how the work on women’s rights was organized in the German section com-
pared to the Swiss section. This made the comparison between the German
section and the Swiss section potentially interesting.
18 AICH was founded in Zurich in 1970, nine years after the foundation of Amnesty Inter-
national as a global movement. The first so-called prisoner adoption groups already
existed in the 1960s (Clark 2001).
19 As of 2004, the Swiss section was the sixth largest AI section behind those in the USA,
the UK, the Netherlands, France, and Germany (Hopgood 2006, p.197).
20 Hopgood 2006, p.197.
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5.4 Data corpora
5.4.1 Criteria for data collection and generation
I chose the data at the core of the analysis according to specific criteria relat-
ing to the research topic and the research questions. I strove to triangulate
data andmethods to enhance my study’s validity and cross-check and corrob-
orate my findings.21 I used various types of data: written archival materials
(both physical and stored and accessible electronically), interviews, and sec-
ondary literature.22 I treated published literature on AI as data and not only
as a theoretical framework, as other forms of research do.23 As I describe
in greater detail later, these types of data required different data gathering
methods.
I applied two specific criteria to my data selection, which are both related
to the research topic. First, my research’s emphasis on women’s rights lim-
ited the selection of the data to the period over which AI engaged in work on
women’s rights issues. In the case of written data, documents had to be pub-
lished between the mid-1980s and 2010. Potential interviewees were chosen
according to their engagement with AI during the same time period.
Second, data were selected according to their main content. Since the
study requires accounting for the institutional context in which AI’s work on
issues of VAW evolved, I chose data containing information on the structure
and functioning of AI, as well as data primarily concerning the organization’s
work on women’s rights. The same criteria led me to conduct interviews with
two sorts of people: so-called experts,who hadworked on the issue of women’s
rights at the international or the national level within AI – either officials or
activists or external people with specific knowledge related to the research
subject – and ordinary AI officials and activists, who witnessed the integra-
tion of women’s rights into the organization’s activities because of their long-
term engagement within AI.
21 Lamnek and Krell 2016.
22 Maggs-Rapport 2000.
23 Birks and Mills 2011, p.80.
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In addition to purposive sampling, I used snowball sampling24 to identify
appropriate interviewees.25 With the information collected from interviews
and written archival documents, I identified suitable interviewees and could
determine the number of interviews required to gain adequate information
for my research. Thus, it was the grounded theory methods of concurrent data
collection, generation and analysis, and theoretical sampling that enabled me to
select suitable interviewees. Cross-checking the lists of potential interviewees
provided by interviewed persons and taking into account information found
in the archival material helped me make sure that I had an adequate number
of interviews.
Data collection and generation took place over a period of nearly four
years. While typical for grounded theory research, data analysis started with
an initial sample and was subsequently completed with additional data using
the technique of theoretical sampling. The following section provides details on
the data corpora containing all the data collected and generated over the du-
ration of the study. As mentioned above, the data corpora consisted of three
types of data, which were assembled concurrently: written first-hand archival
materials,26 interviews, and secondary literature. Including data from both
the international and national levels, the corpora consisted of nearly 800
archive documents, 49 interviews, and 20 secondary publications.27
24 Noy 2008.
25 In this situation, I relied on the contact information providedbypreviously interviewed
persons or the assistance of persons external to my research. Most of the potential
interviewees I approached agreed to giveme an interview. Somedid not respond tomy
request and others refused to be interviewed explaining that they did not have time
to participate. However, contacting themwas not useless, as they repeatedly served as
informants.
26 They include personal notes and letters from staff and activists as well as (confiden-
tial) documents, such asmeetingsminutes and letters from AI bodies at the Swiss, the
German, the US, the Canadian, and the Austrian sections.
27 I included the following secondary literature in the data corpora: Scoble and Wise-
berg 1974; Ennals 1982; Steiner 1991; Clark and McCann 1991; Besset 1991; Thakur 1994;
Fried 1994; Baehr 1994; Sidhu and Chatterjee 1995; Bahar 1996;Watson 1997; Pack 1999;
Welch 2001; Mutua 2001; Clark 2001; Buchanan 2002; Hopgood 2006; Michel 2009;
Lake and Wong 2009; Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
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5.4.2 Written archival documents
Thewritten first-hand documents (primary sources) were found in the follow-
ing three archives. First, since important portions of the IS archives housed at
the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam have been closed
to the public, I used the intranet-based AI document library called AIDAN
Search. The latter is an online tool for accessing documents related to the
international level of the organization. It is comprised of AI-indexed docu-
ments, which have been published by the IS since 1961. Second, I used cat-
alogued electronic and physical documents from the Swiss section archives.
Lastly, I used uncatalogued electronic and physical documents from the Ger-
man section archives.
I analyzed about 400 documents focusing on the international level.These
first-hand documents consisted of IEC Information bulletins and IEC policy pa-
pers regarding mandate development; resolutions; reports and decisions of
different ICMs; Integrated Strategic Plans (ISP) (detailed long-term plans of AI
activities for a period of six years); campaign agendas; reports and strategy
papers; meetings agendas and minutes; and consultation papers on mandate
development.
The same types of first-hand archive documents were included for the
two case studies on AI’s national level: meeting minutes, communication pa-
pers, and campaign materials. However, there was a sizable difference in the
amount of data collected on each section. The corpora for the Swiss section
were larger than that for the German section. For the Swiss section, I analyzed
approximately 300 documents. These documents consisted of: 1) minutes of
different meetings;28 2) communication papers, such as letters, emails and
faxes; 3) campaign documents related to planning and evaluation. For the Ger-
man section, I analyzed about 110 first-hand documents.29 These documents
28 Minutes of the Internationale Kommission, the Groupe de travail Gender Action Plan (the
working group Gender Action Plan), the Groupe Action Urgente Femmes Chêne-bourg, the
Groupe Nord-Vaudois, Frauengruppe Bern, the Frauenrechtskommission, the Groupe de Coor-
dination Femmes, the Frauennetzwerk, the Delegiertenversammlung/Jahresversammlung.
29 The analyzed archival material included the documents consulted at the German
secretariat in Berlin, which contained documents about the section’s specific work
on women’s rights from 1993-1995, minutes of the Annual general assemblies 1979-
1993, ai-info 1981-1995. I could not access the minutes of meetings of the AK-
Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen because these documents are not archived at the
secretariat but are distributed among the respective spokespersons.
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consisted of: 1) minutes from annual meetings30; 2) communication papers,
such as letters, emails, faxes and articles from the section’s magazine, ai-in-
tern; 3) campaign documents related to planning and evaluation. For ethical
reasons, archive material such as letters, emails or personal statements from
individual AI members or staff are anonymized by using a cross-referencing
system for pseudonyms.
5.4.3 Interview data
I conducted 49 interviews in three languages (German, French, and English)
between September 2011 and November 2015. The interviews were conducted
face to face (32), by phone (9) or via Skype (7).31 The majority of the inter-
viewees agreed to being identified by name.32 Nevertheless, I decided to
anonymize the interview data for ethical reasons. I removed direct identi-
fiers, such as the interviewees’ names, and replaced them with pseudonyms.
That is why I dispensed with attaching a list that contains the names of my
interviewees.
For the international level component of my analysis, I conducted expert
interviews with four (former) IS officials and two external individuals. The
former IS staff members I interviewedwere specifically chosen among a small
group of officials who had worked on women’s rights issues between 1989 and
2010. Additionally, I retained four interviews originally conducted for a third
case study, as they also provided relevant information for the international
level.
For the Swiss section, I conducted 7 expert interviews and 24 interviews
with ordinary activists or officials. For the German section, I conducted 7 ex-
pert interviews. I was not able to conduct interviews with ordinary officials
and activists from the German section. While all potential interviewees were
identified according to the two criteria mentioned above, I applied two ad-
ditional criteria when looking for potential interviewees among ordinary ac-
tivists at the Swiss section. These criteria were the size and location of the AI
30 Jahresversammlung.
31 Even though I didn’t include the Irish or French sections as case studies, I kept the in-
terviews with officials and activists from these sections in the data corpora because
they contained relevant information. In fact, many of their statements related to AI’s
women’s rights work in general and were not only about their section’s activities.
32 Generally speaking, people from the Swiss section agreed to be identified, whereas
officials at IS or Germany and activists from the German section preferred anonymity.
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group33 to which the activists belonged. I interviewed members of AI groups
in both the German and French parts of Switzerland.34 Furthermore, I se-
lected groups located in cities as well as groups working in the countryside.
Given the size of AI, the number of interviews may appear meager at first
glance. Nevertheless, the number of interviews is sufficient for two reasons.
First, because only few people within AI worked as officials or activists on is-
sues of women’s rights both internationally and within national sections over
the two decades covered in the study, the number of potential expert inter-
viewees able to provide relevant information on why and how AI integrated
VAW into its activities is relatively small, compared to the overall number of
officials and activists. Theoretical sampling allowed me to purposefully se-
lect interviewees, and it ensured that I included those officials and activists
who were involved in AI’s work on women’s rights between 1989 and 2010.
I therefore reached the people having institutional knowledge on the issue.
Second, interview data was only one of three types of data included in the
analysis. As previously explained, I applied data and methods triangulation
to collect a significant amount of first-hand archival material and about a
dozen secondary literature sources that allow to corroborate and cross-check
the findings.35
As I mentioned before, I conducted two forms of interviews: expert inter-
views and interviews with ordinary AI officials and activists. For both inter-
view types, I created questionnaires that combined main questions, follow-up
questions, and probes to structure the conversations.36 Because of the study’s
focus, people had to be asked about things that happened in the past. Since
people tend to forget or only partially remember events that they experienced
years ago, there was an implicit potential for information loss. By resorting
to oral history, a common method in the historical sciences, I tried to account
for this bias.
In oral history, researchers explore people’s experiences of histori-
cal events.37 Accordingly, follow-up questions were formulated so as to
33 A groupmust consist of at least seven activemembers. A group of this size implies that
the group is implementing the campaigns proposed by the national secretariat.
34 Because of the language barrier, groups located in the canton of Tessin were not con-
sidered.
35 Lamnek and Krell 2016.
36 Rubin and Rubin 2005.
37 Ritchie 2003; Ritchie, Donald A. (Ed.) 2011; Kurkowska-Budzan and Zamorski 2009.
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chronologically trace past events and how interviewees experienced them.38
Whereas the order of the questions was similar for both types of interviews,
the questions diverged and were adapted to the interviewees. One was
used in expert interviews at the international level, another one in expert
interviews at the Swiss section, one for the ordinary activists and officials at
the Swiss section, and one in the expert interviews at the German section.
A good interview is determined not only by the questionnaire and the
wording of its questions, but also by the interviewer’s skills. In fact, achieving
openness, confidence, and a small power imbalance between me as an inter-
viewer and the informants is paramount to ensure the validity of the interview
situation and the associated data quality.39 For privacy reasons, I suggested
not mentioning the interviewees’ real names when quoting their statements,
opting instead to use pseudonyms. This procedure enhances openness and
trust during the interview.
As I already briefly mentioned before, it was relatively easy to collect and
generate data for the Swiss case study. Being a member of AICH and hav-
ing previously collaborated with the section’s SVAW campaign coordinator
proved to be helpful in accessing the archive and identifying potential inter-
viewees. In fact, throughout the research project the former SVAW campaign
coordinator was a very important informant. She introduced me to the sec-
tion’s information and documentation officer who later became fundamental
to my research project. In fact, he facilitated the consultation of catalogued
documents at the archive, helped me find documents that were not yet cat-
alogued, and provided me with internal address lists containing details on
staff members and groups. Because I was a member of one of the Bernese AI
groups, I was also given access to normally confidential information, such as
minutes from the meetings of the section’s executive committee.
Accessing the German section archives and finding potential interviewees
in Germany turned out to be a rather difficult endeavour, at least at the onset
of my field work. AI Germany’s former Secretary-General eventually helped
me gather the necessary data for the German case study. He provided me
with names of (former) activists and officials involved in women’s rights ac-
tivities in the German section. Furthermore, showing personal interest in my
research, he invited me to Berlin and arranged a visit to the archive where he
himself was conducting research at the time.
38 Rubin and Rubin 2005, S.162.
39 Steinke 2000.
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5.5 Data analysis
The data corpora consisted of many written first-hand archival materials, 49
interviews, and a small amount of secondary literature. I used the qualitative
data analysis software AtlasTi to organize/code/cross-reference the interview
transcripts.
As the first coding step, initial coding, needs a line-by-line analysis of the
text of interest. Applying this procedure to my first interviews and to a couple
of archival documents on AI’s first activities related to women’s rights resulted
in approximately 100 codes.Concurrent data collection and generation and analysis
required me to constantly compare new codes and categories to pre-existing
ones. Constant comparative analysis was thus part of the process of concurrent
data collection, generation and analysis.
At the same time, theoretical sampling allowed me to assess the saturation
of the previously developed categories and evaluate the need for additional
information.40 I identified the data to be integrated into the data corpora
employing the theoretical sampling technique according to the data’s ability to
contribute to the research topic.41 Additional data were collected and gener-
ated over a period of approximately four years. While my initial codes were
very close to the data, codes became more and more abstract as my research
progressed. Later, through intermediate coding, I reduced the number of codes
bymerging similar codes or redefining them asmore abstract concepts.When
a code was applied frequently, I developed sub-categories based on the con-
tent coded within them.42 I also developed higher-level categories as needed.
At the end of intermediate coding, when no new codes emerged and the col-
lection and generation of data came to an end, I established a coherent and
concise coding system with roughly 200 codes subdivided into 10 overarching
categories, 75 categories and 115 subcategories.
The final analysis and the interpretation of the data are thus based on the
use of initial and intermediate coding by means of concurrent data analysis,
constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling. The structure of the
following three empirical chapters (6, 7, and 8), which provide the findings of
my research, reflects the coding system developed throughout the application
of the aforementioned grounded theory methods.
40 Birks and Mills 2011, p.166.
41 Birks and Mills 2011, p.25.
42 Friese 2011, p.6.

6. AI’s structure, decision-making,
and policy implementation
Because AI’s organizational context is pivotal for the comprehension of AI’s
growing interest in issues of violence against women, this chapter details the
development of AI’s work and highlights some essential organizational char-
acteristics, decision-making processes, and policy implementation practices.
Chapters 7 and 8, which analyze in detail AI’s work on issues related to vi-
olence against women, build on these foundations. Because the focus of my
study concerns the period 1989-2010, chapter 6 concentrates first and fore-
most on AI’s functioning during these years. The present chapter starts with
a brief overview of the development of AI’s work in general (section 6.1). Sec-
tion 6.2 concentrates on three essential organizational characteristics. Sec-
tion 6.3 describes AI’s internal structure at the international level. I describe
the International Secretariat, the International Executive Committee, and the
International Council as the main components of the AI network at the inter-
national level. Section 6.4 details the structure of the Swiss and the German
sections. Finally, section 6.5 offers details on the processes of decision-mak-
ing and implementation at the international and the national levels.
6.1 Brief overview of the development of AI’s work in general
Conceived as an international movement for the release of prisoners of con-
science and mainly composed of volunteers in the 1960s, Amnesty Interna-
tional has, over the course of the following decades, changed tremendously to
become a complex and highly professional international human rights NGO.
Its membership has grown continually, despite some periods of stagnation,
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and many new sections have emerged.1 AI’s overall work was defined by its
mandate limited to civil and political rights and distinguishing between pro-
motional and oppositional work until 2001.2 AI only defended a limited set
of civil and political rights; by promoting all human rights, it emphasized the
indivisibility, the universality, and the equal importance of all human rights.3
During the 1990s, the changing pattern of human rights violations around
the world increasingly challenged this specific focus. During this period, AI
started working on abuses committed by non-governmental entities and de-
cided to hold governments responsible for their inaction in the face of abuses
by non-state actors. In addition to its work against the violation of a limited
number of civil and political rights, AI also enlarged the scope of its promo-
tional work during this decade. It began to oppose not only specific practices
but also “grave violations” against certain sets of rights.4 Consequently, while
keeping its traditional individual case work for the release of prisoners of
conscience, AI increasingly focused on specific groups of people subjected to
mass human rights violations.5
In light of these changes in its mandate, AI also modified its activities.
Starting in the 1980s, AI began to professionalize its lobbying work; the latter
1 For the growth of the movement in terms of number of sections, see appendix 2.
2 AI’s statute defined promotional work as “promoting awareness of and adherence to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally recognized hu-
man rights instruments, the values enshrined in them, and the indivisibility and in-
terdependence of all human rights and freedoms” (Amnesty International: Statute
of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd International Council, meeting in
Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995, p.1). Its promotional work focused on the
following three techniques: “human rights awareness, training and advocating the rat-
ification of international human rights instruments” (Amnesty International, Interna-
tional Secretariat: Inside the mandate, December 1995, p.3). At the same time, since
1991, AI has defined its oppositional work as “campaigning to oppose grave violations
of a limited number of the rights mentioned in the declaration, namely, the detention
of prisoners of conscience, unfair trials for political prisoners, torture and the death
penalty, and ‘disappearances’ and extra-judicial executions” (Amnesty International,
International Secretariat: Inside the mandate, December 1995, p.3).
3 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Inside the mandate, December 1995.
4 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the Standing Committee on
Mandate to the 1995 ICM, 14.07.1995.
5 The thematic campaigns on torture, such as the 1995 campaign Human Rights are
Women’s Rights, were examples of these advocacy activities opposing mass human
rights violations.
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advocated for respect of the United Declaration of Human Rights in the UN
and other international and intergovernmental organizations. The organiza-
tion also started to engage in educational activities seeking to enhance its
members’ and the broader public’s understanding of current human rights
standards. Further, AI began to collaborate with other NGOs in the 1990s -
a practice that had been a taboo for many years. As I explain later, women’s
rights groups were among the first organizations with which AI started to
collaborate.
By abandoning its mandate and adopting the mission including civil and
political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights in 2001, the orga-
nization radically changed its objectives and adapted its working methods
accordingly. From then on, beside its traditional focus on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, AI also engaged in activities promot-
ing the respect of economic, social, and cultural rights. Further, the delegates
agreed to address non-state actors’ responsibility for abuses committed in the
private sphere at the 2001 ICM.The following extract of Irene Khan’s opening
speech to the 2003 ICM illustrates the significance of the 2001 policy changes
for AI:
“Obtaining the release of a prisoner is like a shot of tequila for AI members
an exhilarating experience, directly linking our own compassion with the
fate of the individual. But aswe expand ourwork on discrimination and [eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights], our exhilaration must be with the release
of the prisoners of poverty, of the prisoners of prejudice, of the prisoners of
powerlessness. This is a qualitatively different business!”6
Conscious of the need to adapt its working methods to the important over-
all policy change, the organization did so concurrently. At the 2001 ICM, AI
abandoned the Work on Own Country policy (WOOC policy), which prohib-
ited national sections from undertaking their own research on human rights
violations in their country, giving each section the ability to do research on
and oppose violations of human rights in their own country.7
6 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.12.
7 With this principle, AI aimed to protect its ownmembers frombeing “held responsible
for the passing of information by their government” (Ennals 1982, p.67). At the same
time, this rule reflected one of the main features of AI’s ethical culture – its commit-
ment to international solidarity (Winston 2001, p.31).
–
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The adoption of the mission also entailed a shift from campaigning that
focused on countries and individuals to thematic campaigning. Further, AI
ceased distinguishing between promotional and oppositional work after the
adoption of the mission. As I detail in chapter 8, these fundamental changes
also influenced AI’s work on issues of VAW. However, the central principles
of the organization, such as impartiality of research, financial independence,
independence from governmental influences, nonviolence, and international
solidarity remained unchanged.8
6.2 A gendered human rights NGO
Evidence shows that gender and religion9 are important social categories that
have structured AI from its beginnings. AI had traditionally been a highly
gendered organization, with a majority of female activists and men dominat-
ing the organization’s leadership positions. As the introduction highlights,
the long-lasting male dominance of AI’s leadership helps explain the gender
bias inherent to AI’s traditional work. Like many other Western human rights
NGOs, AI had white male founding fathers.10 In fact, AI basically attracted
two distinct groups of persons in its early years. First, a number of white
British men grouped around the lawyer Peter Benenson,11 founder of AI. Be-
nenson’s peers “constitut[ed] AI’s informal senior advisory groups known as
the ‘Godfathers’.”12 The second was a group of predominantly female volun-
teers who ran the organization and had little prior experience with human
rights issues. Benenson only appointed men to serve as Secretary Generals
and to other leadership positions in the organization’s first years. The early
foreign missions were carried out by men.13
8 Ennals 1982; Winston 2001.
9 Here, I use the term ‘religion’ to refer to the prevailing religious communities in a spe-
cific geographical region.
10 Mutua 2001, p.151-153.
11 The group of like-minded friends was composed of Louis Blom-Cooper, a well-known
attorney; Eric Baker, a Quaker academicwhowas, at the time, working for the secretary
of the National Peace Council in Britain; and David Astor, editor of The Observer (Ennals
1982).
12 Buchanan 2002, p.589.
13 Buchanan 2002, p.590.
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At the same time, women played an important but subsidiary role in AI’s
first years. While men predominated in the organization’s leadership posi-
tions at least until the end of the 1990s, women constituted the majority of
its membership and of lower-level staff within the IS and in many Western
sections.14 Most of the leading positions at the IS were held by men for many
years.15 Internal figures presented by Hopgood show that 63% of the IS staff
in 2002 were women, with a disproportionate number of women in lower po-
sitions.16 The representation of women within sections followed similar pat-
terns. In fact, women constituted the majority of members in most of the
sections in the 1980s: “AI France (but that is also the case for the majority of
the sections) had an important female majority among their ranges. In total,
two of three members are women!”17 Nevertheless, they were a minority of
higher-level staff within the secretariats.18
In addition, AI’s Secretary Generals (SG) had always been male until the
nomination of the first female SG and deputy SG in 2001.19 In fact, the IEC
appointed Irene Khan as SG and Kate Gilmore as deputy SG, which was re-
lated to the decision to launch a first thematic long-term global campaign
on VAW. Even though reliable data on the share of women in AI’s manage-
ment position are lacking, internal information indicates that men’s predom-
inance began to shrink within the headquarters in the 1990s. As the following
graph illustrates, there was a growing number of women at least among the
IS deputy SGs from 1992 to 2001.
Graph 1 sheds light on the share of women in the members of the IEC
and among the Deputy SGs20 at the IS between 1989 and 2011. Because of
the twofold structure of the study, I first focus on the period from 1989 to
14 There exist no comprehensive data on the representation ofwomen andmenwithin AI
as awhole. Thus, the findings are based on secondary literature and archivalmaterials.
15 Besset 1991, p.156.
16 Hopgood 2006, p.149.
17 Besset 1991, p.155: “Amnesty-France (mais il en va de même dans la majorité des sec-
tions) comporte une majorité écrasante de femmes dans ses rangs. Au total, sur trois
adhérents, deux sont des femmes !”.
18 Besset 1991; Frey: Gender Audit bei ai Deutschland - die Ergebnisse, August 2002.
19 The male SGs were: Peter Benenson (1961-1966), Eric Baker (1966-1968), Martin Ennals
(1968-1980), Thomas Hammarberg (1980-1986), Ian Martin (1986-1992), Pierre Sané
(1992-2000).
20 Calculated in comparison to the total number of Deputy Secretary Generals and Fi-
nance Directors fluctuating between two and six.
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Graph 1: Representation of women in the IEC 1989-2011 and among Deputy SGs,
1992-2001
Source IEC members: Minutes of IEC meetings (1992-2003), reports from the Interna-
tional Council Meetings (ICM) (2005, 2007, and 2009), Annual Reports (1989 and 1991).
Source Deputy SGs: minutes of meetings of the IEC (December 1992-March 2001)
2001 and then on the period between 2002 and 2010. Women represented
between 22% and 50% of the members of the ICMs in the 1990s. No general
tendency is apparent for them during this time period. At the same time, the
proportion of women in leading positions at the IS21 increased steadily from
0% in 1992 to 60% in 2001. Given that AI’s work on issues of VAW began in
the late 1980 and increased during the 1990s, the increase in the proportion of
women in IS management positions during this period may have contributed
to the increase in AI’s work on issues of VAW. However, these quantitative
data do not suffice to explain AI’s growing interest in issues of VAW because
of their limited reliability and because such a tendency could only be observed
within the IS but not among the members of the IEC. As I show later, an in-
depth analysis of the transformation process focusing on officials and activists
demonstrates the importance of feminist strategizing.
The proportion female IEC members in the 2000s increased and, for the
first time,women represented an average of 50% of the IECmembers between
21 SG, senior directors, deputy SGs, and Finance Director.
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2003 and 2009. The lack of data makes it impossible to track the share of fe-
male Deputy SGs at the IS after 2001. Aware of the limited reliability of these
data, the generally higher share female IEC members in the 2000s suggests
that AI would have been successful in making issues of VAW part of its overall
work. As I show later, even though the SVAW campaign signified a tremen-
dous step towards a more gender-sensitive human rights work, AI did not
succeed in making women’s rights part of its DNA.
During many years, women were largely absent from the organization’s
management positions at the IS and within sections. In contrast to their sta-
tus in the large Western sections, they have always constituted a minority in
themembership of African andMiddle Eastern sections.22 Evidence indicates
that even though the share of women in AI’s leadership positions increased
during the period under scrutiny, and even though women reached the orga-
nization’s highest positions – SG and Deputy SG, – the masculine working
culture within AI’s headquarters persisted. In fact, a female IS staff member
described the IS culture as a masculine culture of “heroism and self-denial
and nothing touches me, and I will break at nothing. […] I shall be right. I
shall produce. […] And I will never show vulnerability either intellectually or
emotionally.”23 In their assessment of AI’s women’s rights work, Kelleher and
Bhattacharjya point to female IS staff ’s perception of the internal decision-
making processes as “deeply patriarchal in how they run the organization.”24
Referring to the under-representation of women and to AI’s cultural origin in
Western Europe, Hopgood (2006) described “a white and masculine working
culture.”25
TheChristian religious and cultural background of European societies has
shaped AI from themoment of its founding: “Christianity, culturally and spir-
22 According to an AI internal document from 2004 “the most female members are to
be found in Europe and the Americas” whereas only 30% of the members in Africa
are women. Only 10% of the members in the Benin and the Ghana sections were
women, and in the Senegal and the Gambian sections women represented 30% and
36%, respectively, of the membership by the year 2000 (Amnesty International, Inter-
national Secretariat: Women and their role in the Amnesty International movement,
19.02.2004, p.3. Hopgood 2006; Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Fe-
male GenitalMutilation: An evaluation of thework of AI in fourWest African countries,
July 2001).
23 Hopgood 2006, p.148.
24 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.10.
25 Hopgood 2006, p.147.
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itually, was an integral part of Amnesty’s origins.”26 Hopgood (2006) located
the cultural and social background of AI in the “tradition of ecumenical Eu-
ropean Christianity”27 and saw AI’s origin as a response to the decreasing
importance of the churches28 in defining the moral values of modern Europe
in the early 1960s. While AI’s statute did not mention God, and many officials
and activists were neither religious, nor Christian, AI’s initial symbols (such
as the candle), its organizational principles of nonviolence, and the opera-
tional mechanism behind AI’s case work on prisoners of conscience, among
others, made Hopgood define AI as a “secular Free Church.”29
While AI’s members diversified over the years as AI’s work developed,
the organization professionalized, and the movement grew (adding new sec-
tions and structures in the South), evidence indicates that religion and, more
specifically, Christianity have continued to shape parts of the movement. In
fact, this cultural specificity manifests in AI’s daily work at the sectional level,
as the example of AI activist groups cooperating with local parishes in the lat-
ter’s activities shows. As I highlight later, the organization’s closeness to the
church30 is more or less pronounced depending on the section.
6.3 Internal structure - the international level
The IS, the IEC, and the IC are the main components of the AI network at
the international level. The IS, AI’s headquarters and central node of the net-
work, is based in London.31 Led by the Secretary General and a team of Senior
Directors, it is responsible for the daily business of the organization and car-
ries out the majority of the research and campaigning work (concentrated in
the IS’s Research and Campaigning departments). Since the 1990s, research,
campaigning, lobbying, and outreach work have been the core activities of
26 Hopgood 2006, p.18.
27 Hopgood 2006, p.8.
28 Hopgood does not distinguish between different churches.
29 Hopgood 2006.
30 I use the term ‘Church’ to designate the predominant religious communities or Lan-
deskirchen in Switzerland and Germany, which are the catholic and the protestant
churches.
31 At the beginning of the 2010s, AI started a restructuration process throughout which
many regional programs at the headquarters were delocalized to regional hubs on
other continents.
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the several hundred human rights professionals working at the IS. They col-
lect and verify information and facts about human rights violations, develop
reports, and plan and prepare urgent actions and campaigns that sections
subsequently implement.TheWOOC rule, which prohibited national sections
from undertaking their own research on human rights violations in their
country, gave the IS exclusive responsibility over research for many years, un-
til it was abandoned in 2001.
As AI’s executive body, the IEC - composed of nine people, all AI members
from sections, except for one IS representative and a treasurer - is in charge
of the leadership of the AI network worldwide and appoints the Secretary
General.32 According to AI’s statute, the IEC is “responsible for the conduct
of the affairs of AI and for the implementation of the decisions of the Inter-
national Council (IC).”33 Besides its pivotal role in supervising the activities of
the IS, AI’s statute gives the IEC the ability to submit resolutions to the ICM,
AI’s decision-making body where representatives of sections make decisions
concerning AI’s mandate/mission or its statute in the biannual meeting, or-
ganized in a different country section each semester. As I detail below, only
the ICM is allowed to make decisions on AI’s mission or statute.
32 Four so-called standing committees advised the IEC in specific thematic domains, such
as finance, mandate development, or the organization of the movement until 2001.
The four standing committees were: The Standing Committee on the Mandate (SCM),
The Standing Committee on Research and Action (SCRA), The Standing Committee on
Organization and Development (SCOD), and the Standing Committee on Human Re-
sources, Information and FinancialManagement (SCHIFM) (Amnesty International, In-
ternational Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin No. 23, April 1998a). Later,
the so-called Chairs Forum led by the Steering Committee and composed of section
chairs and other delegates was appointed by sections as an intermediate structure of
governance between ICMs. The Chairs Forum contributes to the development of the
ISP, supervises the implementation of AI’s policies and priorities, and meets annu-
ally (Amnesty International: Report and decisions of the 25th International Council of
Amnesty International, 2001, p.141-142). In addition, a so-called Directors Forum com-
posed of senior and other IS managers functioned as a management forum and also
met annually (Amnesty International: Report and decisions of the 25th International
Council of Amnesty International, 2001).
33 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd Interna-
tional Council, meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995, p.2.
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6.4 Internal structure - the national levels
At the national level, AI’s network is composed of country sections or so-
called “structures.”34 Whereas the IS is responsible for the preparation of the
case work and campaigns, sections concentrate on campaign implementa-
tion, fundraising, and membership development.35 According to AI’s statute,
national sections are autonomous in the organization of their work. Most of
the sections are organized as associations with a General Assembly supervis-
ing the section’s activities and electing the board of directors that appoints
the section’s secretary generals.36 Most AI sections are made of one Secre-
tariat37 and of a network of various activists groups.38 AI groups have been
key for the functioning of their respective sections for many years, as they
are largely responsible for fundraising. Through their activities, groups raise
funds and give them to their respective secretariat. The secretariats in turn
always transfer a large amount of resources to the IS according to a defined
ratio. For example, in 2010, the Swiss section gave 30% of its income to the
IS.39
AI’s human rights work has historically been based on the groups’ activ-
ities fighting for the release of prisoners of conscience. Thus, activists have
been key to AI’s human rights work. Until the beginnings of the 1990s, groups
were each assigned three verified prisoner of conscience cases: one from the
West, one from a communist state, and one from the South. Although the
adoption of prisoners has no longer been bound to a state’s political posi-
tion since the end of the Cold War, case work has continued to be key for
the engagement of many activists. Evidence shows that case work on a par-
ticular prisoner has often entailed that activists develop a personal relation
34 In contrast to sections, structures are smaller and are therefore often not economically
auto-sufficient and do not financially contribute to the IS. But their work depends on
the IS’s and other wealthier sections’ support. In contrast to AI’s representations in the
Northern hemisphere, most of AI’s branches in the South are so-called structures.
35 Sections had been essential to fundraising as voluntary donations by sectionmembers
(groups or individuals) have constituted the organization’s main income.
36 Typically, the members of the board of directors are long-term AI activists exercising
their functions on an honorary basis. In contrast, people working at AI’s national sec-
retariats are awarded a salary.
37 Some larger sections, such as the German section, have additional regional offices.
38 Such as local groups, thematic groups, country groups, youth groups, etc.
39 Jegher 2011, p.30.
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to their prisoner of conscience. The fact that activists feel like working “for
somebody, for an individual”40 has motivated their engagement at AI. As I
highlight later, many long-term activists have complained of losing this per-
sonal relation with the opening of the organization’s working spectrum to
economic, social, and cultural rights in the 2000s.
6.4.1 The Swiss section
This section begins with a short overview of the Swiss section’s development
from its origins in the 1960s to 2010, before it illustrates the section’s struc-
ture and its functioning. I then briefly highlight the gendered composition of
the section’s membership and staff and the section’s closeness to the church,
and identify the section’s distinctive particularities: its constructive culture of
interactive debate and its general openness to policy changes.
As I have briefly mentioned before, the Swiss AI section is one of the old-
est and largest AI sections member- and funding-wise. In Switzerland, the
first AI groups had already formed by the 1960s, with ten local groups finally
establishing the Swiss section in Zurich on 15 October 1970, nine years after
AI’s foundation as a global movement.41 Group-wise, the section grew until
1993 when it comprised 93 groups.42 That number decreased to about 80 in
2011. In the same period, the Secretariat developed a professional structure:
one employee started working there part-time in 197643 and personnel had
increased to 47 employees and 11 trainees by 2010.44
Since its formation, the section has been organized as an association with
an Executive Committee (EC),45 an Annual Delegates Assembly (the section’s
decision-making body),46 a Secretariat headed by a Secretary General and a
40 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.V., 07.06.2013: “Pour quelqu’un, pour une personne.”.
41 Chevalier:Mémo chronologique de la création de la section suisse 1964-1975, 26.04.2001.
42 See Appendix 2 for details.
43 From 1970 to1976, a single volunteer was in charge of the work.
44 Amnesty International: Stellenentwicklung im Sekretariat, 2010.
45 In 1978, the ECwas reorganized anddivided into twobodies: the EC and aManagement
board composed of senior-level staff from the Swiss secretariat.
46 At the 2007 General Assembly, the delegates voted on a new concept of membership
introducing the principle of “one person / one vote” (Motion 3a) and transforming the
Delegates Assembly into a General Assembly (Amnesty International: Delegiertenver-
sammlung 2007, 06.05.2007).
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Management Board.47 The Secretariat’s responsibilities first included cam-
paigning, human rights education, and lobbying, and later also incorporated
fundraising.48 The secretariat prepared and coordinated the campaigns and
actions coming from the IS. The groups implemented the campaigns on the
ground.49
In the early years, AI activists mainly organized in local groups. Later, ac-
tivists formed topic-, profession-, and country-specific groups called Berufs-
und Zielgruppen.50 An interviewee’s testimony provides an insightful picture
of the qualitative transformation of the groups over the years: “before there
were completely generalist groups with young, elderly, men and women […]
with different professional backgrounds. It was a real representation of soci-
ety. And later it becamemore fragmented.We started to found groups only for
the young and the same thing for women.”51 Another informant highlighted
the importance the personal identification with the victims of human rights
violations held for the groups’ diversification and for the activists’ engage-
ment: “Previously, the idea behind these professional groups was that they
would primarily engage in single cases of victims of human rights violations
in their domain, meaning students for students, lawyers for lawyers.”52
47 The supervision and control of the sectionwere incumbent upon the EC elected for two
years by the Annual Assembly and composed of a minimum of five and a maximum
of nine members (mostly seven) from 1994 to 2000. Following a reorganization, the
number of EC members was reduced to five or six by 2000 (Ganzfried: Conversation
with C.D., 12.08.2011; Ganzfried: Interview with A.U., 10.10.2012).
48 Until the beginning of the 2000s, a group had to collect at least 3000 CHF per year
for the Swiss Secretariat. Later, the fundraising was professionalized and carried out
by the Secretariat.
49 The groups’ main work methods consisted in urgent action letter writing, signature
collections, stand actions, photo or art exhibitions, and concerts. Groups often orga-
nized their activities in collaboration with other organizations or institutions on occa-
sion of, for example, the International Refugee Day, the International Human Rights
Day, or the International Women’s Day.
50 Such as women’s groups or the group of lawyers, youth groups, university groups, and,
later, groups like “Queeramnesty” or the “Groupe LGBT”.
51 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.I., 07.06.2013: “Avant c’était les groupes complètement général-
istes avec des jeunes, des vieux, des hommes, des femmes. […] toutes sortes de professions dif-
férentes. C’était vraiment une représentation de la société. Et on a morcelé. On a commencé à
faire des groupes uniquement jeunes. […] Et la même chose avec les femmes.”
52 Ganzfried: InterviewmitB.F., 04.04.2012: “Die Idee ist früher gewesen,dass die sich vorAllem
für einzelne Fälle einsetzen sollen, für Opfer von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die in ihrem
Gebiet sind, also Studenten für Studenten, Juristen für Juristen.”
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Evidence shows that the growth of the secretariat was accompanied by a
professionalization of the section’s work and the groups’ decreasing impor-
tance in the section’s work on human rights in the 2000s. An interviewee
explained the effects of the growing professionalization of the section’s work:
“the secretariat had been serving the groups. They [the secretariat] provided
[the groups] the necessary material, they gave the petitions [to the groups],
I think, for a long time, [the groups] had been giving impulse to the work.”53
In contrast, referring to the actual situation, the same interviewee explains
that “today, I sometimes have the impression that the groups serve the secre-
tariat.”54
Similar tomost other sections,women formed amajority of the Swiss Sec-
tion’s members and lower-level staff. However, as graph 2 highlights, women
also occupied a majority of the section’s management positions from 1992 un-
til 1998.They became aminority ofmanagement staff in the following years. In
the same period, the representation of women in the EC increased from 30%
to 67% between 1990 and 2008, despite some setbacks and boosts (Graph 2).
Evidence suggests that the section or at least some of its members were
close to the Church.55 As I show later, this closeness is less pronounced in
the Swiss section than in the German section. In fact, out of the 24 inter-
viewed activists, all women over 60 referred to their proximity to the Church.
One woman reported that she found something similar to the Church at AI,
explaining that “I always declared: human rights are my religion.”56 Others
mentioned their personal affiliation to the local parish or described outreach
activities that their group had co-organized with the local parish.57
53 Ganzfried: Interviewwith A.L., 06.06.2013: “Le Secrétariat, qui pourmoi pendant des années
étaient un peu au service des groupes, c’est eux qui nous fournissaient le matériel, c'est eux
qui nous donnaient les pétitions, […] je trouvais pendant très longtemps que c’était nous qui
donnions un peu l'impulse aux choses, à la pratique.”
54 Ganzfried: Interview with A.L., 06.06.2013: “Maintenant […] j'ai des fois l'impression que les
groupes sont au service du Secrétariat.”
55 The interview material does not allow me to determine which church (catholic or
protestant) the activists were linked to in each case. Therefore, by the expression ‘close
to the church,’ I mean the catholic or the protestant church.
56 Ganzfried: Interview with A.E., 14.06.2013: “J’ai essayé de retrouver parce que je suis dans la
paroisse aussi, […] moi je dis toujours ma religion c’est les droits de l’homme.”
57 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.G., 05.06.2013; Ganzfried: Interview by phone with
B.V., 07.06.2013 Ganzfried: Interview with A.D., 06.06.2013; Ganzfried: Interview with
A.L., 06.06.2013; Ganzfried: Interview with A.N., 03.06.2013; Ganzfried: Interview with
A.S., 15.05.2013
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Graph 2: Representation of women in the Swiss section’s management positions and
Executive Committee, 1990-2008
 
Source: My own, based on an internal list provided by the document specialist of the
Swiss section’s Secretariat in 2011.
Evidence indicates that the Swiss section was rather open to mandate
changes. Comparing the Swiss section to its German counterpart, an inter-
viewee described the Swiss section as “much more flexible. It is just so lovely
and open and always considering everything coming from the IS marvelous.
[…] It has somehow been such a lovely section.”58 Further, evidence shows
that a culture of constructive discussion among the membership was another
particularity of the Swiss section. In fact, according to a long-term official,
attendants to the Swiss Annual Assembly from other sections often expressed
their astonishment with the section members’ unanimous approval of bud-
gets or reports of the EC.59
58 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Die Schweizer Sektion, die war ja viel
geschmeidiger. Die ist einfach so lieb und offen und findet immer alles toll was vom IS kommt.
[…] Das war irgendwie so eine süsse Sektion.”
59 Ganzfried: Interview with A.A., 31.05.2013: “Ils sont tous complètement surpris de voir que
quand on vote le budget ou le rapport du Comité il n'y a quasiment aucune question qui est
posée et puis le budget il passe avec...cette année il a été voté à l’unanimité moins une voix.”
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6.4.2 The German section
This section begins by briefly presenting the German section’s development
since its foundation in parallel with the evolution of the international move-
ment, from the 1960s until 2010. It then expounds on the structure and func-
tioning of the section before explaining the division of labor between the Sec-
retariat and the groups and its evolution over time. Later, I highlight the gen-
dered composition of the section’s membership and staff, and I demonstrate
that in general the German section’s membership can be considered rather
church60 oriented. Finally, I stress the German section’s nature of a powerful,
autonomous, immovable, and sometimes obstinate associate of the AI net-
work.
The German section grew rapidly from its very beginnings and became
the biggest AI section in the 1970s. It has been contributing half of the IS
budget for many years and continues to be one of the most powerful sections
today. The German AI section formed two months after the foundation of
AI’s international movement in 1961 and became the first section outside the
UK.61 The section registered an enormous growth in terms of the number of
its groups, which multiplied from 7 in 1963 to 500 in 1974 and 650 in 1982.
Between the 1980s and the end of the 2000s, the number of groups remained
the same at 650.62 A first secretariat was inaugurated in 1963/1964 in Bonn.
The German section’s secretariat grew from about 6 people in 1974 to 65 staff
members, called Hauptamtliche (officials), in 2012.63 AI Germany’s secretariat
had one office in Bonn and another one in Berlin for several years before they
centralized in Berlin in the early 2010s.64
The German section is organized as an association with an EC, a General
Assembly (GA) serving as the section’s decision-making body, a Secretariat
60 Again, I refer to the catholic or the protestant church, as the data do not allow me to
distinguish between these religious communities.
61 Whereas the AI section of the Federal Republic of Germany formed as early as 1961, a
new section in Eastern Germany was only founded in 1990. Both associations united in
1992.
62 See appendix 2 for details.
63 In full-time positions. The Secretariat counted 28 officials in 1990 and 43 in 1999
(Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
64 Other smaller regional offices existed; for example, one of them was in Munich.
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headed by a Secretary General, and an Executive Secretary.65 The Secretariat
is responsible for the coordination of the section’s daily business and for the
implementation of the GA’s decisions under the direction of the Secretary
General.The supervision and control of the section’s management are incum-
bent upon the EC, which was elected for two years and was comprised of 6
to 7 members between 1990 and 2010.66
Activists in the German section are organized in local, country or the-
matic groups. The so-called Länder-Kogruppen or Fachgruppen (approximately
60 Kogruppen existed in the 1990s) are composed of activists with a specific
thematic or country expertise, assisting the work of local groups and serving
as experts for the section’s thematic work.67 In light of their increasing num-
ber, local groups organized in so-called Bezirke, which “are associations of AI
members and groups in one region.”68 The Bezirke have their own assemblies
called Bezirksversammlungen where group members decide upon their com-
mon tasks and where they elect the Bezirk spokesperson (BezirkssprecherIn) and
other thematic consultant (FachreferentInnen).69
The regional subdivision of the groups and the importance of the Fach-
gruppen for the section’s topical work distinguish the German section from the
Swiss section and from many other sections. As I highlight later, this speci-
ficity entails a particularly powerful membership. Given Fachgruppen’s impor-
tance for the section’s thematic and country-specific work, the Secretariat has
mainly concentrated on campaigning, communication, and country-specific
work over the course of many years. As an interviewee explained, the section’s
work was mainly country specific, and asylum was the only thematic human-
rights issue the secretariat worked on until the end of the 1990s. The section
started to integrate a broader range of topics into its thematic work only at
the beginning of the 2000s. Despite its gradual professionalization, evidence
65 The position of the Secretary General was created by the Executive Committee for the
purpose of giving the section’s human rights interventions an appearance of greater
importance in politics and among the public in the 1970s (Ganzfried: Interview by phone
with B.U., 13.02.2015).
66 Deile et al. 2015.
67 As experts, these groups often were the first contact for media requests in their do-
main of expertise. They kept lobbying appointments independently from the secre-
tariat (Ganzfried: Interview with A.C., 14.04.2015).
68 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: “Bezirke sind der Zusam-
menschluss von Mitgliedern und Gruppen eines Gebiets.”.
69 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
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indicates that the Fachgruppen and the Länder-Kogruppen continued to play a
pivotal role in the section’s work.
As inmany other sections,women have represented amajority of all mem-
bers and have been underrepresented in the EC and in the high-level posi-
tions at the German section’s secretariat. Data from an internal gender audit
show that in 2002, 40% of the members of 169 groups were men and 60%
women. In the same year, women and men were equally represented in the
BezirkssprecherInnen.70 At the same time, as graph 3 illustrates, the proportion
of women among the EC lay between 0 and about 30%, except for a short pe-
riod of approximate parity between 2001 and 2003.The gender audit indicates
that with 56-44 men-to-women ratio, women were also a minority in the sec-
tion’s management board in the beginning of the 2000s.71 Female secretary
generals headed the section from 1986 to 1990 and from 1999 to 2009.72
 Graph 3: Representation of women in the Executive Committee of the German section,
1990-2010
Source: Chronik der Deutschen Sektion von Amnesty International, Deile et al. 2015.
Evidence indicates that members’ closeness to the Church was more pro-
nounced in the German section than in the Swiss section. An informant called
70 Frey: Gender Audit bei ai Deutschland - die Ergebnisse, August 2002, p.17.
71 Frey: Gender Audit bei ai Deutschland - die Ergebnisse, August 2002.
72 Brigitte Erler, 1990-1999: Volkmar Deile; 1999-2009: Barbara Lochbihler.
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my attention to the religious tendencies among the membership, saying: “You
are surely aware that many German AI members are Church oriented.”73 An-
other interviewee further explained: “The membership is rather conservative.
Conservative because AI Germany had always been closely connected to the
Churches here in Germany.”74The importance of the Christian faith for many
of the German section’s members becomes evident in an extract of an in-
ternal document that indicates that many members of the German section
believe that human beings’ life starts at the moment of conception and not
at birth.75 The connection to the Church also becomes evident in the groups’
activities. In fact, the document retracing the section’s history and the in-
ternal AI journal mention group activities organized with Christian institu-
tions, such as sermons or AI’s participation in the Evangelischer Kirchentag.76
Further, in contrast to the Swiss section, a transregional group called Kirchen
Arbeitskreis, whose aim has been to convince more and more Christians and
members of other religious communities to stand for the respect of human
rights globally through the organization of church services on AI’s matters of
concern, has existed since 1980.77
The German section had always been a rather uncomfortable member of
the AI network. Together with an early formation and a dominant grassroots
membership, the interviews present the section as a powerful, autonomous,
immovable, and sometimes obstinate associate of the AI network.An intervie-
wee explained that “the German section had always been different from other
sections.”78 As another informant accurately explains, because of its relatively
early creation, the German section had to develop on its own, without having
a model on how to deal with the growing number of members, or on how to
73 Ganzfried: Interview by phonewith A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Sie wissen ja auch, dass viele Amnesty-
Mitglieder kirchenorientiert sind.”
74 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “Die Mitgliedschaft ist eine eher konservative
Mitgliedschaft, konservativ weil Amnesty Deutschland ist immer sehr stark mit den Kirchen
hier in Deutschland verbunden, […].”
75 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.12.
76 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai-intern, November
2006; Deile et al. 2015.
77 Deile et al. 2015; Kirchen Arbeitskreis (AK) München und Oberbayern.
78 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “Die deutsche Sektion ist zu anderen komplett
unterschiedlich.”.
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organize its work.79 The resulting specific group structure, which I have al-
ready described, made the German section immobile and, at the same time,
lead to “a very solid basis.”80 According to the same interviewee, this particu-
larity has influenced the section throughout the years, shaping a self-feeding
structure, which can only be influenced from the outside with difficulty.81
Related to this, AI Germany has, for many years, used a logo that is differ-
ent from the one used internationally.82These specific characteristics are also
reflected in the section’s position on the development of AI’s mandate and in
the implementation of activities coming from the IS. Evidence indicates that
the German section has often been reluctant to open the mandate.83 An in-
terviewee stated: “The German section is that balky. At each mandate modi-
fication, they thought ‘The mandate is already this huge, we cannot possibly
change it anymore.’”84 At the same time, as another interviewee highlights,
the section has also sometimes been at the vanguard, proposing things to
the IS which the latter did not want.85 For instance, the German section was
the first AI section where members started to work on the right to food in
1982, almost two decades before the movement decided to abandon the man-
date. In contrast to others, the German section also ignored the WOOC rule
by working on prisoners’ cases in Germany,86 and engaged for the release of
any imprisoned asylum seeker, regardless of his or her political convictions.87
79 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.U., 13.02.2015.
80 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.U., 13.02.2015: “Die deutsche Sektion ist durch die
Gruppenstruktur in gewisser Hinsicht unbeweglich gewesen, aber sie hat ein sehr solides Fun-
dament gehabt.”.
81 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.U., 13.02.2015: “Meine Erklärung ist bis heute, dass
daraus eine Struktur gewachsen ist, die selbst tragend war, und auf die es schwieriger ist von
aussen Einfluss zu nehmen”.
82 Ganzfried: Interview with A.C., 14.04.2015.
83 Ganzfried: Interview with A.N., 03.06.2013; Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Q.,
27.02.2015; Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012.
84 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Die [Die Deutsche Sektion] ist so
bockig. Die fand immer bei jeder Mandatsänderung: […] das [Mandat] ist doch so gross schon,
wir können das unmöglich noch ändern.”.
85 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.U., 13.02.2015: “Also die deutsche Sektion ist auch
manchmal vorwärts stürmend gewesen und wollte was von der Internationalen Organisation
was diese nicht wollte.”.
86 Deile et al. 2015.
87 Deile et al. 2015.
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Consequently, the relationship between the German section and the IS has
been rather conflicting.
In fact, several debates about the groups’ autonomy vis-à-vis the interna-
tional organization’s centralism occurred between 1981 and 1986.88 In one of
the ECmeetings in 1985, the minutes keeper stated: “The German section per-
ceives the IS as a very distant instance.”89 Further, an interviewee reported
that in the German section, “London” was a term filled with fear.90 In light of
the section’s sometimes critical and antagonistic positions vis-à-vis the inter-
national movement, it is not astonishing that activists describe their Annual
Assembly like this: “discussions are very tough, it is not at all some ‘cuddle’-
Amnesty.”91The same interviewee reported guests from other sections’ aston-
ishment upon visiting the AI Germany’s GA and being confronted with this
manner of discussion and debate.92
Summing up, while the Swiss section and the German section are both
among themost important AI sectionsmembers- and funding-wise, evidence
points to some central differences between these two sections in several do-
mains, other than size. First among them is the power structure between the
secretariat (professional structure) and the groups (activists). In the German
section, the groups play a pivotal role in the section’s work, whereas in the
Swiss section, the professional structure seems to be more important, as the-
matic work is mainly centralized in the Secretariat. In fact, whereas both
sections were marked by a tendency to professionalize over the period un-
der scrutiny, in the German section, thematic work remained in the hands of
the Länder-Kogruppen or Fachgruppen. Further, as I show in section 6.5.2, the
German section’s membership has a particularly powerful position within the
section due to its ability to participate in decision-making at both the national
and the local levels.
Second is the share of women in the EC. In fact, in general terms, the
proportion of female EC members was more important in the Swiss than in
the German section during both periods. Third, whereas evidence shows a
88 Deile et al. 2015.
89 Deile et al. 2015: “Das internationale Sekretariat wird aus der Sicht der Sektion als eine sehr
entfernte Instanz wahrgenommen.”.
90 Deile et al. 2015: “Reinhard Marx schreibt zum gleichen Thema: ‘London’ ist ein angstbe-
setzter Begriff innerhalb der deutschen Sektion.”.
91 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015: “Da wird sehr hart diskutieren, das ist
gar nicht so Kuschel-Amnesty.”.
92 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015.
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certain closeness to the Church in both sections, this proximity seems to be
more pronounced in the German section. Fourth is the relationship between
the section and the headquarters. The Swiss section seems to have been open
to mandate changes and can be described as a rather assimilated member of
the overall AI network. In contrast, AI Germany has been rather critical of
mandate changes and can be characterized as a powerful, autonomous, im-
movable, and sometimes obstinate associate of the AI network. As I explain
later, these differences help us understand how both sections integrated is-
sues of VAW into their work from the start. They also help explain the differ-
ence in the extents to which the Swiss and the German sections managed to
integrate the issue of VAW into their work in the 2000s.
6.5 Decision-making and implementation
As an organization build on democratic principles, the process of policy-mak-
ing, which delineates the organization’s working focus, and the implementa-
tion of its policy are key to properly understanding AI. By distinguishing be-
tween the international and the national levels, this chapter provides insights
into themechanism of decision-making and its implementation as well as the
underlining power relations.
6.5.1 The international level – The IS as a powerfull central node
At the international level, only the ICM can make decisions amending the
mandate/the mission or the statute defining AI’s working focus.93 AI de-
scribes the ICM as “AI’s highest decision-making body and a significant el-
ement of its democracy in action.”94 Every two years, delegations from all
sections and “structures” meet at the ICM to discuss AI’s future direction and
work. Section delegates there debate various topics in working groups and
vote on resolutions submitted either by the IEC (enabling resolutions) or by
sections (resolutions) in plenary sessions. Each of the sections sends a dele-
gation to the ICM.The latter is composed of activists and officials and is pro-
portional to its size, calculated as a function of the number of its members.
In contrast, the IEC does not have the right to vote at the ICMs. As I show
93 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International, August 1991.
94 Amnesty International.
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hereafter, even though the IS is formally excluded from decision-making at
the ICM, it nevertheless influences the process indirectly. In fact, despite not
having the right to vote IS members participate in the ICM.
Decisions at the ICMs require “a simplemajority of the votes cast.”95 How-
ever, decisions are often taken by consensus, often involving long and inten-
sive discussions among section representatives during the two weeks of the
ICMs. Evidence shows that reaching a consensus on particular issues usually
starts months or even years before a definitive decision is made.Welch (2001)
has noted that “expansion of themandate requires years of patient,worldwide
lobbying of national sections.”96 Sections thus prepare their statements and
inputs to the ICM in advance and seek alliances with like-minded sections on
issues on the meeting’s agenda, which the IEC has defined in advance.
Generally, before sections submit their resolution to the ICMs, theirmem-
bers decide on the submission at the section’s GA. Thus, to a certain extent,
the content of the resolution and, consequently, the following ICM decisions
reflect the activists’ opinions. The sections’ role in AI’s decision-making pro-
cess is important, as AI’s statute gives sections the exclusive right to partici-
pate in the process in two ways. Whereas sections can submit resolutions to
the ICMs and have the exclusive right to vote on resolutions, as well as adopt
subsequent decisions, the IEC is only given the right to submit resolutions
and is excluded from voting on them. The sections and, consequently, AI’s
membership are thus assigned a pivotal role in the policy-making process.
Nevertheless, evidence shows that the headquarters significantly influ-
ence decision-making and policy implementation. In fact, the composition of
the IS, its exclusive task of doing research for the whole movement over a long
period, and its involvement in the executive affairs and in the organization of
the ICMs make the IS comparatively powerful. Even though it is formally ex-
cluded from participating in the ICM, evidence indicates the ability of the IS
“to control the content of the AI human rights agenda.”97 IS staff are profes-
sional human rights workers and therefore generally possess greater, specific
knowledge of human rights than ordinary AI section activists do. Relatedly,
as explained by an interviewee, the exclusive task of conducting research for
the whole movement “gives [the IS] enormous power on the movement.”98
95 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International, August 1991.
96 Welch 2001, p.92.
97 Lake and Wong 2009, p.149.
98 Ganzfried: Interviewwith A.I., 26.09.2012: “ça donne un pouvoir enorme sur lemouvement.”.
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Further, as stressed by Welch (2001), even though the ICM “examines
broad policy matters, including the mandate, and although the IEC super-
vises national sections, the overwhelming majority of operational decisions
are made within the IS.”99 The decisions about the adoption of prisoners of
conscience are based on confidential information and sources, which pre-
cludes the IS from consulting with the whole movement. As the professional
expertise remains in IS staff, decisions concerning individual country work
are also made within the IS.
The IS is also closely involved in the organization’s executive work. In fact,
as the minutes of the IEC meetings show, in addition to the regular IS rep-
resentative, the SG and its deputies regularly participate in the committee’s
meetings. IS staff members also represent the IS within various Standing
Committees, such as the Standing Committee on the Mandate (SCM), for-
merly called the Mandate Review Committee,100 established to examine pos-
sible ways tomodify themandate.The resignation of the chairman of this spe-
cific committee in 1990 shows that because of the professional staff ’s knowl-
edge advantage, the Secretariat’s influence on executive affairs was judged
highly problematic by AImembers themselves. In fact, the chairman declared:
“I am not opposed to the I.S. influencing the Committee. However, I am of
the view that, given the number of I.S. staff at the meetings and the fact that
they have more knowledge than most of us regarding the issues, their influ-
ence has been undue.”101
Furthermore, evidence shows the close involvement of IS staff both in the
organization of the ICMs and in lobbying for or against particular decisions.
In fact, as Hopgood highlights, while “IS staff members undertake the orga-
nization of the ICM, […] particular IS senior directors can be heavily involved,
for example, in behind-the-scene lobbying, resolution drafting, and coalition
building for IEC positions.”102 At the same time, according to Hopgood, “a
99 Welch 2001, p.109.
100 Generally, at least one staff member and the SG as well as the deputy SGs represented
the IS at the IEC. The 2003 ICM eliminated the IS representative on the IEC following
anAI Israel resolution (Hopgood 2006, p.194.). According to differentminutes ofmeet-
ings of the SCM, the IS represented half of the SCM members from 1992 to 1996. The
IS was present in the three other standing committees, as well.
101 Deile et al. 2015.
102 Hopgood 2006, p.194.
100 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
ritualistic pretense is maintained that the IS is not involved at every stage in
giving serious and detailed strategic and policy advice to the IEC.”103
Thus, while the sections and, consequently, the members officially deter-
mine AI’s human rights work through their right to submit resolutions and
their exclusive voting right at the ICM, “de facto the professional structure
[the IS] had much more power compared to the governing structure [the
ICM].”104 As explained by an interviewee, this is because the IS cumulates
the task of preparing the decisions for the ICM and the task of subsequently
implementing these decisions. Hence, even though the statutes mainly limit
the headquarters’ role to conducting daily business, the IS has remained “the
heart – and the brain – of AI.”105 As Lake and Wong (2009) and Welch (2001)
highlight, we can even assume that over the years “the power of the central
node increased,”106 as “the longer an organization survives, the greater the
likelihood that its permanent employees rather than its members determine
the goals.”107
6.5.2 The national level – AI sections
As I have previously highlighted, the sections participate in the decision-mak-
ing process by submitting resolutions and deciding upon them at the ICMs.
Sections play a key role in decision implementation. Organized as indepen-
dent associations, “sections [took] no action on matters that [did] not fall
within the stated object andmandate of AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL”108 un-
til 2001. Sections are autonomous in the implementation of the campaigns
and in the individual cases of prisoners developed and proposed by the IS.
This has been even more so since the adoption of the mission, which changed
the scope of AI “from being constrained by its statute in what it could do, to
being free to do pretty much what its staff and volunteers wanted to do.”109
Member involvement happens in each section’s groups, which implement the
103 Hopgood 2006, p.194.
104 Ganzfried: Interview with A.I., 26.09.2012: “De facto la structure professionnelle a nette-
ment plus de power que la structure de gouvernance.”.
105 Welch 2001, p.90.
106 Lake and Wong, 2009: 152.
107 Welch 2001, p.109.
108 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd Interna-
tional Council, meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995, p.5.
109 Deile et al. 2015.
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campaigns and actions prepared by the IS on the ground. Thus, activists are
assigned a pivotal role in the achievements of the organization’s objectives.
As independent associations, sections autonomously decide upon their
annual budget, their members’ financial contributions, their long-term
strategic and financial planning, and the election of their secretary generals.
In the case of the Swiss section, activists can influence policymaking by sub-
mitting a motion or a postulate to the GA on behalf of their respective group.
These instruments enable activists to demand the submission of a resolution
to the ICM. Further, activists can vote on these motions or postulates at the
AG and, in doing so, influence AI’s decision-making process.110
In contrast to the Swiss section and to the majority of the other sections,
the German section has given its members additional opportunities to influ-
ence decision-making at the section level. According to an interviewee, the
German AI activists have more opportunities to participate in the decision-
making compared to their counterparts in other sections.111 The fact that ac-
tivists can participate in decision-making at the national as well as the local
levels gives the membership a particularly powerful position within the sec-
tion. At the GA, delegates decide on long-term strategic planning, elect the
EC, and vote on motions coming either from individual members, group(s),
from a Bezirk or from the EC.112 At the regional assemblies (Bezirksversammlun-
gen), group members of the respective Bezirk decide on their common tasks
and elect the regional spokesperson.113 The latter is closely involved in EC’s
affairs through her or his participation in the Bezirkssprecherinnenkonferenz, a
conference bringing all regional spokespersons together twice a year.114
110 Until 2007, internal collectives, such as groups, commissions or working groups, had
a collective voting right (groups voting rights were fivefold). At the 2007 GA, the del-
egates decided to introduce the principle of “one person / one vote.” From then on,
eachmember of the Swiss section had the right to vote, transforming the delegates’ as-
sembly into a General Assembly (Amnesty International:Delegiertenversammlung 1997,
27.04.1997; Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 2007, 06.05.2007).
111 Ganzfried: Interview with A.C., 14.04.2015: “Unsere Mitglieder haben sehr viel Mitsprache-
und Partizipationsrecht, wahrscheinlich mit ammeisten bei Amnesty”.
112 Each group sends a delegate with the rights to vote. Since 1991, each group has had
one delegate with ten votes, while individual members (who were not affiliated to
one group) had the right to participate in the AGwith one vote. The decisions are taken
through a simple majority of the votes.
113 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
114 As explained in the statutes, the EC is committed to taking the decisions of the
Bezirkssprecherinnenkonferenz into account in their decision-making. Important section
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The preceding paragraph illustrates the sections’ and therefore the mem-
bers’ pivotal role in the process of decision-making and the subsequent im-
plementation of the decisions. At the same time, the IS has a very powerful
de facto position with regards to the definition of AI’s agenda. In fact, even
though it is excluded from voting at the ICMs, the IS, with its composition of
human rights professionals, its exclusive role in conducting research, its in-
volvement in the organization’s executive affairs through its participation in
the IEC and in the related Standings Committees, and its role as the organizer
of the ICMs, has exerted consistent influence on the organization’s human
rights agenda. AI’s democratic principle is safeguarded within the sections
thanks to the general assemblies, where the members decide on their sec-
tion’s work. Even though activists are assigned a pivotal role in the decision-
making process within sections, as the example of the Swiss and the Ger-
man sections shows, the activists’ importance in defining the section’s work
varies. Because of their importance in the section’s thematic work and their
involvement in decision-making at the national and the local levels, the Ger-
man section’s membership has a particularly powerful stance compared to
that of its Swiss counterpart.
tasks, such as long-termplanning and the coordination and implementation of the sec-
tion’s actions, are incumbent upon both the EC and the Bezirkssprecherinnenkonferenz
Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
7. The beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW
The present chapter examines the beginnings of AI’s interest in issues of vi-
olence against women, focusing on the period between 1989 and 2001. I first
explore the international level (section 7.1) and then the Swiss and the German
sections in section 7.2. This chapter thus highlights the changes concerning
VAW in AI’s human rights policy and emphasizes the ways in which AI inte-
grated the issue into its activities, while respecting the boundaries of its man-
date. In so doing, the chapter stresses the importance of women strategizing
at the international and the national levels for understanding AI’s growing in-
terest in VAW. Further, it shows the disinterest with which parts of the move-
ment approached the intensification of AI’s work on issues of VAW in the
1990s.
7.1 The international level
Section 7.1.1 begins by descriptively charting the gradual development of AI’s
policy from its essential focus on civil and political rights to the adoption
of a mission recognizing the indivisibility of all human rights, including eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. It does so by examining ICMdecisions. Sec-
tion 7.1.2 then highlights how the organization integrated VAW into its activ-
ities while respecting the frame of the mandate. In section 7.1.3, I emphasize
the relevant internal actors. I also demonstrate that female activists’ strate-
gizing in an intersectional network initiated AI’s work on women’s rights
and successfully influenced decision-making and implementation by lobbying
sections, the IEC, and the IS. Later, section 7.1.4 shows that the integration of
issues of VAW into AI’s work met with officials’ and activists’ disinterest and
reluctance, rather than with their resistance.
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7.1.1 Policy development 1989-2001
By focusing on the decisions made at the ICMs between 1989 and 2001, this
section provides a detailed account of AI’s policy development regarding
VAW1 and concludes with a brief description of how the policy changes were
reflected in AI’s strategic plans. Between 1989 and 2001, the International
Council met seven times (in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001). The
delegates made many decisions at each ICM.2 Some of them concerned AI’s
work on VAW either directly or indirectly. As I show later, distinguishing
between these two types allows me to accurately explain the origins of the
respective ICM decision and the debates heralding its adoption. I also differ-
entiate between these two categories because, as I have mentioned before,
policy developments regarding VAW cannot be analyzed in isolation from the
modification of the essential principles of AI’s mandate.
By distinguishing between the two categories, figure 1 provides a graphi-
cal overview of the policy developments between 1989 and 2001. The mandate
modifications highlighted in the left rectangles of the figure indirectly con-
cerned AI’s work on VAW, as their principal target was not VAW, but AI’s
broader mandate. In fact, as I have already revealed, the integration of non-
state actors into AI’s mandate (illustrated in the upper gray box in the right
rectangle of figure 1) and the subsequent end of the mandate, with the con-
comitant extension to social, cultural, and economic rights (illustrated in the
lower gray box in the right rectangle of figure 1) are important general policy
changes that also influenced how AI dealt with issues of VAW in its activities.
At the same time, the organization directly adopted various decisions con-
cerning its work on VAW (illustrated in the right rectangle of figure 1).3 For in-
stance, the delegates adopted several decisions demanding an increase in AI’s
work on women’s rights. I have labeled these decisions “AI’s work on women’s
rights” (illustrated on the left in the right rectangle of figure 1). At the same
1 Because only the ICM can make decisions amending the mandate/the mission or the
statute, analyzing ICM decisions allows us to understand policy development in gene-
ral and regarding VAW in particular.
2 As an example: The 1989 ICM released 55 decisions, the 1991 ICM issued 86 decisions,
the 1993 ICM and the 1995 ICM each resulted in 50 decisions, the 1997 ICM resulted in
51 decisions, the 1999 ICM resulted in 49 decisions, and the 2001 ICM resulted in 36
decisions.
3 I label these three sub-types as decisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAWbecau-
se their focus was only and explicitly on how AI should handle VAW in its work.
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time, the ICM explicitly decided to integrate Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
in its promotional and, later, in its oppositional work. The related decisions
are labeled “a specific women’s right/a specific women’s rights violation” in
the middle of the right rectangle in figure 1. Further, the organization de-
cided to broaden its approach concerning governmental inaction in cases of
VAW committed by private actors and enlarged the criteria for the adoption
of prisoners of conscience (labeled “women’s rights in general” on the right
side of the right rectangle of figure 1).
Figure 1: Overview of the policy development between 1989 and 2001
Source: my own
If we classify the summarized decisions according to the ICM during
which they were adopted, it becomes evident that AI adopted most of the de-
cisions directly concerning its work on VAW at the 1995 ICM (graph 4 and fig-
ure 2).This convergence points to the importance that the momentum gained
at the fourth WCW held for the organization’s growing interest in women’s
rights issues. As I explain in more detail later, the WCW can be considered a
window of opportunity as far as the advancement of the organization’s work
on VAW is concerned.
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Graph 4: Decisions per ICM, 1989-2001
Source: my own, based on ICM reports for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999,
and 2001.
By distinguishing between ICM decisions directly and indirectly concern-
ing AI’s work on VAW, this paragraph provides a general overview of the de-
velopment of AI’s policy in this issue area between 1989 and 2001. The follow-
ing sections highlight the policy developments focusing on the content of the
ICM decisions adopted between 1989 and 2001. It starts with the description
of the decisions indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAWbefore describing the
ICM decisions directly concerning the latter. Figure 2 shows all ICM decisions
directly or indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAW.
7.1.1.1 ICM decisions indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAW
The following section illustrates the implications of AI’s gradual mandate
opening for the work on violence against women by focusing on the ICM
decisions indirectly concerning this work (illustrated in the left rectangle of
figure 2). In this period, the delegates to the ICM made several decisions
challenging the essence of the mandate, which finally led to the adoption of a
new mission in 2001. I distinguish between decisions implying a reconceptu-
alization of the civil and political rights approach (upper gray box in the left
rectangle of figure 2) and decisions that demand abandoning this old way of
working (lower gray box in the left rectangle of figure 2).
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Figure 2: Detailed policy development between 1989 and 2001
Source: my own, based on ICM reports for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999,
and 2001.
Until 1991, AI considered the state to be the primary violator of human
rights and the organization’s activities mostly targeted governments. Because
of the topicality of interstate conflicts and the emergence of new patterns
of human rights violations, AI included abuses committed by “political non-
governmental entities,” such as arbitrary killings and hostage taking, into its
mandate in 1991 (Decision 5 of the 1991 ICM).4 Hopgood states that “the im-
plications of this [decision] were profound – it opened the way for social and
economic rights, allowing AI to move its attention away from the state exclu-
sively to take in corporations or the relations between individuals (e.g., men
and women).”5 Nevertheless, the same decision reaffirmed “that AI should
continue to regard human rights as the individual’s rights in relation to gov-
ernmental authority.”6
Subsequent ICM decisions continued to challenge AI’s focus on civil and
political rights and on the state as the primary perpetrator of human rights
abuses in the following years. For example, by adopting decision 5 at the 1997
ICM, the delegates decided that: “AI will act when governments breach their
4 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
5 Hopgood 2006, p.120.
6 Amnesty International: 1991 ICM Decisions.
108 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
duty to ensure respect for human rights by failing to take action against abuse
of human rights by private actors where that abuse would constitute a grave
violation of human rights […].”7Working on cases of human rights violations
where the state failed to meet its obligation to prevent the abuse was a new
field of activity for AI. Conscious of the need to acquire first experiences in
this particular domain, the ICM decided to do pilot projects in order to de-
velop its future oppositional work on abuses by non-state entities. Decision
5 of the 1997 ICM called for an inclusion of the issues of women’s rights into
these pilot projects.8 As I detail in the next section, three out of four pilot
projects finally concerned issues of women’s rights, such as honor killings in
Pakistan, abuses affecting women trafficked from Russia into Israel’s sex in-
dustry, private security actors in Brazil, and female genital mutilation inWest
Africa.9 At the same time, by prohibiting the use of oppositional techniques
towards non-state actors, AI dispensedwith holding these actors accountable.
Four years later, the delegates finally decided to use oppositional and promo-
tional techniques towards non-state actors (Decision 8 of the 2001 ICM).This
amendment was decisive for AI’s effective work on VAW, as it enabled the
organization to hold the perpetrators accountable.
During the same period, AI started a general discussion about its man-
date. Several ICM decisions reflected this debate and preceded the ultimate
decision to abandon the mandate, which was taken at the 2001 ICM (see the
gray box on the lower left side in the left rectangle of figure 2). As a concrete
manifestation of this final amendment, delegates expressed the concern that
“themandate is sometimes perceived as unwieldy and unfocused”10 and called
for a comprehensive review of AI’s mandate until the 2001 meeting at the 1997
ICM (Decision 3 of the 1997 ICM).11 Two years later, the 1999 ICM (Decision 3)
stressed the importance of a mandate review again, suggesting that the IC
7 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.8-9.
8 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.9.
9 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Mandate Review 1997-2001: Non-
State Actors, August 2000, p.6.
10 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Inside themandate - issue 9,Novem-
ber 2000.
11 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Inside themandate - issue 9,Novem-
ber 2000.
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should “explore whether and to what extent AI could address more effectively
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.”12
After a movement-wide consultation, the IEC submitted three different
approaches for a first discussion: first, the “status quo” approach,whichwould
continue to restrict AI’s work to civil and political rights; second, the “new core
concept” approach, which would gradually broaden the scope of AI’s work to
integrate some economic, social, and cultural rights; and third, the “full spec-
trum” approach, which would change the mandate into a mission and would
enable AI to use oppositional techniques against violations of economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights.13 At the 2001 ICM, after an intensive discussion, the
delegates finally agreed to go for the “full spectrum” approach and to replace
the mandate with a mission. The organization thus scratched the list of spe-
cific violations of civil and political rights off its statutes and claimed to “un-
dertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses
of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and ex-
pression, and freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work
to promote all human rights” (Decision 2 and Decision 3 of the 2001 ICM).14
In decision 6, the IC further affirmed “the need to break down the percep-
tion that civil and political rights are more important than economic, social,
and cultural rights;”15 and recognized “the consensus in themovement that AI
needs to engage further with economic, social and cultural rights.”16With De-
cision 6, the IC further decided to increase its cooperation with other NGOs:
“[…] engaging in strategic alliances with other NGOs whose expertise, infor-
mation or action possibilities can usefully and effectively combine with those
of AI […].”17 Meanwhile, decision 7 of the 2001 ICM emphasized the indi-
12 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 24th International Council 1999,
September 1999, p.7-8.
13 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Inside themandate - issue 9,Novem-
ber 2000.
14 Decision 2 specifies that the IC decided to adopt the new Statute of AI detailed in
Decision 3 (Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of
the 25th International Council of Amnesty International, 2001).
15 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 25th In-
ternational Council of Amnesty International, 2001, p.116.
16 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 25th In-
ternational Council of Amnesty International, 2001, p.116.
17 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 25th In-
ternational Council of Amnesty International, 2001, p.117.
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visibility of all human rights stating that “AI may use any appropriate tech-
nique to oppose grave abuses of economic, social and cultural rights where
these abuses arise from a policy of discrimination, or are abuses of the rights
to freedom of conscience and expression, freedom from discrimination, or
physical and mental integrity.”18
The adoption of the mission was significant for AI’s work on VAW, as it al-
lowed for the interpretation of VAW as a structural and social problem whose
root causes lay in the social and economic subordination of women, and not
merely as individual acts. Yet equally important for AI’s concrete and effec-
tive work for the elimination of VAW was the 2001 ICM decision abandoning
the WOOC rule, which prohibited sections from intervening in favor of vic-
tims of human rights abuses in their own country. This limitation had been
debated repeatedly. Yet, only in 2001 did a majority of the sections’ delegates
finally vote for the abolition of this rule (Decision 13 of the 2001 ICM).19 This
decision facilitated AI’s engagement against VAW, as it enabled sections to
campaign against specific women’s rights violations in their own countries.
It therefore enhanced the cooperation with local women’s rights organization
on this specific issue, which in turn was crucial for effective action.
7.1.1.2 ICM decisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW
This section demonstrates that by adopting three ICM decisions calling for
an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights, the organization intended to
strengthen its work on VAW, which falls within the mandate during the 1990s
(gray box on the bottom left in the right rectangle of figure 2). The section
then emphasizes that FGM was the first women-specific human rights viola-
tion with which AI expanded its mandate (gray box in the middle of the right
rectangle in figure 2). The section concludes by describing several ICM deci-
sions that illustrate the organization’s growing awareness of the importance
of gender-specific human rights violations (gray box on the right side in the
right rectangle of figure 2).
18 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 25th In-
ternational Council of Amnesty International, 2001, p.119.
19 TheWOOC policy was first adopted in Decision 29 of the 1979 ICM, revised in Decision
35 of the 1987 ICM, and simplified in Decision 48 of the 1995 ICM.
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ICM decisions calling for an increase in the work on women’s rights
As mentioned before, until 1989, AI’s work on violence against women was
rather ephemeral and essentially limited to individual cases of female pris-
oners of conscience. At the 1989 ICM, the IC adopted its first decision calling
for increased attention and resources for the work on human rights violations
against women. In decision 15, the IC “resolved that human rights violations
against women which fall within AI’s mandate deserve more attention in the
research of the IS and the publication activities of the IS and sections and
that adequate resources be provided for that.”20 In decision 15, the IC further
requested AI to cooperate with other NGOs and Intergovernmental Organi-
zations (IGOs) in its actions “to seek protection and safeguards for women
which give due consideration to the aspects of human rights violations that
are specific to their sex.”21
As I show later, because parts of the movement considered the resulting
activities related to violations of women’s rights insufficient, decision 20 of
the 1995 ICM recalled decision 15 of the 1989 ICM and requested a clarification
of AI’s work on women. Further, decision 20 sought to ensure that the work
for the promotion and protection of women’s human rights be carried out
at all levels of the organization. It also stipulated that the work on women’s
human rights become an integral part of AI’s overall work, especially in re-
search and publications, so that adequate personal and financial resources be
provided in its support. In contrast to decision 15 (1989 ICM), decision 20 of
the 1995 ICM further recommended strengthening the financial and human
resources available to initiate and effectively monitor the work to end human
rights violations against women, which falls within the mandate.22
Again in 1997, the IC declared itself “concerned that […] the full potential
for AI’s work on women’s human rights has yet to be realized,”23 and worried
about providing “continued provision of support for the implementation of
organizational mechanisms that will lead to the full integration of women’s
human rights in all areas of Amnesty International’s work.”24 In order to re-
20 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Decision No. 15 ICM 1989, 1989.
21 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Decision No. 15 ICM 1989, 1989.
22 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995.
23 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.47.
24 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.47.
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alize the integration of women’s rights into all areas of AI’s work, the IC rec-
ommended conducting a comprehensive gender audit at all levels of the orga-
nization and including a focus on gender into the sections’ mandate training
and development sessions as well as in their strategic planning processes.25
As I highlight later, the ICM delegates refused to undergo a gender audit at
the 1995 ICM, but accepted the request at the 1997 ICM.
These three ICM decisions sought to make the organization increase its
work on violations of women’s rights that fell within the mandate without
demanding a change in the state-focused mandate. They called for sufficient
personal and financial resources, and they formulated concrete recommenda-
tions on how to make women’s rights an integral part of AI’s overall work. As
I highlight later, these decisions go back to female AI activists’ and officials’
movement-wide strategizing to make AI increase its work on violations of
women’s rights. Even though none of these decisions explicitly mentioned the
issue of VAW, they directly enabled and promoted AI’s activities on this front,
as they demanded a sustained integration of the work on women’s rights vi-
olations into AI’s overall work within the frame of the mandate.
ICM decisions concerning the work on FGM
Female genital mutilation was the first women-specific human rights viola-
tion with which AI expanded its mandate. Concretely, the issue entered the
decision-making process at the 1993 ICM. There, in decision 10, the IC ex-
pressed its concern about the practice of FGM, considering it as “[…] causing
permanent health risks and in many cases death or major damage to [the]
health [of women].”26 Decision 10 urged the IEC to include the issue in a study
on governmental inaction, in order to clarify if and to what extent AI should
include FGM in its promotional work and get involved in cases “where human
rights abuses are inflicted by individual citizens on each other.”27 Further, the
decision “instructs the IEC to present recommendation on this matter to the
next ICM.”28
25 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998.
26 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1993 ICM,
30.09.1993, p.13
27 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1993 ICM,
30.09.1993, p.14.
28 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1993 ICM,
30.09.1993, p.14.
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After intensive debates, AI recognized the practice as “[affecting] the full
enjoyment of human rights by millions of women and girls” and acknowl-
edged that governmental inaction in cases of FGM constitutes a violation of
international human rights standards. It then integrated FGM into its pro-
motional mandate (Decision 6 1995 ICM). Two years later, by integrating FGM
into the pilot projects on the future of AI’s oppositional work against non-
state actors, AI also allowed oppositional work against the practice (Decision
6 1997 ICM). It did so by recognizing “that FGM constitutes an abuse by non-
state actors and is therefore covered by Decision 5 of the 1997 ICM.”29
Because oppositional work on FGM required cooperation with local NGOs
and the involvement of AI activists in the countries where it was a widespread
phenomenon, the IC specified that, in accordance with the ongoing loosening
of the WOOC rule,30 sections might be allowed to work on FGM in their own
countries. With this final decision on FGM, AI broadened its mandate with
an issue of violence against women. It confronted the issue of governmental
responsibility for inaction and tested the ways AI might hold private actors
accountable. Thus, the decisions on FGM must be considered a “significant
expansion into the private sphere.”31
ICM decisions concerning women’s rights in general
Thegradualmandate opening illustrated, among other things, the importance
of the issue of FGM for future work on non-state actors. In addition to the
decisions calling for an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights, AI also delib-
erated on other subjects related to violence against women in the same period.
I will only mention the most important among them, which are decision 22
of the 1993 ICM and decisions 9 and 8 of the 1995 ICM. Decision 22 called for
support for the UN initiative to establish a Special Rapporteur on violence
against women. AI stressed that every effort should be made to use campaign
opportunities to work against human rights violations against women.32This
decision echoed decision 15 of the 1989 ICM and recognized “that women suf-
29 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.12.
30 As described in Decision 48 of the 1995 ICMWork on Own Country.
31 Watson 1997, p.8.
32 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 21th International Council Meeting
Report and Decisions, Resolutions referred to the IEC, 1993, p.63.
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fer grave human rights violations, including rape and sexual ill-treatment and
other forms of persecution directed against their sex.”33
Then, in decision 9 of the 1995 ICM, the IC explicitly called to:
“examine situations where the government systematically fails to prevent,
investigate and punish acts of violence against women […], including but not
limited to honor killings, bride burning and the systematic non-persecution
of domestic violence.”34
Similar to the decision on FGM, this decision signaled an opening of AI’s
working spectrum to human rights violations occurring in the private sphere.
At the same time, AI extended the criteria for the adoption of prisoners of
conscience, enabling the organization to also include persons imprisoned be-
cause of existing laws that make their identity “a defined element of the of-
fense.”35 In fact, decision 8 of the 1995 ICM allowed the organization to help
women detained because of their sex and to engage in promotional work
against such discriminatory rules.
Whereas the ICM decisions reflect the policy frame of AI’s activities, the
Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs) fix the movement’s strategic direction for
four to six years.36 The analysis of AI’s first ISP, the Ljubljana Action Plan
(LAP) 1996 – 1999, indicates where the organization put its emphasis when it
comes to the implementation of the respective ICMdecisions.While decisions
related to AI’s work on VAW ranked among the top priority issues of man-
date development for the first time,37 other decisions concerning AI’s work
33 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1993 ICM,
30.09.1993, p.30.
34 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1995 ICM,
01.09.1995, p.21.
35 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1995 ICM,
01.09.1995, p.20.
36 Prior to 1996, AI had broadly formulated medium-term objectives (five to six years)
formulated as ICMdecisions (Decision 1 of the 1993 and the 1995 ICM). These objectives
were criticized for not allowing adequate priority setting and demand regulation. In
contrast to the medium-term objectives, the new planning instrument in the face of
the ISP allowed for a rolling long-term strategic planning, integrated with financial
planning (Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Strategic directions: 1995-
1998 A discussion paper, 30.06.1993, p.16-21).
37 The LAP classified the decisions of the 1995 ICM into four areas (mandate, action, or-
ganization and development, and finances). In each of these areas, decisions were cat-
egorized either as top-priority, mid-priority, or low-priority.
7. The beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW 115
on VAW were only given medium priority, meaning that their implementa-
tion depended on resource availability. In fact, the organization stressed its
intention to integrate its work on the promotion and protection of women’s
rights into its overall work. It also emphasized its intention to work on FGM
in its promotional activities by singling the respective decisions (decision 20
1995 ICM, decision 6 1995 ICM) out as high-priority issues. At the same time,
AI ascribed less importance to a comprehensive gender audit at all levels of
the organization and to oppositional work on FGM, considering these deci-
sions (decision 32 of the 1997 ICM, decision 6 of the 1997 ICM) of only medium
priority.
Summing up, AI’s human rights policy gradually shifted from its essen-
tial focus on civil and political rights and on the state as the basic violator
of human rights, to adopting a mission that recognized the indivisibility of
all human rights including economic, social and cultural rights. The recog-
nition of abuses committed by political non-state actors within the mandate
in 1991 was the first step of the subsequent redefinition of AI’s policy away
from seeing the state as the primary violator of human rights. The issue of
FGM was central to AI’s redefinition of its position regarding state account-
ability for inaction in cases of human rights violations committed by non-
governmental entities and the responsibility of private actors for abuses of
human rights. In fact, FGM was the first women-specific human rights viola-
tion with which AI expanded its mandate. These mandate amendments were
significant for effective action against violations of women’s rights because
they entailed the end of the long-lasting public-private divide inherent to the
traditional understanding of human rights.They enabled the AI to take action
against VAWwhoever the perpetrator.The adoption of themission,which also
considered economic, social, and cultural rights, enabled the organization to
campaign against VAW as a structural and social problem whose root causes
resided in the social and economic subordination of women.While these pol-
icy changes indirectly contributed to making AI increase its work on issues of
VAW, AI adopted three subsequent ICM decisions calling on the organization
to increase its work on women’s rights within the frame of the mandate. As I
explain in more detail later, these decisions originated from female activists
and officials in the sections, and they directly stimulated AI’s activities on
issues of VAW.
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7.1.2 Policy Implementation
- AI’s activities on VAW within the frame of the mandate
The present chapter concentrates on the ways AI initially integrated VAW into
its activities while respecting the boundaries of the mandate. It shows that
AI’s work in this regard evolved considerably between 1989 and 2001. I start by
providing a broad overview of AI’s activities related to VAW before focusing
on threemajor activities that the organization undertook during the same pe-
riod. Combining a quantitative overview with a detailed description of these
activities, I provide a comprehensive picture of the evolution of AI’s activities
on issues of VAW under the mandate.
The analysis of archive documents from the International Secretariat al-
lows me to capture the approximate number and variety of activities that
the organization carried out following the initial decision at the 1989 ICM.
It also allows me to draw a typology of activities based on the content and
the type of activity (Figure 3).38 As a reminder, the ICM decision called for
increased attention and resources for the work on human rights violations
against women. Based on the data, I establish two categories related to the
activities’ content (horizontally illustrated in figure 3): AI either addressed
women’s rights in general or focused on a specific case of VAW. Within this
category, I distinguish between cases of VAW committed by the state or by
state actors and those cases committed by private actors for which the state
can be held accountable for failing to prevent or punish them. Further, I dif-
ferentiate between four broad types of activities (vertically illustrated in fig-
ure 3): “Institutionalmeasures;” “Research and campaigning;” “IGOwork;” and
“Outreach.”
“Institutional measures” includes all activities seeking to increase the
staff ’s and activists’ awareness of women’s rights issues. The type “Research
and Campaigning” is comprised of reports and campaigns with a regional
or a thematic focus as well as individual appeal cases and specific activities
such as women’s day actions. Within this type I further distinguish between
activities specifically and uniquely focusing on violations of women’s rights
and those that added a women’s branch to other thematic- or country-specific
human rights reports or campaigns. Under the type “IGO work,” I classified
38 I examined internal and external documents issued by the IS during the period of in-
terest, such as meeting reports, campaign evaluations, strategic guidelines, etc.
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Figure 3: Typology of AI activities related to VAW
Source: my own, based on archival material.
AI’s activities consisting in lobbying the UN or other IGOs. Again, I differen-
tiate between IGO activities with organizations specialized in women’s rights
and those activities with organizations working on human rights in general.
Further, I classified contact to and collaboration with women’s rights groups,
associations, and organizations as belonging to the “outreach” type. As I
further highlight later, these women’s rights NGOs constituted an important
knowledge basis for AI. The collaboration with these groups enhanced AI’s
campaigning capacity with respect to VAW.
Figure 3 illustrates the categories according to which I classified AI’s ac-
tivities on VAW.Concerning the “Institutional Measures” category, AI put var-
ious actions in place to increase awareness of women’s rights among staff and
activists: the pilot project for decentralized work on women, the international
consultation meeting in Bonn in preparation of the campaign Human Rights
are Women’s Rights, member training within the frame of the aforementioned
campaign, and the latter’s evaluation. Further, in 1996, AI established a Gen-
der Forum39 at the IS to provide strategic advice in the implementation of the
objectives regarding women’s rights fixed in its long-term strategic plan (the
LAP). In addition, AI issued Gender-Sensitive ResearchMethodology Guidelines (as
demanded in decision 32 of the 1997 ICM)40 and endorsed a harassment pol-
39 The role of the Gender Forum is discussed in chapter 8.
40 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Gender Sensitive Research Method-
ology Guidelines, January 1999.
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icy in 1999 (as specified in decision 2 of the 1997 ICM).41 Finally, AI organized
specific training courses for staff on the issue of rape as a form of torture in
preparation for the Take a Step to Stamp Out Torture campaign.
“Research and campaigning” was the most common type of activity. The
predominance of research and campaign activities is not surprising, as these
activities had always constituted AI’s “primary organizational output.”42 As
I highlight in more detail later, the 1991 report Women in the Front Line and
the 1995 campaign Human Rights are Women’s Rights were AI’s most important
actions organized in the 1990s in terms of how issues of VAWwere integrated
and of financial and personal resources. Besides, the IS issued several smaller
country and thematic reports, and prepared numerous Appeal Cases focusing
on cases of VAW committed by state actors and by non-state actors alike. AI
also focused on specific cases of VAW by integrating them into other reports
and campaigns.The Take a Step to StampOut Torture campaign launched in 2000
was the most important, as it was the first time that AI had considered VAW
in the private sphere a form of torture.
Further, AI started to lobby several IGOs on women’s rights around the
mid-1990s. In doing so, AI’s either promoted the topic within IGOs in charge
of human rights issues in general, such as the UN, or it tried to collaborate
with IGOs specialized in women’s rights issues, such as the CSW or the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. The occasions on which AI pro-
moted specific cases of VAWwere much more rare. Examples of this were the
efforts to recognize rape as a war crime in the Rome Statute and the Inter-
national Criminal Court or the participation in a UN Committee drafting a
protocol on trafficking of women and children in 1996. Even though AI had
established links to the women’s rights organization prior to the WCW, par-
ticularly, after the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, most of
its outreach work to women’s NGOs occurred during and after the 1995 cam-
paign.
The preceding paragraphs have elucidated the variety of activities AI im-
plemented following decision 15 of the 1989 ICM.The classification of these ac-
tivities according to the year of their launch allows us to see that most of them
were launched in 1996 (graph 5). The significant increase in activities in 1996
41 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Strengthening Research and Action
onHumanRights Violations againstWomen Formulating an Implementation Strategy
for the LAP (1996-2000), 06.07.1999
42 Hopgood 2006, p.26.
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is linked to the fourth WCW in Beijing 1995 and to the related campaign Hu-
man Rights are Women’s Rights as well as to decision 20 of the 1995 ICM, which
called for an increase in AI’s work on violations of women’s rights. Graph 5
also illustrates that AI’s activities on the issue regressed in quantitative terms
after 1996 but that they remained higher than before 1995.
Graph 5: Evolution in the number of activities, 1989-2001
Source: my own, based on archive materials from the IS.
By classifying these activities according to their content and type, these
paragraphs have provided an overview of AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s.
While I have commented on its variety and numeric progression, the clas-
sification does not account for the qualitative evolution of AI’s work on VAW
during this period. By providing a detailed account of three key activities, I
chose according to information frommy interviews or archival materials, the
following three sections shedmore light on how AI effectively integrated VAW
into its activities and how this work evolved. First, I offer details on AI’s first
comprehensive report, Women in the Front Line, published in 1991 and the re-
lated pilot project for decentralized work on women. Then, I concentrate on
the 1995 campaign Human Rights are Women’s Rights, AI’s first comprehensive
international campaign on the rights of women. Finally, the campaign Take
a Step to Stamp Out Torture illustrates how the organization included a case of
VAW in a long-term thematic campaign.
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7.1.2.1 Women in the Front Line
As a result of the first ICM decision that demanded an increase in the work
on women’s rights (decision 15 of the 1989 ICM), the AI section in the US
(AIUSA) and the IS worked out a pilot project seeking to decentralize AI’s
work on women from the IS to AIUSA. Within this pilot project, AIUSA was
accountable to the IS for the development of AI’s so-called “target sector work”
for women for a period of two years, from January 1991 to December 1992.43
One of the outcomes of the pilot project was AI’s first report on violations of
women’s rights,Women in the Front Line:HumanRights Violations AgainstWomen.
The latter introduced the issue of gender-based violence in state custody into
AI’s language.44 For the first time, women were not only portrayed as victims
of state violence but also as political actors challenging state repression. Ac-
cording to AI, “the report was the first AI report ever to compile a worldwide
survey of human rights violations against women”45 falling within the man-
date. Eight appeal cases of women prisoners reflecting “the different kinds of
human rights abuses within AI’s mandate that women suffer” accompanied
the release of the report.46
7.1.2.2 Human Rights are Women’s Rights
AI organized its first international campaign onwomen’s rights,HumanRights
are Women’s Rights, in parallel with its preparation for and participation in
the fourth WCW.Therefore, this section also includes AI’s involvement in the
Beijing conference. In terms of employed resources, the 1995 campaign was
by far the most important action on issues of VAW that AI had realized under
the mandate. The campaign had two broad objectives: “define and raise the
profile of AI’s work on human rights abuses against women” and “pressure
governments to place the indivisibility of human rights and women’s rights
at the heart of the WCW.”47 Benefiting from the momentum of the fourth
43 Amnesty International: Report of the Intersectional Meeting on Women and Human
Rights, August 1991, p.17.
44 Roach 1994.
45 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Women’s action 1991, 1990, p.3.
46 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Women’s action 1991, 1990, p.1.
47 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.5; Amnesty International, International
Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign - Women and Human Rights, October
1996.
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WCW, AI intended the campaign to place the issue of women’s rights at the
top of public and the governmental concerns.48
The campaign sought to make women’s civil and political rights appear in
the fourth WCW’s final document, mobilizing global public opinion and con-
tributing to the ratification of all international treaties regarding women’s
rights by as many states as possible.49 AI pushed to integrate a clear refer-
ence to states’ responsibility for VAW and a number of concrete steps govern-
ments should take to end VAW into the Platform for Action, the conference’s
final document.50Thus, at the Beijing conference, AI mainly concentrated on
the issues of recognizing states’ responsibility to end and prevent VAW, the
vulnerability of women in armed conflicts, including states’ responsibility to
respect international human rights and humanitarian law, and states’ respon-
sibility to ensure the respect for female activists’ human rights.51
AI qualified the 1995 campaign as the beginning of increased activities on
women’s rights: “the campaign was seen not simply as another short-term
exercise but as an opportunity to ‘kick-start’ a comprehensive and ongoing
program of activities.”52 The importance of the campaign becomes evident
in the number of officials and activists involved in its preparation and in the
composition of AI’s official delegation to the conference in Beijing, which was
composed of the SG, 12 IS staff members, and 16 selected AI section partici-
pants.
The idea to realize a campaign against the violations of women’s rights to
accompany the movement’s participation in the fourthWCW goes back to the
UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna 1993.53 It became evident at the 1993
ICM two months later, where Pierre Sané stated: “We need to start planning
48 Amnesty International: Formation continue Campagne Femmes engagée - femmes en
danger, 25.02.1995
49 Amnesty International: Formation continue Campagne Femmes engagée - femmes en
danger, 25.02.1995
50 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the Fourth UNWorld Con-
ference on Women Beijing, China 4-15 September, October 1995, p.13.
51 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the Fourth UNWorld Con-
ference on Women Beijing, China 4-15 September, October 1995, p.24-26.
52 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Strengthening Research and Action
onHumanRights Violations againstWomen Formulating an Implementation Strategy
for the LAP (1996-2000), 06.07.1999, p.2.
53 Amnesty International: ICM 1993: Resolutionen B, 1993.
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for Beijing now.”54 Effective planning and organizing began in March 1994,
when the IEC finally decided to bring this idea to fruition.55 At the move-
ment-wide consultation meeting in Bonn in September 1994, AI clarified the
content of the campaign and the strategy for its participation in the fourth
WCW. Outreach activities had already started during the preparation of the
campaign and AI’s participation in the WCW. Participating in all of the UN
regional and CSW “prepcom”meetings charged with drafting the Beijing Plat-
form for Action, AI began to establish strong links to women’s NGOs around
the world.56 In addition, an Outreach Coordinator at the IS was responsible
for AI networking with other NGOs at the various NGO Forum preparatory
meetings. As the campaign’s evaluation documents: “Sections were encour-
aged to explore the possibilities of developing long-term relations with NGOs,
especially the major women’s NGOs […].”57 Many sections were involved in
lobbying their governments with the objective “to persuade them to adopt
the position advocated by AI for the WCW.”58
Further, AI supported an international petition, addressed to the UN and
asking it to fulfill its commitment to eliminate VAW.The latter was launched
by a large number of organizations affiliated under the title Global Campaign
for Women’s Human Rights, within which AI sections contributed to the collec-
tion of “several hundred thousand signatures,”59 making it “the most success-
ful and popular part of the [Human Rights are Women’s Rights] campaign.”60 At
the parallel NGO Forum, where numerous IS staff and section activists repre-
54 Amnesty International: Fax from the IWN to the IEC and SG, 18.11.1993, p.1.
55 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996.
56 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Key milestones of AI’s work on
women’s human rights, 02.04.2002, p.2; Amnesty International, International Secre-
tariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign - Women and Human Rights, October 1996.
57 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.10.
58 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.7-8.
59 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.8.
60 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.8.
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sented AI,61 AI concentrated its outreach activities on publicity for its work,
especially for its Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign, and on network-
ing with NGOs working on women’s rights.62 After the conference, the out-
reach to women’s NGOs was one of AI’s main follow-up activities. In parallel,
the IS encouraged sections to continue and intensify their work with women’s
NGOs in their respective countries in order to ensure the government’s ful-
fillment of the Platform of Action.63
After intensive preparations, the Human Rights are Women’s Rights cam-
paign was finally launched on the 8th of March 1995.The campaign’s thematic
focus fell on violations of women’s civil and political rights. Respecting the
boundaries of the mandate, it primarily highlighted the issues of VAW in sit-
uations of war and affecting female human rights defenders and women in
custody. AI pointed to the particular vulnerability of female refugees, defined
rape committed by state actors as an act of torture, and stressed the right of
women not to be tortured, killed, arbitrarily detained or disappeared.The or-
ganization called on governments to implement stronger measures to protect
women from human rights violations committed by state and non-state ac-
tors. Therefore, the state remained the main addressee of these demands.64
An important component of the 1995 campaign, which distinguished it from
the 1991 action, was its message that even though women’s rights were at the
center of the campaign, it was not a women’s campaign but a campaign for
all AI members.
As far as outcomes are concerned, the evaluation of Human Rights Are
Women’s Rights reveals that AI considered the campaign successful, as it raised
AI’s profile as an organization fighting to stop and prevent human rights vio-
lations against women. Further, the fact that the campaign stimulated a sig-
nificant expansion of research and action on women’s rights issues, as illus-
trated in graph 4, was also deemed positive. An interviewee pointed out that
61 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: AI’s Presence in Beijing (Internal),
25.11.1994; Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Letter from the Project
Coordinator WCW, 01.03.1995.
62 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Letter from the Project Coordinator
WCW, 01.03.1995.
63 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: "Beyond Beijing - the struggle con-
tinues" Follow-up activities on the Platform for Action, March 1996.
64 Amnesty International und International Secretariat: Evaluation Campaign 1995, De-
cember 1995
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the implication of the whole movement in the Beijing preparation process en-
hanced the members’ awareness of the importance of integrating the work on
women’s rights into AI’s overall work. She explains: “from the moment that
all the sections started to work on the Beijing conference there was a sort of
awareness building in people’s mentality.”65
Moreover, the relationships established with women’s NGOs during the
women’s campaign were judged very effective. An informant explains that
AI’s participation in Beijing “was a very successful attempt by Amnesty. For
the first time Amnesty became accepted, was accepted very well by the key fe-
male leaders in themovement.”66 At the same time, the limitation fixed by the
mandate and theWOOC rule hindered some sections’ attempts to reach out to
women’s rights NGOs because AI could not address the issue of domestic vi-
olence.67 In addition, the evaluation also stated that other factors hampered
the success of the campaign, such as the delayed decision to undertake the
campaign, the under-staffing affecting campaign work at the IS, inadequate
research information on some subjects, and the fact that the preparation of
AI’s participation in Beijing took time and resources needed for the broader
campaign.68 In sum, the lack of human and/or financial resources was con-
sidered the main obstacle to effective campaigning.69
Consequently, Women in the Front Line and Human Rights are Women’s Rights
were AI’s first comprehensive international research and campaign activities
addressing cases of VAW as covered by the mandate. The 1995 campaign fo-
cused on a range of women-specific human rights violations covered by the
mandate and tackled states’ responsibility to end VAW committed by private
actors, such as trafficking or FGM. Nevertheless, AI still defined itself as a
65 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “Il n’y avait pas systématiquement tous les rap-
ports qui parlait de ça mais dès le moment ou après toutes les sections se sont mise à travailler
par rapport à la conférence de Beijing il y a un espèce de awareness building dans la mentalité
des gens.”.
66 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
67 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.10; Amnesty International, International
Secretariat und Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 1997 Meeting of the
Intersectional Women’s Network (IWN), May 1997.
68 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.11-12.
69 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.11.
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movement “that works to prevent some of the gravest violations by govern-
ments of people’s fundamental human rights.”70 Even though archive mate-
rials do not allow me to define the exact financial and personal resources AI
destined to the activities related to the fourth WCW, compared to the pilot
project and the Women in the Front Line report, which was mainly carried out
by a team of two officials at the US section and the IS, AI substantially in-
creased the financial and personal resources available for the Human Rights
are Women’s Rights campaign. More importantly, through the 1995 campaign
and its active participation in the fourth WCW, AI enhanced its staff and ac-
tivists’ awareness of women’s rights and became a valuable partner of women’s
rights organizations in their struggle to make the international community
consider women’s rights as human rights.
The campaign has been criticized for “continue[ing] to reproduce an im-
age of passive, dependent women who need paternal families and states to
protect them.” As explained by Bahar, “this image ultimately relies on assump-
tions of a patriarchal family where female child-rearers depend on strong
male figures for protection.”71 In addition to specific women’s rights activ-
ities, such as the 1991 report and the 1995 campaign, by the late 1990s the
organization had started to consider the issue of VAW in broader thematic
campaigns, such as the one on torture, within which AI considered VAW in
the private sphere as an act of torture for the first time.
7.1.2.3 Take a Step to Stamp Out Torture
The Take a Step to Stamp Out Torture campaign was launched in October 2000
and can be considered the most important example of the integration of VAW
into a thematic campaign. More important, it was the first international the-
matic campaign where AI defined VAW in the private sphere as an act of
torture. According to an interviewee, the campaign signaled the beginning of
AI’s work on women’s rights in the private sphere: “AI started doing women’s
rights work and LGBT and sexuality work under the torture campaign.”72 In
fact, identity-based abuses such as torture based on gender, sexuality or race
constituted core issues of the campaign. In the main campaign document, AI
explains that “Many forms of violence against women in the home and in the
70 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Campaign on women and human
rights - theme leaflets, 07.03.1995, p.2.
71 Bahar 1996, p.117.
72 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
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community may also constitute torture or ill-treatment.The harm inflicted is
often the same or comparable to that which is inflicted on women who are
tortured in custody.”73
The IS published a specific report on torture and ill-treatment of women
within the campaign, underlining AI’s aim of holding “states accountable for
all acts of torture of women, whatever the context in which they are commit-
ted and whoever is the perpetrator.”74 In fact, by defining cases of VAW in the
private sphere as acts of torture, AI applied the International Convention on
Torture, a “hard” human rights standard, to women. The work on VAW car-
ried out within the torture campaign was significant, as “Under the rubric [of
the torture campaign AI] first began to do the sexuality work using one of the
hardest standards in international law, hard law, black letter law, it is an abso-
lute standard, there is no excuse to undermine it.”75 However, as I show later,
this new approach seems to have been unsustainable in the SVAW campaign.
AI “moved from ‘black letter standard’ to soft law”76 addressing VAW in the
private sphere, such as domestic violence, not as a matter of state account-
ability but foremost under the concept of due diligence entailing a focus “on
the state obligation to create conditions to prevent and adequately respond
to violence against women perpetrated by non-state actors.”77
Summing up, the present section has highlighted the ways in which AI
initially integrated VAW into its activities respecting the boundaries of the
mandate and shown that AI’s work evolved considerably between 1989 and
2001. Whereas the report Women in the Front Line focused on gender-based
violence in state custody and highlighted patterns of political persecutions of
women, theHumanRights areWomen’s Rights campaign focused on torture, the
death penalty, extra-judicial executions, and disappearances as they affected
women. It also tackled states’ responsibility to end VAW committed by private
actors such as trafficking or FGM.However, similar to its first report, the state
remained the primary addressee of the organization’s demands to prevent
and condemn VAW. By independently considering all forms of VAW as acts
73 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Take A Step To Stamp Out Torture,
2000, p.28.
74 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Broken bodies, shatteredminds Tor-
ture and ill-treatment of women, 2001, p.4.
75 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
76 Ganzfried: Correction of citations A.W., 22.08.2018.
77 Benninger-Budel 2008.
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of torture, whatever their context and whoever their perpetrator, the Take a
Step to Stamp Out Torture campaign can be seen as AI’s first effective attempt
to campaign against VAW in the private sphere.
Even though AI’s activities on the issue of VAW increased tremendously
during the 1990s, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, an internal re-
port from 2000 stated: “the sum of all activities undertaken since 1995 does
not amount to institutionalization nor does it amount to sustainability.”78
Evidence indicates that despite the intensification of its fundraising efforts
and the reallocation of resources following the 1995 ICM, a lack of resources
continued to plague efforts to make women’s rights an integral part of AI’s
work. 79 For example, the medium priority given to the execution of a gender
audit in the LAP (decision 32 of the 1997 ICM) and financial cuts in the IS
impeded the realization of a comprehensive gender-based evaluation of the
whole movement as demanded at the 1997 ICM.80
The previous two sections have delineated policy developments regarding
VAW and emphasized the evolution of AI’s body of work. However, they have
remained silent on the origins of this progress.The following section fills this
knowledge gap and shows that feminist strategizing is key in comprehending
why AI started to do work on VAW and in understanding the subsequent
increase in the latter.
7.1.3 Feminist strategizing
As mentioned in chapter 2.3, external and internal factors are known to have
contributed to AI’s growing interest in issues of VAW.The changing patterns
of human rights violations contributed to making AI question its state-
focused mandate,81 thereby facilitating work on violations of women’s rights.
Further, the growing international awareness of gender equality stemming
from the UN Decade for Women 1975-1985 and the related WCWs, especially
78 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Final Implementation Report of the
Ljubljana Action Plan, 1996-2000, July 2000, p.8.
79 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Evaluation of Theme Campaign -
Women and Human Rights, October 1996, p.15.
80 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Letter fromHabibaHasan (IECmem-
ber with brief on Women & gender) giving an update on the Gender Audit and Inter-
sectional Women’s Network, November 1998.
81 Thakur 1994; Pack 1999.
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the conference in Beijing, affected AI’s approach to women’s rights.82 At the
same time, the international women’s rights movement challenged main-
stream human rights organizations, such as AI, to expand their mandate
to violations of human rights in the private sphere.83 The positive stance
of the SG Pierre Sané, who “took a leading role in enunciating Amnesty’s
support for women’s rights […],”84 the growing number of women occupying
management positions at the IS, and activists’ lobbying the organization to
work on women’s rights more seriously are all internal factors known to have
contributed to AI’s increasing interest in issues of VAW.
Aware of these external and internal factors, the present section demon-
strates that the feminist strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing
were crucial in increasing AI’s interest in issues of VAW. They also explain
the decision to launch a first global theme campaign on VAW. Even though
female activists and officials within AI would not necessarily have perceived
their strategies as feminist, I define them as feminist because they were set
up by women and ultimately challenged the underlining gender hierarchy in-
herent to AI’s conception of human rights.85
I argue that by setting up the IWN, female activists and officials were
able to internally lobby to increase AI’s work on violations of women’s rights
in an effective way. Organizing in an intersectional network allowed female
activists and officials to reach out to the whole AI movement and find ma-
jorities for their demands at the ICMs. Parallel networking was thus one of the
strategies used to influence AI’s agenda. I call the strategy parallel networking
because the IWN was based on AI’s overall transnational-network structure.
At the same time, female activists and officials called for an increase in AI’s
work on women’s rights within the frame of the mandate. They thus used a
strategy of analogous framing because by demanding an intensification of the
organization’s work on violations of women’s civil and political rights, rather
than calling for the end of AI’s state-focused mandate, they framed their de-
mand in a manner analogous to AI’s overall policy. Similar to the strategy of
parallel networking, this strategy was crucial in making AI increase its work on
VAW because it allowed female activists to garner the majority of the move-
ment’s support to engage more seriously with women’s rights.
82 Bunch 2001.
83 Bahar 1996.
84 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.4.
85 Sperling et al. 2001.
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The section begins by providing initial evidence of the IWN as a vector for
change in the 1990s. It proceeds to trace the foundation of the network and
highlight female activists’ role in initiating AI’s work on violations of women’s
rights that falls within AI’s mandate in the late 1980s. The section follows up
by highlighting the lack of sustainability of the pilot project for decentralized
work on women established following decision 15 (1989 ICM). The section on
the UNConference onHuman Rights and the fourthWCWdemonstrates how
IWN members continued to push the implementation of decision 15 of the
1989 ICM and the adoption of the related follow-up decision at the 1995 ICM
(decision 20). In particular, the 1995 WCW in Beijing became a window of op-
portunity for the lobbying efforts of female activists and officials who wanted
the organization to increase its work on VAW and facilitate the integration
process. Later, the section illustrates that with the appointment of an IWN
coordinator at the IS, the network members changed their lobbying efforts
and began to target the essence of AI’s work, namely research. The section
concludes by establishing that continuing pressure from female activists and
officials at various levels organized in the IWN finally led the IEC to decide
to launch AI’s first global thematic campaign on VAW in 2001.
Several archive documents and secondary publications illustrate the im-
portance of the IWN for making AI increase its work on issues of VAW. This
significance proves the existence and the effectiveness of a feminist strategy of
parallel networking. Internal voices from both the IS and sections emphasized
the network’s importance “[…] in raising the profile of AI’s work on women’s
rights in their countries as well as globally.”86They identified the IWN as “re-
sponsible for many of the strides made in AI’s work on women’s rights and in
particular on VAWprior to the launch of the SVAW campaign.”87 According to
Kelleher and Bhattacharjya (2013), “The IWN […] contributed to the pressure
on the IS to bring women’s rights to their work.”88 IWNmembers themselves
emphasized their network’s substantial contribution to monitoring the insti-
86 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 2002 Intersectional Women’s Net-
work (IWN) Meeting, October 2001, p.1.
87 Amnesty International: AI and a new internationalwomen’s rights network,November
2009, p.6.
88 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.3.
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tutionalization of gender within AI89 and qualified it as a vector for change
for the sections.90
In fact, the IWN was founded by female activists as an intersectional ad-
visory group with expertise on women’s rights issues in the early 1990s.While
de facto open to all members, the network was mainly composed of female
activists and officials.91 It developed from “an informal grouping of women’s
activists”92 without a formal standing in 1991 into an officially recognized net-
work93 of 58 sections by 2001.94 According to an IS document:
“the IWNhas evolved over the years froma loose and informal structurewith
most of itsmembers not having a formal status in sections to a network com-
posed of individuals or groups or networks or committees set up by sections
to specialize on their work on women’s rights.”95
Combining the IWN’s significance in causing AI to strengthen its work on is-
sues of VAWwith the fact that all previously described ICM decisions directly
concerning VAW (underlined in Figure 4) were based on resolutions initiated
by sections (Figure 4)96 suggests that the members of the IWN must have
pushed policy developments in AI’s work on issues of VAW. In fact, I show
89 Amnesty International, International Secretariat und Amnesty International, Interna-
tional Secretariat: 1997 Meeting of the Intersectional Women’s Network (IWN), May
1997, p.7.
90 C. und C.: IWNmeeting, April 2002.
91 Amnesty International: Amnesty International IntersectionalWomen’sNetworkMem-
ber List, 1995; Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 2002 Intersectional
Women’sNetwork (IWN)Meeting,October 2001; Amnesty International, International
Secretariat: Information pack for Intersectional Women’s Network, May 2001
92 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Letter fromHabibaHasan (IECmem-
ber with brief on Women & gender) giving an update on the Gender Audit and Inter-
sectional Women’s Network, November 1998, p.2.
93 The IEC approved the IWN’s Terms of References (TORs) in April 1998 (Amnesty In-
ternational, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin No. 23, April
1998b).
94 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Information pack for Intersectional
Women’s Network, May 2001.
95 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Information pack for Intersectional
Women’s Network, May 2001.
96 Decision 6 of the 1995 ICMgoes back to an initiative of the Luxembourg section (formu-
lated in decision 10 of the 1993 ICM) instructing the IEC to present recommendations
on howAI should deal with FGMat the next ICM (Amnesty International, International
Secretariat: The Decisions of the 1993 ICM, 30.09.1993, p.14).
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that the members of the IWN mostly concentrated on the adoption and im-
plementation of those decisions made at the 1989, 1995, and 1997 ICMs that
called for an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights within the mandate (un-
derlined and in italic in Figure 4). I thus present analogous framing as one of
the strategies female activists and officials employed to affect AI. Female ac-
tivists also seemed to have initiated policy development on FGM: “working on
the issue of FGM was, at the time, a demand from the women of the South,
from African women.”97 However, this concern was not the focus of the IWN’s
lobbying efforts. 98
Figure 4: The origin of ICM decisions
Source: ICM reports
Months of internal discussions and lobbying from female AI section ac-
tivists heralded the adoption of decision 15 at the 1989 ICM. In fact, activists’
complains about the systematic under-representation of women in the cases
investigated by AI dates back to the late 1980s.99 In this period, the lack of
cases involving women seemed striking: “In 1987, of the thirty-three prisoner
cases carried in Amnesty’s International Newsletter, only three were women
and, of the eleven cases initially highlighted in 1988 as part of the ‘Human
97 Ganzfried: Interview with B.N., 06.06.2013: “De travailler contre les mutilations génitales,
c'était une demande à l'époque des femmes du Sud, donc des femmes africaines […].”Ganzfried:
Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012.
98 The composition of the IWN,whosemembersmostly came fromWestern sectionsmay
be one reason for this focus. In fact, in 1995, only 1 of 30members came from an African
section (namely Tanzania).
99 Roach 1994.
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Rights Now!’ tour, only one was a woman.”100 The following statement color-
fully illustrates the activists’ concern about the absence of women among AI
cases from AIUSA’s perspective:
“In 1988, Amnesty members from around the United States came together
in a membership meeting and they said, ‘You know, we’ve got some reports,
we’ve looked at the materials, and women are really just missing. These are
great reports and they are really important. But turning the pages, what you
have is case of man after man after man after man—on whose behalf we do
want to work. But where are the women?’”101
As a result, in 1989, US section members used an Annual General Meeting
Resolution to call upon AIUSA to strengthen work on behalf of the protection
of women’s human rights.102 A large majority of AIUSA members accepted
the resolution. The section’s board of directors sent a letter to the IEC and
to the IS notifying them, among other things, that “Work on women needs
to be more comprehensive and visible at every level of the movement”103 and
offering “to help in any feasible way, including devoting additional resources
to the task.”104
Because they “were really sick and tired of the IS becoming very gender
blind,”105 AI members in Germany, Switzerland, Britain, and Ireland pres-
sured their sections to demand a better integration of women’s rights into
AI’s overall work from the SG and the IEC, as well.106 These section initia-
tives heralded the forming of the IWN.
Then, at the 1989 ICM, a group of section delegates gathered together in an
informal meeting to talk about the issue of how to start working on women’s
rights and “brought back a resolution to the full body that called for strength-
ening Amnesty’s work for women at every level of the organization.”107 The
100 Hopgood 2006, p.152.
101 Roach 1994.
102 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994.
103 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
104 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
105 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
106 Roach 1994.
107 Roach 1994, p.10.
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resolution was subsequently adopted as decision 15. The adoption of decision
15 can be interpreted as the first success of the feminist strategy of analogous
framing, as the decision called on “the movement to strengthen its work on
behalf of women”108 as covered by the mandate. During this informal meet-
ing, the participants agreed to develop a “network of representatives from
Amnesty sections and groups around the world interested in promoting AI’s
work for women”109 and decided that AIUSA should coordinate the develop-
ment of the network.110
Consequently, this informal meeting of female delegates at the 1989 ICM
can be seen as the origin of the IWN or the beginning of a feminist strategy of
parallel networkingmeant to make AI increase its work on women’s rights. The
testimony of a participant in the informal meeting at the 1989 ICM reveals
the female activists’ hope about this first achievement: “We were so happy
when we heard [that the resolution passed].We thought, ‘This is it! This is the
breakthrough. This is what we’ve been waiting for.’”111
The IWN was established (without having recognized Terms of Refer-
ences) at the first intersectional meeting on AI’s work on women’s rights in
Geneva in February 1991. This first intersectional meeting112 was meant to
push the further development of AI’s work for the protection of women’s hu-
man rights.The Swiss and the US sections co-hosted the gathering113 and the
engagement of individual female activists seems to have been important for
the organization of the event, as the Swiss section initially refused to organize
the meeting because of the lack of “logistic possibilities to do it.”114The efforts
of some female activists finally made it possible to organize the conference in
Geneva. The results of the meeting, attended by representatives from 26 sec-
tions, were the forming of the IWN and the adoption of recommendations,
108 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
109 Amnesty International: Report of the Intersectional Meeting on Women and Human
Rights, August 1991.
110 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the IntersectionalMeeting
on Women and Human Rights, August 1991, p.2.
111 Roach 1994, p.10-11.
112 The 1991 meeting was later referred to as the first meeting of the IWN.
113 Amnesty International: Report of the Intersectional Meeting on Women and Human
Rights, August 1991.
114 Ganzfried: Interview with A.B., 12.04.2012.
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which “were [subsequently] sent to the IS, IEC, and all sections.”115 Neverthe-
less, as I detail hereafter, except for the establishment of the IWN,most of the
recommendations have not been implemented because of the lack of financial
and personnel resources.116
In parallel with the forming of the IWN and as a result of the decision 15
(1989 ICM), the IS and AIUSA worked out the pilot project for decentralized
work on women, according to which an AIUSA staff member “worked part
time as a member of the IS campaign unit to ensure the integration of work
for women in campaigns and actions.”117 Additionally, the IS “target sector
coordinator who was also responsible for trade unionists, children, religious
groups, journalists, engineers, etc.”118 was given “women” as an additional tar-
get sector.119 In a separate arrangement, an AIUSA staff member was given
permission to “research IS material on women” 120 and the AIUSA women’s
task force identified “patterns of abuse that were gender-based.”121 The out-
come of these efforts was the publication of AI’s first comprehensive report on
the violation of women’s rights,Women in the Front Line, in March 1991. How-
ever, this first “substantive and effective work”122 on women rights violations
was not sustained. By the end of the pilot project in 1993, the work on women’s
rights issues was handed over to two IS staff persons already responsible for
work on the death penalty, political killings, and disappearances. These staff
members “made it clear they had no time or resources to devote to women’s
115 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
116 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994; Amnesty International: Internationale Tagung über die ai-Kampagne für
die Menschenrechte von Frauen, Bonn, 16.-18. September 1994, October 1994.
117 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
118 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.2.
119 AIUSA, 1994 Annual General Meeting, June 10-12, Chicago, Illinois, Doc. 052.013, 49.
120 AIUSA, 1994 Annual General Meeting, June 10-12, Chicago, Illinois, Doc. 052.013, 49.
121 Roach 1994, p.11.
122 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.3.
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human rights issues.”123 Further, the funding of the IWN was neither truly
clarified nor sufficient in the first years.124
Concerned about the decline in work onwomen’s human rights violations,
the Canadian and the US sections pushed for an improvement by writing let-
ters to the SG and the IEC. In a letter addressed to Pierre Sané, the Canadians
expressed their “anxiety regarding the inadequate level of activity within AI
concerning human rights violations against women”125 and asked “that the
steps taken by AI towards addressing human rights violations against women
be strengthened, as per 1989 ICM Decision 15 […].”126 At the same time, the
Chair of the AIUSA Board of Directors urged the IEC to make a commitment
and allocate resources to ensure “that a focus on women is automatically inte-
grated into our ongoing work including research, campaigns, press and pub-
lications.”127These letters were not signed by IWN members. However, given
that the AIUSA member of the IWN had been especially engaged in pushing
AI to increase its work on women’s rights violations and that she continued to
push her section in this regard, it is worth assuming that IWNmembersmust
have been behind these initiatives. Further, as I show subsequently, the IWN
members of the US and the Canadian sections were particularly engaged in
pressuring their section to make the movement strengthen its work on viola-
tions of women’s rights.
Even though the IWN coordinator described her network at the time of
the 1993 ICM as “not organized,”128 IWN members capitalized on the UN
Conference on Human Rights in 1993. In fact, IWN members from different
AI sections129 organized a meeting titled “AI and Women’s Human Rights”
during the conference and reiterated “their concerns regarding the inade-
quate level of activity within AI concerning human rights violations against
123 Amnesty International: Amnesty International USA 1994 Annual General Meeting,
10.06.1994, p.3.
124 Amnesty International: Internationale Tagung über die ai-Kampagne für die Men-
schenrechte von Frauen, Bonn, 16.-18. September 1994, October 1994.
125 Amnesty International: Letter to the IS concerning AI’s work on women’s rights,
27.04.1993, p.1.
126 Amnesty International: Letter to the IS concerning AI’s work on women’s rights,
27.04.1993, p.2.
127 Amnesty International: Letter from the Chair of the Board of Directors of AIUSA to the
Chair of the IEC, 10.05.1993, p.1.
128 Roach 1994, p.11.
129 The Austrian, British, Canadian, Dominican, German, and the US sections.
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women.”130 During this meeting the IWN members agreed to urge their re-
spective sections to send letters similar to those previously issued by the US
and the Canadian sections. Further, they agreed to ask their delegates to the
1993 ICM to push for a major campaign on women’s human rights violations
around the 1995 WCW.131
As a result, several sections finally complained about the poor implemen-
tation of decision 15 (1989 ICM) to the IEC132 and others intervened at the
1993 ICM. The German section, for example, submitted a resolution133 to the
1993 ICM asking to “capitalize on the event of the UN World Conference on
Women to be held in Beijing in 1995 to campaign on human rights violations
against women.”134 The Austrian section actively supported the German res-
olution in a letter to the ICM delegation and to the German section.135 At the
1993 ICM itself, the IWN members “got [their] directors to complain and say
that [they] absolutely had to do better work than [what they] had been do-
ing.”136 Additionally, the AIUSAWomen’s Human Rights Steering Committee
called the SG and the IEC to undertake additional steps to strengthen its work
on women’s rights in October 1993.137
Following these diverse lobbying efforts from IWN members, the IEC or-
ganized a movement-wide consultation on a possible theme campaign and
decided (based on its outcome) to launch a campaign on human rights viola-
tions against women in view of the upcoming fourthWCW.138 Additionally, by
mid-1994 the IEC assigned amember of the IWN as the first holder of the Spe-
130 Amnesty International: Minutes of the meeting “AI and Women’s Human Rights” at
the UNWorld Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1993, p.1.
131 Amnesty International: Minutes of the meeting “AI and Women’s Human Rights” at
the UNWorld Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1993.
132 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the meeting of the IEC 15-
18 April 1994, 26.07.1994, p.39.
133 Resolution B37, see appendix 2.
134 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 21th International Council Meeting
Report and Decisions, Resolutions referred to the IEC, 1993, p.94.
135 Amnesty International: Letter from the Austrian Section to the ICM Delegation 1993
and to the German section, 07.07.1993.
136 Roach 1994, p.11.
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cial Brief onWomen139 within the IEC with the objective of increasing the at-
tention to women’s rights at all levels, especially within research, ICM resolu-
tions, campaigns, and publications.140 Having a representative within the IEC
marked an important advance for the IWN members, as their demands were
backed from within an AI’s governing body from then on. Whereas archive
material does not allow me to determine the exact origin of the idea to estab-
lish this Special Brief, the following extract from the IEC meeting shows that
the IWN clearly backed its creation: “there has been support from sections,
namely the inter-sectional network, for the development of the Brief.”141
The IWNwas closely involved in the planning and organization of theHu-
man Rights are Women’s Rights campaign and used the opportunity presented
by the fourth WCW to continue pressuring for sustained work on women’s
rights within the whole movement. At the international consultation meeting
for the preparation of the Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign in Bonn
in September 1994,142 which was initiated by the German section’s member
of the IWN, the IWN members formulated demands for AI’s future work on
women’s rights.They asked the IEC tomakemore resources at the IS available
for thework onwomen’s rights leading up to Beijing andwanted the IEC-Brief
onWomen to become a permanent institution.143 At the Bonnmeeting,which
became known as the IWN’s second meeting, the IWN additionally agreed to
increasingly target sections “to make them collectively push AI’s work on per-
secuted women and to influence the SCM, the ICM and the IEC.”144
At the same time, as the following extract from a letter from the IWN co-
ordinator to the members indicates, the network continued pushing for the
139 Amnesty International International, Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin
No. 12, 17.10.1995, p.30; Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
140 Gruber und Frauenkommission Sektion der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Letter from
the Women’s group of AI Germany to the AI German section, 05.10.1994, p.2.
141 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report of the meeting of the IEC 15-
18 April 1994, 26.07.1994, p.39.
142 Amnesty International: Internationale Tagung über die ai-Kampagne für die Men-
schenrechte von Frauen, Bonn, 16.-18. September 1994, October 1994.
143 Amnesty International und Stuttard: BonnMeeting - Summary of minutes, 04.11.1994;
Amnesty International und Svorad: Bericht über die Tagung in Bonn, 09.1994.
144 “[I]ndem mehrere Sektionen gemeinsame Vorstösse für verstärkte ai-Arbeit für ver-
folgte Frauen unternehmen und Einfluss aufs SCM, ICM, IEC usw. ausgeübt wird.”
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adoption of another ICMdecision that would force AI to allocate the personnel
and financial resources necessary for sustained work on violations of women’s
rights at all levels: “It is very important that as a network we begin now to
develop a strategy that will ensure strong support from our section ICM del-
egates for allocating resources to support substantive work for women in the
movement.”145
As a result of the IWN members’ lobbying, AI appointed a part-time
women’s rights coordinator at the IS who was responsible for the coordi-
nation of the Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign and of the IWN,
in addition to other briefs. In fact, following a mutual agreement, AIUSA
handed the IWN coordination over to the IS in early 1995.146 As I develop
later, the centralization of the IWN coordination changed the focus of the
IWN members’ lobbying. At the same time, the IWN members’ pressure
on sections also bore fruit. In fact, as a letter from the coordinator to the
IWN members highlights, “in about seven sections around the world, [IWN
members] have brought forward very specific resolutions”147 to submit to
the 1995 ICM.148 In light of the upcoming 1995 ICM, the IWN coordinator
insisted in a letter to the members: “It is urgent that your delegation a.)
Understand and support the resolution, and b.) Be willing to lobby delegates
from other sections to support it as well.”149
Finally, the US, the Canadian, the Austrian, the Irish, the Venezuelan, and
the UK sections submitted three resolutions to the 1995 ICM requesting the
integration of the work onwomen’s rights into AI’s overall work at all levels.150
In resolution B4.2, the US, the Canadian and the Austrian sections called for
the creation of a staff position at the IS responsible for the work on women’s
human rights, among other things.151 By submitting resolution B4.3, the Irish
section called for a clarification of the mandate in order to work on a broad
145 C.: Letter to the IWNmembers, 17.06.1994.
146 See the list with the names of the IWN coordinators in appendix 1. (For a short period
of time (July to September 1995) Susanne Reichinger from AI Germany held the role of
coordinator.).
147 Roach 1994, p.11.
148 Amnesty International: Internationale Tagung über die ai-Kampagne für die Men-
schenrechte von Frauen, Bonn, 16.-18. September 1994, October 1994, p.6.
149 C.: Letter to the IWNmembers, 10.03.1995.
150 For details on the resolutions, see appendix 2.
151 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: International Council 1995 Circular
XII, 03.03.1995.
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number of violations of women’s human rights.TheUK section demanded the
organization of a movement-wide gender analysis of its structure and work
in resolution B4.4. Decision 20 of the 1995 ICM integrated all the demands
brought forward in these resolutions except for the request of a comprehen-
sive gender audit.
Thus, the female activists’ and officials’ strategies of parallel networking and
analogous framing reaped its first successes by 1995. After the adoption of the
first ICM decision calling for increased attention and resources for work on
human rights violations against women at the 1989 ICM, female activists and
officials forced the movement to further increase its work on this issue in
decision 20 of the 1995 ICM. Organizing in an intersectional network and
formulating their demands in accordance with the mandate were pivotal for
the achievements at the policy level as this allowed them to reach out to the
whole AI movement and build majorities for their demands at the ICMs. In
their quest, the fourth WCW appeared as a window of opportunity to enable
female activists and officials to enhance their lobbying efforts and make AI
launch its first major theme campaign on women’s rights. The creation of the
Special Brief on Women at the IEC and the appointment of a women’s rights
coordinator at the IS, whose responsibilities included coordinating the IWN,
can also be considered a consequence of the IWN members’ lobbying efforts.
The feminist strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing were
also bearing fruit at the national level. In fact, as revealed in the IWN sur-
vey, most of the sections developed their work on women’s rights around the
1995 campaign: “Although some sections’ work on women’s rights dates back
to the 1980s, most (92%) has been established since 1991. 75% of the sections
have established their work on women’s rights since the 1995 campaign.”152
Many national women’s groups or networks formed after 1995, and some sec-
tions appointed women’s rights coordinators in charge of the coordination of
activities on the issues with the IS and other sections.153 In many cases, these
sectional focal points were members of the IWN at the same time. I detail
the development of the work on VAW within sections in the upcoming pages
about the Swiss and the German sections.
152 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: AI Intersectional Women’s Network
Survey 2001 - Brief Overview of Results, 2002.
153 Amnesty International, International Secretariat und Amnesty International, Interna-
tional Secretariat: 1997 Meeting of the Intersectional Women’s Network (IWN), May
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As I have highlighted before, until the 1995 campaign, the women orga-
nized in the IWN mostly lobbied their sections, the SG, and the IEC in order
to make AI increase its work on women’s rights, focusing on decision-mak-
ing and implementation. With the centralization of the IWN coordination
at the IS, the IWN also increasingly emphasized the lifeline of the organiza-
tion namely, research. Having evaluated the movement’s achievements with
respect to the IWN goals by the end of the 1995 campaign, an interviewee ex-
plained: “we [the IWN] have done very well in our contacts with the women’s
movement, we have done very well in terms of strengthening our female ac-
tivists, we have done very well in terms of our presence at the UN but ‘What
do we do with research?’”154 As the following statement shows, and as I de-
velop further hereafter, the new IWN coordinator at the IS established her
own strategy to make AI increase its work on women’s rights issues:
“[She] took [her] briefs, [she] developed [her own strategy that [she] will
make use of the section’s network of women focal points […]. So together
with them [she] strategized, [she] built their capacities, [she] gave them a
bigger voice in Amnesty in terms of criticizingAmnesty’s reportswhere there
could have been more visibility for women, etc. etc.”155
In fact, a group of officials at the IS clustered around the IWN coordinator
organized the systemization of gender analysis in AI’s research reports. As a
consequence of decisions 20 of the 1995 ICM, the SG appointed Agnes Calla-
mard, a women’s rights activist and academic, to the position of Research-
Policy Coordinator to help build the researchers’ capacities for gender analysis
in 1997.156 As an informant explains, whereas the IWN coordinator was more
“a campaign and capacity building person,”157 Callamard brought along a
“solid background in terms of policy and developing research frameworks”158
and therefore, had the necessary “credibility to provide [the researchers] with
tools for gender analysis.”159 Additionally, another colleague “was looking at
what is Amnesty’s state in terms of IGO at the UN.”160 According to the same
154 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
155 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
156 Later Agnes Callamard led AI’s policy work and research onwomen’s human rights and
served as Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary General from 1998 until 2001.
157 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
158 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
159 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
160 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
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interviewee, they started to build “a family’s caucus inside the IS,”161 a “pool
of researchers who [were] at least gender sensitive, if not feminist.”162Thus, a
“triumvirate”163 had organized within the IS by the year 1997 in order to make
AI’s research more gender sensitive by producing “some groundbreaking re-
ports so that it would set a precedent, some kind of a template for others to
do their thing.”164
Similarly, the IWN members lobbied to abandon the WOOC rule be-
cause “unless Amnesty’s sections could become an important voice in their
own country, we will never be able to gain full credibility in the eyes of
the women’s movement.”165 As mentioned before, AI finally cancelled the
WOOC rule, opening the way for sections to undertake their own research on
violations of women’s rights in 2001. What my informant labeled the “caucus
of feminists and advocates of gender within the IS”166 was officially known
as the Gender Forum.167 This forum aimed at providing strategic advice in
the implementation of the objectives fixed in AI’s strategic plan (the LAP)
regarding women’s rights.168 Curiously, in contrast to the IWN coordinator,
who emphasized the pivotal role of the “caucus of feminists,” information
about the Gender Forum found in archive documents was scarce. The lack of
written data indicates that the triumvirate’s strategy of making the research
more gender sensitive was not straightforward but obviously hidden and not
openly communicated.
Evidence indicates that systematized gender analysis in AI’s research was
difficult.While “the number of IS staffmemberswho haveworked onwomen’s
issues or are expressing interest in doing so has increased”169 and “women’s
human rights violations are integrated in the planning and implementation
161 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
162 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
163 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
164 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
165 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
166 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
167 Mentioned as one of the “Institutional measures” AI put in place in chapter 7.1.2.
168 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: International Secretariat Opera-
tional Plan 1996-97, 27.09.1996, p.16.
169 Amnesty International, International Secretariat und Amnesty International, Interna-
tional Secretariat: 1997 Meeting of the Intersectional Women’s Network (IWN), May
1997, p.7.
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of all campaigns,”170 the IWN criticized that “the manner by which women’s
rights are reflected in the overall research and actions produced by the IS
are inconsistent and unsustainable”171 and that “contextual information that
would highlight the gender-based background of human rights violations
against women (e.g. cultural issues) is lacking in IS’s research.”172 Addition-
ally, between 1996 and 2000, the overwhelmingmajority of individual AI cases
continued to prioritize men.The report on the implementation of the LAP re-
vealed that in this period, 3,013 cases focused on men while 192 focused on
women.173
Concerned about the inconsistency and un-sustainability of how women’s
rights are reflected in research and actions carried out by the IS, the IWN
members stressed the importance of the IEC taking the leading role inmaking
women’s rights an integral part of AI’s overall work at its third meeting in
January 1997.174 In their letter to the IEC, the participants in the IWNmeeting
stressed:
“the overwhelming sense of the meeting is that the IEC must take the lead
in ensuring that the movement takes a hard, clear look at the reality of AI’s
work on women, and develop clear mechanisms of accountability to ensure
that the organization is moving systematically to institutionalize and op-
erationalize ICM commitments to increase AI’s effective work to promote
women’s human rights.”175
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Stressing the IWN’s pivotal role for the organization’s work on women’s
rights, the participants in the IWN meeting remarked: “our work can only
[be] as powerful as our institutionalized support”176 nodding to the IEC.
Beside lobbying the IEC, individual sections continued to pressure AI’s
decision-making organs leading up to the ICM. Such was the case of the
Australian section, headed at the time by Kate Gilmore,177 who was known as
a “women’s rights advocate”178 and future Deputy Secretary General. In fact,
the Australian section submitted resolution C1.3.1 to the 1997 ICM (finally
accepted as decision 32), calling for a global gender analysis of AI’s work.
By 1998, the remaining pressure from the IWN seemed to have borne fruit.
In fact, in response to IWN’s demands, the IEC declared that “the work on
women should not be marginalized or developed as a ‘special project’”179 but
should be integrated “into the regular work of the IS.”180 And, in April 1998,
the IEC approved the IWN’s TORs,181 giving the network a formal standing
within AI after years of informal existence. Additionally, the IEC finally allo-
cated the resources necessary for a gender audit between 2000 and 2002.182 It
thereby responded to an old IWN request formulated in resolution B4.4 to the
1995 ICM, which was reiterated in the Australian resolution C1.3.1 to the 1997
ICM. Declaring that it had “recognized the need to consolidate, sustain and
institutionalize work on women’s rights violations,”183 the IEC “called for the
integration of a movement-wide gender-sensitive perspective to AI work.”184
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At the same time, female section secretary generals maintained the same
pressure during the following ICM. In fact, at the 1999 ICM, the Australian
section’s secretary general pledged to develop a strategy to fully integrate
women’s rights into AI’s work. Barbara Lochbihler,185 secretary general of the
German section, expressed the German section’s concern about the decline of
AI’s work on women’s rights. At the same time, AIUSA “suggested to create a
gender unit in the IS.”186
Parallel to this, IWN members pushed to make the organization appoint
its first female SG. One of my interviewees explained:
“by 2000, […] this pressure on Amnestywas sustained over time, because you
have a milestone that helps us. So, every five years...so Beijing plus five, Bei-
jing plus ten, we have thosemilestones to be able to sustain themomentum
also within the organization. So, the year 2000, the milestone, was to have a
woman Secretary General.”187
In fact, the nominations of Irene Khan and Kate Gilmore, who was known
as a “relatively high-profile figure in women’s rights in Australia,”188 should
underscore the organization’s willingness and credibility to engage in human
rights work on VAW. An interviewee explained: “it was very clear that the
board would appoint a Secretary General who would be a woman, so that the
public would see at the highest position, at the highest office of Amnesty, we
have a public face who is a woman.”189
Finally, in the beginning of 2001, the IEC decided tomake violence against
women the topic of its first global thematic campaign under the mission
from 2003 onwards, picking the issue from a list of themes such as the death
penalty, children’s rights, economic actors, refugee rights, the rights of in-
digenous people, and land rights and poverty.190 In the same year, the ICMen-
185 Before, she was the director of the Women’s International League for Peace and Free-
dom (WILPF).
186 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 24th In-
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187 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
188 Ganzfried: Interview with B.R., 25.06.2012.
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190 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin
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dorsed the IEC’s proposal of a theme campaign on VAW.191 As I demonstrate
in chapter 8, selecting the issue of VAW for AI’s first global thematic campaign
implied “that it gets very high priority in resources,”192 which needed/called
for an unprecedented commitment from AI’s management. As such, the de-
cision can be interpreted as the fruit of a continuous strategy of parallel net-
working and analogous framing by female activists and officials.
Summing up, in setting up the IWN, female activists and officials built
a strategy to make AI increase its work on issues of VAW which was well
adapted to the overall structure of AI. Linking up with like-minded female
activists and officials beyond their own national sections proved useful for
effectively putting pressure on the organization’s decision-making body, as it
allowed them to reach out to the whole AI movement and find majorities for
their demands at the ICMs. In fact, the strategy of parallel networking first en-
abled the women and officials of different sections to convince their section
delegates to adopt AI’s initial decision demanding an increase in the work
on women’s rights at the 1989 ICM. It then helped them to push sections to
submit resolutions raising the same demands to the 1995 ICM and to lobby
their ICM section delegates to vote for these resolutions. The female activists
and officials lobbying for the adoption of decision 15 at the 1989 ICM and for
decision 20 at the 1995 ICM further indicate that they wanted first and fore-
most an intensification of the organization’s work on violations of women’s
rights within the frame of the mandate. Their strategy of making AI increase
its work on violations of women’s rights was thus formulated in compliance
with the overall policy of the organization.
The strategy of analogous framing was crucial in making AI increase its
work on women’s rights because it allowed the same activists to compel the
majority of the movement to support their claim. Given the long-lasting sig-
nificance of the state-focused mandate for AI’s human rights work and the
important debates occurring around the question of whether and to what ex-
tent AI should open its mandate to abuses committed by non-state actors, it
is worth assuming that a strategy challenging the essence of AI’s work would
have been less successful. Further, taking advantage of the 1993 UN Confer-
ence on Human Rights and the fourth WCW, female activists and officials
191 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin
37, July 2001, p.13; Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Action Planning
Bulletin November 2001, November 2001.
192 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
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who were organized in the IWN successfully pressured the IEC to mind the
effective implementation of the ICM decisions (15 ICM 1989 and 20 ICM 1995).
In turn, this finally led to the creation of the Special Brief on Women within
the IEC and to the appointment of a women’s coordinator at the IS. The cre-
ation of the position of a women’s rights coordinator at the IS in 1995 changed
things and made women organized in the IWN adapt their objectives to this
achievement. From then on, a triumvirate of women’s rights advocates at the
IS engaged in making the core of AI’s work, namely research, gender sensi-
tive.
Nevertheless, as the continuing pressure of the IWN on the IEC indicates,
the strategy of parallel networking remained crucial for female activists and
officials. At the same time, the women organized in the IWNmaintained their
strategy of analogous framing as decision 32 of the 1997 ICM demonstrates.
Finally, both of these strategies were important in making AI decide to launch
its first long-term thematic campaign under the mission on the issue of VAW.
They enabled the effective lobbying of sections, the IEC, and the SG, which in
turn allowed women to convince the organization of the necessity to further
strengthen its work on violations of women’s’ rights.
Consequently, female activists played a central role in initiating AI’s work
on women’s rights at the end of the 1980s, and a subsequent bottom-up pro-
cess of integrating VAW into AI’s activities culminated in the SVAW campaign
at the beginning of the 2000s. The feminist strategies of parallel networking
and analogous framing are key in understanding AI’s growing interest in is-
sues of VAW and the associated decision to make VAW the topic of AI’s first
long-term thematic campaign under the mission. At the same time, as em-
phasized in chapter 6.2, it is plausible that the growing number of women
in management positions at the IS and the supportive SG Pierre Sané also
played a positive role. Further, external factors such as the opening of the
mandate, the growing international awareness of gender equality stemming
from the UN Decade for Women 1975-1985 and the related WCWs, especially
the conference in Beijing, and the international women’s rights movement
challenging AI to expand their mandate to violations of human rights in the
private sphere also contributed to the transformation process.
7.1.4 AI’s work on women’s rights discussed
With the strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing, female ac-
tivists and officials succeeded in making the organization significantly in-
7. The beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW 147
crease its work on issues of VAW. However, as the present chapter shows,
these achievements met with resistance from sections and from within the
headquarters. I focus on the debates on the adoption of the decisions directly
concerning AI’s work on VAW that took place at the ICMs to demonstrate that
sections discussed and sometimes opposed these decisions, which were part
of the IWN members’ strategy of analogous framing.They sometimes also dis-
agreed with the decisions to integrate the issue of FGM into AI’s promotional
and oppositional work. Nevertheless, resistance against the latter was more
important. Then, the section illustrates that integrating a gender perspective
into AI’s research was not straightforward. In fact, many IS researchers were
reluctant to yield to the IWN demands of integrating a gender perspective
into the reports produced at the IS.
Figure 5 illustrates that, of all ICM decisions directly concerning AI’s work
on VAW, those that followed the IWN member’s strategy of analogous framing
(namely, decision 15 (1989 ICM), decision 20 (1995 IMC), and decision 32 (1997
ICM)) and the decisions demanding the integration of FGM into AI’s promo-
tional and oppositional work (decision 6 of the 1995 and 1997 ICM), caused the
most debates (left column in figure 5). In contrast, the first ICM decision on
FGM, the decision on the UN rapporteur on Women, and decision 9 of the
1995 ICM were not subject to debates (rights column in figure 5).
Figure 5: Debates on the ICM decisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW
Source: my own, based on the reports of the 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997 ICMs.
Based on an analysis of the ICM reports, I first highlight the opposition to
the IWN members’ demand to make AI increase its work on women’s rights
before illustrating the section’s reactions to enlarging AI’s mandate with the
issue of FGM.
The ICM report reveals that, when discussing decision 15 of the 1989 ICM,
“many sections strongly opposed the idea of creating a special category of vic-
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tims of human rights violations, but supported the spirit of the resolution.”193
However, given the adoption of decision 15, it is worth assuming that this
resistance was limited. Discussions at the 1995 ICM crystallized around the
British section’s demand for a movement-wide gender analysis of AI’s struc-
ture and activities (formulated in resolution B4.4).194While the delegates did
discuss the usefulness of the other resolutions demanding an increase in AI’s
work on women’s rights, which were finally adopted as decision 20, they were
profoundly divided on resolution B4.4. In fact, a majority of the delegates
rejected the resolution, questioning its usefulness and concerned about the
costs such a study implied.The Icelandic, Greek, German, and Benin sections,
for example, opposed the resolution saying “it was trying to find a problem
that did not exist.”195 Referring to the debates around the question of a move-
ment-wide gender analysis, one of the delegates reported that “the quality
of the debate […] was extremely disappointing and showed a lack of under-
standing of the issues”196 and a poor understanding of what a gender analysis
might imply.197
Sections did not only disagree on the content of decision 20. Once it was
adopted, sections differed on how the decision should be reflected among
AI’s strategic priorities over the following years. Various sections questioned
the classification of decision 20 as one of LAP’s high priority issues. For in-
stance, the Hong Kong section explained that “Amnesty’s mandate should be
formen,women and children”198 and argued that the disproportional empha-
sis on women in the LAP “might cause problems in that Amnesty’s case-load
would not reflect the importance of children.”199 Similarly, the Danish and the
Swedish sections expressed concern that treating women’s rights separately
193 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 19th
International Council of Amnesty International 19-27 August 1989, Dublin, Ireland,
19.08.1989, p.98.
194 See appendix 2 for details on the resolutions.
195 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.132.
196 Watson 1997, p.7.
197 Watson 1997, p.8.
198 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.21.
199 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.21.
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would make them incorrectly appear as “different from men’s rights,”200 or
as “different to all people’s rights.”201 In contrast, the Dutch section seemed
to have been worried about AI’s ability to oppose violations of women’s rights:
“concentrating too many resources in some situations [of massive human
rights violations] might be wasting them; and special emphasis on women
could be counterproductive if AI has nothing special to offer.”202 Further,
the Philippines section considered “the women’s issues to have been exag-
gerated”203 within the LAP.
Sections discussed the demand to increase work on women’s’ rights with
less controversy two years later. While a majority of the section delegates re-
jected the British resolution for a movement-wide gender policy at the 1995
ICM, they accepted a similar resolution (C1.3.1) from the Australian section
that called for “a global assessment for the whole movement of the work ac-
complished on women’s human rights since 1990”204 at the 1997 ICM. As the
report of the 1997 ICM reveals, the formulation of a demand for a gender as-
sessment (rather than a study) of AI’s structure and activities rendered the
resolution less controversial, finally leading to its acceptance by consensus.
This happened despite some sections’ initial fears that “expressed concern,
given the number of areas covered, that study might be taking precedence
over action.”205
Aside from the three subsequent decisions that raised the same demand
to the movement, the issue of FGM also caused controversy and triggered
some sections’ opposition. As section 7.1.1 explained, it took the organization
four years to move from the adoption of the first decision (10) at the 1993 ICM
to the inclusion of the practice into AI’s oppositional work, reflected in deci-
sion 6 of the 1997 ICM. This comparatively long process already indicates the
200 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.26.
201 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.26.
202 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.26.
203 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.26.
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205 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 23rd International Council Meeting
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controversial character of the issue. An analysis of the ICM reports shows the
content of the debate on the issue among the sections.The delegates approved
decision 10 at the 1993 ICM without opposition, urging the IEC to include the
issue in a study on governmental inaction and instructing the IEC to present
recommendations on how to deal with the issue at the 1995 ICM.
The integration of FGM into AI’s promotional work was subject to inten-
sive discussion before and at the 1995 ICM.The contentious nature of the issue
becomes evident in the number of different resolutions on it that sections sub-
mitted to the 1995 ICM. In addition to an enabling resolution from the IEC,
the Netherlands, the Belgium and the Israeli sections submitted resolutions
to the 1995 ICM.206While these sections finally withdrew their resolutions in
favor of the IEC enabling resolution, the discussions at the ICM concerned
three options proposed in the enabling resolution. The first option called for
the postponement of the issue to the next ICM. The second one suggested
making FGM part of AI’s promotional and educational work, and the third,
most conservative, option recommended refusing the inclusion of FGM into
AI’s work.207
After long discussions, option two garnered greatest support among the
ICM delegates. While some sections suggested amendments to the proposal
to make FGM part of AI’s promotional work, the final resolution integrating
these corrections was finally approved by 33:11 votes to become decision 6. As
the ICM report explains, “the debate was divided between those pushing for
a major expansion of AI’s mandate, and those believing that this whole issue
was confusing to the AI mandate.”208 According to a delegate from the Swiss
section, the opposition essentially came from the Northern sections, which
claimed that this question would divide the movement between the North
and the South.209 An interviewee explained the opposition from some of the
sections by pointing out that FGM was a taboo that should not be touched
upon.210
206 See appendix 2 for the details on the resolutions.
207 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 22nd International Council Meeting,
1995, p.107.
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dire, mais ça c’est un tabou, on ne peut pas toucher à cette problématique.”.
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While in 1995 the debate concerned the question of whether AI should
or should not integrate FGM into its promotional work, two years later the
discussion mainly focused on the way oppositional work on FGM should in-
form AI’s work on non-state actors. Sections presented four different resolu-
tions to the 1997 ICM.This number already indicated the diversity of opinions
concerning AI’s future work on FGM. In their resolution “Gender Distinc-
tion in Genital Mutilation,” the Bermuda section, for example, requested not
to discriminate between male and female genital mutilation. While the ICM
delegates defeated this resolution, they accepted the other three resolutions
jointly presented by the Bermuda, the Ivory Coast, and the UK sections. The
latter called to test the use of oppositional techniques in the case of FGM and
governmental inaction by including the issue in the pilot projects on non-
state actors.211The discussions around the integration of FGM into AI’s work
that took place between 1993 and 1997 were part of the larger debate AI went
through in the 1990s. The latter centered on AI’s position concerning cases of
human rights violations where the state failed to meet its obligation to pre-
vent the abuse.The debates on how AI should work on the issue of FGM were
important because taking action against this practice challenged AI’s state-fo-
cused mandate, as it also meant taking into account human rights violations
perpetrated by individuals.
The analysis of the ICM reports revealed that sections disagreed on the
necessity of increasing AI’s work on violations of women’s rights. Only at the
1997 ICM did a majority of the sections agree upon “the full integration of
women’s human rights in all areas of Amnesty International’s work.”212 The
discussions on the adoption of decision 20 at the ICM reveals the existence of
internal reticence towards an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights. How-
ever, aside from the resolution calling for a movement-wide Gender Policy
at the 1995 ICM, sections did not oppose increasing their work on violations
of women’s rights. In contrast, the debates on the issue of FGM were more
important.They revealed a divide between sections defending AI’s work’s tra-
ditional focus on governments as the primary violator of human rights and
others convinced of the necessity to address the problem of state responsi-
bility for inaction in cases of violations of human rights perpetrated in the
private sphere.
211 As defined in decision 5 of the 1997 ICM.
212 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The Decision of the 1997 ICM,
05.01.1998, p.47.
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Evidence from the secondary literature and interviews indicates that re-
sistance to increasing AI’s work onwomen’s rights also existed at the IS. Kelle-
her and Bhattacharjya (2013) point to the negative reactions the Human Rights
are Women’s Rights campaign received from “conservative members of the IS
who were concerned that women’s rights activists were trying to highjack
Amnesty’s voice.”213 At the same time, the testimony of one ofmy interviewees
reveals the difficulties that plagued the first staff members who integrated a
gender perspective into their research:
“Around 1995 […], I did a report and I had to fight to do a very basic [report].
I used to work on Peru at that time and Ecuador […]. And I pushed to be able
to write a report on women in Peru and the effect on all these women that
had been killed by the Shining Path, the Guerrilla group that was in Peru at
that time. And it was not easy! They all looked atme oh no I will not do any of
that, why? ‘You know how many people are disappearing?’ I know! It wasn’t
easy!”214
Another interviewee mentioned the difficulties the “feminist caucus” at the
IS encountered in its efforts to make AI’s reports more gender sensitive. She
explained that “[The former Research-Policy Coordinator Agnes Callamard]
was trying to bring a gender perspective to Amnesty’s work and I know she
found it very difficult.”215 For Watson (1997), who used to be a member of AI
Australia, the difficulties of integrating a gender perspective into AI had to
do with the fact that by this time, the IS research department was dominated
by men who “have not been particularly receptive in the past to the criticism
that their research strategies have at times been blinkered in ways that mean
that women, and the abuses suffered by them, are not readily uncovered.”216
For another informant the lack of gender analysis in the researchers’ work
can be explained with their fear “that once they opened themselves to having
a gender analysis in their investigations of what happened to women it would
demand a lot of their time, there would be resource implications for them.”217
In a nutshell, the analysis of the ICM reports reveals that sections dis-
agreed on the necessity to increase AI’s work on issues of VAW. While oppo-
213 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.4.
214 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
215 Ganzfried: Interview by skype with B.H., 18.12.2014.
216 Watson 1997, p.10.
217 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
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sition to the decisions calling for an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights
existed, resistance to AI’s position on the issue of FGM was more important
as this concern defied AI’s mandate. At the same time, the difficulties that
female officials at the IS in the 1990s encountered in their efforts to bring a
gender perspective into AI’s reports indicate that opposition to this new fo-
cus existed among the IS staff members. Consequently, AI’s work on issues of
VAW during the 1990s led to discussions among sections and was criticized
from within by the researchers at the IS. However, as I show later, AI’s work
on VAW encountered much more resistance from sections and from within
the IS under the mission.
7.2 The national levels
The present chapter illustrates the beginnings of AI’s work on issues of vio-
lence against women in the Swiss and the German sections.218 It highlights
that in both sections, female activists initiated this work by forming women’s
groups focusing on the defense of female prisoners in the early 1980s. Over
the years, the women’s groups remained the driving force behind the sections’
work on issues of VAW. However, women in the two sections organized and
proceeded differently. While female activists and officials in the Swiss sec-
tion seemed to use the strategy of parallel networking, no clear strategy was
discernible in the case of the German women’s group except for a tendency
to focus on influencing decision-making at the international level and main-
taining regular exchanges with the IWN. Similar to the section’s overall or-
ganization of its thematic work, the Swiss section professionalized the work
on issues of VAW in the course of the Human Rights are Women’s Rights cam-
paign.Meanwhile, in the German section, the women’s group continued to be
responsible for the majority of the section’s work on issues of VAW through-
out the 1990s. Further, instead of opposing this initial work, the membership
in both sections ignored AI’s growing interest in issues of VAW. In contrast,
similar to the developments at the international level, the question of state re-
218 In contrast to the Swiss section,where I foundmanydocuments on thewomen’s groups
themselves, the German section did not grant me access to the documents from the
women’s group. Therefore, compared to my writing on the Swiss section, the chapter
on the German section is less detailed.
154 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
sponsibility for inaction in cases of grave human rights violations committed
by non-state actors became an issue of major debate in both sections.
7.2.1 The Swiss section
By providing evidence of collective and individual initiatives carried out by
female activists concerned about the under-representation of women in the
cases AI defended, this section demonstrates that female activists initiated
the Swiss section’s work on issues of VAW in the early 1980s. Later, I show
that the fourth WCW also boosted the section’s work on issues of VAW. A
demand to the GA to make the section increase its work on women’s rights
was formulated by a group of female activists and officials during the period
leading up to Beijing. In the aftermath of the fourth WCW, the structures
involved in issues of VAW developed and female activists and officials finally
established a section-wide women’s network by 2000.Thus, in the Swiss case,
female activists and officials also used the strategy of parallel networking to
make AI increase its work on women’s rights at the section level. However, in
contrast to the international level, where the IWN had already taken shape in
1989, the formation of a section-wide network was postponed. Then, I high-
light that the membership was not generally opposed to work on issues of
VAW, as long as the violations did not challenge AI’s mandate. In this sense,
female activists and officials faced more ignorance than opposition in their
efforts to lobby the section.
7.2.1.1 First collective and individual initiatives
Thesection’s work onVAWgoes back to the initiatives of female activists in the
French and the German parts of Switzerland.219 Concerned about the under-
representation of women in the cases of prisoners of conscience defended
by AI, activists formed their own groups and Urgent Action Networks in the
beginning of the 1980s. The latter essentially sought to engage in the release
of female prisoners.220 The first such group, Réseau d’actions urgentes femmes
(Women Urgent Action Network), was comprised of a core group of eight to
219 According to one internal document, another urgent action network for women
(Frauen-Zielgruppen) existed in Ticino in 1983 (Amnesty International: Frauenkam-
pagne 1991, 1991). However, I could not find further information on thiswomen’s urgent
action network in the South part of Switzerland.
220 Ganzfried: Interview with B.I., 07.06.2013.
7. The beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW 155
ten women and a pool of about 200 supporters, and was founded in Geneva
in 1981.221 While the wider network of supporters essentially concentrated
on the writing of letters to the relevant authorities, the core group met on
a regular basis and organized activities, such as stands for the collection of
signatures, or conferences with female victims of political persecution.222
The frustration with the invisibility of women in the cases AI defended
seems to be the reason for the first collective initiative. In its leaflet, the
Geneva Réseau d’actions urgentes femmes explained that “the foundation of such
a group was justified by the fact that the public was still ignoring the impor-
tant number of women prisoners of conscience.”223 According to them, only
10% of all Urgent Actions launched within the Swiss section in 1988 concerned
women.224 According to an interviewee, the group was independent from the
rest of the Swiss section finance-wise and activities-wise.225
The Réseau d’actions urgentes femmes existed until 1993, when one of the
founders of the group left. This withdrawal contributed to the group’s diffi-
culties in regrouping and reorganizing its activities.226 However, as evidence
shows, another women’s group formed in Geneva some months later.227 A
second similar collective initiative could be observed in Zurich in the same
period. In fact, female activists launched a solidarity women’s network called
‘Women help politically persecuted women’ in 1983.228 Like its counterpart in
Geneva, the group was composed of a core group of female activists and a
wider network of supporters essentially involved in urgent action letter writ-
ing.
221 Urgent Actions are one of the methods used by AI. Urgent actions are launched in all
cases when a rapid intervention to save a person’s life is needed.
222 Groupe femmes Chêne-bourg: Leaflet on thewomen’s group Chêne-bourg, 14.03.1989.
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liberté, qui fait que des choses ont pu être faites sans attendre.”.
226 Amnesty International: Schlussbericht zur Reorganisation der Berufs- und Zielgrup-
pen, 09.02.1993.
227 Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 1994 Postulat F Vorbereitung der
Weltfrauenkonferenz in Peking 1995, 30.04.1994.
228 Amnesty International und Frauennetzwerk: Protokoll des Frauennetzwerktreffens
vom 21.1.2000, 01.02.2000; Amnesty International: Aufbau eines Solidaritätsnetzes in
der Deutschschweiz Frauen helfen politisch verfolgten Frauen, Juni 1983.
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The principle of solidarity seems to have guided the action of these first
women’s groups.Themembers’ identity as women served as the basis for their
engagement for the release of female prisoners. In fact, according to a leaflet,
because they faced and continue to be confronted with certain forms of gen-
der-based discrimination and oppression, they felt closer to the women for
whom they were writing the urgent actions.229 As one of the interviewees
explained: “with these women urgent actions, it was about playing with the
proximity of women for women.”230 The Women Urgent Action network in
Zurich argued for a specific group engaged for the release of women prison-
ers using the fact that men prisoners of conscience were usually supported
by AI professional groups (lawyers, health workers etc.). Meanwhile, female
prisoners, often without any professional activity, could not count on a pro-
fessional solidarity network.231
An interviewee explained that women, who were already extremely en-
gaged at the professional level as nurses, social workers, or mothers, initiated
these first women’s groups.232 In contrast to the core group members, the
members of the wider network were often just women who wanted to write
their letters for other women and “not women who wanted to engage for the
UN resolution 1325 or who somehow dealt with a political context.”233 As such,
these groups essentially concentrated their public activities at the local level,
sometimes collaborating with other local AI groups. At the same time, there
was no exchange between the two women’s groups until 1988.
229 Groupe femmes Chêne-bourg: Leaflet on thewomen’s group Chêne-bourg, 14.03.1989,
p.3: “Notre identité féminine, le fait d’avoir connu et de continuer de connaître certaines formes
de discrimination ou d’oppression nous rendent plus proche des femmes pour lesquelles nous
écrivons.”.
230 Ganzfried: Interview with B.I., 07.06.2013: “avec les actions urgentes socio-professionnelles,
c’était de jouer de la proximité des femmes pour des femmes.”.
231 Amnesty International: Aufbau eines Solidaritätsnetzes in der Deutschschweiz Frauen
helfen politisch verfolgten Frauen, Juni 1983.
232 Ganzfried: Interview with B.I., 07.06.2013: “Par des femmes extrêmement engagées, qui
étaient engagées aussi déjà au niveau professionnel, comme infirmière ou comme assistante
sociale, ou comme mère de famille aussi.”.
233 Ganzfried: Interview mit B.F., 04.04.2012: “Eine Frauengruppe ist früher eine Gruppe gewe-
sen, es sind Frauen gewesen, die zum Beispiel einfach Briefe schreiben wollten zugunsten von
Frauen. Das sind nicht Frauen gewesen, die sich für 1325 engagiert haben oder die sich ir-
gendwiemit politischen Kontexten auseinandergesetzt haben. Es sind sehr oft wirklich Frauen
gewesen, die wollten einfach ihre Briefe schreiben, aber möglichst für Frauen.”
7. The beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW 157
Then, members of the groups met for the first time at the section’s GA.234
However, this exchange did not result in other collaborations or activities. De-
scribed “as small cells which faced difficulties in expanding,”235 these Women
Urgent Action Networks initiated the work on VAW at the Swiss section but
their actions had not yet really been recognized by the section. The isolation
of the Women Urgent Action Networks began to weaken after the adoption
of decision 15 at the 1989 ICM. In fact, the action, launched around the re-
portWomen in the Front Line on the 8th of March1991, was the first activity on
women’s rights organized by the secretariat of the Swiss section in collabo-
ration with the women’s group in Zurich.236 Women’s rights activists affili-
ated to theWomen Urgent Action Network Zurich used the occasion to widen the
spectrum of their activities by calling for new members to build up a bigger
women’s group.237 The women’s group in Zurich reiterated their call for new
members and an action network when launching the women’s day action a
year later.238
Independent of the collective activities of the Women Urgent Action Net-
works in Geneva and Zurich and the 1991 action, individual AI female activists
initiated activities on the issue of VAW on their own. For instance, they fo-
cused on violations of women’s rights in specific country projects they were
in charge of. 239 Others discussed the issue in their local AI group. An inter-
viewee explained the significance of these individual initiatives:
“At the Swiss section, we also have women who had been engaged since the
beginning of AI. Some of them at the Swiss section have always prioritized
women’s rights even before the movement decided to make it a top priority;
they organized fantastic actions and campaigns with effective people mobi-
lization.”240
234 Groupe femmes Chêne-bourg: Procès-verbal du 3 décembre 1987, 03.12.1987; Groupe
femmes Chêne-bourg: Procès-verbal du 7 avril 1988, 07.04.1988.
235 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “C’était comme des petits noyaux qui avait
un petit peu de la peine à essaimer.”.
236 Amnesty International: Frauenkampagne 1991, 1991.
237 Amnesty International: Frauenkampagne 1991, 1991.
238 Amnesty International: Frauenkampagne 1992 Aktionsanleitung, 08.03.1992.
239 Ganzfried: Interview mit B.F., 04.04.2012: “Ich habe einfach im Rahmen von meiner Ar-
beit immer geschaut, dass ich irgendwie möglichst viele Frauen auch in diese Projekte hinein-
nehmen konnte.”.
240 Ganzfried: Interview with A.I., 26.09.2012: “On a aussi au niveau d’AI des femmes qui sont
engagées depuis quasi les débuts d’AI. […] p. ex. Alba Viotto […]; des femmes incroyables qui
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Another interviewee mentioned the exposition of Rwandan artists meant to
call attention to the women rights violations that occurred during the geno-
cide as another example of individual initiatives from female activists.241The
first collaborations between members of the women’s group and staff at the
secretariat emerged around the same time, and individual officials started
to pay attention to the sex of the prisoners of conscience they were defend-
ing. An interviewee explained that she “relied upon these volunteers of the
women’s [group] to have their know-how about how to sell this question or
integrate this women’s issue into the campaign [‘500 Years of the Discovery
of Latin America and Its Impact on Indigenous People’].”242 She further high-
lighted that she also attempted “to have a woman when we had our famous
illustrative cases and not only have Tibetan monks.”243
Summing up, female activists concerned about the invisibility of women
in AI’s case work initiated the section’s work on VAW in the 1980s. They or-
ganized in the so-called Women Urgent Action Networks, which were based
on the idea of solidarity among women and took action for the release of
women prisoners. In addition to the Women’s Urgent Action Networks in
Zurich and Geneva, which functioned independently from the secretariat, in-
dividual women activists highlighted violations of women’s rights with their
own specific activities, and individual officials began to consider women’s
rights within the section’s campaign work. A first section-wide action on the
issues of VAW was organized in connection with the launch of the report
Women in the Front Line. As I show in the next section, the isolation of the work
on women’s rights began to evolve with the preparation of the 1995 campaign
Human Rights are Women’s Rights.
ont toujours défendu les droits des femmes avant que le mouvement décide de les mettre en top
priorité et qui ont organisé des actions et des campagnes magnifiques capables de mobiliser les
gens.”.
241 Ganzfried: Interviewwith A.J., 09.03.2012: “Des femmes comme cette Alba Viotto. Elle a par
exemple organisé une exposition d’artiste sur le Rwanda.”.
242 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “Je m’appuyais sur ces bénévoles de ce réseau
femme pour avoir un peu leur know-how comment vendre un peu la question, intégrer cette
problématique femme dans la campagne [500 ans de découverte de l’Amérique latine sur les
peuples indigènes].”.
243 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “On a toujours essayé de voir quand on avait nos
fameux cas d’appel illustratifs d’avoir une femme. On n’avait pas que des moines tibétains.”.
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7.2.1.2 A women’s network emerges
The movement-wide mobilization around AI’s participation in Beijing and
the 1995 campaign also affected the Swiss section. Female activists and of-
ficials actively started to pressure the section to increase its efforts in the
area of women’s rights in the period preceding the Beijing conference. In fact,
concerned about the delayed start of the preparation for the fourth WCW, a
group of female activists submitted a postulate to the 1994 Annual Assembly
demanding: “instead of waiting for [international] action plans, the section
should have already committed to an intensified engagement for women and
tried to reinforce the women’s groups by now.”244 In the postulate they fur-
ther called upon “the Swiss section to stress women’s human rights on the
occasion of the Beijing conference.”245
Under the name Frauen in Aktion - Frauen in Gefahr, the section partici-
pated in the movement-wide Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign in
1995. Many activists and officials were strongly involved in the preparation
for and organization of this campaign, which, according to an informant, en-
hanced the members’ awareness of the importance of integrating the work on
women’s rights into AI’s overall work. In view of the 1995 campaign prepara-
tion, both designated staff members and the women’s groups were responsi-
ble for the section’s work on women’s rights for the first time. Concretely, the
people involved in the preparation and coordination of the 1995 campaign
Frauen in Aktion - Frauen in Gefahr included a voluntary coordinator (called
Frauenkoordinatorin), based at the secretariat and in charge of coordinating ac-
tivities between the secretariat and the women’s groups in Geneva andWil,246
and two female officials responsible for campaigning and action.247
244 Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 1994 Postulat F Vorbereitung der
Weltfrauenkonferenz in Peking 1995, 30.04.1994, p.1: “Statt Aktionspläne abzuwarten,
sollte sich die Sektion schon jetzt zu einem intensiveren Einsatz für Frauen bekennen und bere-
its jetzt versuchen, die BZ-Gruppen Frauen zu stärken.”.
245 Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 1994 Postulat F Vorbereitung der
Weltfrauenkonferenz in Peking 1995, 30.04.1994, p.1: “Die Schweizer Sektion […] setzt an-
lässlich der Konferenz einen sichtbaren Schwerpunkt für die Menschenrechte von Frauen.”.
246 In fact, an analysis of the archival materials sheds light on the formation of a women’s
group in Wil, which apparently replaced the former Women Urgent Action Network
Zurich.
247 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Sitzung vom 3.11.1994 im AI-Sekretariat, Bern
Themen: Peking, Frauenkampagne, Stärkung der Frauengruppen, 03.11.1994; Amnesty
International: Sitzung in Zürich vom 15. Dezember 1994 zur Vorbereitung der
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Boosted by the movement-wide activities surrounding the 1995 Beijing
conference and the campaign, the Swiss section saw the number of women’s
groups increase in the following years. A new women’s group was founded
in Lausanne in August 1998.248 Initiated by the secretariat, another women’s
group was established in Bern around the same time.249The Frauen Urgent Ac-
tion Netz und Frauengruppe Zurich was relaunched as a formal women’s group
the same year. A new women’s group was founded in Geneva in 2000.250 Fur-
ther, a so-called Kogruppe formed in October 1999.251The Kogruppe was an ad-
visory group with the objective of acquiring knowledge on women’s rights
issues and providing sections with advice on these issues. An interviewee de-
scribed its role as “similar to other specialist groups that were experts in the
export of weapons or death penalty.”252
As far as the secretariat was concerned, by 2000, an intern there was given
the task of coordinating the activities of the different women’s groups,253
and a staff member was assigned to work on women’s rights.254 Thus, by the
end of the 1990s, female activists and officials were organized in four local
women’s groups and a Kogruppe, and two persons were in charge of the work
on women’s rights issues at the secretariat.
The formation of a section-wide network happened simultaneously and
also benefited from the exchange with the IWN. While I could not find any
evidence of regular contacts with the IWN, there must have been exchanges
at particular points. On a visit to the Swiss section in October 1999, the IWN
coordinator met with women activists and stressed the importance of orga-
nizing a women’s network within the Swiss section: “It is pivotal to know each
Frauenkampagne und Peking, 15.12.1994; Amnesty International: Protokoll der Sitzung
vom 15. Dezember 1994 zur Vorbereitung der Frauenkampagne und Peking, 15.12.1994.
248 Amnesty International und Frauennetzwerk: Protokoll des Frauennetzwerktreffens
vom 21.1.2000, 01.02.2000.
249 Amnesty International: Reconnaissance d'un groupe Amnesty en formation,
21.09.1999; Frauennetzwerk: Le réseau femmes se présente, ca. 2000.
250 Frauennetzwerk: Le réseau femmes se présente, ca. 2000.
251 Amnesty International und Frauennetzwerk: Protokoll des Frauennetzwerktreffens
vom 21.1.2000, 01.02.2000.
252 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012.
253 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Sitzung Aufbauprojekt Kogruppe Frauen,
20.10.1999.
254 Frauennetzwerk: Le réseau femmes se présente, ca. 2000.
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other and to enrich mutually. The women’s work does not have to be lim-
ited to a small group acting in a corner; the women’s issue has to go through
the whole section.”255 The strategy of building a section-wide women’s net-
work in order to bring forward the issue of women’s rights became evident
in the invitation to a first network meeting in January 2000, where the coor-
dinator explained: “It is also important […] by the establishment of a strong
network to build a common ground for leading the battle for the defense of
women’s rights worldwide but also within AI well and successfully.”256 At a
first meeting in January 2000, the members emphasized their conviction that
a women’s network was extremely necessary to strengthen, link, and keep the
women’s rights movement updated.257 The network members met again in
April and June of the same year. There, they once again stressed the impor-
tance of “a continuing presencewith regards to the secretariat so that women’s
rights remain an issue.”258 One of the first actions of the network consisted in
an intervention at the section’s GA in 2000, which called the delegates’ atten-
tion to the activities of the various women’s groups. According to the network
members, the intervention was successful as it reinforced the participants’
impression of the growing significance of the women’s network for the sec-
tion’s work.259
Summing up, the structures involved in the section’s work on issues of
VAW evolved from two independently acting urgent action networks in the
1980s into a section-wide women’s network composed of activist groups, an
255 Groupe AI femmes - Lausanne: Procès-verbal de la réunion du groupe Amnesty
Femmes - Lausanne: 25 Octobre 1999, 30.10.1999.
256 Amnesty International: Einladung zum Frauennetzwerktreffen, 07.12.1999, p.1: “So
ist es auch wichtig […] durch das Bilden eines starken Netzwerkes, eine gemeinsame Basis
aufzubauen, damit der Kampf – es ist tatsächlich noch immer ein Kampf – für die Verteidigung
der Frauenrechte weltweit aber auch innerhalb von AI, erfolgreich und gut geführt werden
kann.”.
257 Amnesty International und Frauennetzwerk: Protokoll des Frauennetzwerktreffens
vom 21.1.2000, 01.02.2000.
258 Amnesty International und Frauennetzwerk: Protokoll des Frauennetzwerktreffens
vom 20. Juni 2000, 20.06.2000, p.3: “eine anhaltende Präsenz gegenüber dem Sekretariat,
damit Frauenrechte ein Thema bleiben.”.
259 Amnesty International: Einladung zum Frauennetzwerktreffen 19. April 2000, March
2000, p.1: “Die DV Besucher/innen konnten der Erfahrung nicht ausweichen, dass sich inner-
halb AI ein ziemlich aktives Frauennetzwerk ausbreitet, das über kurz oder besser lang die
Aktivitäten der Sektion beeinflussen wird.”.
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advisory group and staff members in the late 1990s. Female activists and of-
ficials began to organize collectively with the aim of making their sections
increase the work on women’s rights issues during the Beijing preparation
period. The formation of a section-wide network of women’s activists and
officials had become a strategy meant to strengthen the section’s work on vi-
olations of women’s rights by 2000. Thus, parallel networking also was a strat-
egy female activists and officials within the Swiss section employed to make
the section increase its work on women’s rights. However, compared to the
developments at the international level, where female activists had already
gathered in the IWN by 1991, this strategy only became evident after the 1995
campaign. Further, in contrast to other sections, such as the US, the Canadian
or the British one, where female activists and officials who were organized in
the IWN lobbied their sections in order to influence decision-making at the
ICM, I could not find any evidence of a female activists’ and officials’ attempt
to influence AI’s general agenda. It seems that female activists and officials
strategizing in a section-wide women’s network focused on the work of their
own section.
7.2.1.3 Ignorance rather than opposition
The present section shows that the work on violations of women’s rights faced
the Swiss section’s disinterest, rather than opposition during the 1990s. In
contrast to the developments at the international level, no sign of explicit re-
sistance to the work on this issue is detectable at the Swiss section during this
decade. Instead, given that almost 20 years passed between the foundation of
the first Urgent Action Network in Geneva in 1981 and the establishment of
a section-wide women’s network by 2000, the membership must have simply
ignored this kind of work for many years. Similar to what I emphasized at the
international level, the question of how AI should work on the issue of state
responsibility for inaction - and, relatedly, AI’s approach to FGM - was much
more controversial.
The section’s indifference towards women’s rights issues became visible in
its reaction to the first intersectional meeting of the IWN that was organized
in Geneva in 1991. An interviewee, explains that the secretariat was initially
unwilling to help the US section to organize the event. She interpreted the
refusal as a form of opposition to the initiative stating: “for example, when
the Swiss section replied to the US section that it was not able to do it, […]
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it was a form of resistance, which is important.”260 In contrast, rather than
resistance, the statements of other interviewees demonstrate the disinterest
and ignorance of large parts of the membership. An interviewee explained
that of “those engaged in the issue of women’s rights, a lot had to plough
through a layer of boredom and disinterest.”261 Another informant stated: “I
have never felt any resistance to say ‘but why are you choosing this women’s
issue at AI?’”262 Another interviewee agreed that there was no formal opposi-
tion forbidding the formation of women’s groups.However, she pointed to the
section’s lack of support and encouragement.263 And for another interviewee,
the establishment of the women’s group and the efforts to raise awareness of
women’s rights within AICH was quite a battle.264
The membership’s disinterest also became visible in the women’s groups’
activities. Throughout the 1990s, the main structures that engaged in activ-
ities concerning violations of women’s rights were women’s groups. As the
example of the women’s group Bern shows, only a few other activists partic-
ipated in activities organized by women’s groups. In fact, the minutes of the
meetings of the women’s group Bern reveal that “the AI internal participation
was extremely lean and disappointing for us.”265Themembers of the women’s
group were very disappointed by the officials’ lack of enthusiasm and idealism
as well as by their general absence from the events organized by the women’s
group.266
260 Ganzfried: Interview with A.B., 12.04.2012: “Quand la section Suisse répond par exemple à
la section américaine qu’elle ne peut pas le faire, sans consulter...c’est une forme de résistance
qui est importante.”.
261 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Vermutlich haben sich diejenigen, die
sich da sehr engagiert haben dafür, dass AI das aufnimmt, mehr durch so eine Schicht von
Langeweile und Desinteresse durchackern müssen, das ist meine Vermutung.”.
262 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “J’ai jamais ressenti de résistance de dire ‘mais
pourquoi vous choisissez cette problématique femme au sein d’AI?’”.
263 Ganzfried: InterviewwithA.B., 12.04.2012: “Il n’y avait pas, disons, d’opposition formelle.Moi
je n’ai jamais trouvé quelque chose d’écrit qui interdisait la création de groupes femme. Mais il
n’y avait pas, en tout cas, de soutien ni d’encouragement, à cette époque-là.”.
264 Ganzfried: Interview with B.K., 16.05.2013: “[Die Etablierung der Frauengruppe und die
Förderung von Frauenrechten innerhalb AI] ist ein ziemlicher Krampf gewesen.”.
265 Frauengruppe Bern: Protokoll der Monatssitzung November der Frauengruppe Bern,
25.11.1999, p.1: “AI-interne Beteiligung war äusserst mager, enttäuschend für uns.”.
266 Frauengruppe Bern: Protokoll der Monatssitzung November der Frauengruppe Bern,
25.11.1999, p.1: “Bemerkung zu AI-Sekretariatsleuten: Es wird bemängelt, dass kein En-
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Thus, the membership’s reaction to the work on issues of VAWwas gener-
ally not opposition but disinterest. An interviewee interpreted this as a man-
ifestation of members’ fear of the mandate’s dissolution or of their lack of
knowledge about how to work on violations of women’s rights, in the after-
math of long years of engagement against any abuses of political and civil
rights, regardless of the victim’s identity.267 For another interviewee, the lack
of interest in the issue was mainly a consequence of the field from which
AI developed, which she qualified as “somehow closely related - in a rather
problematic way - to the sex-appeal of the political combatant.”268 The same
interviewee qualified some of the very engaged people within AI as “kind of
exciting guys, half Che Guevaras.”269 According to her, parts of AI’s work had
always somehow been the search for sex-appeal, thereby making women’s
rights issues seem much less exciting.270 However, she did not interpret the
absence of interest as a sign of misogyny.271
While there had been no resistance to thework on issues of women’s rights
in the 1990s, archival material indicates that the opening of the mandate to
states’ responsibility for inaction and the related issue of FGM caused dis-
cussions among the members of the Swiss section.272 Members disagreed on
the question of whether and to what extent AI should combat violations of
human rights in the private sphere. For example, in a comment to the sec-
retariat, the members of the women’s group Zurich raised concerns about
the inclusion of human rights violations in the private sphere, with which
thusiasmusund Idealismus auf ihrer Seite spürbar ist. Selten kommenEchos von ihnen,
da sie sich auch selten an Anlässen zeigen. Finden wir schade.”.
267 Ganzfried: Interview mit B.F., 04.04.2012: “Aber mehr zum Teil auch aus Unkenntnis. Oder
das Bewusstsein ist einfach von diesen langen Jahren wo man es nicht gemacht hat noch so
stark, dass doch eigentlich von Folter, von Verschwinden lassen, von aussergerichtlichen Tö-
tungen. Alle sind betroffen,wiesomussman jetzt das irgendwie fokussieren auf eine Gruppe?”.
268 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Also es war eigentlich mehr so, dass
das Interesse vielleicht bei einigen nicht so gross war.Wissen Sie, das Feld, aus dem AI gewach-
sen ist, das ist eine Sache die irgendwie wahnsinnig viel und auch irgendwie auf ein bisschen
fragwürdige Art undWeise mit dem Sexappeal des politischen Kämpfers zu tun hat.”.
269 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Leute, die sich auch sehr engagiert
haben und so aufregende Typen waren so halbe Che Guevaras. Und dann sind Frauen irgen-
detwas.”.
270 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012.
271 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012: “Ich sehe da auch keine grosse Frauen-
feindlichkeit dem Thema gegenüber.”.
272 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.T., 12.09.2012.
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AI would certainly be overwhelmed. According to the author, an engagement
against human rights violations perpetrated by private persons in individual
cases was not feasible for practical and technical reasons.273 In another state-
ment, a female activist argued that it is important to include state inaction
in the mandate in order to effectively protect women from violence.274
Relatedly, members disagreed on how to integrate FGM into AI’s work.
Critical voices argued that working on FGM would mean engaging in an is-
sue that does not concern them275 and others reasoned that NGOs, such as
UNICEF, that were specialized in the issue were better placed and able to
combat this specific women’s rights violation than AI.276
Consequently, the work on VAW as covered by the mandate - reflected
in the reportWomen in the Front Line and the 1995 campaign Frauen in Aktion -
Frauen in Gefahr as well as the formation of specific women’s groups and the
creation of a women’s network - was not seen as controversial. The disinter-
est observed at the Swiss section contrasts with the findings about the IS,
where the feminist caucus regularly faced with criticism and resistance. Nev-
ertheless, as the discussion around the work on FGM illustrates, cases of VAW
became subject to debate when they challenged AI’s state-focused mandate.
7.2.2 The German section
This section illustrates that by forming the Sektionsarbeitskreis Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen an Frauen (MaF) female activists initiated the German sec-
tion’s work on women’s rights in the 1980s. Similar to the Swiss section, the
MaF initially focused on cases of female prisoners. The section continues by
highlighting that the MaF carried out the majority of its work on issues of
273 Leiterin Zielgruppe Frauen: Stellungnahme zur Frage der Mandatserweiterung betre-
ffend “Governmental inaction”, 05.12.1994 .
274 C.: Persönliche Stellungnahme zur Mandatserweiterung “State inaction”, 23.11.1994.
275 Ganzfried: Interview with B.N., 06.06.2013: “Et bien, justement, je me rappelle, justement,
sur les mutilations infantiles, les mutilations des jeunes filles. Ça je me rappelle, il y en a qui
[disaient] ‘oui, mais c’est s’occuper de choses qui ne nous regardent pas’.”.
276 Ganzfried: Interview with A.P., 24.06.2013: “Ein ganz typisches Beispiel ist natürlich
Frauenbeschneidung gewesen, wo ja UNICEF sich ganz stark macht dafür, wo man irgend-
wann sagenmusste ,ja sollen wir auch noch so viele Ressourcen gleichzeitig in diesem Ausmass
bringen?‘ Obwohl wir es thematisiert haben, aber ich denke es ist auch sinnvoll, dass man sagt
‘also da gibt es ja eine NGO die das ganz gross bringt, also müssen wir jetzt nicht auch noch
nebendran ganz ganz gross sein?’.”.
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VAW as a Fachgruppe (expert group) and remained a driving force behind the
section’s work on violations of women’s rights throughout the 1990s. The sec-
tion further demonstrates that the MaF became involved in policy-making
when the movement was about to make its first decision calling for an in-
crease in AI’s work on women’s rights in the late 1980. The Fachgruppe then
demanded the submission of other resolutions about the movement’s work
on issues of VAW to the ICM in the 1990s. Further, I also show that the MaF
was a particularly active part of the IWN at this moment.
However, in contrast to the Swiss section, the German section did not
establish a specific position for work on women’s rights at the Secretariat.
Instead, women’s rights violations were included in the work on asylum and
refugees, which at this time was the only thematic human rights issue the
secretariat worked on.277 Then, I briefly describe that the section’s reaction
towards work on women’s rights was mainly disinterest and not resistance.
In contrast, just like in the Swiss section, the question of state responsibility
for inaction in cases of grave human rights violations committed by non-state
actors was an issue of major debate among members.
7.2.2.1 Sektionsarbeitskreis Menschenrechtsverletzungen
an Frauen
Female activists initiated the work on women’s rights in the German sec-
tion in the 1980s.The SektionsarbeitskreisMenschenrechtsverletzungen anFrauen
(MaF)278 formed in 1984 andwas formally recognized by the section in 1987.279
An article in the internal magazine ai-info reveals that the foundation of the
MaF goes back to “the need of several AI activists to conduct an in-depth
analysis of the different situations of women confronted with state measures
and to highlight potential analogies.”280 According to an interviewee, “it was
very much this working group (MaF) [that pushed the issue of women’s rights
277 See chapter 6.3.2.2.
278 In English: Working Group Violations of Human Rights of Women.
279 Deile et al. 2015.
280 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai info 6/86,
Juni 1986, p.10: “Es besteht bei den Mitgliedern das Bedürfnis, die verschiedenen Situ-
ationen von Frauen, die staatlichen Massnahmen ausgesetzt sind, inhaltlich tieferge-
hend zu untersuchen und eventuelle Parallelen aufzuzeigen.”.
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at the German section]”281 in the early years. Similar to other Sektionsarbeit-
skreise, the MaF members were dispersed all over the country and initially
only met at the biannual Bezirkssprecherkonferenzen or during seminars.
The MaF thus resembled a network linking female activists from all over the
section more than it resembled a local AI group.
Like its Swiss counterpart, the group focused on female prisoners and
gender-specific forms of violence and persecution in its early years.282 In
contrast to the Swiss section, where the women’s group used the wording
“women’s rights” to refer to the rights it was engaged with, the MaF explic-
itly defined its engagement as action against “violations of human rights of
women.” An interviewee explained the choice of this wording: “In our opinion,
there are no women’s rights but human rights, and these human rights are
particularly often violated in the case of women. […] These are human rights
valid for women. That is why we do not like the phrase ‘women’s rights’.”283
Raising AI members’ awareness as well as that of a larger public had been
at the core of the group’s engagement in the 1980s. Members of the MaF fre-
quently published articles on the issue of politically persecuted women in the
ai-info.284 Yet, as the following example illustrates, the MaF’s activities went
beyond promoting the issue within the section. In fact, one of the most im-
portant actions the MaF was involved in was the submission of a motion on
gender-specific persecution and violence women prisoners were victims of
to the Deutsche Bundestag (the German Parliament) in 1988, in cooperation
281 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.E., 06.03.2015: “Das war ganz stark diese Arbeits-
gruppe [die sich für das Thema Frauenrechte innerhalb der Deutschen Sektion stark gemacht
hat].”.
282 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai info 6/86,
Juni 1986.
283 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Wir sind der Ansicht, es gibt keine
Frauenrechte, sondern es gibt Menschenrechte und die Menschenrechte werden bei Frauen
besonders oft verletzt. [...] Es sind Menschenrechte, die für Frauen gelten, deshalb finden wir
das Wort ‘Frauenrechte’ nicht so gut.”.
284 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai-info 3/1987,
März 1987; Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai-
info 4/1988, April 1988; Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
Artikel im ai-info 3/1987, März 1987; Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Mehrere Artikel im ai-intern 3/1989 zum Thema “Frauen und Menschen-
rechte“, März 1989.
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with 63 women from all congressional parties.285 According to an official,
“this was one of the first initiatives exclusively introduced by women beyond
the congressional parties in the German Parliament.”286
7.2.2.2 The MaF’s successful attempts to influence decision-making
In addition to internal and public awareness-raising activities on violations of
women’s civil and political rights, the MaF became involved in policy-making
at a relative early stage. In fact, the minutes of the 1988 and the 1989 meetings
of the section’s GA illustrate the existence of a motion calling on the section
to increase its research on human rights violations against women.They also
document the section’s decision to submit resolution B14 to the 1989 ICM,
which was subsequently accepted as decision 15. Even though these docu-
ments do not identify the author of themotion,287 given theMaF’s prominent
role in the section’s work on women’s rights at that time and in the following
years, it is worth assuming that female activists organized in the MaF were
among the initiators of the demand. The MaF continued to influence deci-
sion-making at the international level by submitting a motion to the 1992 GA
which the section subsequently submitted to the 1993 ICM as resolution B37,
asking the organization to support the establishment of a UN Special Rap-
porteur on Violence Against Women and to capitalize on the fourth WCW by
organizing a campaign on women’s rights.288
Similar to the IWN, theMaF took advantage of the 1993 UNHuman Rights
Conference in Vienna “[…] to express again long-standing demands for the
protection of women from women-specific persecution at the international
level.”289 In the same document, the MaF spokesperson invited AI “to take
285 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai-info 4/1988,
April 1988.
286 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.U., 13.02.2015: “Das war eine der ersten Initiativen
im deutschen Bundestag, die NUR von Frauen angestossen wurde und zwar Fraktionsüber-
greifend.”.
287 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Protokoll der 23.
Jahresversammlung vom 21.5. bis 23.5.1988 in Wuppertal, 24.05.1988; Amnesty Inter-
national Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Protokoll der Jahresversammlung 1989
Oldenburg 13. bis 15. Mai 1989, 15.05.1989.
288 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Antrag an die Jahresver-
sammlung 1992 der AK-Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen, 19.03.1992.
289 Reichinger und Sektionsarbeitskreis Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen: Die
Weltmenschrechtskonferenz in Wien - eine Bilanz aus frauenspezifischer Sicht,
30.11.1993, p.1: “Auch unser Arbeitskreis nahm diese Konferenz zum Anlass, erneut
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the appeals calling for an increased focus on women’s human rights within
the human rights work to heart.”290
In addition to the MaF’s attempts to influence decision-making at the in-
ternational level by submitting motions to the GAs, the group must have also
been a particularly active part of the IWN. In fact, the second meeting of the
IWN in Bonn goes back to the initiative of the German section’s IWN mem-
ber, who was also the IWN interim coordinator before the appointment of the
IWN coordinator at the IS in 1995. Further, the MaF played an important role
in the section’s activities related to the 1995 campaign. In an outline of the
focus of the 1995 campaign sent to the section, the MaF suggested “[…] to call
the groups to end the thematic marginalization of violations of human rights
on women and to stop always consulting the same public (theWomen’s move-
ment, church women, union women, women in parliament, etc.).”291 In the
same document, the MaF further recommended that the country coordina-
tion groups work on violations of women’s rights in their respective countries.
The MaF further argued that international developments were increasingly
overtaking AI and “urged that we in our organization handle the new facts
regarding the development of human rights in a constructive way, not only
to remain modern, but to continue being relevant!”292 It demanded that the
section should take the opportunity presented by the campaign to initiate an
internal discussion about the section’s conception of human rights.
Additionally, the MaF pushed the section to participate in the German-
wide NGO activities in preparation for Beijing by suggesting that the EC
langjährige Forderungen gegenüber internationalen Ebenen zum Schutz von Frauen
vor frauenspezifischer Verfolgung vorzubringen.”
290 Reichinger und Sektionsarbeitskreis Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen: Die
Weltmenschrechtskonferenz in Wien - eine Bilanz aus frauenspezifischer Sicht,
30.11.1993, p.3: “Auch ai sollte sich die Appelle, Frauenmenschenrechte in der Men-
schenrechtsarbeit mehr Gewicht zu geben, zu Herzen nehmen.”.
291 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Letter from Frauke
Marohn from theMAF-Sektions-AK, 1994, p.3: “[…], wollen wir die Gruppen auffordern,
die thematische Marginalisierung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen an Frauen zu
beenden und sich nicht immer wieder an immer dieselben Adressaten (Frauenbewe-
gung, Kirchenfrauen, Gewerkschaftsfrauen, Frauen im Bundestag etc.) zu wenden.”.
292 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Aufriss des MAF-
Sektions-AK's zu einer internationalen ai-Kampagne gegenMenschenrechtsverletzun-
gen an Frauen 1995, 32.3.1994, p.3-4: “Wir halten es darum für dringend geboten, dass
wir in unserer Organisation konstruktiv mit den neuen Tatsachen der MR-Entwicklung
umgehen, nicht allein, ummodern zu sein, sondern um sachgerecht zu bleiben!”.
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send a member of their group as the AI representative to the NGO coalition
NGO-Frauenforum.293 At the same time, various letters to the German del-
egation illustrate the MaF’s involvement in the section’s lobbying activities
for the integration of women’s civil and political rights into the WCW’s final
document.294
As far as the section’s campaign activities were concerned, while local and
thematic groups participated in the campaign, the MaF realized the major-
ity of the thematic work related to the campaign in its capacity as an expert
group. In contrast to the Swiss section, the German section had not estab-
lished any specific position for the work on women’s rights issues at the Sec-
retariat by the time of the 1995 campaign. Instead, some officials working in
the department on LänderThemen und Asyl (country-related issues and asylum)
focused on issues of women’s rights because female refugees were considered
particularly vulnerable persons, who often fled from gender-based human
rights violations.295
The lack of archival materials for the period between 1996 and 2000 does
not allow me to provide more details about the German section’s work on
issues of VAW or about the MaF in the post-Beijing period.The only evidence
I collected is some information about the dissolution of the MaF during this
period.296 However, as I show in chapter 8.2.2, the group continued to play
a significant role in the implementation of the SVAW campaign within the
German section in a new composition.
Summing up, like in the Swiss section, women initiated the German sec-
tion’s work on issues of VAW in the 1980s. By setting up a thematic Sektion-
293 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Letter from the
Sektions-Arbeitskreis Menschenrechtsverletzungen to the Executive Committee,
24.06.1994.
294 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Protokoll Lobbyge-
spräch im Auswärtigen Amt am 22.3.1995, 13.05.1995.
295 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015. The section’s specific focus on the rights of
female refugees also becomes evident in the publication Frauen im Blickpunkt (1991),
which included a chapter on female refugees and on the protection of persecuted
women in Germany, and in the report Frauen in Aktion - Frauen in Gefahr (1995), which
specifically focused on female asylum seekers in Germany (Amnesty International Sek-
tion Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991; Amnesty International, Sektion Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland 1995).
296 “The preceding group, which had been in place since the 1980s, somehow petered out”
(Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015).
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sarbeitskreis, with members dispersed all over the country, female activists
organized nationally within the German section with the aim of raising the
section’s awareness of violations of the human rights of women.The MaF got
involved in decision-making immediately after its formal recognition by the
section in 1987. It initiated several motions to the section’s GA demanding
the submission of resolutions relevant to AI’s work on issues of VAW to the
ICM. As an expert group, the MaF carried out most of the section’s work on
violations of women’s rights before and during the 1995 campaign, and it was
the driving force behind the section’s work in this regard. While I could not
clearly identify a specific MaF strategy, it is worth highlighting its focus on
influencing decision-making at the international level as well as its exchange
with other IWN members, which contrasts with my observations about the
Swiss section.
7.2.2.3 Disinterest regarding women’s rights
Similar to the Swiss section, the membership of the German section showed
no resistance to the initial work on women’s rights, except for some criti-
cal voices who disapproved of the MaF’s initial constitution and questioned
the sense of its work. In a June 1986 article in the ai info, a member of the
MaF wrote: “Meanwhile, some members expressed their concerns about our
[group], which, in sum, question the sense, and the legitimacy of our [group]
inside AI and our ability to positively influence and further develop AI’s daily
work.”297
In general, the issue of women’s rights faced ignorance here, as well. How-
ever, as the following statement shows, the disinterest seems to have some-
times played an important role. In fact, according to an interviewee, those en-
gaged in the promotion of women’s rights issues within AI “sometimes had
the impression of being forced to convince their own people of the neces-
sity to work on women’s rights much more than the public […].”298 Generally,
the critical voices against increasing the work on women’s rights argued that
297 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Artikel im ai info 6/86,
Juni 1986, p.10: “In der Zwischenzeit haben einige Mitglieder Bedenken gegenüber
unserem AK geäussert, die zusammengefasst den inhaltlichen Sinn, bzw. Die Exis-
tenzberechtigung unseres AK innerhalb ai’s und unsere Möglichkeiten einer positiven
Einflussnahme undWeiterentwicklung der alltäglichen ai-Arbeit in Frage stellen.”.
298 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “man [hatte teilweise] den Eindruck, man muss
die eigenen Leute viel stärker noch von der Notwendigkeit der Arbeit zu Frauenrechten
überzeugen als die Öffentlichkeit, […]”.
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“there are women’s rights organizations, AI does not have to do this, it should
better engage in the release of individual political prisoners.”299
Instead, just like in the Swiss section, the most controversial discussion
of the 1990s concerned the integration of states’ responsibility for inaction in
cases of grave human rights violations committed by non-state actors. Ac-
cording to an interviewee,
“the German section was almost divided on [the question of non-state ac-
tors]. […] There were votes at the General Assemblies […] battle votes and
where we barely lost on the question ‘Should AI become active in the case of
persecutions by non-state actors and therewith in the case of gender-specific
persecutions?’”300
While I could not find any evidence of specific opposition to engaging in the
issue of FGM, the practice seemed to have been discussed as part of the larger
debate about the mandate’s enlargement to states’ accountability for their in-
action as a sort of “case study for the controversy.”301 According to an inter-
viewee, “the discussions were very theoretical. Theoretical in the sense of ‘we
want to have a coherent concept of our mandate.’”302 As the following state-
ment shows, as in other sections, AI members feared that the organization
would be overtaxed if it had to do research on cases of human rights viola-
tions committed by non-governmental entities:
“[…] the related concerns were just questions such as ‘AI is not able to do
research on all that.’ And ‘we are already at the limit of our ability to collect
really solid information about human rights violations in the classical cases,
299 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “Es gibt ja Frauenorganisationen oder Frauen-
rechtsorganisationen und Amnesty soll sich doch lieber für den einzelnen politischen Gefan-
genen einsetzen, […]”.
300 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.E., 06.03.2015: “Also es gab SCHWIERIGE Debatten,
insbesondere in der deutschen Sektion.Also ichwürde sagen, dass Anfang der 90er die deutsche
Sektion FAST gespalten war in dieser Frage. Also nicht sonst, aber halt in dieser Frage. Da gab
es Abstimmungen auf der Jahresversammlung […] wo es wirklich KAMPFAbstimmungen gab
und wir dann die Frage ,SOLL Amnesty auch im Falle nichtstaatlicher Verfolgung UND damit
geschlechtsspezifischer Verfolgung tätig werden‘ knapp verloren haben.”
301 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.E., 06.03.2015.
302 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.E., 06.03.2015: “Die deutsche Sektion hat zum Teil
sehr theoretisch diskutiert. Also theoretisch im Sinne von ,Wir wollen ein stimmiges Konzept
unseres Mandats haben‘.”.
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such as torture, and then you are going to engage in the area of non-state
actors where research is even more difficult!’”303
Let me briefly summarize the main insights provided by the two case stud-
ies. Female activists initiated the work on issues of VAW by forming locally
anchored Women Urgent Action Networks in the Swiss section and by es-
tablishing a section-wide “Arbeitskreis” focusing on the defense of women
prisoners in the 1980s. In both sections, these women’s groups remained the
driving force behind the work on issues of VAW during the 1990s. However,
the women at each section organized and proceeded differently. At the Swiss
section, women had successfully established a women’s network composed of
five women’s groups and a representative at the secretariat by the end of the
1990s.Thus, parallel networking seemed to have been a strategy female activists
and officials used to make the section increase its activities on issues of VAW.
Meanwhile, the female activists organized in the MaF focused on influencing
decision-making at the international level and were in regular contact with
the IWN. However, I could not find evidence for any clear strategy the MaF
employed to make its section increase its work on issues of VAW.
Similar to the section’s overall organization of its thematic work, the Swiss
section professionalized the work on issues of VAW over the course of the
Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign. Meanwhile, in the German sec-
tion, the women’s group continued to be responsible for the majority of the
section’s work on issues of VAW throughout the 1990s. In both sections, the
membership’s general reaction to AI’s activities on issues of VAW and to the
women’s groups’ demands to increase work on violations of women’s rights
was ignorance, rather than opposition. In contrast, the question of state re-
sponsibility for inaction in cases of grave human rights violations committed
by non-state actors was an issue of major debate in both sections, just like it
was at the international level.
303 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with B.E., 06.03.2015: “Also ja es war wirklich EXTREM um-
stritten. Und die Sorgen die damit verbunden waren, waren halt so Fragen wie ,das kann
Amnesty ja alles nicht recherchieren und, wir sind eh schon am Limit unserer Möglichkeiten
wirklich SOLIDE Informationen über die Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu liefern in den KLAS-
SISCHEN Fällen wie Folter und dann geht ihr jetzt in den nichtstaatlichen Bereich wo die
Recherchen ja ungleich schwieriger sind‘.”.
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7.3 Intermediate conclusions
Chapter 7 has illustrated the beginnings of AI’s interest in VAW in detail. In
the 1990s, AI’s human rights policy gradually shifted away from its essential
focus on civil and political rights, which saw the state as the primary violator
of individuals’ human rights. It moved towards adopting a mission that rec-
ognized the indivisibility of all human rights including economic, social and
cultural rights in 2001.The 1991 recognition that abuses committed by political
non-state actors fell within the mandate was the first step of the subsequent
redefinition of AI’s policy. Later, AI decided to hold states accountable for
inaction in cases of human rights violations committed by non-governmen-
tal entities, before it held private actors themselves responsible for abuses
of human rights. In 2001, AI adopted the mission and expanded its policy
to economic, social and cultural rights. These mandate developments were
highly significant for effective action against VAW because they signified the
end of the long-lasting public-private divide and allowed the organization to
consider VAW as a consequence of structural inequalities rather than as indi-
vidual acts. This, in turn, enabled AI to take action against VAW whoever the
perpetrator. Concurrently with the modification of the mandate, AI adopted
three consecutive ICM decisions calling on the movement to strengthen the
work on women’s rights for the first time.
The evolution of AI’s policy on VAW was reflected in its activities. In
fact, whereas AI’s first comprehensive report on violations of women’s
rights, Women in the Front Line (1991), focused on gender-based violence in
state custody and highlighted patterns of political persecutions of women,
the 1995 Human Rights are Women’s Rights campaign focused on torture, the
death penalty, extra-judicial executions, and disappearances as they affected
women. Nevertheless, the state remained the primary addressee of the or-
ganization’s demands to prevent and condemn VAW. The Take a Step to Stamp
Out Torture campaign launched in 2000 was seen as AI’s first effective attempt
to campaign against VAW in the private sphere because it independently
considered all forms of VAW as acts of torture, whatever the context and
whoever the perpetrator.
Women organizing and strategizing at the international and national lev-
els are key to our understanding of AI’s increasing interest in issues of VAW
reflected in the above-mentioned policy developments and activities. Female
activists, concerned about the under-representation of women in the cases
defended by AI, not only initiated AI’s work on issues of VAW by forming
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specific Urgent Action Networks and women’s groups in the early 1980s. By
forming the IWN and demanding an intensification of work on violations of
women’s rights within the frame of the mandate, rather than the abolition
of the state-focused mandate, female activists and officials also successfully
pressured AI to increase its work on VAW and to choose VAW in the private
sphere as the theme of its first thematic long-term campaign under the mis-
sion. The external factors, such as the changing pattern of human rights vio-
lations (contributing to AI’s questioning of its state-focused mandate),304 the
growing international awareness of gender equality (especially in response
to the conference in Beijing),305 the international women’s rights movement
(challenging AI to expand its mandate to violations of human rights in the
private sphere),306 and some internal factors, such as SG Pierre Sané‘s pos-
itive stance and the growing number of women in AI’s leadership positions,
are therefore insufficient to fully explain the beginning of AI’s work on issues
of VAW and the movement’s growing interest in issues of VAW in the 1990s.
Instead, the latter must be seen primarily as the result of the feminist strategy
of parallel networking and analogous framing.
In fact, by organizing in the IWN, female activists and officials were able
to do effective internal lobbying for an increase in AI’s work on violations
of women’s rights. Organizing in an intersectional network allowed the fe-
male activists and officials to reach out to the whole AI movement and build
majorities for their demands at the ICMs. Further, female activists and offi-
cials called for an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights within the frame
of the mandate. The strategy of analogous framing was crucial in making AI
increase its work on VAW because it allowed garnering the majority of the
movement’s support for more seriously engaging in work on women’s rights.
In their quest, the fourth WCW in Beijing in 1995 appeared as an important
window of opportunity, enablingwomen organized in the IWN and at the sec-
tion level to enhance their lobbying efforts and make AI launch its first major
theme campaign on women’s rights. Finally, both of these strategies were im-
portant in making AI decide to launch its first long-term thematic campaign
under the mission on the issue of VAW, as they enabled the effective lobbying
of sections, the IEC, and the SG. They also convinced the organization of the
necessity to further strengthen its work on violations of women’s rights.
304 Thakur 1994; Pack 1999.
305 Bunch 2001.
306 Bahar 1996.
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AI’s increasing interest in issues of VAW in the 1990s was accompanied by
controversial internal discussions that crystallized in relevant ICM decisions,
yet, above all, in AI’s position on states’ responsibility for inaction in cases
of grave human rights violations. In this regard, the issue of how AI should
proceed with the issue of FGMwas discussed to much controversy at all levels
of the movement during the 1990s. In contrast, the female activists’ and of-
ficials’ lobbying efforts and the multiplying activities on issues of VAW faced
members’ ignorance. Resistance could primarily be observed among IS staff
who criticized the new focus and refused to incorporate a gender perspective
into their work.
Thus, AI increasingly integrated VAW into its activities in the 1990s. The
feminist strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing proved to be
key to policy development and the implementation of activities on issues of
VAW. They greatly contributed to making AI choose the issue of VAW in the
private sphere as the theme of its first long-term global thematic campaign
in 2001. In light of AI’s historically grown, long-lasting gender-biased under-
standing of human rights, this decision was an important achievement. Yet
were these achievements truly sustainable? Focusing on the period between
2001 and 2010, the following chapter intends to answer this question.
8. The challenges to make women’s rights
part of AI’s DNA
This chapter emphasizes the development of AI’s work on violence against
women in the 2000s. Examing first the international and then the national
level, it starts by illustrating how policy on VAW developed within the new
framework of human rights provided by AI’s mission and how AI integrated
VAW into its activities. Chapter 8 demonstrates that unlike its passive role in
the 1990s, AI’s leadership was the driving force behind policy development on
the subject in the 2000s and behind the implementation of the SVAW cam-
paign. Nevertheless, the SVAW campaign did not succeed in making women’s
rights an integral part of AI’s overall work. Two reasons prevented women’s
rights from becoming part of AI’s DNA: first, the top-down implementation of
the SVAW campaign caused female activists and officials who had initiated
AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s to lose their influence on the organization’s
work on these issues. Second, activists and officials resisted the SVAW cam-
paign and the adoption of a policy on abortion. The focus on the Swiss and
the German sections, however, shows considerable differences with respect
to the extent to which AI succeeded in integrating the issue of VAW into its
work at the national level. While the Swiss section managed to at least par-
tially integrate VAW into its work, the German section reaped little success
in this regard.The German section membership’s important opposition to the
SVAW campaign and to the adoption of a policy on abortion help explain this
divergence. I argue that the German section members’ relative closeness to
the Church and their comparatively powerful position further account for the
difference between the two sections.
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8.1 The international level
This chapter first describes the development of AI’s policy on VAW (section
8.1.1). It especially highlights the development of AI’s first common posi-
tion on the issue of sexual and reproductive rights (particularly abortion).
It continues with an account of the thematic focus and the content of the
SVAW campaign, the organization’s first long-term thematic global campaign
(8.1.2). This section spotlights the campaign’s successes and shows that one
of its core aims, to mainstream gender throughout the organization,1 was
not achieved. As the review of the campaign indicated, AI did not succeed in
making women’s rights part of its DNA.
In addition to providing an in-depth picture of how AI prepared and in-
ternally organized the SVAW campaign and of the controversial discussions
leading to the adoption of AI’s position on abortion, sections 8.1.3 and 8.1.4
also explain AI’s failure to make women’s rights part of its DNA. Section 8.1.3
demonstrates that the organization’s leadership initiated the majority of the
ICM decisions concerning AI’s work on VAW. I highlight how the manage-
ment pushed the implementation of the SVAW campaign from the top and
describe the establishment of the Machinery for the successful running of
the SVAW campaign at the IS. Many of the feminist caucus at the IS, who had
pushed the organization to increase its work on issues of VAW in the 1990s,
were included in the preparation and, particularly, in the implementation of
the campaign as members of the SVAW campaign Machinery. However, the
Campaign Team’s and the Gender Unit’s problematic embedding in the IS and
their lack of clear responsibilities and power made it difficult for the women’s
rights advocates at the IS to effectively implement the campaign. I show that
the female activists and officials who had initiated AI’s work on VAW in the
1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work on issues of VAW. I argue
that this loss of influence was one of the reasons AI did not manage to make
women’s rights part of its DNA through the SVAW campaign.
1 Gender Mainstreaming refers to a “strategy for making women’s as well as men’s con-
cerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, moni-
toring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal
spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated”
(Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop VAW Campaign internal strat-
egy, September 2003, p.6). For AI’s work on VAW during the SVAW campaign this
meant that issues of VAW were not confined to the campaign but were meant to be-
come an integral part of AI’s overall work.
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Section 8.1.4 then emphasizes the reactions the SVAW campaign received
and the participation in it, and focuses on the debates surrounding the adop-
tion of the ICM decisions on sexual and reproductive rights and abortion. I
highlight activists’ and officials’ resistance to the SVAW campaign and to the
adoption of a policy on abortion. The opposition to the campaign was mo-
tivated by various factors. Some of the members and officials perceived that
the SVAW campaign stood for the broader policy change brought about by
the adoption of the mission. They resisted the campaign because they were
critical of the adoption of the mission. Other critiques related to the struc-
ture and the setting of the campaign, rather than to its content. At the same
time, at least part of the opposition was primarily motivated by the issue of
the campaign itself. In contrast to the resistance to the campaign, the oppo-
sition to the adoption of a policy on abortion, which came from the sections,
can more clearly be identified as related to the issue of abortion itself and less
to AI’s overall policy change. Thus, I argue that several sections’ resistance to
the adoption of a policy on abortion and the opposition to the campaign are
important reasons why AI failed to make women’s rights part of its DNA.
8.1.1 Policy development 2002-2010
Analyzing ICM decisions allows us to understand AI’s policy development in
general and that on VAW in particular. Between 2003 and 2010, the ICM took
place four times (in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009). Each ICM issued between 15
and 40 decisions,2 some of which either directly or indirectly concerned AI’s
work on VAW (highlighted in figure 6).
For the period between 1989 and 2001, I classified the ICM decisions de-
manding a modification of the mandate as indirectly concerning AI’s work on
VAW. Because of the adoption of the mission, the ICM no longer made simi-
lar decisions in the 2000s. As figure 6 highlights, I classify the ICM decisions
that sought a more equal representation of women and men in the organiza-
tion’s membership and leadership as indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAW
(left side of figure 6). I do so because AI considered the equal representation
of women and men within the movement and the adoption of a gender sen-
sitive perspective to be important factors in ensuring the credibility of the
SVAW campaign. Evidence shows that the leadership wanted to sensitize the
2 The 2003 ICM adopted 39 decisions, the 2005 ICM - 29 decisions, the 2007 ICM - 24,
and the 2009 ICM - 15 decisions.
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movement to potential gender inequalities among staff and activists, and it
considered the internal commitment to gender equality a (pre)condition for a
successful campaign on VAW.An internal document issued prior to the SVAW
campaign explains: “We need to establish gender equality at the core of AI’s
mission and organizational culture to ensure a credible and authentic voice
for the issues that the campaign will promote.”3
The analysis of the ICM reports allows me to identify two types of de-
cisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW: those codifying AI’s policy on
sexual and reproductive rights, and several others related to women’s rights in
general (highlighted in the right rectangle of figure 6). With the SVAW cam-
paign, female activists’ and officials’ demand (reflected in decision 15 of the
1989 ICM, decision 20 of the 1995 ICM, and in decision 32 of the 1997 ICM) to
increase the organization’s work on women’s rights came to fruition. That’s
why there were no ICM decisions that demanded increases in this work dur-
ing the period between 2002 and 2010.
Figure 6: Overview of policy developments between 2002 and 2010
Source: my own, based on the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 ICM reports.
By distinguishing between the ICM decisions directly and indirectly con-
cerning AI’s work on VAW, the preceding paragraph has provided a general
overview of the development of AI’s policy on VAW between 2002 to 2010.
The next section illustrates policy developments by focusing on the content of
the ICM decisions adopted between 2002 and 2009. It starts with the descrip-
tion of the decisions indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAW before doing the
3 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Campaign against VAW, August 2003,
p.2.
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same for those directly concerning it. Figure 7 displays all such ICMdecisions.
I show how gender mainstreaming and the principle of equal representation
of men and women became part of AI’s policy and demonstrate in detail the
internal process leading to the adoption of AI’s first position on sexual and
reproductive rights, as well as that on abortion.
Figure 7: Detailed policy developments between 2002 and 2010
Source: my own, based on the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 ICM reports.
8.1.1.1 ICM Decisions indirectly concerning AI’s work on VAW
In the 1990s, AI identified diversity and multiculturalism as issues important
for the movement’s international growth.4 In the 2000s, AI began to consider
gender equality as increasingly relevant to the development of the organi-
zation. While equality among its staff and activists had already become an
important aspect of the internal SVAW campaign strategy by 2003, AI first
integrated the principle of equal representation of women and men into its
policy at the 2005 ICM. In decision 5 of the 2005 ICM, the delegates defined
“multiculturalism, linguistic plurality, diversity, and equity in both gender
and sexual orientation within AI [as] a crucial part of the growth agenda […]”5
(left side of figure 7). According to this decision, sections were encouraged to
4 Decision 28 of the 1995 ICM that set out the 1996 – 2001 Integrated Strategic Plan called
for a movement-wide implementation of the “standards consistent with AI values, in-
cluding human resource management strategies covering such issues as multicultur-
alism and gender equity […].”.
5 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 14th-20th August 2005, p.115.
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develop their own plan for growth and respect gender equality and diversity
when deciding on their delegations to international AI meetings.
While AI recognized the importance of a balanced representation of
women and men within the organization during the SVAW campaign, the
codification of these principles only occurred at the end of the long-term
campaign in 2009. At the 2009 ICM, the organization stressed the impor-
tance of an equal representation of both genders in all its bodies by making it
one of the main objectives of the upcoming Integrated Strategic Plan. At the
end of the decade, AI also codified the principle of gender mainstreaming.
Figure 7 illustrates that gender equality figured in several decisions of the
2009 ICM as a factor facilitating growth or democracy. The decision thereby
codified the principle of diversity and gender equality. Decision 1 of the 2009
ICM stipulated that the 2010 – 2016 strategic plan should enable AI to learn
and grow by “[m]aking diversity and gender-mainstreaming a reality,”6 and
defined gender mainstreaming as one of the five pillars of the organization’s
core work within the ISP “that all AI entities shall undertake.”7
The International Council also decided to ensure diversity and gender
equality in the nominating process for the IEC and other international elected
positions (Decision 7). It wanted to make diversity and gender “principles
for the movement’s democratic governance at all levels” (Decision 10). The IC
stated: “AI’s governance bodies must be diverse and gender-sensitive.”8 At the
policy level, gender equality thus mostly appeared as a synonym of equal rep-
resentation of women and men in various hierarchical positions.The analysis
of these decisions indicates that gender equality was considered a means to
achieving growth and enhancing the movement’s democratic governance.
6 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 29th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 46 ICM Decisions 2009, 16.08.2009, p.3.
7 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 29th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 46 ICM Decisions 2009, 16.08.2009, p.4.
8 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 29th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 46 ICM Decisions 2009, 16.08.2009, p.10.
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8.1.1.2 Decisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW
The issue of sexual and reproductive rights first became topical with the
launch of the SVAW campaign. While the discussion about AI’s work on
sexual and reproductive rights had already started around the 2003 ICM, the
organization only codified its work at the 2005 and the 2007 ICMs, respec-
tively, and elaborated two respective policies: one on sexual and reproductive
rights, and the other on the AI policy on selected aspects of abortion.9 As I show in
section 8.1.4, finding a common position on sexual and reproductive rights,
particularly on abortion, took long, intensive, and controversial discussions.
The issue of abortion divided the organization in an unprecedented way and
made many long-term activists withdraw from their engagement within
AI. The present section highlights the content of the organization’s position
on sexual and reproductive rights, particularly on the issue of abortion, by
focusing on the related ICM decisions. I emphasize the origins of these ICM
decisions in section 8.1.3 and describe the related controversial discussions
in section 8.1.4.
Following a discussion at the 2003 ICM that did not lead to any deci-
sions, AI organized a movement-wide consultation on sexual and reproduc-
tive rights.10 Based on it, the International Executive Committee submitted
an enabling resolution to the 2005 ICM. The delegates accepted the latter as
decision 3 on “Sexual and Reproductive Rights.” The content of this decision
reveals the sensitivity of the topic. In fact, while it broadly delineates the or-
ganization’s position on sexual and reproductive rights, it emphasizes the im-
portance of integrating the existing diverging viewpoints on abortion into a
policy that should be elaborated in a movement-wide consultation process.
In decision 3, AI affirmed its commitment to defending and promoting
sexual and reproductive rights, and averred that the related work should be
made in the context of the current ISP. It decided that the IEC would develop
a comprehensive statement and a strategy for action on sexual and reproduc-
tive rights. A future policy would support the right of access to information
about sexual and reproductive health as well as the right of access to sexual
and reproductive health services, including contraception. In addition, deci-
sion 3 also specified that a “consultation, education, and awareness-raising
9 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007.
10 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007, p.15.
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process”11 should be initiated in order to enable the organization to make an
informed decision about its position on abortion.
For the first time, AI considered abortion to be closely related to women’s
subordinated position in society, recognizing “that the need for abortion in
a large number of cases is a consequence of violence against women, a lack
of empowerment of women as well as of a lack of access to education and
health services like contraception.”12 At the same time, the content of the de-
cision reveals the disagreement on the question of whether AI should defend
a woman’s right to abortion. It specified that:
“the [consultation, education, and awareness-raising] process should enable
AI to take an informed decision as to the organization’s position - should it
choose to do so - on the question of whether a woman’s right to physical and
mental integrity includes her right to terminate her pregnancy, subject to
reasonable limitations, and of whether abortion should therefore be legal,
safe and accessible to all women.”13
The IEC was given the chance to “‘fast-track’ decision-making”14 on three as-
pects of abortion, namely the decriminalization of abortion, access “to quality
services for themanagement of complications arising from abortion,” and “le-
gal, safe and accessible abortion in cases of rape, sexual assault, incest, and
risk to a woman’s life.”15 Later, these three aspects formed the core of the AI
policy on selected aspects of abortion adopted in 2007.16 All other possible AI po-
sitions on the issue of abortion were postponed for discussion at the 2007
ICM.17
11 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.104.
12 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.103.
13 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.104.
14 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007, p.2.
15 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.104.
16 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007.
17 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.104.
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The principles of AI’s work on sexual and reproductive rights, which also
served as the frame of a future policy on abortion,was subject to a policy paper
in October 2006.18 In the document, the IEC stated that sexual and reproduc-
tive rights were “central to the realization of every individual’s human rights”
and stressed AI’s belief “that all persons must be enabled to enjoy their sex-
ual and reproductive rights free of coercion, discrimination and violence.”19
Further, in the “Statement Summarizing AI’s Current Policy on Sexual and
Reproductive Rights,” sexual and reproductive rights were framed as an is-
sue of civil and political rights: “The realization of sexual and reproductive
rights requires respect for rights relating to physical and mental integrity,
such as the right to life, […],”20 as well as an issue of economic, social, and
cultural rights: “The realization of sexual and reproductive rights requires also
respect for economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to education
and the right to the highest attainable standard of health […].”21 In the same
document, AI further affirmed its commitment to defending and promoting
these rights in the context of its mission, its core values, and its strategic
goal. Finally, AI called upon the responsibility of the state to respect, protect,
and fulfill the sexual and reproductive rights of every person, and upon the
responsibility of other societal actors, such as corporate actors or health pro-
fessionals, to do so, as well.22
After a movement-wide consultation process, AI adopted its policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion23 in April 2007. Based on the three aspects of abortion
that were considered capable of drawing a consensus within the movement
at the 2005 ICM, the policy called for the decriminalization of abortion but
recognized “the right of states to impose reasonable limitations on access to
18 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006.
19 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006, p.2.
20 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006, p.3.
21 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006, p.3.
22 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006.
23 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007.
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abortion services.”24 It called for access to quality health services in cases of
complications arising from abortions, and it requested that states provide
access to legal, safe, and accessible abortions “in the case of an unwanted
pregnancy as a result of rape, sexual assault or incest, or if the pregnancy
poses a risk to the life or grave risk to the health of the woman.”25 It further
called for sexual and reproductive health services for women and men, rec-
ognizing their importance for the prevention of unwanted pregnancies and
abortions.26Thepolicy thus enabled AI to help “those womenwho wish to end
unwanted pregnancies resulting from sexual violence, […] to support women
who seek treatment for complications arising from abortion,” and “to oppose
imprisonment or other criminal penalties for abortion.”27
That same autumn, the ICM delegates accepted decision 3 at the 2007
ICM. By adopting this decision, the organization codified the previously
adopted policy documents on sexual and reproductive rights and abortion.
In fact, decision 3 of the 2007 ICM stipulated that:
“the recently adopted policy on: decriminalization of abortion; access to
quality services for themanagement of complications arising from abortion;
legal, safe and accessible abortion in cases of rape, sexual assault, incest, risk
to the life or grave risk to the health of the woman enables the organization
to tackle the grave violations of women’s human rights that fall within its
mission and its SVAW campaign strategy.”28
At the same time, AI confirmed the importance of strengthening preventive
work in order to avoid unwanted pregnancies and the recourse to abortions,
and it recognized that the work on these issues needed to be “discussed across
the movement before AI can make an informed decision about further policy
development in relation to other aspects of sexual and reproductive rights not
covered by existing policies.”29
24 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007, p.3.
25 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007, p.3.
26 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007.
27 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007, p.3.
28 Amnesty International: 28th international Council Meeting, 2007, p.67.
29 Amnesty International: 28th international Council Meeting, 2007, p.87.
8. The challenges to make women’s rights part of AI’s DNA 187
Consequently, after long and intensive movement-wide consultations and
debates, the organization finally reached a consensus and codified its policy
on sexual and reproductive rights and abortion in 2007. Therein, AI consid-
ered sexual and reproductive rights as part of every person’s human rights,
and it framed these rights as civil and political rights and as economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights. The decriminalization of abortion and legal, safe,
and accessible abortion, if the unwanted pregnancy is a result of any form of
VAW or if the pregnancy endangers the life of the pregnant woman, formed
the core principles of AI’s position on abortion. AI also agreed on the im-
portance of providing sexual and reproductive health services to women and
men, recognizing its importance for the prevention of unwanted pregnancies
and abortions. While stressing each individual’s right to freely decide on his
or her sexuality and reproductive life, AI did not stand for a woman’s right to
freely choose if she desired to terminate her pregnancy or not.Thus, while AI
defended the sexual and reproductive rights of every individual, it adopted a
more restrictive position towards abortion, limiting the right to abortion to
threatened women, while demanding that the state decriminalize the prac-
tice. As I detail later, AI’s policy on selected aspects of abortion (widely criticized
by women’s rights organizations) was a compromise between those within AI
who were calling for the right to abort and others who espoused the view that
AI should not take a position on the issue.
In addition to the controversial policy-making on sexual and reproductive
rights, the organization made three ICM decisions (decision 1 of the 2003
ICM, decision 2 of the 2005 ICM, and decision 4 of the 2009 ICM) concerning
other aspects of its work on VAW. The following paragraph briefly presents
the content of these decisions.
In decision 1 of the 2003 ICM on “globalizing justice,” the delegates de-
cided to make women’s rights and VAW an integral part of AI’s upcoming
2004 to 2010 ISP. In fact, one of the fifteen goals of the ISP stated that AI
should emphasize the strengthening of “the protection of women and girls
in international, regional and national law” and that AI should demand “ac-
countability of states regarding respect, protection and fulfillment of rights
for women and girls” and “accountability of non-state actors regarding the
rights of women and girls.” Further, the same goal stipulated that AI should
“work in alliance with the women’s movement to increase awareness and hu-
man rights education towards the eradication of violence against women and
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girls.”30 Reflecting the objectives of the internal SVAW campaign, the same
goal also highlighted the importance of promoting women’s rights inside AI
and the commitment of its membership and staff to these rights. In accor-
dance to one of the main objectives of the public SVAW campaign, decision 2
of the 2005 ICM resolved to strengthen the movement’s work on women in
conflicts by emphasizing, among other things, “the ways in which military
actions disproportionately affect women,”31 and by searching for solutions to
this disparity. Furthermore, at the 2009 ICM, the delegates decided to ame-
liorate AI’s long-term work on behalf of individuals at risk by committing to
an equal representation of women and men in its cases of prisoners of con-
science (Decision 4 2009 ICM).
Summing up, AI’s policy on VAW mainly developed in two domains in
the 2000s. First, at the end of the decade, AI codified gender equality as an
important principle of internal governance and growth, and emphasized the
importance of integrating women’s rights in all areas of its work by codi-
fying the principle of gender mainstreaming. Second, for the first time, AI
discussed and decided upon a common position on sexual and reproductive
rights and adopted the AI policy on selected aspects of abortion.32
8.1.2 Policy Implementation
- Focus and content of the SVAW campaign
In the 2000s, most of AI’s activities on VAW fell within the SVAW campaign.
Before describing the content of AI’s first global thematic long-term cam-
paign, it is worth it to briefly highlight the institutional context of its imple-
mentation. This would allow us to appreciate the challenge that the SVAW
campaign represented for the organization and would improve our under-
standing of the difficulties AI faced in its attempts to integrate VAW into its
work. As I have highlighted before, at the turn of the millennium, AI radically
changed its approach to human rights by adopting a mission that encom-
passed all human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights. As
30 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 25th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2004, p.97.
31 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.102.
32 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Amnesty International policy on se-
lected aspects of abortion, 20.04.2007.
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a consequence, AI also changed its working methods. For example, it aban-
doned theWOOC rule and undertook a shift away from campaigning centered
around the country and the individual and toward thematic campaigning.
Furthermore, collaboration with external actors, such as other human rights
or women’s rights organizations or experts, became increasingly important
during this period, as AI lacked internal expertise in working in the domain
of social, economic, and cultural rights and in framing the related work on
VAW. As Wallace and Baños (2010) highlight, these modifications signified “a
real break with the past”33 and the SVAW campaign was the “flagship” of these
changes.34 Observing its potential, the IEC explained: “We look forward […]
to the human rights revolution we hope [the SVAW campaign] will inspire!!”35
Relatedly, as an extract of Irene Khan’s speech to the delegates at the 2003 ICM
illustrates, AI’s leadership attached great expectations to the SVAWcampaign:
“We stand together, as a movement, at the threshold of an extraordinary
opportunity which is the SVAW campaign. I feel, hear and witness the
tremendous power of this coming campaign to change inside and outside
AI. Through this campaign we will ask you to turn to your own communities
and to seek out and act against the violence […]. We will bring human rights
home to every woman. […]”36
The IS Campaign Team saw the SVAW campaign as a transitional undertak-
ing “in which we are moving from our ‘old’ style campaigning towards new
ways of working,”37 in which campaigning began to determine research. The
increasing importance of thematic campaigning challenged the prominence
of AI’s researchers at the IS, who had traditionally benefited from a highly
valued status. It is therefore not surprising that this group of officials at the
IS voiced the most active resistance to the campaign.
AI implemented the campaign in two phases.The first took place between
2003 and 2005 and the second between 2007 and 2010. Initially planned for
33 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.9.
34 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.9.
35 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin 48,
02.03.2004, p.5.
36 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.14.
37 Stop VAW campaign team: STOP VAW Campaign Progress update 4, 12.2003, p.9.
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two years, the SVAWcampaign developed into a global campaign for the dura-
tion of the ISPwhen the IEC approved this change in January 2004.38Without
going into detail, the following paragraphs provide an overview of the cam-
paign’s thematic content during its two phases.39 Then, section 8.1.3 high-
lights how AI pushed for the implementation of the campaign from the top
down.
AI launched the SVAW campaign with an internal campaign at the 2003
ICM because, in the words of the IEC Chair: “We are launching an internal
SVAW campaign at this ICM because frankly we need to walk the walk be-
fore we can talk the talk on this campaign.”40 As Irene Khan pointed out, the
staff ’s and activists’ commitment to gender equality was pivotal for the pub-
lic credibility of AI’s work on VAW. It also was an important condition for
the establishment of an effective partnership with the women’s movement -
a necessity for the SVAW campaign’ success.41
The so-called Gender Action Plan (GAP)42 formed the core of the internal
campaign.The plan served as an internal strategy to coherently connecting the
public campaign message and the organization’s internal functioning. In the
GAP, AI emphasized the need to become a “gender equitable organization”43
and stressed the necessity to “ensure that gender is mainstreamed through-
out the organization and not confined solely to the VAW Campaign.”44 In
fact, “[o]ne of the key aims of the SVAW campaign was to mainstream gender
throughout Amnesty International’s work – to bring it into the DNA of the or-
ganization.”45TheGAP sought to do this with concretemeasures, such as gen-
der-awareness training or gender-sensitive tools and guidelines.46 Further,
38 Amnesty International, International Executive Committee: IEC Information Bulletin 48,
02.03.2004.
39 For more details on the campaign, consult: Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
40 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.9.
41 Khan 2003, p.9.
42 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop VAWCampaign internal strategy,
September 2003.
43 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop VAWCampaign internal strategy,
September 2003, p.7.
44 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop VAWCampaign internal strategy,
September 2003, p.7.
45 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.141.
46 Miller 2006, p.28.
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internal gender audits at various level of the organization would ensure that
gender was integrated “into AI’s way of working internally.”47 Similarly, staff
members were supposed to integrate a gender perspective into their work and
to do research on issues of VAWwithin their specific regional responsibilities.
Sections were also asked to subsequently develop and implement their own
GAPs based on the overall GAP.48
Following the internal launch of the campaign,AI launched its public cam-
paign on the 8th ofMarch 2004. Its first phase essentially concentrated on two
topics: “VAW in armed conflicts” and “Domestic violence” (figure 8). In addi-
tion, AI continued to implement the GAP.
Figure 8: First phase of the SVAW campaign, 2003-2005
Source: my own
“VAW in armed conflicts” and “Domestic violence” were operationalized
in three campaign projects (highlighted in the three gray rectangles of fig-
ure 8) which reflected the importance of the concept of “‘due diligence’ as
the main analytical tool of the SVAW campaign.”49 One project focused on
armed groups’ impunity for acts of violence against women and on women’s
involvement in peace processes. Another project concentrated on discrimi-
natory laws that lead to violence against women and the legal protection of
women’s rights. A third project emphasized the responsibility of “states, na-
tional, local and municipal authorities to respect, protect, and fulfill women’s
rights to be free from violence.”50
47 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.96.
48 The implementation of the GAPs at national level is discussed in chapter 9.2.
49 Ganzfried: Correction of citation A.W., 22.08.2018, p.1.
50 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop Violence Against Women 2004-
2010 Campaign projects for 2004-2006, July 2004, p.7.
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In the frame of the public campaign, AI producedmanymaterials defining
its approach to issues of VAW. For example, under the campaign, AI defined
the persecution of adultery or “zina,” considered a crime under sharia law,
as a human rights violation. Further, legal officers developed due diligence
standards that determined how the movement should deal with the issue of
violence in the family and prepared standards on the work on VAW in armed
conflicts, both of which were considered important contributions to holding
governments and other actors accountable for violence against women.51The
IS prepared a huge number of actions for each of the projects, which the
sections subsequently implemented. For example, sections worked towards
the CEDAW’s ratification and implementation by lobbying their respective
governments, or they collaborated with other NGOs to pressure governments
to abolish laws that discriminated against women.52 Lobbying for the im-
plementation of the UN resolution 1325 was one of the activities within the
second project.53
Before launching the second phase of the campaign, AI focused on the
issue of violence against women in intimate relationships (highlighted in the
white rectangle on the right side of figure 8). Thereby, AI addressed the gap
between law and implementation and stressed the importance of women’s
empowerment for a life without violence.54
During the second phase, AI continued with the implementation of the
Gender Action Plan (GAP) within the internal campaign (highlighted on the left
side of figure 9), stating: “We must be confident that the values we advocate
externally are those which we observe within our internal organizational cul-
ture.”55 The GAP remained the relevant policy document for the achievement
of the internal campaign goal: “change ourselves to change the world.”56 At
the same time, even though the campaign strategy of the second phase stated
that AI wanted “to build on the achievements and use the knowledge and ex-
51 Ganzfried: Correction of citations A.W., 24.08.2018.
52 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop Violence Against Women 2004-
2010 Campaign projects for 2004-2006, July 2004.
53 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Stop Violence Against Women 2004-
2010 Campaign projects for 2004-2006, July 2004.
54 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Phase IV - VAW in the family action cir-
cular: “VAW in intimate relationships”, 02.01.2006.
55 SVAW Team (IS): SVAW campaign strategy: “Make rights real!”, October 2006, p.28.
56 SVAW Team (IS): SVAW campaign strategy: “Make rights real!”, October 2006, p.28.
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perience gained in the first phase of the campaign,”57 issues of VAW were
only integrated into one of three main campaign goals of the second phase.
In fact, AI continued its work on VAW in the frame of the newly defined goal
of “Human rights concerns.” However, it used the second campaign phase
to address and resolve the general problem of member stagnation, which it
had been facing since the 2000s. Thus, AI defined “Human rights concerns,”
“Growth of activism globally on VAW,” and “Growth of AI through the SVAW
Campaign” as the three objectives of the second phase (highlighted in figure
9).58
Figure 9: Activities in the second phase of the SVAW campaign, 2007-2010
Source: my own
In the frame of the objective “Human rights concerns,” AI campaigned
for several initiatives, such as “Safe schools for girls,” “Safe work places for
women,”59 and services for women survivors of sexual violence, as defined
in its newly adopted policy on abortion.60 At the same time, under the cam-
paign goals “Growth of activism globally on VAW” and “Growth of AI through
the SVAW Campaign,” AI called for increasing activism in regions where it
traditionally had few members (such as the Middle East or Africa) and specif-
ically sought to reach out to young people and women.Not only did AI modify
the focus of the campaign; it also lessened the campaign’s intensity during
the second phase of the campaign. Wallace and Baños (2010) explain that,
compared to the first phase: “much less work was undertaken under the sec-
ond strategy by researchers and [sections].”61 As an example, the first phase
57 SVAW Team (IS): SVAW campaign strategy: “Make rights real!”, October 2006, p.4.
58 These areas were developed in consultations with all sections and structures.
59 SVAW Team (IS): SVAW campaign strategy: “Make rights real!”, October 2006.
60 SVAW Team (IS): SVAW campaign strategy: “Make rights real!”, October 2006, p.9.
61 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.139.
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saw the publication of an average of 60 documents per year; this number
decreased to 14.2 publications per year during the second phase of the cam-
paign.62
Lacking a clear exit strategy, the SVAW campaign ended with a final com-
munication advisory in March 2010, which indicated how to take various as-
pects of the SVAWcampaignwork forward. Yet, it did not specify how existing
activities and relationships with women’s rights NGOs should be concluded
or continued.63 As I highlight later, considerable uncertainty surrounded the
question of how work on issues of VAW should continue after the SVAW cam-
paign, and the professional future of those working for the campaign within
the IS (in the Campaign Team) and within sections remained unclear.
In a nutshell, the internal campaign sought to mainstream gender
throughout the organization. VAW in the private sphere – namely “Domestic
violence” and “Violence in intimate relationships” – became the main topics
of the first phase of the public campaign. Meanwhile, growing the movement
through the campaign became the central topic in the latter’s second phase.
Since the majority of AI’s activities on issues of VAW in the 2000s were
organized under the umbrella of the SVAW campaign, the success of the
latter can inform us about the extent to which AI succeeded in integrating
VAW into its work. The campaign’s 2006 mid-term evaluation and its final
review provide an in-depth picture of its successes and failures.64 Because
the present research project does not seek to assess the campaign and is in-
stead interested in understanding the causes behind the identified failures,
I only briefly recapitulate the evaluation’s conclusions. The SVAW campaign
allowed the movement to embrace economic, social, and cultural rights, and
helped women’s rights become better recognized as a part of the organiza-
tion’s work.65 The production of wide-ranging research on diverse topics re-
62 Whereas the IS published 38 campaign reports in two years (between 2004 and 2005),
it produced 26 reports during the four years of the second phase of the campaign (be-
tween 2006 and 2010) (Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.149). Also counting the in-
ternal documents, 120 documents (public and internal) concerning the SVAW – cam-
paign were produced by the IS in the first phase, and 71 papers were released in the
four years of the second phase. Based on information from the AIDAN Search base on
AI Intranet. Using the following keywords: AI Class: ACT; Sub-Class: 77; Year: 2004-2010
(Last consultation 17.10.2014).
63 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.179.
64 Miller 2006; Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
65 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.176.
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lated to women’s rights was an important achievement. Specifically, the re-
search and campaigning realized within the Northern sections had a real im-
pact as a consequence of the cancellation of the WOOC rule.66 Further, the
recognition of collaborating in the domain of VAW led to many fruitful part-
nerships with local NGO’s working on women’s rights, which in turn helped
AI to act locally against violence against women.67
The mid-term review of the campaign also revealed that “the SVAW cam-
paign ha[d] given greater legitimacy to research on VAW” realized by country
researchers “and that the Campaign Team (and the Gender Unit) ha[d] facili-
tated this kind of work through providing resources and research backstop-
ping.”68 According toMiller (2006), a positive outcome of the first two years of
the campaign was its contribution to a greater awareness of the relevance of
gender equality and women’s rights to the work of AI among the staff at the
IS.69 Additionally, AI also developed some important policy positions, such
as the policy on the restricted aspects of abortion that called on governments
to decriminalize abortion, or its position on states’ responsibility for the pre-
vention of violence by non-state actors (due diligence).70 While the SVAW
campaign led to a rise in the active memberships of some sections, others
developed new partnerships with local organizations or introduced innova-
tive campaign methods.71 On a broader scale, the campaign contributed to
VAW becoming universally perceived as a human rights issue.72 Even though
it is difficult to assess the global impact of the campaign, good AI lobbying
and campaigning led i.a.
“to changes in attitudes (for example, around rape in the Nordic countries),
policy (for example, the provision of shelters for women in municipalities
in Sweden), awareness (lobbying work in several countries and strong
membership engagement), partnerships (for example, through the GBV
66 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.176.
67 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: SVAW Campaign 2006-2010 Draft
Strategy for Consultation, 21.12.2005, p.8.
68 Miller 2006, p.28.
69 Miller 2006, p.28.
70 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
71 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.177.
72 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: SVAW Campaign 2006-2010 Draft
Strategy for Consultation, 21.12.2005, p.3.
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and EVAW networks in Ireland and the UK…), and improved legal rights for
women experiencing violence.”73
In addition to these important achievements, the final review concluded that
the campaign had failed in one important aspect. Namely, it did not suc-
ceed in making women’s rights part of the organization’s DNA.74 The most
important evidence of this failure manifests in the GAP’s faltering and in
the Demand Dignity campaign’s nonexistent “gender analysis or aims around
women’s rights.”75 It is thus worth asking why AI did not succeed in sustain-
ably integrating women’s rights into its work through the SVAW campaign? I
first focus on AI’s policy-making style and on the campaign’s implementation
(section 8.1.3). I then examine the reaction the SVAW campaign elicited, the
participation in it, and the debates accompanying the adoption of the ICM
decisions on sexual and reproductive rights (section 8.1.4). I do so to show
that the main reasons for this failure had to do with the fact that the female
activists and officials who had initiated AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s lost
their influence on the organization’s VAW work during the SVAW campaign
and with the resistance that the campaign and the adoption of a policy on
abortion faced from activists and officials alike.
8.1.3 Pushing work on the issue of VAW from the top down
This section demonstrates that, in contrast to the 1990s, AI pushed the work
on VAW from the top down.The section starts by illustrating the IEC’s pivotal
role in the adoption of the ICM decisions directly and indirectly concerning
AI’s work on VAW.Then, the section focuses on the SVAW campaign prepara-
tion period and examines the management’s leading role in it. I later provide
details on the SVAW campaign Machinery and highlight the role the different
components of the machinery played in the implementation of the campaign.
I specifically focus on the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit and highlight
how their problematic embeddedness into the IS and their lack of clear re-
sponsibilities and power hampered this implementation. In doing so, I show
that the top-down implementation of the SVAW campaign meant that the fe-
male activists and officials who had initiated AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s
lost their influence on the organization’s work in this domain.
73 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.177.
74 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010a, p.16.
75 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010a, p.16.
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8.1.3.1 Policy development initiated by the IEC
This paragraph highlights the important role that the IEC and the SG played
in pushing policy development on VAW further. The classification of the ICM
decisions into two groups based on their origin from a resolution submitted
by either a section or several sections (illustrated on the left in figure 10) or by
the IEC (illustrated on the right in figure 10) shows that the IEC initiated all
but one ICM decision, whether directly (underlined in figure 10) or indirectly
concerning the work on violence against women.
Figure 10: ICM decisions and their initiators, 2003-2009
Source: my own, based on the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 ICM reports*
*Decision 2 (2005 ICM) is classified as coming from the IEC because two of the original
resolutions were enabling resolutions. Decision 3 (2007 ICM) is classified as coming
from the IEC because it followed decision 3 of the 2005 ICM, which originated from an
enabling resolution.
The classification in figure 10 highlights the important role the IEC played
in shaping AI’s policy development concerning the organization’s work on
VAW in the 2000s. Given the overlap between the IEC and the SG highlighted
in chapter 6, and in light of the fact that a huge majority of the ICM deci-
sions originated from enabling resolutions, the classification also indicates
the existence of a top-down process of policy development. Thus, while the
decisions calling for an increase in AI’s work on women’s rights in the 1990s
had been initiated by female activists and officials organized in the IWN, evi-
dence indicates that female activists were no longer the driving forces behind
the development of AI’s policy on VAW in the 2000s.
198 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
8.1.3.2 Getting ready for the SVAW campaign
The following paragraphs demonstrate the management’s leading role in
preparing the SVAW campaign and the IWN activists’ and officials’ shrinking
importance in the planning of the top-down endeavor.
As a “flag-ship” for the changes in focus and working methods brought
about by the adoption of the mission, the SVAW campaign was conceived
as a top-down endeavor from its beginning. This meant that its preparation
and implementation were steered from within the IS. Consequently, the SG
and her deputy played a leading role in the campaign’s preparation. Evidence
further shows that, in addition to this, the SG deputy also pushed AI’s work
on issues of VAW in this period. According to one interviewee: “[Irene Khan]
pushed it quite hard and the second person,whowas Kate Gilmore, extraordi-
nary, I mean she was a proper feminist.”76 Another considered Kate Gilmore
the key figure stating: “the arrival of somebody like Kate Gilmore to the Secre-
tariat. […] So, she came in and she just, you know, ‘we must do gender. Again,
we just look like a dinosaur; we need to get some serious gender analysis.’”77
Similarly, another interviewee qualified Kate Gilmore as “a very powerful fig-
ure pushing for women’s rights.”78
The importance of the IS, the SG and her deputy for AI’s work on issues of
VAWwas reinforced by the dissolution of the IWN in 2002.79The fact that the
IWN’s fourth and last meeting held in London in April 2002 was organized
by the IS (unlike previous gatherings) already indicates that the issue of VAW
was pushed increasingly from the top down. This top-down approach and
the leading roles that SG Irene Khan and her Deputy Kate Gilmore played in
preparing the SVAW campaign were reflected in, among other things, three
campaign preparation meetings in May 2002, October 2002, and July 2003.
Organized prior to the launch of the internal campaign, these gatherings
sought to create a broad commitment to the campaign among activists and
officials.They were informed by the need to include the women’s rights move-
ment, deemed essential for the success of the campaign. By inviting Charlotte
Bunch of the Center forWomen’s Global Leadership and Roxanna Carillo from
76 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
77 Ganzfried: Interview with B.R., 25.06.2012.
78 Ganzfried: Interview with B.R., 25.06.2012.
79 Despite the fact that no archive material puts the dissolution of the IWN in black and
white, the fact that I could not find any minutes of IWNmeetings after 2002 indicates
that the network ceased to exist.
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the UN Development Fund For Women (UNIFEM), two important figures in
the women’s rights movement, the first meeting, organized exclusively for the
IS staff, sought to inform “the IS thinking and planning to deliver the forth-
coming campaign on VAW.”80 There, Roxanna Carillo emphasized the neces-
sity to work with the women’s movement by stating that AI “had to overcome
the ‘general perception from the women’s movement about AI … Always go-
ing solo … which could hamper AI’s credibility as a voice for women’s human
rights.’”81
After amovement-wide consultation, Irene Khan convened a second cam-
paign-preparationmeeting with sections and IS representatives and again in-
vited several high-profile figures of the women’s rights movement82 with the
goal of discussing and deciding upon the campaign’s focus.There, the partic-
ipants chose “domestic violence” and “VAW in armed conflicts” as the primary
themes of the campaign, and approved the twofold campaign strategy (an in-
ternal launch followed by a public campaign starting around 8 March 2004).
Therefore, the campaign’s focus can be considered the fruit of a movement-
wide consultation and of the inclusion of voices from the women’s rights
movement. Indeed, it was the latter who suggested making “domestic vio-
lence” the principal theme of the campaign.83
At the third consultation meeting in Oxford in July 2003, the SG invited
IS staff, officials and activists from sections with the aim of building a move-
ment-wide engagement in the preparation of the VAW campaign and of initi-
ating the internal transformative processes necessary for ensuring the effec-
tiveness of the campaign. Once again, an important number of prominent in-
ternational women’s rights and “gender and organizational change” experts84
80 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: IS Staff Forum on Violence Aganist
Women Campaign 9 May 2002, 12.05.2002, p.1.
81 Hopgood 2006, p.153.
82 Roxanna Carrillo (Unifem), Doo Aphane (Women and Law in Southern Africa),
Shamima Ali, Fiji (Women’s Crisis Centre), Indai Sajor (International Criminal Justice
Institute), Asma Khadeer (Sisterhood is Global Institute in Jordan) (Amnesty Interna-
tional, International Secretariat: Report of the Violence Aganist Women Campaign Consul-
tation Forum, 14.11.2002).
83 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Courrier électronique hebdomadaire
40/02 à l’attention des coordonnatuers Campagnes, 23.10.2002
84 Among the invited experts were: Radhika Coomaraswamy (former UN Special Rap-
porteur on VAW), Zaitun Mohammed Kassim (independent consultant and member
of Sisters in IslamMalaysis), Agnes Callamard (Executive Director of the Geneva-based
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were invited to help AI in assessing its organizational culture and identifying
the key internal challenges that AI needed to address, if it was to carry out
a credible and effective campaign on VAW.85 At the Oxford meeting, the SG
stressed the importance of the internal campaign by emphasizing the con-
sistency between AI’s internal culture and its public statements: “An internal
strategy to facilitate a movement-wide understanding of gender-based vio-
lence and its root causes and human rights consequences is inevitable if we
are to guarantee this long-term commitment.”86 It became evident that “with-
out exposing itself to the gender lens, Amnesty could have no hope of political
authority with the women’s movement.”87 At this last preparatory consulta-
tion meeting, the participants decided to make “change ourselves to change
the world”88 the slogan of the internal campaign, and labeled the public cam-
paign “Stop Violence Against Women.”89
8.1.3.3 The SVAW campaign Machinery
AI established new organizational entities, some of which were at the IS, to
ensure the smooth running of the campaign. Making use of the name one
of my interviewees mentioned, I label these bodies the SVAW campaign Ma-
chinery. This section describes the role and the functioning of the Machin-
ery in detail. As the left side of figure 11 highlights, it was made up of the
Campaign Team and the Gender Unit at the IS. The creation of these two new
units required substantial financial resources, as it entailed the creation of
new posts. It is therefore not astonishing that these entities were key to the
running of the campaign.
Further, the Campaign Steering Committee and the SVAW network also
formed part of the SVAW campaign Machinery. These were decentralized
entities composed of IS and section staff, namely the section’s campaign
coordinators, who were specifically appointed for the preparation and the
Humanitarian Accountability Project International), Nira Yuval Davis (Prof. in Gender,
Sexualities and Ethic Studies at University of East London).
85 Khan: Letter from the secretary general Irene Khan to sections, 16.09.2003; Amnesty In-
ternational, International Secretariat: VAW Campaign progress update 28 July 2003,
28.07.2003.
86 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: The VAWcampaign AnAgenda for Gen-
der Equity The proposed framework for the “internal strategy”, 01.07.2003, p.1.
87 Hopgood 2006, p.153.
88 Khan: Letter form Irene Khan to sections, 01.04.2004.
89 Hopgood 2006, p.237.
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implementation of the campaign at the sectional level. In the present section,
I provide details on the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit. I then highlight
how their embeddedness in the headquarters and their lack of clear respon-
sibilities and power hampered the implementation of the campaign. In doing
so, I also show that the female activists and officials who had initiated AI’s
work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work on
issues of VAW because of the top-down nature of the campaign. This loss of
influence can in turn be seen as one of the reasons why the SVAW campaign
did not succeed in making women’s rights part of AI’s DNA. Later, I focus
on the decentralized entities in the SVAW campaign Machinery – the SVAW
network and the Campaign Steering Committee.90 I provide further details on
how AI organized the campaign’s implementation at the national level in the
upcoming sections on the Swiss and the German sections (section 8.2).
Figure 11: The SVAW campaign Machinery
Source: own
The Campaign Team was responsible for promoting the movement’s cam-
paign and coordinating the campaign.91 It was in charge of drafting the cam-
paign strategies, heading the communication about the campaign, and pro-
viding the regional research teams at the IS with advice and support through-
out the duration of the entire campaign.92 The team thus had to closely col-
90 While many archival documents contained information about the Campaign Team and
relatively many interviewees mentioned the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit, in-
formation on the SVAW network and on the Campaign Steering Committee was scarce.
Consequently, the following paragraphs on the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit dig
deeper than the passages on the Campaign Steering Committee and the SVAW network.
This differencemay be interpreted as reflecting the pivotal role the Campaign Team and
the Gender Unit played in the implementation of the SVAW campaign, in contrast to
the two decentralized entities.
91 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
92 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.140.
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laborate with and “was reliant on the research teams, who wrote the majority
of the research reports.”93 Embedded in the IS campaign’s department, the
team was initially lead by the former IWN coordinator and was composed
of “many of the early “gender pioneers” from within the IS.”94 The members
of the first Campaign Team were mainly female officials formally organized
in the IWN. Thus, in contrast to the members of the second Campaign Team
who coordinated the campaign from 2006 onwards, the members of the first
team were senior IS staff possessing consolidated knowledge and expertise
in women’s rights issues. Indeed, many of them had previously lobbied the
organization to increase its work on women’s rights.
The campaign reviewer highlighted that all primary team members left
in the beginning of the second phase of the campaign, and a new team com-
posed of less experienced and less senior staff was nominated for campaign
coordinator.95 The latter was led by Widney Brown (formerly responsible for
women’s issues at HRW and Senior Director of the International Law and
Policy department at the IS). At the end of the campaign, the Campaign Team
was dissolved and most of its members left AI, with others being integrated
into other IS departments. While it was not clear how the work on issues of
VAW was to be continued in the aftermath of the SVAW campaign, some of
the Campaign Team’s work was handed over to the newly created Gender, Sex-
uality, and Identity Program, which replaced the Gender Unit at the end of the
campaign.96
Established in 2003, the Gender Unit can be traced back to an initiative
of AIUSA97 and to the lobbying of the IWN. In fact, as an interviewee ex-
plains: “The Gender Unit itself was a product of campaigning by the movement
and the women’s network within AI.”98 Mainly composed of two people, the
Gender Unit “[was] situated in different institutional locations”99 before being
attached to the policy and evaluation program. It was in charge of developing
the SVAW campaign and providing policy advice both for it and for AI’s work
on women and human rights in general. It was also initially responsible for
93 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.140.
94 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.140.
95 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
96 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.144.
97 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 24th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 21.08.1999, p.16.
98 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012, p.1.
99 Miller 2006, p.26.
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the GAP before handing this responsibility over to the deputy SG.100 Thus,
the members of the Gender Unit collaborated “with colleagues [from the policy
and evaluation program] on all policy issues connected with gender”101 and
commented on SVAW reports.102
Further, an informant explained that the Gender Unit “was responsible for
all the reports. Every report on SVAWwent through [their] desk. And most of
the sections’ reports they invaded [the Gender Unit]. […] So [the Gender Unit]
worked with [the researchers] before, through the report, and worked with
them after the report.”103 Because the IS team working on the legal stan-
dards of human rights was not sufficiently trained to frame the violations of
women’s rights within the appropriate legal principles, and because AI did not
dispose of its proper policy defining the position of the movement regarding
specific women’s rights violations at this moment in time, the Gender Unit also
had to provide the relevant international policy frameworks onwomen’s rights
for the IS research teams. For example, as one of my interviewees reported,
AI did not have a position on the issue of “underage sex” or “child marriage,”
which made it difficult to do research and produce reports on these issues.104
Thus, the Gender Unit was responsible for many issues that had signifi-
cantly changed over time, from “mainstreaming across all AI, strateg[y] for
SVAW campaign, [and directing the] short period leading the Campaign, to
policy development onWomen’s Human Rights issues.”105 Similar to theCam-
paign Team, the Gender Unit relied on collaboration with the legal teams and
the research teams at the IS. The Gender Unit also dissolved at the end of the
SVAW campaign and was replaced with the Gender, Identity and Sexuality
Program. As I highlight later, AI suspended the head of the Gender Unit after
she criticized the organization for taking on the defense of the extrajudicial
detainee Moazzam Begg, who was known as a supporter of the Taliban. The
100 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: VAWCampaign progress update 28 July
2003, 28.07.2003, p.6; Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
101 Amnesty International: Report of the meeting on: regional campaigning on SVAWwooc re-
search projects in Europe, decembre 2005, p.16.
102 Amnesty International: Report of the meeting on: regional campaigning on SVAWwooc re-
search projects in Europe, decembre 2005, p.16.
103 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
104 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
105 Miller 2006, p.26.
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former head of the Gender Unit argued that AI was risking its reputation on
human rights with this association with Moazzam Begg.106
The Campaign Team’s and the Gender Unit’s institutional embeddedness
into the IS and their lack of clear responsibility and power prevented the
campaign from being effectively implemented. An interviewee described the
functioning of the IS as: “It is like 300 organizations are all doing tiny inef-
fective things.”107 Wallace and Baños (2010) stress the “lack of coordination
around global campaigning” and “the strongly ‘siloed’ ways of working in the
IS,” which were exemplified by “different departments and teams focused on
different women’s rights issues, some under SVAW and some not, and there
was no coherent picture of who was driving campaigning on what issue.”108
Moreover, the SVAW campaign was also perceived within the IS as work
extraneous to the rest of the headquarters’ work. An interviewee explained
the difficulty of mainstreaming a gender perspective into the IS’s work with
the fact that AI’s work on VAW “was very much contained as ‘that was in
that campaign and the rest of our work is entirely separate.’”109 Situated in
the campaign department’s policy and evaluation programs, respectively, the
Campaign Team and the Gender Unit were detached from the research program
and the legal program, where researchers undertook research that nurtured
the campaign and the legal bases of AI’s work on human rights were elabo-
rated. Thus, the Campaign Team had to work horizontally with other depart-
ments across the IS,110 and the Gender Unit had to collaborate closely with the
legal teams.
Often, informal contacts compensated for the absence of formalized col-
laboration between the Campaign Team and other departments. Eventually,
they were pivotal for the achievements of the campaign objectives. The cam-
paign review (2010) highlights that: “The relationships fostered [across the
departments] appear to have depended on individual initiatives rather than
being formalized in any way.”111
While there had been good and frequent dialogues between the Campaign
Team and other departments (most notably the regional and policy teams),
106 Daily Mail Reporter 2010.
107 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
108 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.140.
109 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
110 Miller 2006, p.27.
111 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.146.
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and the collaboration between the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit was
rather positive,112 these entities’ lack of clear responsibilities and authority
hampered the implementation of the campaign. Indeed, there had been “a
confusion over the role of the SVAW teamas comparedwith theGenderUnit”113
and over the two entities’ roles and responsibilities, as well as over how both of
them were linked to the IS’s other functions. 114 The campaign review points
out that “both [for example] commented on all documents relating to women’s
rights.”115
However, the lack of power seems to have been particularly problematic
for the work of the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit. An interviewee ex-
plains: “The SVAW team had the responsibility for [the coordination of the
campaign] but they had no power, no power to make anything happen.”116
Another interviewee refers to the Campaign Team’s difficulties from the posi-
tion of a team member: “So you are left saying ‘I am going to lead this cam-
paign but I have no research to lead it with.’”117 The team’s dependence upon
the research teams and the fact that “the team had little authority over the
organization’s research agenda”118 made campaign coordination difficult.
Similar to the Campaign Team, the members of the Gender Unit also lacked
authority and power. An interviewee reports that, “the Gender Unit […] just
cannot go to someone and say ‘you need to change your research a little, do
this and that so it deals with women’s rights.’”119 Instead, “the research teams
had to do some things on women’s rights. But it was pretty much up to them
what they did, how they did and when they did and where they did it.”120The
Gender Unit’s lack of accountability and authority entailed that collaboration
was voluntary, which made its work even more difficult. An interviewee ex-
plains: “sometimes [the research teams] just did what they like and didn’t tell
us. […] If they were good, they came to us to plan [the reports]. If they weren’t
so good, they just went off on a mission and sent it to us later.”121The first ex-
112 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.141.
113 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.145.
114 Miller 2006.
115 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.145.
116 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
117 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
118 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.140.
119 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
120 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
121 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
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ternal evaluation of the campaign revealed that the absence of responsibilities
and authority also was a problem for the implementation of the internal cam-
paign. In fact, according to Miller (2006), one of the reasons why AI failed to
realize the internal campaign objectives was “the lack of strong signals from
senior management on the implementation of the GAP,”122 and the fact that
no one had the ultimate authority and responsibility to implement it.123
In summary, the Campaign Team’s and the Gender Unit’s detachment from
the research program and the legal program, which were both key for AI’s
overall work because they lay the factual and legal basis for all activities and
actions of the organization, and their lack of clear responsibilities and power
hampered the work of these centralized entities of the SVAW campaign Ma-
chinery and, consequently, the implementation of the campaign. Further-
more, it is worth assuming that the composition of the staff of the Campaign
Team and the Gender Unit influenced the implementation of the campaign in
qualitative as well as quantitative terms. According to some IS staff members,
the fact that the Campaign Team was composed of some very strong people
during the first campaign phase hampered the collaboration with other IS
teams.124 At the same time, the first team greatly contributed to the success
of the campaign: “the team’s commitment, knowledge and expertise added
value to the campaign” and “played an essential role in supporting [sections] to
produce campaign strategies.”125 Consequently, the composition of the first
Campaign Team somehow compensated for the team’s detachment from the
research program and the absence of clear responsibility and authority.
However, as the following extract from the campaign review shows, the
problematic embeddedness of the team and its lack of authority and support
played an important role in the first campaign team’s decision to leave. The
staff of the Campaign Team left at the end of the first campaign phase because
they “were exhausted and felt they did not have the authority or resources
to fulfill their responsibilities well, and they were not sufficiently supported
to implement a major complex global campaign.”126 As I have already men-
tioned, they were replaced by less senior staff that an interviewee qualified
122 Miller 2006, p.26.
123 Miller 2006, p.26.
124 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.141.
125 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.141.
126 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.141.
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in the following way: “They just weren’t senior enough. Not even vaguely se-
nior.”127 According to her, because the Campaign Teamwas junior, they lacked
the authority and respect necessary to continue effective coordination.128 As
far as the Gender Unit is concerned, the team’s temporary understaffing and
its under-qualified replacement hampered the Unit’s effectiveness. In an in-
terviewee’s words: “They didn’t replace her. [Instead] they gave somebody the
brief […] along with all their other work […] who had no idea of women’s
rights.”129
The preceding paragraphs have illustrated the pivotal role the Campaign
Team and the Gender Unit played in the running of the SVAW campaign and
have highlighted how their problematic embeddedness in the IS and the ab-
sence of clear responsibility and authority made their work difficult. Before
concluding this section, I briefly describe the role of the SVAW network and
the Campaign Steering Committee in the campaign’s implementation.
The SVAW network was set up to facilitate the circulation of information
from the IS to sections, thereby enhancing the capacity of the movement to
campaign on VAW.130 It was thus mostly composed of the Campaign Team
and the Gender Unit as well as of the sections’ SVAW campaign coordinators.
In fact, according to one interviewee, the SVAW network was basically “the
contact person in each section and structure [the Campaign Team] would send
stuff to.”131Thecampaign evaluation highlighted that, because the sections in-
volved in the SVAW campaign were not required to provide feedback on their
work to the Campaign Team, the sharing of information about the campaign
was often “done in an ad hoc way, often through the SVAW network.”132 While
one interviewee saw the SVAWnetwork as an extension of the IWN, explaining
that:
“the SVAWnetworkwas an attempt to expand the IWN.With the [possibility]
that men could join meetings as well, sections could join as well and that it
127 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
128 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
129 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
130 Amnesty International: AI and a new international women’s rights network, November
2009.
131 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
132 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010, p.146.
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would rally individuals and sections who could not find a feminist orienta-
tion as their comfort zone but would be willing to support VAW issues,”133
another interviewee suggested that the setting up of a network for the imple-
mentation of the SVAW campaign contributed to the dissolution of the IWN.
According to her “the SVAW network was set up and money was put in to that
[…]. So, it became a rival of [the IWN].”134 Nevertheless, given the lack of data
on the SVAW network and the absence of any terms of references, it is worth
assuming that it played a minor role in the running of the campaign.
However, at the end of the campaign, the sections’ campaign coordina-
tors took advantage of the network in order to pressure the organization into
continuing its work on women’s rights.135 In fact, as pointed out by one of my
interviewees,many section campaign coordinators “[…] were in danger of los-
ing their jobs because the SVAW campaign was closing. So, there were women
who […] when the SVAW campaign ended, were looking unemployment in the
face.”136 The same informant pointed out that they:
“protested and […] they said that ‘look, you know we need to have resources
to do further work on women’s human rights.’ […] They weren’t just fight-
ing for their jobs, they were fighting on the principled issue of ‘can’t just say
SVAW is gone, ok, we will do other work.’”137
While a part of the Campaign Team’s and the Gender Unit ’s former staff con-
tinued working at the IS in a different function, it is not possible to say with
certainty what happened to the campaign coordinators within sections. The
function of the campaign coordinator of the Swiss section was transformed
into a permanent position. It is worth assuming that other sections did the
same for their campaign coordinators. However, the lack of information pre-
vents us from making this conclusion with certainty. Similar to what hap-
pened to the Campaign Team and the Gender Unit, the SVAW network as such
disappeared at the end of the SVAW campaign. However, the former mem-
bers of the SVAW network at the IS and in different sections formed a new
network called the International Women’s Human Rights Network in 2011. It
sought to “mobilize and strategize on women’s human rights at a time when
133 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
134 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
135 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
136 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
137 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
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many are concerned that the gains that have been made in women’s rights
within AI may be lost.”138
Similar to the situations described above, I also found very scarce data on
the Campaign Steering Committee. None of my interviewees mentioned it when
they talked about the SVAW campaign. It is thus worth assuming that it only
played a marginal role in the overall running of the campaign.The little infor-
mation that I did find had to do with its composition and general objectives.
The Campaign Steering Committee was composed of senior section represen-
tatives, such as the Swiss section’s secretary general, and of IS staff. It was
meant to monitor and supervise the campaign, to develop lessons for future
theme campaigns and “to improve communications and exploit more effec-
tively the expertise and experience in the movement.”139 Further, the com-
mittee was meant to enhance the commitment of the section directors and
contribute to the endorsement of the campaign, particularly of the internal
campaign.
Summing up, the organization’s leadership initiated the majority of the
ICM decisions concerning AI’s work on VAW, and pushed AI’s work on VAW
from the top down with the SVAW campaign. The IWN, which had been ini-
tiated by female activists and which had been used as a strategy to make AI
increase its work on women’s rights throughout the 1990s, was dissolved in
2002. Many of the female officials were part of the feminist caucus at the
IS and members of the IWN were included in the preparation and, particu-
larly, in the implementation of the campaign as members of the SVAW cam-
paign Machinery. However, the problematic embeddedness of the Campaign
Team and the Gender Unit into the IS and their lack of clear responsibilities
and power made it difficult for the women’s rights advocates at the IS to ef-
fectively implement the campaign. Further, at the end of the first campaign
phase, many of the “gender pioneers” at the IS left AI. Others quit at the very
end of the campaign in 2010. Thus, it is worth assuming that with the SVAW
campaign implemented from the top down, the female activists and officials
who initiated AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the orga-
nization’s work on issues of VAW.This loss of influence can therefore be seen
as one of the reasons why AI did not succeed in making women’s rights part
of its DNA through the SVAW campaign.
138 Amnesty International: AI and a new international women’s rights network, November
2009, p.1.
139 Khan 2003, p.9.
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8.1.4 Resistance against AI’s work on VAW
This section emphasizes AI members’ and sections’ reaction to and participa-
tion in the SVAW campaign and specifically focuses on the debates accom-
panying the adoption of the ICM decisions on sexual and reproductive rights
and abortion. In doing this, I highlight the activists’ and officials’ resistance
to the SVAW campaign and to the adoption of a policy on abortion. Section
8.1.4 begins by examining the opposition to the campaign and shows that
three principal factors motivated it. First, some of AI’s members and officials
opposed the SVAW campaign because they primarily perceived it as a flagship
for the change that the adoption of the mission brought about. Second, other
criticisms related to the structure and the setting of the campaign, rather
than to its content. Third, some opposition related to the content of the cam-
paign itself. Later, I highlight the critiques and the resistance to the adoption
of the policy on abortion. This opposition can more clearly be identified as
opposition to the issue of abortion and less to AI’s overall policy change.
8.1.4.1 Resistance against the SVAW campaign
The 2001 ICM heralded many fundamental changes related to the content of
AI’s work and to its working methods. By adopting the mission, AI increas-
ingly focused on economic, social, and cultural rights. The organization gave
its concentration on individual cases up and opened out to thematic cam-
paigning. At the same time, it increasingly engaged in collaborations with
other organizations and abandoned the WOOC rule.
As its first long-term global thematic campaign, AI used the SVAW cam-
paign as a flagship to test these transformations.The campaign thus served to
probe the new way of thematic campaigning and to gain experience in giving
sections the chance to conduct research on their own country. Evidence shows
that part of the staff opposed the campaign because it embodied a departure
to a new way of working on human rights and, consequently, a break with the
past. An interviewee explained the opposition to the campaign with its “flag-
ship role” in establishing a new way of working under the mission. The same
person explained that the fact that the campaign “was used to drive many
other things […], made the campaign very unpopular for a lot of people.”140
Kelleher and Bhattacharjya (2013) accurately explain that:
140 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
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“the opposition to this [the SVAW campaign] also was not necessarily a
misogynistic response at the time, [but] more to the broadened mandate,
the feeling that AI was entering waters it did not have enough expertise in,
and that the reasons for doing such work were not clear […].”141
Relatedly, the collaboration with external specialists on women’s rights, in-
evitable when AI started dealing with a new thematic issue, posed problems
to the IS staff. An interviewee explained that “there was a general kind of
resistance to work with anyone else.”142 In fact, as mentioned before, col-
laboration with external women’s rights specialists was an integral part of the
various campaign preparation meetings. Because VAWwas a new issue, most
IS staff had little or no experience in addressing it in their work, and cam-
paign IS staff was required to collaborate with and learn from women’s rights
specialists external to AI during the Stop Violence against Women campaign. In
his 2006 book Keepers of the flame, Hopgood explained the internal opposition
against the SVAW campaign with the incompatibility between AI’s original
focus and the complexity of VAW. He argued that:
“Violence against women is complex; violence against women takes many
forms, has many justifications and excuses, and is politically fraught locally
and contentious globally. What would a simple illustrative case be? […] But
Amnesty aims to speak for women everywhere in the name of universal hu-
man rights. What case can it choose that truly reflects the core intuition, the
very spirit, of universal rights? The founders, […], had found one: the prisoner
of conscience. That Amnesty identified with humanity as a whole-gender-
less, colorless, without sexuality-had been its virtue.”143
Thus, according to him, there was an antagonism between AI’s original fo-
cus and the complexity of VAW, which explains the challenge that the SVAW
campaign presented to the organization and the internal opposition it evoked
because, as he explained, “Amnesty [could not] continue to be what it has been
as a result.”144
As highlighted previously, the SVAW campaign was implemented in two
phases with distinct thematic focuses. Evidence indicates that the modifi-
cation of the thematic emphasis between the first and the second part was
141 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.5.
142 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
143 Hopgood 2006, p.154-155.
144 Hopgood 2006, p.154-155.
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subject to critiques from staff and activists. In fact, officials and activists
criticized abandoning the focus on “VAW in armed conflicts” and “Domes-
tic violence” at the end of the first phase. According to them, this change
prevented the organization from continuing to build expertise and networks
around these issues. As a result, many staff and activists simply ignored the
campaign’s new direction and carried on doing what they had been doing
during the first phase of the campaign, because they did not understand the
changes.145
For another interviewee, in the second phase “the campaign lost in in-
ternational coherence [because] beside the girls-action [...], no strong cam-
paigning line was visible.”146 Further, as mentioned before, the last two years
of the SVAW campaign coincided with the preparation of AI’s second global
thematic campaign Demand Dignity, which was launched at the beginning of
2009. Relatedly, as the evaluation of the SVAW campaign pointed out, “there
was never a clear exit strategy for the campaign or for ending the work with
partners.”147 Thus, while not necessarily provoking opposition, the change of
the thematic focus away from a unique emphasis on VAW toward becoming
an instrument for achieving AI’s growth agenda during the second phase, the
absence of a clear exit strategy, and the related parallel launch of the Demand
Dignity campaign made the SVAW unpopular among staff and activists.
While it is difficult to grasp the IS’s opposition to the SVAW campaign
in its entirety, the data allow us to locate the resistance and identify the
main reasons behind it. Evidence indicates that opposition came from
certain groups of researchers at the IS. One interviewee explained that as
“traditional researchers, many of them, did not want to look at women’s
rights. Did not, would not.”148 Another interviewee highlighted: “a certain
research group […] just didn’t take it seriously. They were not interested.They
didn’t really think that women’s rights were an issue in the Middle East for
example.”149 Some researchers refused to integrate a gender perspective into
their reports, saying that “[they] d[id]n’t have the capacity,”150 whereas others
were “only open to incorporate a gender analysis if Gita [the head of the
145 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.139.
146 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009, p.3.
147 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b, p.179.
148 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
149 Ganzfried: Interview with A.Z., 26.06.2012.
150 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
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Gender Unit] would go with them on a mission. And back after the mission,
Gita would write the section on gender.”151
During the campaign, there were regular conflicts between theGenderUnit
and the legal program,which could also be interpreted as a form of opposition
to the SVAW campaign coming from some legal staff members. An intervie-
wee explained: “[the Gender Unit was] constantly on battle with our own legal
program because they hadn’t got a clue about the legal standards related to
women’s human rights.”152The conflict between the Gender Unit and AI’s legal
and policy experts became manifest in the elaboration of AI’s policy on abor-
tion.TheGender Unit submitted a document on the absolute denial of abortion
in Nicaragua to the UN Committee Against Torture, considering this denial
a form of torture. An informant explains that “several of AI’s legal and policy
experts were furious”153 with it, as the submission was a public document and
did not reflect the state of AI’s position on the issue at that time. However,
as the following statement of the same interviewee demonstrates, the legal
program’s critique of applying black letter laws, such as the UN Convention
against Torture, to issues of women’s rights reflects a disregard of women’s
rights issues compared to the traditional human rights issues that AI had
focused on before. According to this informant:
“if [the Gender Unit was] trying to use the issue of torture for women’s rights
it was treated as if [they were] using an inflationary language. […] this is too
precious to be applied to issues of women. It has to be applied to serious
things like male political prisoners and so on.”154
How can this content-related opposition against the SVAW campaign be ac-
counted for?While it is difficult to definitively establish the reason behind this
opposition, evidence indicates that it had to do with the patriarchal men-
talities of some of the IS staff. Bhattacharjya identified “patriarchal mind-
sets”155 behind the internal opposition and contestation of the SVAW cam-
paign. Kelleher and Bhattacharjya further explained that many womenwithin
AI perceived the functioning of AI to be “deeply patriarchal.”156 Comparing AI
151 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
152 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
153 Ganzfried: Correction of citations A.W., 22.08.2018.
154 Ganzfried: Interview with A.W., 25.06.2012.
155 Bhattacharjya 2013, p.5.
156 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013, p.10.
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to a secular church, defining AI as “basically a church,”157 another interviewee
provides a similar explanation for the organization’s struggles with the incor-
poration of women’s rights into its overall work. He stated: “And you know
how well the church deals with women’s rights, very, very badly. Because they
think women’s rights are not really important enough and it is not fundamen-
tal to what it is about. It is about some deeper thing.”158
Thus, while part of the resistances to the SVAW campaign had to do with
its flagship role and the campaign’s structure and setting, another part of the
resistance (observed at least among the IS staff) was clearly linked to the con-
tent of the campaign. An explanation for this seems to be the presence of pa-
triarchal mentalities among IS staff members. Or, given that the church as an
institution deeply embodies a patriarchal culturemore than any other organi-
zation, AI’s resemblance to a church may also explain the internal resistance.
The correlation between AI’s resemblance to a church and the opposition to
the SVAW campaign also becomes evident within sections. As I show in sec-
tion 8.2.2, the German section’s closeness to the church explains its virulent
opposition to the campaign and to the adoption of an abortion policy at least
to a certain extent.
8.1.4.2 Resistance against the adoption of a policy on abortion
By focusing on the ICM decisions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW, the
present section illustrates that “the debate on reproductive rights […] was one
of the most challenging periods for Amnesty […].”159 and that abortion was
a highly controversial issue. In fact, as figure 12 illustrates, among the deci-
sions directly concerning AI’s work on VAW, only the decisions on sexual and
reproductive rights that included the issue of abortion provoked debates at
their respective ICMs (highlighted in the left column of figure 12).160
The first signs of disagreement about the extent to which AI should work
on the issue of sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion, became
157 Ganzfried: Interview with B.R., 25.06.2012.
158 Ganzfried: Interview with B.R., 25.06.2012.
159 Ganzfried: Interview with A.O., 23.01.2015.
160 As the report from the 2005 ICM shows, debates heralded the adoption of decision 2 of
the 2005 ICM. But, these discussions did not focus on AI’s work on women in conflict,
but concerned other aspects of the resolution not related to women’s rights. For this
reason, I classified decision 2 of the 2005 ICM among those not triggering debates.
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Figure 12: ICM decisions and related debates, 2002-2009
Source: my own, based on the 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 ICMs reports
evident in 2003. At the 2003 ICM, several South American sections (AI Ar-
gentina, AI Mexico, and AI Peru) initiated the discussion by emphasizing the
importance of addressing sexual and reproductive rights when working on vi-
olence against women. AI Peru noted that this issue was particularly relevant
in their region, where women were often denied the right of access to family
planning.161 At the same time, concerned about AI’s credibility with respect
to the global SVAW campaign, the Irish section162 also called AI to further
engage with the subject of abortion.163 Others, such as the Italian and the
Indian sections, were more reluctant. The 2003 ICM report reflects that “the
Italian section stated that they were not ready to enter into the area of abor-
tion but were open to debate on the issue.”164 The Indian section expressed
concerns about how to campaign on the issue of abortion and suggested pro-
moting the decriminalization of abortion but not the right to abortion.165 As I
mentioned at the beginning of chapter 8, the IEC launched a movement-wide
consultation process with the aim of developing a common position in the af-
termath of these initial discussions. Based on the results of the consultation,
161 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.154.
162 Later, the same section proved to be more critical towards the adoption of an abortion
policy.
163 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.153.
164 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.154.
165 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 26th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2003, p.154.
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the IEC proposed its first enabling resolution to the 2005 ICM (illustrated in
figure 13).
Figure 13: Origin of the two decisions on sexual and reproductive rights
Source: my own, based on the 2005 and 2007 ICM reports
The report of the 2005 ICM reveals the sensitivity of the issue: “The Chair
[reminded] the Working Party that this topic was very sensitive and urged a
respectful debate.”166 The discussion of the enabling resolution at the 2005
ICM illustrates the diverging viewpoints, which mostly crystallized on the
issue of abortion. In fact, many sections feared that adopting a position on
abortion at this moment would result in the drop-out of many AI members.
While the delegates agreed that “the IEC [would] develop a policy showing
AI’s commitment to defending and promoting sexual and reproductive rights
within its mission,”167 section representatives disagreed about abortion.
While a majority (28 sections) called for further movement-wide consulta-
tions before developing a definite position, 19 sections favored the principle
of legal, safe and accessible abortions for all women (this position was also
espoused by the IEC), another 16 sections chose a position in line with the
international legal consensus (i.e. where abortion was legal, it should be safe
and where it was illegal, it should be decriminalized), and a minority of five
sections favored a position stipulating that AI should only address a woman’s
right to abortion in instances of sexual assault, rape, and incest.168 Further,
the sections disagreed on the process of reaching a consensus on this issue.
166 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 14th-20th August 2005, p.74.
167 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.69.
168 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.67.
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While half of the sections were in favor of adopting a position at the 2005
ICM, the other half wanted additional consultations, arguing that a decision
was premature.169 Therefore, they opposed the IEC’s enabling resolution
and wanted to postpone the adoption of a definite position until the 2007
ICM.The divergence around decision 3 of the 2005 ICM thus concerned both
the decision-making process and the content of AI’s position on abortion.
Consequently, the issue was postponed until the 2007 ICM, giving sections
additional time for discussion.
However, as the submission of three section resolutions and one enabling
resolution to the 2007 ICM (illustrated in Figure 13) shows, two years later,
sections still disagreed on AI’s future work on sexual and reproductive rights
and abortion. AI Germany formulated the most critical position, suggesting
that “AI will keep its neutral position on whether or not abortion should be
a right of the woman.”170 As one of the German delegates highlighted at the
2007 ICM, “It was very clear that the German section was perceived pretty
much as trouble-makers in this matter”171 by the rest of the movement. The
German resolution revealed a conservative understanding of a woman’s right
to end or not end her pregnancy, which juxtaposed fetal rights with maternal
rights, stating:
“the possibility of fetal rights […] is contentious and has medical, legal, and
ethical facets. Experience with decades of discussions around this issue have
shown that individuals, societies, and states cannot come to an agreement
in the potentially tragic conflict woman-fetus.”172
TheGerman section explained its reticence to take a position on abortion with
its members’ belief in the importance of the question of whether “a fetus has
a right to life.”173
169 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Report and Decisions of the 27th Inter-
national Council of Amnesty International, 2006, p.73.
170 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.12.
171 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015: “Es war aber ganz klar, dass man uns,
die deutsche Sektion wahrgenommen hat als ziemliche Störenfriede in dieser Angelegenheit.”.
172 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.13.
173 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.13.
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In its resolution, the Swedish section adopted the position most contrast-
ing with the German position. This stance, also shared by the IS,174 asked for
an evaluation of the current policy on abortion as to whether it fitted AI’s fu-
ture work on the right to health, a main issue within the upcoming Demand
Dignity campaign. It also raised the possibility of addressing the global prob-
lem of “maternal deaths, [which] are due to unsafe abortions.”175 In its resolu-
tion, AI Peru (Figure 13) proposed “a policy on access to quality services for the
management of complications arising from abortion,”176 arguing that such a
policy did not mean that AI agreed with abortion or with the decriminaliza-
tion of abortion. Instead, it would guarantee the right of access to health care
that every person should enjoy.
At the same time, in its enabling resolution, the IEC demanded the adop-
tion of the policy on selected aspects of abortion (decriminalization of abortion;
access to quality services for the management of complications arising from
abortion; legal, safe, and accessible abortion in cases of rape, sexual assault,
incest, and risks to a woman’s life). After some discussion in the working party
at the ICM, the delegates finally reached a compromise, and the final resolu-
tion (HRS A) was accepted by a largemajority to become decision 3. Neverthe-
less, a small minority (seven votes, which included the Irish, the Venezuelan,
and some African sections) still firmly disagreed with the adoption of any
policy on abortion.177 Even though it shared this disagreement, the German
section finally grudgingly accepted decision 3.178
In sum, AI took more than six years to find a common position on the
issue of abortion. The length of the decision-making process reflects the im-
portant opposition of some of AI’s members and staff to the adoption of an
AI policy on abortion. While the analysis of the ICM reports allows us to un-
derstand the decision-making process, the reports do not allow us to identify
each section’s position.We are, however, able to recognize some regional ten-
dencies thanks to personal interviews. According to one of my interviewees,
many Latin American country sections were in favor of adopting a position on
174 Ganzfried: Correction of citations A.G., 30.07.2018.
175 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.9.
176 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 28th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 42 Resolution and Statute Amendment Pack, July 2007, p.8.
177 Amnesty International: 28th international Council Meeting, 2007.
178 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015.
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abortion. She explained that “Interestingly the sections in Latin America had
no problem with putting abortion [on the agenda].”179 Similarly, the Nordic
sections, such as the Swedish, the Norwegian, and the Danish sections, fa-
vored a position in favor of the decriminalization of abortion. In contrast, as
I have already illustrated, the German section opposed any policy-making on
the issue for many years. Further, African sections seem to have been rather
critical of the adoption of the policy.
One of the reasons why some sections strongly opposed the adoption of
any position on abortionwas their fear of losingmembers. Speaking on behalf
of the critical sections, an interviewee explained: “If we do this, the members
are going to go. […]. They were scared, who is going to give the money?”180
There were cases of long-term activists leaving their sections and the orga-
nization when AI adopted its policy on the restricted aspects of abortion. In
fact, because of AI’s nature of a membership organization based on demo-
cratic principles that gave members the opportunity to define the organi-
zation’s working focus, the attitude of a section’s membership towards the
issue was paramount for the section’s position on AI’s policy on abortion. It
seems that the traditionally conservativemembership,manifest, among other
things, in the section’s closeness to the Church, explained its opposition to the
adoption of an abortion policy, at least in the case of the German section.
In fact, according to an informant, the members of the German section
were rather conservative and close to the Church: “It just shows you the type
of people and how the organization grew because in the North, interestingly
enough, because it all started with Church and going with little groups in
the Church here in this country in Germany or whatever.”181 In contrast, the
same interviewee explains, Latin American AI sections were generally in favor
of adopting an abortion policy because of their progressive membership:
“you can think ‘Latin America is very Catholic.’ But the people in Latin Amer-
ica who would become members of AI belong to a kind of elite, the middle
classes. […] University students, they are the ones who are becoming mem-
bers, not the conservative people. […] The Latin American sections are new
ones; the members are university people […].”182
179 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
180 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
181 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
182 Ganzfried: Interview with A.X., 25.06.2012.
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Mydata thus points to a relationship between a section’s church-relatedmem-
bership and its willingness to integrate issues of VAW into its work. As I high-
light later, this relation is also reflected in the case studies on the German and
the Swiss sections.
Summing up, activists and officials put up real resistance to the SVAW
campaign and to the adoption of a policy on abortion. In the case of the SVAW
campaign, staff and activists also opposed the campaign for reasons other
than its content. In the case of the discussion on the ICM decisions on sex-
ual and reproductive rights, the resistance was clearly related to the issue of
abortion itself. I therefore argue that the content-related opposition against
the SVAW campaign and against the adoption of a policy on abortion were an
important reason for AI’s failure to integrate VAW into its work through the
SVAW campaign.
So far, the analysis at the international level indicates that it is worth as-
suming that AI did not succeed in integrating VAW into its work through
the SVAW campaign for two main reasons. First, female activists and offi-
cials who initiated AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the
organization’s VAW work. Second, activists’ and officials’ resistances to the
SVAW campaign and to the adoption of an abortion policy was too strong to
be neglectedAs I demonstrate in the following pages, there were considerable
differences in the extent to which AI succeeded in integrating the issue of
VAW into its work at the national level, in the section’s reactions to the par-
ticipation in the SVAW campaign, and in the opposition to the adoption of an
abortion policy. I examine all of these issues in my case studies on the Swiss
and the German sections.
8.2 The national levels
My focus on the national level allows me to examine the considerable differ-
ences in the extent to which the Swiss and the German sections managed to
integrate the issue of VAW into their work in the 2000s. While the Swiss sec-
tion was more successful in making VAW part of its overall work, the German
section hailed limited achievements. Chapter 8.2 provides a detailed picture
of the content and the structures supporting the sections’ work in the frame
of the SVAW campaign. It identifies five criteria that allowme to capture each
section’s success in integrating VAW into its work.The criteria emerged from
the data and have to do with the adoption of the overall campaign by the sec-
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tion; the professionalization of the work on issues of VAW; the leadership’s
commitment to the SVAW campaign; the influence of a section’s women’s
group or network on the section’s work on issues of VAW; and lastly, the sec-
tion’s resistance to the SVAW campaign and the adoption of the abortion pol-
icy. In the chapters on the Swiss and the German sections, I demonstrate the
extent to which the two sections met these criteria. In conclusion, the present
chapter tries to explain the success of the Swiss section and the difficulties of
the German section in making VAW part of their overall work by coming back
to the central differences between the two sections. I argue that the German
section members’ relative closeness to the Church and their comparatively
powerful position help explain the difference between the two sections.
8.2.1 The Swiss section
The present section demonstrates that even though the review of the overall
SVAW campaign showed that AI did not succeed in making VAW part of its
overall work, this general finding has to be nuanced.The Swiss AI section suc-
ceeded in doing so at least partially through the SVAW campaign.The section
starts by providing a detailed picture of the Swiss section’s campaign and
illustrating where the section put the latter’s thematic focus. It also details
the activities realized within the frame of the campaign. It quickly becomes
evident that the Swiss section adopted the thematic focus of the overall cam-
paign and launched an internal as well as an external campaign. Section 8.2.1
then highlights the section leadership’s commitment to the SVAW campaign
and demonstrates the continued importance of the section’s women’s net-
work for the work on violence against women.The section shows that despite
the top-down implementation of the campaign and the professionalization of
the work on VAW at the Swiss section, the female activists and officials of the
women’s network remained important in defining the section’s work on the
issue.Then, I focus on the section’s participation in and reaction to the SVAW
campaign, as well as on the internal discussions regarding the elaboration of
the abortion policy. I demonstrate that resistance to the issue of VAW from
activists and officials was isolated at the Swiss section. At the same time, the
section shows that even though most of the groups participated in the public
SVAW campaign, their involvement was more pragmatic than enthusiastic,
and that work on VAW remained overwhelmingly confined to the members
of the women’s network.
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8.2.1.1 Merging the international campaign strategy
with the section’s priorities
In line with the overall campaign strategy, the Swiss section labeled the cam-
paign Stoppt Gewalt Gegen Frauen, launched an internal campaign and imple-
mented the public campaign in two phases. In contrast to the general cam-
paign, the Swiss section launched the internal campaign and the public cam-
paign simultaneously in 2004. It developed its ownGender Action Plan contain-
ing section-specific objectives on how to become a gender-sensitive organi-
zation, where gender aspects become a transversal theme in all campaigns
and activities and where members engage with the principle that “women’s
rights are human rights.”183 According to the section’s management, the Gen-
der Action Plan had to help in “making the organization internally coherent
with its public discourse.”184 My interviews revealed that one of the key mes-
sages the Swiss section wanted to convey to its members through the Gender
Action Plan was that the SVAW campaign should be perceived primarily as a
human rights campaign, rather than as a feminist endeavor. Thus, the sec-
tion’s management thought it was pivotal to “[pay] attention to the fact that
men were also bearers, bearers of the message”185 and to achieve a balanced
representation of men and women within all positions at every level of the or-
ganization.186 A long-term official explained: “when there were applications,
of course they had to be of equal qualifications, but there was however a spe-
cific will to say ‘in cases of equal qualifications, we want and we will clearly
privilege women’s applications for themanagement board.’”187 In order to en-
hance the members’ gender awareness, the section organized various work-
shops with external gender specialists.188 Evidence shows that these work-
shops were supposed to make staff and activists reflect on their gender roles
183 Jegher: Der Gender Aktionsplan Schweizer Sektion (GAP-AI CH), 18.12.2003.
184 Amnesty International: Plan d’action Genre de la Section suisse, 17.03.2004, p.2.
185 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “On a toujours fait attention à ce que les
hommes soient aussi porteurs, porteurs de message.”.
186 Jegher: Der Gender Aktionsplan Schweizer Sektion (GAP-AI CH), 18.12.2003.
187 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “Quand il y avait des postulations, bien sûr il
fallait une qualité égale au niveau du dossiermais quandmême une volonté spécifique qui a été
dit ‘nous voulons et nous privilégierons en cas de qualité égale, clairement les dossiers femme
dans la Geschäftsleitung.’”.
188 Jegher: AICH-Kampagnentagung 2005 - durch die Gender-Brille gesehen, 22.10.2005, p.1.
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and to sincerely address possible internal resistance to gender issues.189 As I
emphasize later, the success of these workshops was moderate.
Around the 8th of March 2004, the section also launched the public cam-
paign starting with a media manifesto containing various national personal-
ities’ support messages and primarily followed by women’s groups’ activities.
By May 2004, all AI groups had become involved.190The Swiss section imple-
mented the public campaign over the course of six years, from 2004 until the
end of 2010. However, just like the overall campaign, the intensity of the cam-
paign was higher during the first phase.191 Later, between 2008 and 2009, the
SVAW campaign became one of four main global theme campaigns that the
section was implementing.192 Relatedly, the campaign coordinator explained
that the resources for her brief were reduced to about 50% in 2008, which by
189 Amnesty International: Plan d'action Genre de la Section suisse, 17.03.2004, p.4.
190 Amnesty International: “Halte à la Violence contre les Femmes” Informations sur la cam-
pagne, Janvier 2004; SVAWProjekt TeamAICH: Sitzungsprotokoll 12.2.2004, 12.02.2004.
191 Whereas issues related to women’s rights or to the SVAW campaign had been dis-
cussed at every GA between 2003 and 2006, the same issues disappeared from
the GA’s agenda or were only marginally mentioned at the 2007, 2008, 2009,
and 2010 GAs (Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 2002, 06.04.2002;
Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 2003, 12.04.2003; Amnesty Inter-
national: Delegiertenversammlung AICH 2004, 14.05.2004; Amnesty International:
Delegiertenversammlung 2005, 29.05.2005; Amnesty International: Protokoll der
Delegiertenversammlung 6.-7. Mai 2006 in Delémont, 07.05.2006; Amnesty Interna-
tional: Delegiertenversammlung 2007, 06.05.2007; Amnesty International: Protokoll
der Jahresversammlung 19. und 20. April 2008 Bern, 20.04.2008; Amnesty Interna-
tional: Procès-verbal de l'assemblée générale du 27/28 juin 2009 à Berne, 28.06.2009;
Amnesty International; Amnesty International: Protokoll der Generalversammlung
2010 in Fribourg, 25.04.2010). The decline of the activities organized in the frame of
the campaign could also be observed at the group level. In fact, screening 44 minutes
from meetings of the AI group La côte revealed a declining frequency of the agenda
item ‘SVAW campaign’ or ‘women’s rights’ between 2004 and 2008.While these items
were mentioned in 80% (17 out of 20) of the minutes of the meetings that took place
between 2004 and the end of 2005, the same items only appeared in 54% (13 out of
24) of minutes of meetings from 2006 until the end of 2008.
192 As reported in theminutes of the 2008 GA, in 2008, beside the SVAW campaign, AICH
put emphasis on the Campaign on Dignity, the campaign against the violations of the
torture prohibition called Counter Terror with Justice, and the campaign for the respect
of human rights at the Olympic Games in Beijing 2008 (Amnesty International 2008,
p.11).
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that time was “not sufficient for a more important presence”193 of the SVAW
campaign within the section.
The Swiss section broadened the thematic focus of the campaign, con-
centrating on “Women trafficking” and “Due diligence” in its first phase,194 in
addition to the themes adopted by the overall campaign (“Domestic violence”
and “VAW in armed conflicts”).195 In fact, in a consultation, the surveyed na-
tional women’s rights organization qualified “Women trafficking” and “Due
diligence” as important national VAW issues.196 Further, similar to the overall
campaign, the sectionmainly emphasized “Violence in intimate relationships”
in between the two main campaign phases.197
During the second phase, the Swiss section complied with the growth ob-
jectives of the overall campaign and defined the growth of its active mem-
bership as a means to the organization’s effectiveness.198 At the same time,
the section put a different emphasis on the objective “Human Rights concern”
than that proposed by the IS. The section planned to work on the principle
of due diligence, to lobby the Swiss government in favor of the ratification
of the European convention against human trafficking, to participate in the
internal discussion on AI’s position on sexual and reproductive rights, and
enhance the mainstreaming of women’s rights throughout the section.199 In
2008, aside from some smaller actions on the protection of female human
rights defenders and on domestic violence, the section essentially focused on
193 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009, p.3: “ausser-
dem reichten die deutlich verringerten Ressourcen seitens der Kampagnenleitung (nurmehr ca.
50%) nicht aus für eine stärkere Präsenz.”.
194 Jegher: Kampagne Stoppt Gewalt gegen Frauen Mittelfristige Planung per Jan. 05 bis ca.
März 06, 23.12.2004; Amnesty International: SVAW - Aktuell vom 7.4.2004 News zur
Frauenkampagne AI CH, 07.04.2004; Amnesty International: Kampagnenplanung SVAW
AICH - Strategie- und Aktionsplan updated, July 2004.
195 The Swiss section named this issue “weapon and VAW”.
196 In order to identify the campaign’s priorities AICH asked more than 30 women’s rights
organizations and Equality Offices about the occurrence and the nature of gender-
based discrimination and VAW in Switzerland. Bourquin: VAW Campaign External Au-
dit, 2003.
197 Amnesty International: VAW in the family Progress update Swiss Section, 28.09.2006.
198 Amnesty International: Operativer Plan 2006-2007 (AICH OP 2) Wachstum undWirkung
unseres Einsatzes für die Menschenrechte, 24.04.2006.
199 Amnesty International: Operativer Plan 2006-2007 (AICH OP 2) Wachstum undWirkung
unseres Einsatzes für die Menschenrechte, 24.04.2006.
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women trafficking in a sub-campaign related to the European football cham-
pionship, called “Euro 08 against Women Trafficking.”200 According to the
campaign coordinator, with the women trafficking campaign, the Swiss section
“stressed its own priorities”201 and “did not take up the ‘main’ – girls – cam-
paign”202 focusing on violence and the right to education, as defined in the
overall campaign objective “Human Rights Concerns.”
Within the frame of the aforementioned main thematic priorities, the
Swiss section carried out numerous advocacy, lobbying and outreach activ-
ities. I briefly highlight some of the most important campaign activities real-
ized by the Swiss section in an attempt to shed some light on them. In 2005,
various local groups participated in a bicycle tour of the country, initiated
by the Bern women’s group, with the goal of sensitizing a large public to the
issue of domestic violence.203 Further, in September 2005, in what was one
of the key moments of the campaign, the section organized an international
conference on due diligence in collaboration with other organizations and
institutions.204 In 2006, various local AI groups participated in the action
called “mobile home against domestic violence,” which strived to improve the
state’s interventions against family violence. A tour of the country’s rural ar-
eas sought to sensitize the public and young men, in particular, to the issue
of domestic violence.205 Moreover, in collaboration with other organizations,
the Swiss section lobbied for the tightening of the Swiss legislation in matters
of weapons.206 The Swiss section collaborated with the women’s movement,
just like the campaign’s central organs tried to at the international level.207
Women NGOs, such as the Marche mondiale des femmes, the NGO-Koordination
200 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009.
201 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009, p.3: “Wir set-
zten mit der Frauenhandels-Kampagne eigene Akzente.”.
202 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009, p.3: “griffen die
‘Haupt’-Girls-Kampagne nicht auf.”.
203 Amnesty International: Velotour gegen häusliche Gewalt 3./4. September 2005 Ein Ak-
tionsvorschlag der Berner Frauengruppe, 09.03.2005.
204 Amnesty International: Due Diligence: Rolle und Pflichten des Staates in der Bekämpfung
von Gewalt gegen Frauen: Standards, Probleme, Perspektiven Internationale Fachtagung zur
Kampagne "Stoppt Gewalt gegen Frauen" 21. bis 23. September 2005, 30.03.2005.
205 Amnesty International: VAW in the family Progress update Swiss Section, 28.09.2006.
206 Amnesty International:Notice fromStella Jegher to CarolineHuwiler on the SVAWupdates,
06.08.2004.
207 Amnesty International: Kampagne Stop Violence against Women (SVAW) Strategie- und
Aktionsplan Schweizer Sektion, 21.01.2004.
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Post Beijing,208 the umbrella organization of the Swiss shelters for women,209
the Fraueninformationszentrum FIZ, and 210 the KOFF,211 as well as governmen-
tal organizations, such as the Federal Office for Gender Equality and the Fed-
eral Department of Foreign Affairs, were all among AI’s partner institutions
during the campaign.212
Summing up, the Swiss section implemented the SVAW campaign and
adopted the themes of the overall campaign - “VAW in armed conflicts” and
“Domestic violence,” supplementing them with issues of VAW that were spe-
cific to its national context, such as “Women trafficking.” The Gender Action
Plan and the relatedworkshopwere themain components of the internal cam-
paign strategy.213 During the second phase, the Swiss section focused on the
issues of “Due diligence,” “Women trafficking,” and the internal discussion of
AI’s position on sexual and reproductive rights and continued the implemen-
tation of the GAP. Thus, the Swiss section successfully merged the section’s
priorities on issues of VAW with the international campaign strategy.
8.2.1.2 The continuing importance of the women’s network
While the preceding section highlighted the content of the Swiss SVAW cam-
paign, this section emphasizes how the section organized the latter’s im-
plementation. To do so, I call attention to the leadership’s commitment to
the campaign and demonstrate the continuing importance of the section’s
women’s network for the work on VAW.
The section’s management was committed to and pushed the SVAW
campaign forward. The person in charge of the preparation of the campaign
wrote: “the Swiss section can count on the clear support of the manage-
ment”214 when it faced the challenge of “training and mobilizing the entire
208 Amnesty International: Frauenrechts-Ko-Gruppe Sitzungsprotokoll vom 11. Juni 2007,
11.06.2007.
209 Dachorganisation der Schweizer Frauenhäuser.
210 SVAW Projekt Team AICH: Sitzungsprotokoll 5.8.2004, 05.08.2004, p.2.
211 Amnesty International: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009.
212 Bourquin: Préparation de la VAW - update/listing, 09.09.2003, p.4; Amnesty Interna-
tional: Evaluation Kampagnenprojekte 2008, 16.01.2009.
213 Jegher:Kampagne StopptGewalt gegen FrauenMittelfristige Planungper Jan.05 bis ca.März
06, 23.12.2004
214 Amnesty International: Campagne interne (objectif stratégique 4 de la VAW), 09.09.2003,
p.3: “[L]a section peut s’appuyer sur […] le soutien clair de la Direction générale de la Section
pour les questions droits des femmes, […].”.
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section for [the issue of women’s rights]”215 in September 2003. She further
declared that: “it seems to be clear that the VAW campaign, and particularly
the internal campaign, is part of a process coming from the top to the
bottom.”216 The campaign coordinator explained that the Executive Director
(ED) “promoted women’s rights within the Swiss section.”217 Further archival
material suggests that in the beginning of the 2000s, the ED and the mem-
bers of the EC were dedicated to intensifying the section’s work on women’s
rights and VAW and to integrating the issue into the section’s activities in a
sustainable way. In the response to the women’s network’s postulate to the
2003 GA, which called upon the section to take the measures necessary for
a sustained integration of women’s rights beyond the SVAW campaign,218
the management explained that “the EC and the ED [had] the very clear
intention to make [women’s rights] a permanent issue,”219 and confirmed
their commitment to the organization of the internal campaign.220
Moreover, the EC was in favor of the creation of the Women’s Rights Com-
mission,221 which, as I detail later, was an initiative of the women’s network
and aimed at mainstreaming AI’s work on VAW. Evidence also shows that the
section’s management particularly welcomed the internal campaign.The sec-
tion’s management commented on the overall strategy that: “[they] welcomed
in particular the initiative of conducting an internal campaign in parallel with
the public campaign that questions [their] own practice regarding women
215 Amnesty International: Campagne interne (objectif stratégique 4 de la VAW), 09.09.2003,
p.3.
216 Amnesty International: Campagne interne (objectif stratégique 4 de la VAW), 09.09.2003,
p.1: “Il semble clair que la campagne VAW et plus particulièrement la campagne interne, s’in-
tègre dans un processus venant du haut vers le bas.”.
217 Ganzfried: Interview with B.Q., 09.09.2011: “Auf Schweizer Ebene förderte Daniel Bolomey
die Frauenrechte als Geschäftsleiter.”.
218 Amnesty International: Prise de position du CE et du Secrétariat sur le Postulat A adopté par
l’AD 2003 à Genève, 22.01.2003; Amnesty International: Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung
vom 6.März 2003, 06.03.2003.
219 Amnesty International: Prise de position du CE et du Secrétariat sur le Postulat A adopté par
l’AD 2003 à Genève, 22.01.2003, p.2: “l’intention très claire du Comité et du SG est d’en faire
une problématique permanente”.
220 Amnesty International: Prise de position du CE et du Secrétariat sur le Postulat A adopté par
l’AD 2003 à Genève, 22.01.2003.
221 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Vorstandssitzung vom 23.05.2002, 23.05.2005.
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rights […].”222 Indeed, the section’s leadership stressed the importance of the
internal campaign in a letter to the whole section explaining that “the EC
made the planning of the campaign and the section’s GAP a huge priority.”223
Another element that points to the commitment of the section’s Executive
Director (name of person) was his involvement in the planning of the cam-
paign and its preparation at the international level. He was a member of the
international Campaign Steering Committee, contributed to the delegates’mobi-
lization for the campaign at the 2001 ICM,224 and participated in the move-
ment-wide campaign preparation meeting in Oxford in July 2003 at Irene
Khan‘s request.225 On the whole, one can therefore conclude that the Swiss
section’smanagement was greatly committed to intensifying its work on VAW
and advocated for the effective implementation of the SVAW campaign. At
the same time, as the following section demonstrates, female activists and
officials continued to play an important role in the section’s work on issues
of VAW, especially in further institutionalizing the work on VAW within the
section.
As chapter 7.2.1 explained, female activists in the Swiss section formed a
national women’s network at the beginning of 2000. In 2001, the women’s net-
work was composed of four local women’s groups (Lausanne, Bern, Geneva,
and Zurich) and a Kogruppe and handled the section’s work on women’s rights
and VAW. As we can see, the network remained a driving force behind the
section’s work on VAW during the SVAW campaign.226 Figure 14 provides
an overview of the entities involved in the section’s work on VAW in the
2000s. Besides the various women’s groups (on the right side), some of which
disappeared prior to the SVAW campaign, the campaign coordinator and the
222 Amnesty International: Campagne sur la violence envers les femmes Projet de stratégie
2004-2006, 2004, p.1: “Nous saluons tout particulièrement l’initiative de mener – parallèle-
ment à la campagne public – une campagne interne qui interroge notre propre pratique en
matière des droits des femmes, […].”.
223 Amnesty International: Plan d'action Genre de la Section suisse, 17.03.2004, p.2: “Le comité
exécutif a accordé une grande priorité dans la planification à cette campagne et auPlan d’action
sur le genre.”.
224 Amnesty International: Prise de position du CE et du Secrétariat sur le Postulat A adopté par
l'AD 2003 à Genève, 22.01.2003.
225 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Violence Against Women Campaign
Report on the International Strategy Consultation Meeting 18-20 July 2003 Oxford, UK,
05.08.2003.
226 The women’s network meetings took place in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009.
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Project Team guaranteed the implementation of the campaign between 2003
and 2010. All entities but the SVAW Project Team (on the left side) were part of
the women’s network.
Figure 14: Entities involved in the Swiss section’s work on VAW in the 2000s
Source: my own
Evidence shows that the women’s network, initially composed of four lo-
cal groups and the Kogruppe, originally pursued two main objectives: first, it
sought to attain a broad commitment to and engagement in the work on VAW
within the section. Second, the network wanted to professionalize the sec-
tion’s work on VAW. To realize the first objective, the members of the women’s
network founded the so-calledWomen’s Rights Commission227.The profession-
alization of the section’s work on VAW was achieved with the appointment
of the SVAW campaign coordinator. In 2006, realizing that their role in the sec-
tion’s work on VAW was weakening, the members of the women’s network
reinitiated a coordination group (the Ko-Gruppe Women’s Rights) that sought
to bring the local women’s groups back into play. By focusing first on the
Women’s Rights Commission, then on the SVAW campaign coordinator, and third
on the Ko-Gruppe Women’s Rights, the following paragraphs provide a detailed
picture of the principal actors involved in the section’s work on VAW from
2002 until 2010.They demonstrate that the members of the women’s network
influenced the section’s work on VAW, despite the top-down implementation
of the SVAW campaign and the related professionalization of the work on
violence against women.
227 Called Frauenrechtskommission.
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The establishment of theWomen’s Rights Commission can be seen as an at-
tempt tomainstreamwomen’s rights across the section’s work initiated by the
women’s network. Following the dissolution of the Kogruppe228 at its first na-
tional meeting in February 2002, members of the women’s network came up
with the idea of creating a commission able to better represent their concerns
at the sectional level.229 The network members argued that the activities un-
dertaken by the women’s groups were not sufficient for “the integration of
the issue of women’s rights into the global work of AI.”230 After the presen-
tation of their idea of a women’s rights commission, the EC recognized the
new structural entity in May 2002.231
Aside from its overall goal of “a better integration of women’s rights,”232
the commission was meant to sensitize AI members and the public to
women’s rights, to link AI’s work on women’s rights to the national and inter-
national women’s rights movement, to support other AI groups in their work
on women’s rights, and to promote awareness of and the respect for women’s
rights.233 As defined in its mandate, “the commission [was] composed of
women and men who wish[ed] to engage with AI for women’s rights”234 and
of a representative from each the secretariat, the EC, and each local women’s
group.235
However, evidence reveals that the interest in the commission remained
overwhelmingly limited to those female activists and officials already engaged
in the section’s work on women’s rights. In fact, at the beginning of one of the
meetings, the members of the commission claimed: “we all know each other!
[We regret] that nobody new had joined.”236 My findings indicate that the
commission disappeared with the launch of the SVAW campaign237 because,
228 Details on this group can be found in chapter 7.2.1.
229 Morstein: Presentation of the Women’s rights commission, 2002.
230 Amnesty International: Jahresbericht der Frauenrechtskommission (FRK), 2003, p.3.
231 Morstein: Presentation of the Women’s rights commission, 2002.
232 Amnesty International: Jahresbericht der Frauenrechtskommission (FRK), 2003, p.3.
233 Amnesty International: Jahresbericht der Frauenrechtskommission (FRK), 2003.
234 Morstein: Presentation of the Women’s rights commission, 2002, p.2.
235 Morstein: Presentation of the Women’s rights commission, 2002.
236 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Frauenrechtskommission, 09.11.2002, p.1.
237 In fact, I could not find any minutes of the commission’s meetings after April 2004
(Amnesty International: Protokoll Sitzung Frauenrechtskommission vom 3. April 2004,
13.04.2004).
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as an official involved in the preparation of the campaign observed: “part of
[the commission’s] mandate […] is covered by the campaign on VAW today.”238
As I show in the upcoming paragraph, the newly appointed campaign coor-
dinator and the SVAWProject Team took over most of the commission’s respon-
sibilities.239 The Women’s Rights Commission thus only existed for two years,
and even though supposed to attract activists and officials beyond the circle
of women’s rights advocates, it overwhelmingly brought together the people
already involved in the section’s work on women’s rights. Thus, the women’s
network’s objective of ensuring a broad commitment to and engagement in
women’s rights within the section by installing a Women’s Rights Commission
was only partially achieved. In contrast, as the next paragraph illustrates, the
network’s objective of professionalizing the Secretariat’s work on women’s
rights proved to be more fruitful.
Even though various officials had worked on issues of women’s rights be-
fore, the professionalization of this work only became substantial with the ap-
pointment of the SVAW campaign coordinator in 2003. As mentioned in chapter
7.2.1, without having defined terms of reference, a campaigner had been “un-
officially responsible for women’s rights”240 in addition to her other briefs at
the section’s regional office in Lausanne since the beginning of the 2000s.241
The person responsible for lobbying and the staff member responsible for An-
imation and Education at the secretariat in Bern were later assigned to partic-
ipate in the preparation of the SVAW campaign.They were both charged with
doing this in addition to their other briefs for the period between January and
November 2003, again without a related job description. The section’s man-
agement finally appointed a SVAW campaign coordinator in December 2003.
With this appointment, the section’s leadership sought to “provid[e] the best
conditions for the realization of the internal as well as the external campaign
and to guarantee the long-term integration of this issue in the Swiss sec-
tion.”242
238 Bourquin: Préparation de la VAW - update/listing, 09.09.2003, p.3.
239 Amnesty International: Procès-verbal de la réunion du 8 février 2003, 08.02.2003.
240 Amnesty International: Internal Audit Campaign on violence against women, November
2002, p.1.
241 Bourquin: Journée nationale du réseau femmes de la Section Suisse, 02.02.2002; Ganzfried:
Conversation with C.D., 10.02.2017.
242 Amnesty International: Prise de position du CE et du Secrétariat sur le Postulat A adopté
par l’AD 2003 à Genève, 22.01.2003, p.2: “afin de nous donner les meilleures conditions pour
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Evidence indicates that the campaign coordinator was important for the suc-
cess of the SVAW campaign at the Swiss section. Her friends in arms qual-
ified her as an “an important voice within the section”243 who “had always
been on the cutting edge”244 and who “always tried to pick up [women’s rights
issues].”245 According to one of her colleagues, the campaign coordinator was
“[their] flagship that helped [them] a lot in [their] internal reflections”246 and
“had been extremely well connected to a lot of women’s organizations which
helped her pus[h for] the development [of mainstreaming women’s rights is-
sues within the section].”247 Further, as a long-term official explained, the
appointment of the campaign coordinator also improved the standing of the
women’s groups within the section: “[these women’s groups] did certainly im-
prove with the appointment of [the campaign coordinator] and there really was
this integration with this networking. This was extremely important.”248
Evidence indicates that the creation of the position of campaign coordinator
of the SVAW campaign was the result of months-long women’s network lob-
bying. It began with the network’s intention to submit a respective motion to
the section’s GA at the beginning of 2002. In fact, at its first national meet-
ing in February 2002, the network members decided to write “a motion for
a remunerated position within the Swiss section for women’s rights issues
[…].”249 They would submit the latter to the following GA250 if the section’s
management had not agreed with their proposition prior to that.The archival
documents reveal that the network finally dispensed with it, as the manage-
ment approved the allocation of additional resources to the engagement of a
réaliser la campagne interne au sein de la Section suisse, ainsi que la campagne publique et
intégrer à long terme cette problématique dans la Section suisse.”.
243 Ganzfried: Interview with B.K., 16.05.2013.
244 Ganzfried: Interview with A.P., 24.06.2013.
245 Ganzfried: Interview with A.P., 24.06.2013.
246 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “notre cheval de bataille nous a beaucoup aidé
dans notre réflexion interne.”.
247 Ganzfried: Interviewwith A.J., 09.03.2012: “Stella était une personne qui était extrêmement
bien resautée avec beaucoup d’organisations féminines. Ce qui fait qu’elle a pu vraiment pousser
en fait le développement.”.
248 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “Elles ont certainement gagné dès le mo-
ment où il y a eu l’engagement de Stella et il y a eu vraiment cette intégration avec
cette Vernetzung ; c’est ça qui est extrêmement importants.” .
249 Bourquin: Journée nationale du réseau femmes de la Section Suisse, 02.02.2002, p.5.
250 By submitting motions or postulates to the GA, the groups can shape the section’s
agenda.
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SVAW campaign coordinator. Instead, the network submitted a postulate to the
2003 GA, asking the EC and the ED to pursue the allocation of the necessary
financial and personnel resources allowing women’s rights issues to become a
central and transversal theme in the section’s overall work beyond the SVAW
campaign.251 The postulate was unanimously accepted at the 2003 GA. It can
be considered the basis of the sustainable professionalization of the Swiss
section’s work on VAW.
In addition to the nomination of the campaign coordinator, the section’s
management also installed a SVAWProject Team, composed of the campaign co-
ordinator, the ED, and representatives from different departments,252 as “an
interdepartmental structure that discusses the strategies of the [SVAW cam-
paign] and their implementation”253. As a steering board, it assisted in defin-
ing and implementing the campaign’s strategic options and facilitated the dis-
semination of the decisions to all staff members.254 Except for the campaign
coordinator, the project team members were not part of the women’s network.
With the establishment of the position of campaign coordinator and the de-
cision to allocate the necessary financial and personnel resources for the sec-
tion’s work on VAW beyond the SVAW campaign, the section professionalized
its work on women’s rights and violence against women and created the ba-
sis for a sustained institutionalization. In contrast to the international level,
where female activists and officials at the IS lost their influence on the or-
ganization’s work on VAW over the course of the SVAW campaign, the Swiss
section allowed its women’s network to remain important in the definition of
the section’s work on these topics.
In fact, at the end of the first campaign phase, fearing that said profes-
sionalization would weaken women’s groups’s importance, a group of female
activists around the campaign coordinator complained of the lack of coordina-
tion in the women’s groups’ activities (except for those taking place in the
frame of the SVAW campaign). They also disliked that “each group pursue its
251 Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 2003, 12.04.2003.
252 Amnesty International: Campagne contre les Violences envers les femmes (VAW) Séance du
8 mai 2003, 08.05.2003.
253 Amnesty International: Campagne contre les violences envers les femmes Groupe de projet
séance du 2 septembre 2003, 02.09.2003, p.1.
254 Bourquin: Préparation de la VAW - update/listing, 09.09.2003, p.1.
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own issues and sets its own priorities.”255 They formulated the need to let
women’s groups assume the leading role in the sustainable incorporation of
women’s rights into the Swiss section, “independently of the coming […] ac-
tivities in the frame of the SVAW campaign,”256 and formed a new Ko-Gruppe
Women’s Rights in 2006. From then on, this Ko-Gruppe (coordinated by the cam-
paign coordinator) organized the women’s network’s annual meetings257 and
served as a vessel for the planning and coordination of the section’s activities
related to women’s rights in general and of the SVAW campaign activities in
particular.
The meeting minutes of the Ko-Gruppe Women’s Rights show that it coordi-
nated the women’s groups’ activities throughout the second campaign phase,
organized the annual network meetings, and played a pivotal role in further
institutionalizing the section’s work on women’s rights. In fact, the group
discussed the question of “continu[ing] with the women’s rights work in the
section”258 beyond the SVAW campaign and elaborated the “Swiss Strategy
Women’s Rights and Gender Mainstreaming,”259 a document meant to en-
sure the sustainable and broad integration of women’s rights into the sec-
tion’s activities after 2010.The formation of the Ko-GruppeWomen’s Rights thus
allowed the reintegration of the women’s groups into the agenda-setting pro-
cess of the section’s work on women’s rights. It indicates that female activists
and officials continued to influence the section’s work on issues of VAW, even
in the frame of the SVAW campaign.
Summing up, the previous sesction has illustrated the Swiss section lead-
ership’s commitment to the SVAW campaign.Meanwhile, the preceding para-
graphs have highlighted the remaining importance of the section’s women’s
network for the work on violence against women. It has further demonstrated
that the Swiss section succeeded in professionalizing its work on VAW over
255 Amnesty International: Ko-Gruppe Frauenrechte Vorschlag für eine Neuorganisation und
Umfrage zum Frauenrechts-Netzwerk, End of 2005, p.1: “Jede Gruppe verfolgt mehr oder
weniger ihre eigenen Themen und setzt ihre eigenen Schwerpunkte.”.
256 Amnesty International: Ko-Gruppe Frauenrechte Vorschlag für eine Neuorganisation und
Umfrage zum Frauenrechts-Netzwerk, End of 2005.
257 Amnesty International: Frauenrechts-Ko-Gruppe Sitzungsprotokoll vom 3. April 2007,
03.04.2007; Amnesty International: Ko-Gruppe Frauenrechte AICH: Protokoll Sitzung vom
3.3.2009, 03.03.2009.
258 Amnesty International: Protokoll Frauenrechts-Kogruppe, 14.12.2009, p.1.
259 Amnesty International: Ko_gruppe Frauenrechte Protokoll Sitzung vom 22. September
2010, 22.09.2010, p.1.
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the course of the SVAW campaign and managed to build a sustainable ap-
proach to it. The section has shown that even though the SVAW campaign
was implemented from the top to the bottom, female activists and officials
continued to successfully influence the section’s work on VAW by reorganiz-
ing their network.
8.2.1.3 Women’s rights - confined to a story by women acting
for women
This section focuses on the Swiss section’s participation in and reaction to the
SVAW campaign as well as on the internal discussions about the elaboration
of the abortion policy. I demonstrate that opposition to the SVAW campaign
and to the adoption of a policy on abortion was isolated at the Swiss section.
The section further shows that even though the Swiss activists participated
massively in the SVAW campaign, their involvement was more pragmatic and
less driven by an enthusiasm for the campaign. The work on VAW remained
mainly promoted by the members of the women’s network. My interviewees’
answers to the question “AI is engaging in many different rights, what rights
are you engaging in?” also indicate that rather than mainstreamed among all
members, VAW continued to be an issue mainly embraced and pushed by the
members of the women’s network. In fact, while a majority of the interviewed
activists mentioned rights which are part of the Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical rights and two out of nineteen referred to economic, social, and cultural
rights; no interviewed activist cited women’s rights or issues of VAW as being
in the center of his or her engagement at AI. This indicates that despite its
management’s commitment and its women’s network’s initiatives, the Swiss
section did not succeed in making the issue of VAW part of its DNA. In fact,
as I show hereafter, the conclusion of an internal evaluation of the Swiss sec-
tion’s capacity to engage in a women’s rights campaign revealed that “women’s
rights remain[ed] confined to a story by women acting for women”260 at the
end of the SVAW campaign.
Given the different roles that activists and officials play in the implemen-
tation of the SVAW campaign, the following paragraphs present these groups’
participation and their reactions separately, beginning with the activists.
As part of the Gender Action Plan, activists were supposed to participate in
workshops that sought to sensitize members to the issue of women’s rights.
260 Amnesty International: Campagne interne (objectif stratégique 4 de la VAW), 09.09.2003,
p.3.
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Evidence shows that despite the objective of reaching all members, only 20%
of the Swiss AI groups - about a hundred activists, a majority of whom were
women - participated in the workshops.261 Thus, an internal evaluation re-
vealed that the “sensitization to gender issues of all activists of the Swiss sec-
tion had not been realized via these workshops.”262 Evidence suggests various
reasons for the limited success of these training courses. First, the secretariat
allocated insufficient resources for their implementation. According to an in-
ternal evaluation, workshops lacked timely and financial resources within the
secretariat.263 Second, activists were not interested or did not have time.264
Another activist explained: “as a grassroots member who is working […] then
we are going to the workshops and thenwe cannot implement [what we learnt
at the workshop] because we already used the time we can devote to AI.”265 In
another case, an activist declared: “I just do not have the time to participate
in any workshop. […] Besides, I do not think I need any more input on these
topics.”266 And third was the somewhat obligatory nature of the workshops.
According to the workshop animator and campaign coordinator, “the contra-
diction between the ‘quasi obligatory’ nature of the animation proposed to
the groups and the personal attachment necessary to accept to enter the rel-
evant exercises”267 made activists abstain from participating. The workshop
leader further explained that because themembers overwhelmingly perceived
261 Amnesty International: Gender Action Plan: Auswertung mit Bettina Kurz und Philippe
Beck, 01.06.2005.
262 Amnesty International: Evaluation des ateliers genre de la Section suisse, 06.10.2005, p.1:
“La sensibilisation aux questions de gendre de l’ensemble des militant-e-s de la Section n’a pas
été réalisé via ces ateliers genre.”.
263 Amnesty International: Evaluation des ateliers genre de la Section suisse, 06.10.2005.
264 Amnesty International: Evaluation des ateliers genre de la Section suisse, 06.10.2005.
265 Ganzfried: Interview with A.U., 10.10.2012: “dass wir als Basismitglieder eben die schon ar-
beiten, nicht noch Zeit haben, also dann gehen wir in den Workshop und dann können wir es
nicht umsetzen, weil wir nämlich die Zeit die wir für AI zur Verfügung haben schon gebraucht
haben.”.
266 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.M., 12.10.2012: “ich habe schlicht keine Zeit um nochWorkshops
zumachen. keine chance und ob es die anderen gemacht haben vermutlich auch nicht also bei
uns geht es allen ähnlich. insofern un dich habe auch nicht das gefühl ich müsste da noch gross
input haben also das kommt noch dazu.”.
267 C.: Email from C.A. to Stella Jegher concerning the gender workshops at AICH, 03.06.2004,
p.1: “dans la contradiction entre le caractère ‘quasi obligatoire’ de l’animation proposée aux
groups, et la nécessité d’une adhésion personnelle pour accepter d’entrer dans des exercices per-
tinents à ce sujet.”.
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the Gender Action Plan, and therefore also the training courses, as an imposi-
tion by the IS, the plan severely challenged the groups’ essential aspiration
to engage anonymously,268 therefore hampering the workshops’ success. Ac-
cording to the campaign coordinator, the workshops’ failure had to do with the
groups themselves, which “were not ready for such a project,” 269 and with
those responsible for the preparation of the project, who “overlooked”270 the
membership’s needs and opinions.
In contrast, the activists’ participation in the public SVAW campaign ac-
tivities was comparatively good. In fact, in addition to the women’s groups,
all sorts of groups actively took part in the campaign activities during its first
two years.271 After the launch of the campaign in 2004, the campaign coordi-
nator expressed her satisfaction in an internal memo: “the groups’ participa-
tion was great, stands and actions in almost twenty cities!”272 In April 2005,
she explained that “practically all active groups participated in the SVAW
campaign.”273 However, in an interview, she qualified that “[the SVAW cam-
paign] was positively received by the groups, but without provoking frenetic
activism.”274 In fact, as the interviews with activists also indicate, the groups’
participation in the SVAW campaign was rather pragmatic. Referring to the
campaign action “mobile home against domestic violence,” an activist ex-
plained:
“Well, when a big campaign is coming from the secretariat and it is taking
place in Berne, then they [the secretariat] most often rely on the resources
of the Bernese groups […], they [the Bernese groups] participate, that is evi-
268 C.: Email from C.A. to Stella Jegher concerning the gender workshops at AICH, 03.06.2004.
269 Amnesty International: Gender Action Plan: Auswertung mit Bettina Kurz und Philippe
Beck, 01.06.2005, p.1.
270 Amnesty International: Gender Action Plan: Auswertung mit Bettina Kurz und Philippe
Beck, 01.06.2005, p.1.
271 Amnesty International: SVAW - Auswertung der Kampagne, 14.02.2005; Jegher: Motion
5a, Assemblée des délégué-e-s 2004 à Bienne, 26.04.2005; Jegher:Memo about the launch of
the SVAW- campaign at the Swiss section, 2004; Amnesty International:Notice from Stella
Jegher to Caroline Huwiler on the SVAW updates, 06.08.2004.
272 Jegher:Memo about the launch of the SVAW - campaign at the Swiss section, 2004, p.1.
273 Jegher:Motion 5a, Assemblée des délégué-e-s 2004 à Bienne, 26.04.2005, p.2.
274 Ganzfried: Interview with A.I., 26.09.2012: “ je dirais que c'était positivement reçu par les
groupes mais sans provoquer un activisme frénetique.”.
238 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
dent, if a campaign has been plonked in front of us, then we do not have to
produce something just like that.”275
Alluding to the same campaign action, another long-term activist described
his group’s participation as follows: “We integrated it into the annual actions
[…]. But it has not been a permanent topic for our group.”276
While the activists generally welcomed the public SVAW campaign, evi-
dence points to isolated cases of poor understanding related the campaign’s
focus and other cases of opposition to participation in the campaign due to
its focus on domestic violence. In fact, some activists had problems with the
practical implementation of the campaign because of the novelty of its issue.
According to an interviewee, “there was a real interrogation about our capac-
ity to act on violence against women.”277 As he explained, activists asked: “’do
I have to go tomy neighbor who is beating his wife to tell him to stop?’”278 Ad-
ditionally, activists from one particular professional AI group opposed a the-
matic campaign on VAW. An official explained: “extreme tensions occurred in
the [former] medical group. Because it was about domestic violence and some
men cancelled their membership in consequence.”279 These members com-
plained that the SVAW campaign was a feminist campaign, which ignored
the universal principle of human rights. In a letter sent to the secretariat, an
activist of the medical group disapproved of the focus on domestic violence
stating: “Saying that women are victims of violence everywhere on the globe
just because they are women is not true.”280
275 Ganzfried: Interview with A.U., 10.10.2012: “also, wenn vom Sekretariat eine grosse Kam-
pagne kommt und die in Bern ist, dann greifen siemeistens auf die Ressourcen der Berner Grup-
pen zurück. […] Die machen damit, das ist eigentlich klar.Wenn uns schon eine Kampagne vor
die Nase gestellt wird, dann müssen wir nicht selber etwas aus dem Ärmel schütteln.”.
276 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.L., 24.06.2013: “wir haben es mehr integriert in die Jahresaktio-
nen […] Aber es ist nicht ein Dauerthema gewesen für unsere Gruppe.”.
277 Ganzfried: Interview with A.I., 26.09.2012: “Il y avait une vraie interrogation concernant
notre capacité d’agir par rapport à la violence à l'égard des femmes?”.
278 Ganzfried: Interview with A.I., 26.09.2012: “Est-ce que je dois aller chez mon voisin qui bat
sa femme pour lui dire d'arrêter?”.
279 Ganzfried: Interview with A.K., 01.07.2013: “In den Medizinergruppen hat es EXTREME
Spannungen gegeben. Weil da ist es natürlich wirklich auch um häusliche Gewalt gegangen
und da hat es auch Kündigungen gegeben von gewissen Männern.”.
280 C.: Letter addressed to Stella Jegher, 02.06.2004, p.1: “Dire que les femmes sont victimes de
violence partout dans le monde du seul fait qu’elles sont des femmes n’est pas vrai.”.
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The officials’ reactions to the internal and to the public SVAW campaigns
were quite different. In an e-mail, an official declared “personally regret[ting]
the resources allocated to the GAP workshops for the groups.”281 For another
official, the campaign helped her focus more on women in her domain of
work: “the fact that women’s rights issues became transversal led to the pri-
oritizing of women cases in the asylum domain, as well.”282 According to an-
other, the campaign affected his ownwork little.283 One official explained that
“as everybody, [he] was supposed to put awomen’s rights component into [his]
work, which sometimes became absurd,”284 and criticized the mainstream-
ing approach inherent to the campaign saying:
“[…] I am doing my annual planning for example, the parliamentary lobby-
ing, and I am doing this depending on what? Depending on what I know,
more or less, what will happen in the Parliament during the year. And then
[the campaign coordinator] tells me ‘ah and there is no women’s action in
there?’, and I am telling her ‘of course not, wait it is not me who is fixing
the program of the Parliament’. […] here I have certain resistance.”285
Thus, evidence suggests that some officials seemed to find integrating VAW-
related issues into their work rather problematic. In fact, according to the
same interviewee, there was no problem with the campaign itself, “as long
as it remained in the domain of the campaign and the associated actions […]
it was not a problem for anybody, not me in any case.”286 For another staff
281 C.: Email from W.G. to Stella Jegher concerning the gender workshops, 08.07.2004, p.3: “je
regrette à titre personnel les ressources dévolues aux ateliers GAP auprès des groupes.”.
282 Ganzfried: Interview with A.K., 01.07.2013: “also dass einfach die Frauenthemen ein Quer-
schnittthema geworden ist, oder, hat dazu geführt dass wir einfach auch im Asylbereich sicher
auch noch Frauendossiers Priorität eingeräumt haben.”.
283 Ganzfried: Interview with A.H., 31.05.2013.
284 Ganzfried: InterviewwithA.A., 31.05.2013: “j’étais tenu comme tout lemonde...des foismême
jusqu’à l’absurde, de chaque fois mettre une composant Women’s rights dans mon boulot.”.
285 Ganzfried: Interview with A.A., 31.05.2013: “[…] je fais mon planning de l'année par exemple
pour le lobbying parlementaire et puis je le fais en fonction de quoi? En fonction de ce que je
sais, à peu près, qui va se passer au Parlement dans l'année. Et puis Stella me dit ‘ah et alors
il n’y a pas d'action femme là-dedans ?’, je lui dis ‘non mais attends, ce n'est pas moi qui fixe le
programme du Parlement.’ […], c’est là que moi j'ai quelques résistances.”.
286 Ganzfried: InterviewwithA.A., 31.05.2013: “il n'y a pas eu de problème. Sur la campagne elle-
même, tant que c'était dans le domaine de la campagne et des actions liées à la campagne […]
ça ne posait de problème à personne, en tout cas pas à moi.”.
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member, the large spectrum of the topics covered by the campaign was prob-
lematic. He stated: “for a long time, we thought it was difficult to define what
exactly we pick up because it was just somehow large and undefined […].”287
An official emphasized the difficulties of working with the themes that the
campaign proposed when it came to fundraising. He explained: “as long as
you could work with violent pictures, such as acid attacks, it worked. But if
afterwards you wanted to combine it with domestic violence in Switzerland,
then it became increasingly difficult.”288
Summing up, the Swiss section’s activists generally welcomed the SVAW
campaign and participated in most of the campaign activities, at least dur-
ing the latter’s first two years. Although most of the groups took part in the
public campaign, evidence indicates that this participation was mostly prag-
matic and not necessarily driven by the activists’ enthusiasm for the cam-
paign’s thematic focus. Meanwhile, evidence suggests that parts of the staff
did not oppose the implementation of the SVAW campaign but did show a
certain reluctance to the focus of the campaign and sometimes had difficul-
ties integrating issues of VAW into their respective fields of work. However,
the SVAW campaign did not provoke activists’ resistance, except in the case
of a single group.The organization’s work on VAW remained overwhelmingly
in the hands of the women’s network. Meanwhile, activists’ and staff mem-
bers’ reaction to and participation in the SVAW campaign confirmed that the
conclusion of a 2003 internal evaluation that “women’s rights remained con-
fined to a story by women for women,”289 persisted after the end of the SVAW
campaign.
Even though the Swiss section supported the elaboration of an abortion
policy at the international level, the minutes of the 2005 and 2006 GA meet-
ings suggest that internal debates on the topic took place at the Swiss section
as well. In fact, at the 2005 GA, representatives from the EC, the International
Commission, and the EDdiscussed the issue of sexual and reproductive rights
287 Ganzfried: Interview with A.F., 05.06.2013: “lange haben wir es schwierig gefunden, was
nehmenwir jetzt genau auf und so,weil einfach […] Irgendwowar es so breit und so undefiniert
[…]”.
288 Ganzfried: Interview with A.H., 31.05.2013: “solange du mit heftigen Bildern, eben wie die
Säure-Attacken arbeiten konntest, hat es funktioniert. Sobald du es dannnachher kombinieren
wolltest mit häuslicher Gewalt in der Schweiz, dann ist es schon schwieriger geworden.”.
289 Amnesty International: Campagne interne (objectif stratégique 4 de la VAW), 09.09.2003,
p.3.
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in one of the thematic forums.290Theparticipants there agreed to support the
option that called upon the IEC to elaborate a policy on the non-controversial
issues of abortion. Activists and officials seemed to have been more divided
when they had to decide upon the content of the respective policy a year later.
At the 2006 GA, following the IEC proposition, the EC offered the section the
chance to position itself on the three aspects of abortion.291 At the same time,
a local group submitted a motion refusing to take any position.292 During the
vote in plenary, the participants very clearly rejected the local group’s propo-
sition with 98 against 27 votes and adopted the EC position with 87 against 17
votes.293
The minutes of the 2006 meeting of the GA show the activists’ disagree-
ment on the issue of abortion. The local group officially explained its posi-
tion with the fear that AI would lose its focus and become increasingly frag-
mented “by focusing on ‘sexual and reproductive’ rights, beside the newly de-
fined strategy of working on economic, social, and cultural rights.”294 Further,
the local group explained that: “The members of the group [xy] consider that
the right to life begins at the moment of conception; we do thus not under-
stand how AI could argue in favor of abortion. Abortion has to be considered
as infanticide.”295
The controversial nature of abortion also became evident when some of
the long-term activists dropped out. One of my interviewees revealed that
those who left AI when the organization adopted its policy on abortion, were
290 Amnesty International: Delegiertenversammlung 2005, 29.05.2005, p.10.
291 Decriminalization of abortion; access to quality services for management of compli-
cations arising from abortion; and access to legal, safe, and accessible abortion in the
case of anunwantedpregnancy (Amnesty International:PostulatAPosition der Schweizer
Sektion zu Abtreibung, Delegiertenversammlung 2006, 07.05.2006).
292 Amnesty International: Motion 9 Stellungnahme der Sektion zum Thema Abtreibung
Delegiertenversammlung 2006, 07.05.2006.
293 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Delegierteversammlung 2006 in Delémont,
07.05.2006.
294 Amnesty International: Motion 9 Stellungnahme der Sektion zum Thema Abtreibung
Delegiertenversammlung 2006, 07.05.2006, p.1.
295 Amnesty International: Protokoll der Delegierteversammlung 2006 in Delémont,
07.05.2006, p.14: “Die Mitglieder der Regionalgruppe [xy] sind der Ansicht, dass das Leben
bereits mit der Empfängnis beginnt; demnach verstehen wir nicht, wie AI sich zugunsten
der Abtreibung aussprechen kann. Abtreibung muss als das gesehen werde, was es ist:
Kindsmord.”.
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people from religious communities. The official explained: “we were con-
fronted with resistance even at the level of the Swiss section. We had people
from religious communities who had been very engaged for many years, who
left AI because they could not identify any more with [this new agenda].”296
Other activists did not leave AI or “resist the work on reproductive rights but”
preferred “not to engage in this matter.”297
Thus, at the Swiss section, opposition against the adoption of an abortion
policy existed but was rather isolated. Evidence suggests that, resistance also
mainly came from conservative church-related activists or groups, similar to
what was observed at the international level.
Consequently, the Swiss section’s success in integrating VAW into its over-
all work can be summarized as follows. First, the Swiss section successfully
merged the section’s priorities on the issues of VAW with the international
campaign strategy. The section adopted the thematic focus of the general
campaign and emphasized domestic violence as a national human rights con-
cern for the first time. At the same time, the section conducted an internal
campaign to sensitize its members and staff to gender equality. Second, the
section professionalized its work on VAW in the long term by creating the po-
sition of a campaign coordinator within the secretariat and ensuring its fund-
ing beyond the SVAW campaign.Third, the section’s leadership seems to have
committed to the SVAW campaign. Fourth, the Swiss section’s women’s net-
work continued to influence the section’s work on VAW, even in the frame of
the SVAW campaign being implemented from the top down. Fifth, while offi-
cials harbored certain skepticism towards the campaign, the SVAW campaign
did not generally provoke Swiss activists’ and officials’ resistance. Further, op-
position against the adoption of an abortion policy was isolated at the Swiss
section.
296 Ganzfried: Interview with A.J., 09.03.2012: “On a eu droit à des résistances même au niveau
de la section suisse d’AI.On avait des gens qui était des communautées réligieuses très engagées
depuis des années qui ont quitté AI parce qu’ils n’arrivaient plus à se retrouver dans [cette nou-
velle agenda].”.
297 Ganzfried: Interview with B.K., 16.05.2013: “Nein, zu diesen reproduktiven Rechten nicht
Widerstand aber so im Sinn von ‘Ich möchte mich lieber nicht zu dem engagieren’”.
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8.2.2 The German section
The present chapter shows how the German section implemented the SVAW
campaign and demonstrates that the section did not succeed in integrat-
ing issues of VAW into the section’s overall work through the SVAW cam-
paign. First, the chapter focuses on the thematic content of the German sec-
tion’s SVAW campaign named Look & Act: Preventing violence against women.298
It shows that this campaign strongly emphasized AI’s traditional women’s
rights issues, such as female human rights defenders and FGM, and did not
address the general campaign’s central concern - “domestic violence” as a na-
tional human rights issue. Then I demonstrate that the MaF played a pivotal
role in the implementation of the Look & Act: Preventing Violence against Women
campaign, and it no longer tried to influence decision-making at the national
or the international level. Meanwhile, the personnel resources allocated to the
work on VAW at the secretariat continued to be relatively low. Finally, I em-
phasize the membership’s particularly critical stance towards the campaign,
and highlights the existence of important resistance to it and significant op-
position to the adoption of a policy on abortion.
8.2.2.1 Look & Act: Preventing Violence against Women
Diverging from the overall campaign, the German section labeled the SVAW
campaign Look & Act: Preventing Violence against Women. The German section
organized an internal and a public campaign, implementing the SVAW cam-
paign as a priority campaign between 2004 and 2005. Evidence shows that the
German section did not implement the second campaign strategy. Instead,
issues of VAW were discussed as “one of the main AI issues in the ‘regular’
country and thematic work,”299 meaning that mainly the MaF and several
country groups continued with campaign activities after 2005.300 Based on
the internal gender audit carried out in 2002, the section formulated an in-
ternal campaign objective meant to “ancho[r] equal opportunities at all levels
298 Hinsehen & Handeln: Gewalt gegen Frauen verhindern.
299 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ausformulierte Auswer-
tung SVAW - Campaign, no date, p.1.
300 When talking about the contents and the activities of the campaign, I thus mainly
concentrate on the period between 2004 and 2006. I was not able to access archival
material on the groups’ activities, as these documents are overwhelmingly kept by the
different groups themselves.
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of AI.”301 According to a formermember of the EC, the internal campaign was
implemented mainly before the public campaign. The women’s group orga-
nized workshops about the SVAW campaign and specifically on the issue of
sexual and reproductive rights as part of the former.302
The German section’s public campaign focused on “VAW in armed con-
flicts” and “domestic violence,” yet placed special emphasis on traditional hu-
man rights issues, such as “the support of women human rights defenders,”
and primarily addressed family violence if it occurred in other countries.303
A member of the MaF emphasized the importance of focusing on women hu-
man rights defenders at the German section: “How difficult it may be for
women, there are always […] courageous women who are engaging against
violations of human rights in their country […] and to support them, that is
of big importance to AI […].”304The sectionmainly focused on cases of VAW in
other countries, such as murders of women in Ciudad Juarez,Mexico, women
trafficking and forced prostitution in Kosovo, family violence in Turkey or the
consequence of local tribe courts in Pakistan.305 Thus, even in the frame of
the SVAW campaign, the German section continued to emphasize issues of
VAW, which had already been the focus of the organization in the 1990s.
This traditional focus was also reflected in groups’ activities. As written
in the ai intern, the journal for the German section’s members, several groups
organized expositions in 2005. The latter aimed at “giving visitors an under-
standing of the reality of fleeing, scared, abused and disfigured women from
almost all continents and [pointed] to the urgency of the omnipresent vio-
lence especially against women.”306 An interviewee explained the continuing
301 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Zwischenbilanz der Kam-
pagne "HINSEHEN&HANDELN: Gewalt gegen Frauen verhindern“, 02.11.2005, p.1: “Gleich-
berechtigung auf allen Ebenen innerhalb von amnesty verankern.”.
302 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015.
303 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Zwischenbilanz der Kam-
pagne "HINSEHEN &HANDELN: Gewalt gegen Frauen verhindern“, 02.11.2005.
304 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “wie schlimmes auch immer für Frauen
stehen möge, es gibt immer […] mutige Frauen, und beherzte Frauen, die sich einsetzen gegen
die Menschrechtsverletzungen in ihrem Land […] und die zu unterstützen, das ist ein grosses
Anliegen von AI […].”.
305 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Zwischenbilanz der Kam-
pagne "HINSEHEN &HANDELN: Gewalt gegen Frauen verhindern“, 02.11.2005.
306 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai intern Rundbrief für
Mitglieder der deutschen Sektion von amnesty international, September 2006, p.10: “Be-
suchern die Realität von fliehenden, verängstigten, misshandelten und entstellten Frauen von
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importance that the traditional approach to VAW held for the German sec-
tion: “The closer it comes to our country, the more difficult it becomes. [The
German section] did not actually work on Germany.”307
As far as concrete activities were concerned, except for the MaF, local
and country groups participated in the campaign and often organized their
VAW actions on the occasion of the international women’s day or the “16 days
against VAW.”308 After 2005, women’s rights continued to be mainly thema-
tized within the frame of the section’s work on refugee and asylum issues. For
example, the section lobbied government institutions to grant refugee status
to women facing FGM in their home lands and participated in a campaign
against forced prostitution in Germany. It also called attention to the prob-
lem of sexual abuse and exploitation of au-pair girls and women.309
In contrast, AI members expressed their support for engaging against
other forms of violence against women, particularly female genital mutila-
tion.The minutes of the meetings of various general assemblies show that AI
members repeatedly called upon the section to increase its work on FGM. In
2007, the GA called on the EC to examine how to strengthen the work on FGM
in consultation with the IS.310 In 2008, the GA asked the EC to demand that
AI increase its work on FGM.311 The section’s participation in a national net-
work on FGM a year later testifies to the importance of this specific women’s
rights issue for the German section.312 An interviewee explained the empha-
sis on FGM as follows: “[FGM] is a cruel human rights violations that happens
fast allen Erdteilen näher zu bringen und auf die Dringlichkeit der allgegenwärtigen Gewalt
besonders gegen Frauen hinzuweisen.”.
307 Ganzfried: Interview with A.C., 14.04.2015: “Also je näher es unserem Land / unserer
Gesellschaft kommt, desto schwieriger wird es auch. Also zu Deutschland [hat die Deutsche
Section] eigentlich nicht gearbeitet.”
308 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Grobe Auswertung des
Fragebogens zu der Kampagne Hinsehen & Handeln, ca. 2006.
309 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Feedback and updates from sections and
structures on their SVAW related work carried out at national level, July 2008, p.4-5.
310 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland:  Beschlüsse der 42.
Jahresversammlung 2007 in München, 2007.
311 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beschlüsse der 43.
Jahresversammlung 2008 in Hamburg, 2008.
312 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland:Amnesty Intern Zeitschrift
für Mitglieder von Amnesty International, March 2009.
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far away.”313 The interviewee continued stating: “In fact, it would have cer-
tainly been most comfortable for AI if the issue of women’s rights had been
reduced to FGM. Because this is ok. The German section has always been en-
gaged in this issue and this has always been important for them. But beyond,
it is clearly more difficult.”314
The previous paragraph has shown that even within the frame of the
SVAW campaign, the German section continued to mainly emphasize AI’s
traditional issues of VAW, such as women human rights defenders, FGM,
and cases of VAW in other countries. Yet, it only marginally addressed the
problem of domestic violence in Germany.
8.2.2.2 The MaF - a group of voluntary experts
As chapter 7.2.2 explained, the women’s rights group MaF pushed the sec-
tion’s work on women’s rights throughout the 1990s and was also responsible
for many of the strides that were made in this issue area. In the same decade,
without having specific terms of reference, the official responsible for refugee
and asylum issues integrated VAW into her daily work.Thus, no staff member
was uniquely responsible for women’s rights issues when the organization de-
cided to center its first global thematic campaign on VAW.The present section
demonstrates that this distribution of roles with respect to the work on VAW
barely changed with the preparation and the implementation of the SVAW
campaign.315 After the dissolution of the first MaF at the end of the 1990s,
a new women’s rights group, which was also called MaF, was founded at the
beginning of the 2000s.While this group continued carrying out the majority
of the work on women’s rights issues, the human resources allocated to work
on VAW, and specifically to the implementation of the SVAW campaign, at
the secretariat continued to be limited.
313 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “Das ist eine grausame Menschenrechtsverlet-
zung und weit weg.”
314 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.T., 15.04.2015: “Also für Amnesty Deutschlandwäre es sicherlich
am angenehmsten gewesen, wenn das Thema Frauenrechte auf das Thema Genitalverstümm-
lung reduziert worden wäre. Weil das ist völlig d’accord, ja? Also da hat die deutsche Sektion
sich immer dafür stark gemacht und das war ihnen auch immer wichtig, aber darüber hinaus
ist es deutlich schwieriger.”.
315 In contrast to the Swiss section, for which I found abundant archival material, archival
documents on the existing organizational structures responsible for the work on VAW
at the German section were scarce. The following findings are thus mainly based on
interview testimonies.
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Evidence shows that the SVAW campaign was prepared by a steering
group, composed of “relevant Section staff and one member of the women’s
group,”316 and implemented by the MaF and two staff members. In fact, just
like in the 1990s, the MaF shared the thematic responsibility for the campaign
with an official who was based in the Countries and Asylum department.317
The latter was only able to spend 3 and, later, 9 hours per week on VAW
issues.318 Additionally, a campaigner who was already working on other
campaigns assumed the coordination and the communication of SVAW.319
However, this campaigner was only available during the initiative’s first two
years. From 2006 onward, the MaF and some country groups were the only
ones who continued the campaign activities.320
The MaF’s continued importance for the section’s work on VAW also be-
comes evident when we consider the section’s contact with the media on
the SVAW campaign. An interviewee explained: “if [the media requests] con-
cerned women’s issues, then they were usually passed on to [theMaF], […], the
[expert on women’s rights at the secretariat] did not give any interviews.”321 It
is thus not surprising that officials considered the members of the MaF “vol-
untary experts,”322 rather than simple activists. As the following statement
reveals,MaF members viewed their group as pivotal for the section’s work on
VAW during the SVAW campaign as well: “well, one may say that my group
316 Stop VAW campaign team: STOP VAW Campaign Progress update 4, 12.2003, p.2.
317 Afrika Referentin in der Abteilung Länder und Asyl. Amnesty International Sektion
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai intern Rundbrief für Mitglieder der deutschen Sektion von
amnesty international, April 2007.
318 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015; Ganzfried: Interview with B.T.,
15.04.2015.
319 The campaigner explained her job as follows: “Well we [were] also doing centralizedmea-
sures, promotion, events or so […]. Our jobs actually [consisted] in enabling the members to
do effective local campaigning, providing them with good material, good arguments, Q&A’s,
all this kind of stuff, you know. Because we only have a limited range.” Or, as explained by
a women’s group member, the officials “produced the material; material means leaflets,
postcards, flyers, buttons, eventually and posters and so on, […].”.
320 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Ab 2006 haben wir es dann allein
gemacht mit den entsprechenden Länder-Ko-Gruppen und da haben wir noch ganz viel
gemacht und manche Länder-Ko-Gruppen haben auch das allein gemacht […].”.
321 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Wenn es Frauenthemen sind, werden
diemeisten an unsweitergeleitet, also so gutwie immer. Also [die Expertin im Sekretariat] hat
überhaupt keine Interviews gegeben.” Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015.
322 Ganzfried: Interview with A.C., 14.04.2015: “Ehrenamtliche Expertinnen”.
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was an important push factor for the whole women’s work. […] If we had not
been here, I do not know, […]. We are quite essential to the section’s work on
the issue of women. That is a fact.”323 The MaF thus continued to play a piv-
otal role in the section’s work on VAW throughout the 2000s, also because the
overall organization of the German section meant that the thematic groups
remained important for the section’s thematic work.
However, in contrast to the 1990s, when the MaF pushed the organization
to increase its work on VAW and women’s rights both internally and at the in-
ternational level, the German women’s group no longer remained a relevant
internal actor in the 2000s. For example, the MaF did not try to influence
decision-making at the national or the international level any more. This dis-
tinguishes the MaF from its Swiss counterpart, which successfully pushed for
professionalizing the work on VAW by submitting its demand to the GA (the
demand was accepted). Thus, it is worth assuming that the female activists
and officials who pushed the work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence in
defining the section’s work on VAW in the 2000s.
At the same time, evidence also shows the ED’s commitment to women’s
rights issues in general and to the SVAW campaign in particular. Several in-
terviewees referred to Barbara Lochbihler as particularly committed to and
very progressive towards women’s rights.324 One interviewee explained that
the section’s participation in the SVAW campaign and especially the favor-
able allocation of resources at the secretariat happened thanks to Barbara
Lochbihler, who considered AI’s engagement against VAW a part of the larger
323 Ganzfried: Interviewby phonewithA.Y., 09.01.2015: “Alsomankann schon sagen, dassmeine
Gruppe ein wesentlicher Push-faktor ist für die ganze Frauenarbeit. […] wenn wir nicht da
wären, wüsste ich nicht, […].Wir sind schon sehr wesentlich für die Arbeit zum Thema Frauen
der Sektion, das ist klar.”.
324 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015; Ganzfried: Interview with A.C.,
14.04.2015; Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.T., 15.04.2015; Ganzfried: Interview by phonewith
A.Q., 27.02.2015.
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work on human rights.325 In contrast, as I demonstrate later, the EC was less
convinced by the SVAW campaign.
8.2.2.3 Highly controversial issues - domestic violence and abortion
By focusing on the participation in and the reactions to the SVAW campaign
and on the internal discussions surrounding the elaboration of AI’s abortion
policy, the present section sheds light on the important and widespread op-
position to the work on issues of VAW at the German section. In contrast
to what we observed at the international level, where the opposition to the
SVAW campaign was motivated by a general criticism of the adoption of the
mission or where resistance related to the structure and the setting of the
campaign, the German section mainly resisted the campaign’s content. How-
ever, this does not mean that the section did not oppose the campaign for
other reasons, as well.
My findings do not allowme to discuss howmany of the local AI groups ef-
fectively participated in Look&Act: PreventingViolence againstWomen. Neverthe-
less, evidence shows that approximately two thirds of the German AI groups
signed up for the campaign,326 although only a few local groups continued to
take part in campaign activities during the second phase. A September 2005
evaluation of the campaign reveals that “experienced group spoke persons re-
port[ed] back that it [would] be extremely difficult to motivate members for
the campaign any longer.”327 At the same time, the German section’s mem-
bership had to be convinced to work on issues of VAW as portrayed in the
SVAW campaign. An interviewee explains that members argued that women’s
325 Ganzfried: Interview with B.T., 15.04.2015: “Unsere damalige Generalsekretärin Barbara
Lochbihler, […] der war das Thema eben auch sehr wichtig. […] Insofern hat das natürlich
[…] schon auch immer dazu geführt, dass sich die Sektion da jetzt auch nicht so völlig […] da
raushalten konnten zum Thema. […] ich denke das […] dass Barbara damals das als wichtigen
Aspekt der Menschenrechtsarbeit eben auch gesehen hat, das […] hat eben auch dazu beige-
tragen, […] dass hauptamtlich zumindest irgendwie immer mal ein paar Ressourcen dafür zur
Verfügung gestellt wurden, ja so und dass das nicht nur rein ehrenamtlich wirklich bearbeitet
wird.”.
326 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Protokoll der 40.
Jahresversammlung 2005 in Leipzig, 2005, p.1: “Innerhalb der deutschen Sektion haben sich
erfreulicherweise über 400 Gruppen für die Kampagne angemeldet.”.
327 “Erfahrene GruppensprecherInnen melden zurück, dass es enorm schwierig wird, Mitglieder
weiterhin für die Kampagne zu motivieren.” Hartmetz: Hinsehen & Handeln: Gewalt gegen
Frauen verhindern, 02.09.2005, p.1.
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(rights) organizations were better placed to defend the rights of women and
that “AI should better engage for the individual political prisoner.”328 Accord-
ing to an official, for AI members “issues such as women’s rights still feel
somehow strange”329 and “had to actually find acceptance first.”330 The fol-
lowing statement further reveals that parts of the section did not take the
issue of VAW and the work of the MaF seriously. In fact, an interviewee at
one of the GAs reported that “[the women activists] had been portrayed as the
lilac dungarees who somehow wanted AI to change and would likely make it
disappear.”331
Moreover, some of the opposition to the SVAW campaign was radical. In
fact, compared to the Swiss section, where opposition essentially came from
one particular group, deep-seated resistance was prevalent among part of the
membership of the German section. As the following excerpt from a letter
from a member indicates, the opposition was based on the members’ belief
that domestic violence is not an issue of human rights: “[women victims of
domestic violence] do not need the protection of a human rights organiza-
tion, insofar as it is actually about private conflicts between free and adult
human beings in a liberal, open society. Here AI is absolutely out of place
[…].”332 Numerous protest letters reveal the members’ harsh criticism of the
SVAWcampaign, accusing it of being partial, discriminatory or even racist to-
wards men.The authors of these letters complained that the SVAW campaign
discriminated against men and violated the universality of human rights.333
According to the writers, the campaign was ideologically biased and “an in-
328 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.T., 15.04.2015: “Amnesty soll sich dann halt lieber für den einzel-
nen politischen Gefangenen einsetzen,”.
329 Ganzfried: Interviewwith B.T., 15.04.2015: “so Themenwie Frauenrechte ist irgendwie, ja, es
ist ihnen irgendwie immer noch fremd.”.
330 Ganzfried: Interview by phonewith A.Y., 09.01.2015: “das Thema Frauen überhaupt erst mal
Akzeptanz finden müssen.”.
331 Ganzfried:Interviewby phonewithA.Q.,27.02.2015: “wir irgendwie ein bisschen so als die, als
die lila Latzhosen hingestellt worden sind, die jetzt irgendwie Amnesty so verändern wollen,
dass es die Organisation wahrscheinlich bald nicht mehr gibt.”.
332 C.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 14.04.2004, p.2: “[Frauen, Opfer von häuslicher
Gewalt] benötigen aber nicht den Schutz einer Menschenrechtsorganisation, soweit es sich
nämlich um private Konflikte von freien, erwachsenen Menschen in einer liberalen, offenen
Gesellschaft handelt. Hier ist AI absolut Fehl am Platz […]”.
333 C.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 26.05.2006; C.: Protest letter to the German sec-
tion, 19.04.2004; C.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 06.06.2004.
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strument of the gender war raging in Germany.”334 Another author saw AI
adopting “a feminist gender racism”335 and called upon the organization not
to let itself be abused by the “ongoing feminist ‘differentiating campaign.’”336
In their letters, the members often questioned the gendered prevalence of
domestic violence asserting that in contrast to what the campaign communi-
cated, domestic violence concerned men as much as women, if not more.337
In an open protest letter, the authors warned AI of a potential loss ofmembers
as a result of the “ideologically motivated”338 campaign, which discriminated
against men. The author polemically asked: “Are children and men less wor-
thy of protection from violence?”339 As the following statement reveals, some
opponents must have also resigned from the organization as a consequence
of the SVAW campaign: “You will understand, that I do not want to support
an organization that criminalizes me because of my sex.”340
In addition to the members’ criticism of the work on VAW, my findings
also indicate that parts of the section’s leadership were skeptical of the SVAW
campaign. In fact, a former EC member explained: “We had resistance to, for
example, the gender audit in the EC itself. I did not think it was good then, […]
especially because there weremanywomen in the EC at that time.”341 Pointing
334 C.: Protest letter to theGermanAI section, 29.03.2004, p.1; C.: Protest letter to theGermanAI
section, 26.05.2006; Gemeinnütziger Bundesverein: Open protest letter to the German AI
section, 06.05.2004; C.: Protest letter to the German section, 19.04.2004; C.: Protest letter
to the German AI section, 14.04.2004.
335 C.S.: Protest letter to the GermanAI section, 15.03.2004, p.1: “feministischer Geschlechterras-
sismus”.
336 C.S.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 15.03.2004, p.1: “laufenden, feministischen ‘Dif-
ferenzierungskampagne’”.
337 C.S.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 29.03.2004; C.: Protest Letter to the German
AI section, 11.05.2004; C.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 17.05.2004; C.S.: Protest
letter to the German AI section, 15.03.2004.
338 Gemeinnütziger Bundesverein: Open protest letter to the German AI section, 06.05.2004,
p.2: “ideologisch motiviert”.
339 Gemeinnütziger Bundesverein: Open protest letter to the German AI section, 06.05.2004,
p.3: “Sind Kinder und Männer es weniger wert, vor Gewalt geschützt zu werden?”.
340 C.: Protest letter to the German AI section, 17.05.2004, p.2: “Sie werden verstehen, dass ich
keine Organisation unterstützen möchte, die mich aufgrund meines Geschlechts kriminal-
isiert.”.
341 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015: “Wir haben im Vorstand selber zum
Beispiel den gender audit auch Widerstand gehabt, fand ich damals nicht so gut, […] zumal in
unserem Vorstand damals ziemlich viel Frauen waren.Wo ist denn das Problem?”.
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to the appropriate representation of women in different positions all over the
section, the interviewee stated: “insofar, the necessity [of conducting a gender
audit] was not really seen.”342
Thus, generally speaking, the German section’s membership was rather
critical of the SVAW campaign and parts of the membership, mainly men,
clearly opposed the campaign. Furthermore, there also was criticism of and
resistance to the campaign from within the EC.
As mentioned in section 8.1.4, the German section was one of the few sec-
tions that firmly opposed the adoption of a policy on abortion and advocated
for the status quo of a neutral position at the 2005 and the 2007 ICMs. Given
that a section’s official position at the ICM is generally preceded by a deci-
sion of the section’s GA and that members ultimately exercise their decision-
making power via their vote at the annual GAs, we can assume that the Ger-
man section’s position at the ICM reflected the opinion of a majority of the
German AI members.
As the following paragraph reveals, the decisions of the German section’s
GAs on the adoption of the abortion policy reflects the restrictive opinion of
the majority of the membership. It also demonstrates the importance that the
section attached to maintaining a neutral position on abortion. In fact, at the
2006 GA, the members called “the Executive Committee, the ICM delegation,
and the delegates of the German section to the Chairs Forum in June 2006 to
pledge for the preservation of neutrality with regards to the right to abortion
at all levels of the international organization.”343 A year later, at the 2007 GA,
the members agreed on the contents of the section’s resolution to the ICM344
and called the EC to anticipate the modification of the neutral position on
abortion.The members called on the EC “to communicate as soon as possible
the expectation of the members who do not share the new position,”345 and
to express its opinion, “if AI members can not only have their own personal
342 Ganzfried: Interview by Skype with A.G., 26.04.2015: “insofern war die Notwendigkeit nicht
so ganz gesehen worden.”.
343 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beschlüsse der 41.
Jahresversammlung 2006 in Berlin, 2006: “die ICM-Delegation und die Delegierten der
Deutschen Sektion für das Chairs Forum im Juni 2006 auf, sich in allen Ebenen der interna-
tionalen Organisation für die Wahrung der Neutralität zur Frage des Rechts auf Abtreibung
einzusetzen.”.
344 Resolution HRS D.
345 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beschlüsse der 42.
Jahresversammlung 2007 inMünchen, 2007, p.6: “baldmöglichst eine Aussage darüber zu tr-
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opinion, but if they may express and declare it or if this will be considered as
an attitude damaging for the association.”346
After the adoption of the policy on selected aspects of abortion, the German
section critically observed the rigorous application of the policy and its po-
tential future modification. In fact, the 2008 GA called on the EC and all other
thematic bodies of the German section to “defend a restrictive position on
abortion […]. Further, the EC should, if need be, actively involve itself and
specifically pledge for the respect of the highest possible transparency and
democratic processes in case of any modification of the actual position.”347
As explained by one of my interviewees, after the adoption of the AI policy
on selected aspects of abortion, members continued to monitor the implementa-
tion of the policy as well as any potential future modifications: “quite a few
members of our section pay attention very thoroughly that all petitions and
announcements”348 respect the decision agreed upon at the 2007 ICM.
Similar to the international level, the members and staff at the German
section subjected AI’s abortion policy to substantial discussions. As the fol-
lowing testimony shows, the policy continued to be a subject of controversy
until recently. An activist explained: “There is a really delicate issue in our sec-
tion. [Abortion] is still triggering very, very huge resistance, even today.”349
Referring to the discussion in the 2000s, an activist stated that some of her
effen und intern zu kommunizieren, wie die Erwartung anMitglieder ist, die die neue Position
nicht teilen.”.
346 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beschlüsse der 42.
Jahresversammlung 2007 in München, 2007, p.6: “Insbesondere wird er sich dazu äußern,
ob ai-Mitglieder nicht nur ihre eigene abweichende persönliche Meinung haben können,
sondern sie auch in ai-Zusammenhängen benennen und bekennen dürfen oder ob dies als
vereinsschädliches Verhalten gewertet wird.”.
347 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beschlüsse der 43.
Jahresversammlung 2008 in Hamburg, 2008, p.4: “sich für eine restriktive, nur auf
schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen bezogene, und menschenrechtskonforme Position zum
Schwangerschaftsabbruch, einzusetzen, sich gegebenenfalls aktiv einzubringen,und insbeson-
dere auf die Beachtung größtmöglicher Transparenz und demokratischer Prozesse bei jeglicher
Änderung der derzeitigen Position zu drängen.”.
348 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Es gibt in unserer Sektion etliche, also
Mitglieder die das GANZ streng darauf achten, dass äh bei allen Verlautbarungen und Petitio-
nen und was, das nicht anders rüberkommt.”.
349 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Es gibt ein ganz heikles Thema bei uns
auch in der Sektion. Aus unserer Sektion gab es halt sehr sehr grosse Widerstände auch heute
noch [dem Theam abortion gegenüber].”.
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colleagues refused to work on the issue of abortion. According to her, the in-
ternal resistance was harsh and opponents predicted a “horror vision”350 of a
section that would fall apart if the organization decided to take a position on
abortion.
The extent of the opposition becomes visible in an internal non-represen-
tative survey of German section activists, realized in 2006. The study showed
that almost 74% of the activists either partially or entirely opposed an AI en-
gagement on the issue of abortion.351 Numerous letters to the editors of the
membership magazine ai intern352 show the vivacity and the content of the
controversy. An activist explained his resistance thus: “I can already hardly
bear that AI is engaging with a lot of energy against the Death Penalty and
remaining silent on the issue of abortion. If AI ought to engage for the right
to abortion….I want to work for human rights and not against them!!!”353 An-
other AI member published his support for the adoption of an abortion policy
by expressing his incomprehension of denying health services to women suf-
fering from complications after an abortion stating: “all, dangerous criminals
as well – the comparison is already hardly acceptable in my point of view –
have the right to access tomedical treatment, if needed. A human rights orga-
nization should take this for granted.”354 Thus, abortion was and continued
to be a highly controversial issue for the German AI section until recently.
Resistance to AI adopting a position on abortion was widespread and very
strong.
Consequently, the German section’s success in integrating VAW into its
work can be summarized as follows. First, in contrast to the overall cam-
350 Ganzfried: Interview by phone with A.Y., 09.01.2015: “Eine Horrorvision”.
351 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai intern Rundbrief für
Mitglieder der deutschen Sektion von amnesty international, June 2006, p.1.
352 Published between June 2006 and November 2007.
353 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai intern Rundbrief für
Mitglieder der deutschen Sektion von amnesty international, June 2006, p.7: “Es ist für
mich schon jetzt sehr schwer zu ertragen, dass sich AI mit viel Energie für die Abschaffung
der Todesstrafe einsetzt, aber beim Thema Abtreibung schweigt. Falls sich AI für ein Recht auf
Abtreibung einsetzen sollte, .... Ich möchte für die Menschenrechte arbeiten, und nicht dage-
gen!!!”.
354 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ai intern Rundbrief für
Mitglieder der deutschen Sektion von amnesty international, September 2006, p.12:
“Alle, auch Schwerverbrecher – der Vergleich ist hier meiner Auffassung nach bereits kaum
akzeptabel – haben das Recht auf eine medizinische Versorgung, falls dies erforderlich ist. Für
eine Menschenrechtsorganisation sollte dies selbstverständlich sein.”.
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paign and to the Swiss section, the German section’s Look & Act: Preventing
Violence against Women essentially focused on AI’s traditional women’s rights
issues, such as women human rights defenders and FGM. It did not address
the campaign’s central concern, namely “domestic violence” as a national hu-
man rights issue. Second, the German section’s internal structures working
on issues of VAW remained largely the same as in the 1990s. The human re-
sources allocated to the work on women’s rights at the secretariat never ex-
ceeded nine working hours a week, just like in the 1990s. Thus, in contrast to
the Swiss section, there was no professionalization of the section’s work on
VAW. Third, we lack information on the German section’s leadership’s com-
mitment to the SVAW campaign. Fourth, the data indicate that the influence
of the MaF on the section’s work on VAW in the 2000s was less important
than it had been in the previous decade. In fact, while the MaF continued
to operate as the section’s expert group on all issues related to VAW, it no
longer tried to influence decision-making on the matter at the national or
international level. Furthermore, the 1990s saw MaF disappeared and a new
women’s rights group, also called MaF, was founded at the beginning of the
2000s. Fifth, there was strong and widespread resistance to the SVAW cam-
paign even among the ECmembers. It was primarily related to the content of
the campaign and not to its flagship role or its structure. At the same time,
there was important opposition to the adoption of a policy on abortion from
the membership.
8.2.3 Comparison between the Swiss and the German AI sections
Let me briefly recapitulate the findings from the two case studies on the basis
of the five criteria measuring a section’s success in integrating VAW into its
work.
Figure 15 provides a comparison of the success of the Swiss and the Ger-
man sections in integrating VAW into their work in the 2000s on the basis
of five criteria. Besides the leadership’s commitment to the SVAW campaign
(criteria 3), information forwhich ismissing in the German case, the other cri-
teria indicate that the Swiss section was more successful in integrating VAW
into its work. In contrast to the German section, which continued to focus
primarily on AI’s traditional women’s rights issues and did not address “do-
mestic violence,” the Swiss section adopted the thematic focus of the overall
campaign and did emphasize “domestic violence” as a national human rights
concern. Third, the Swiss section professionalized its work on VAW over the
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Figure 15: Comparison between the Swiss and the German AI sections of their success
in integrating VAW into their section’s work
Source: My own
course of the SVAW campaign. In contrast, just like in the 1990s, the person-
nel resources allocated to the thematic work on women’s rights at the German
secretariat never exceeded nine working hours per week. Fourth, while the
Swiss section’s women’s network successfully pushed for further profession-
alizing its work on VAW through a sustainable approach to work on women’s
rights, the MaF was important for the implementation of the campaign but
no longer tried to influence decision-making at the national or at the inter-
national level. Fifth, in contrast to the Swiss section, the German section wit-
nessed strong and widespread resistance to the campaign Look & Act: Prevent-
ing Violence against Women and harsh opposition to the adoption of a policy
on abortion. These differences demonstrate that the Swiss section was more
successful than the German section in integrating the issue of VAW into its
work.
In order to account for this difference, it is worth looking at the central
dissimilarities between the sections. Chapter 6.3.2 highlighted substantial
differences in four domains: the power structure between the secretariat (pro-
fessional structure) and the groups (activists).The latter have a relatively pow-
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erful position in the German section due to their role in the thematic work
and their ability to participate in the decision-making both at the national
and at the local level. In contrast, the Swiss professional structure seems to
be more powerful than its membership, as thematic work is centralized and
professionalized at the Secretariat.This particularity can serve as an explana-
tion as to why the Swiss section professionalized its work on issues of VAW
over the course of the SVAW campaign, while the German section contin-
ued to allocate only limited human resources to the work on women’s rights.
This conclusion also suggests that the “professionalization of the work on is-
sues of VAW” criterion is not that useful when assessing a section’s success
in integrating VAW into its work. On the other hand, the relatively power-
ful position of the German section’s membership may be one explanation for
the resistance to the SVAW campaign and to the adoption of an abortion pol-
icy at the German section. It is worth assuming that German activists’ com-
paratively huge opportunities to participate in the section’s decision-making
processes gave the policy opponents significantly more weight. Nevertheless,
more member power does not necessarily translate into more resistance to
these kinds of activities or policies. Instead, the reason for the resistancemust
be sought in the members’ attitudes.The lack of data prevents us from know-
ing or measuring members’ attitudes. However, there is some evidence that
the German section’s members are comparatively more conservative and tra-
ditionally closer to the Church. Further, in Germany, the Protestant Church
(Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland) and the Catholic Church have had a long
tradition of collaborating in the promotion of a common position on sexual
and reproductive rights and abortion. Despite harboring differing views on
abortion law, they have stood together for protecting life.355 Consequently,
it is worth assuming that the German section’s closeness to the Church ex-
plains its comparatively huge opposition to the campaign and its failure in
integrating issues of VAW into its overall work. At the same time, the dif-
ferences between the Swiss and the German sections might also come down
to the fact that the share of women in the Swiss EC was higher than in the
German EC over the whole period. While it is impossible to demonstrate a
clear correlation, given the previous research on the relationship between the
absence of women in leadership positions within organizations and the gen-
der bias in the mainstreaming understanding of human rights, it is worth
assuming that a link did exist.
355 Clos 2009.
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Sixth, it is also possible that the difference between the Swiss and the
German sections had to do with the relationship between the section and the
headquarters. In fact, the data indicate that the Swiss section was open to
mandate changes and a rather assimilated member of the overall AI network.
This is in contrast to its neighbor, which has been described as rather critical
to mandate changes and whose relationship with the IS has been character-
ized as periodically conflictual. Thus, the Germans’ refusal to address “do-
mestic violence” as a national human rights issues, while continuing to work
on traditional women’s rights issues, such as female human rights defenders
and FGM, under the SVAW campaign, can be interpreted more as a sign of a
generally critical stance to propositions coming from the headquarters than
as a sign of refusal to work on issues of women’s rights.
Ultimately, it is difficult to definitively conclude why the Swiss section was
more successful than the German section in integrating issues of VAW into
its work through the SVAW campaign. A definite answer certainly needs a
database of interviews with a greater number of activists and officials. Fur-
thermore, taking the respective national political and legislative contexts into
account would provide a deeper - and better - understanding of this differ-
ence. In the Swiss case, the successful process of designing and passing a
law that made domestic violence a crime persecuted ex officio356 in the Swiss
Parliament between 1996 and 2003 - which also contributed to sensitizing the
Swiss public in general - certainly could have helped the campaign to un-
laesh. However, a similar legislative process took place in Germany during
the same period. In fact, the Federal Government adopted the first Action
Plan to combat violence against women in 1999. The Protection against Vio-
lence Act (Gewaltschutzgesetz) was an essential component of this plan and
came into effect in 2002, bringing the issue of domestic violence out of its
niche and making it claim its place in the legal-political and juridical discus-
sion.357 Thus, a legislation process that mirrored the international debate on
the recognition of VAW as a violation of human rights, and which could be
used to explain the difference between the two sections, took place in both
countries. Nevertheless, the present study does not define if and how these
356 Frauen Macht Geschichte. Frauenpolitik und Gleichstellung in der Schweiz 2001-2017.
Bern 2017. Herausgeberin: Eidgenössische Kommission für Frauenfragen EKF.
357 Berliner Initiative gegen Gewalt an Frauen BIG e.V. 10 Jahre Gewaltschutzgesetz, 1. Au-
flage 2012.
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national legal and political developments affected public opinion and influ-
enced the implementation of AI’s campaign in Switzerland and Germany. In-
deed, more research and a broader focus are needed to better understand
these relationships.
Given AI’s basic nature of a membership organization based on demo-
cratic principles, which gives members the possibility to define the orga-
nization’s working focus, the attitude of a section’s membership towards
the SVAW campaign or the adoption of an abortion policy is paramount
to the section’s actions. In turn, this suggests that the German section’s
generally rather conservative membership, visible in its relative closeness
to the Church, combined with activists’ comparatively huge opportunities
to participate in the section’s decision-making processes to further amplify
opposition to the SVAW campaign and contribute to the section’s failure to
integrate issues of VAW into its overall work.
8.3 Intermediate conclusions
Before continuing with the discussion of the empirical findings, it is worth
summing up the insights into the post-mandate period that this chapter has
provided. In the 2000s, AI adopted a first policy on sexual and reproductive
rights and abortion, framing these rights as civil and political rights as well
as economic, social, and cultural rights. In so doing, it recognized them as
essential “to the realization of every individual’s human rights.”358 Addition-
ally, the organization made the principle of gender equality part of its policy
at the end of the 2000s. Chapter 8 has illustrated how the content of AI’s
work on VAW evolved with the launch of the SVAW campaign, when the or-
ganization emphasized the issue of domestic violence for the first time and
engaged in a comprehensive internal change. With the latter, AI members
and staff embraced the campaign’s underlining principle of gender equality
and integrated the principle of “Women’s Rights are Human Rights” into their
work and activism.
Further, my focus on the origin of the relevant ICM decisions and on the
implementation of the SVAW campaign has revealed a top-down process of
358 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Statement Summarizing AI’s current
policy on Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 12.10.2006, p.2.
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integrating VAW into AI’s work in the post-mandate period. The organiza-
tion’s leadership initiated the majority of the relevant ICM decisions and es-
tablished a campaign machinery at the IS for the effective implementation of
the SVAW campaign.
Nevertheless, AI did not succeed in integrating VAW into its work. The
analysis of the role of the women’s rights activists and officials and the reac-
tion to the SVAW campaign and the adoption of an abortion policy indicates
that this failure has two principal reasons. First, with the SVAW campaign
being implemented from the top down, the female activists and officials who
had initiated AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s lost their influence on the organi-
zation’s work on the topic. Second, activists and officials at the international
and the national levels opposed the SVAW campaign and members resisted
the adoption of a policy on abortion.
However, the focus on the national level has showed that there were con-
siderable differences in the extent to which the Swiss and the German sections
managed to integrate the issue of VAW into their work in the 2000s.Whereas
the Swiss section at least partially succeeded in integrating the issue of VAW
into its work, the German section did not do so. I argue that the German
section members’ relative closeness to the Church and their comparatively
powerful position help explain this difference between the two sections.
9. Discussion and outlook
This final chapter starts by recapitulating my main findings and discussing
them with a view to the existing literature on the integration of women’s
rights into AI’s work. Following the two-part structure of the empirical anal-
ysis, chapter 9.1 highlights the book’s new insights into the mandate period
and the post-mandate period separately. In section 9.2, I draw some broader
implications and offer recommendations on how other human rights NGOs
can best integrate women’s rights into their work. By relating the results of
the analysis back to the literature on norm diffusion and dynamics, section
9.3 discusses the new theoretical insights. It specifically highlights the study’s
contribution to the understanding of the ways comparatively powerless actors
within a transnational network are able to cause a new norm to emerge, and
elucidates the study’s contribution to better comprehending the causes of in-
complete norm diffusion. Section 9.4 then concludes with an outlook focusing
on AI’s internal developments with respect to women’s rights in the years after
the SVAW campaign until today.
9.1 Summary and new insights
This section starts by recalling the study’s general objective and discusses the
book’s main insights into the mandate and the post-mandate period sepa-
rately (section 9.1.1 and 9.1.2).
The present study intended to shed light on the reasons why AI chose VAW
in the private sphere as the theme of its first global long-term thematic cam-
paign, despite a historically grown gender-biased vision of human rights. AI
largely informed the dominant understanding of human rights in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century as individuals’ rights to be protected from state
despotism. It treated women’s rights only marginally andmainly as violations
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occurring in the public sphere. I therefore identified the organization’s deci-
sion to focus its first global thematic campaign on the issue of VAW in the
private sphere as a surprising development. Thus, the books has sought to
answer the following questions: 1) Why did AI decide to focus its first global
thematic campaign on the issue of VAW and, especially, on forms of violence
in the private sphere?
As the condemnation of VAW in the public sphere preceded AI’s interest in
VAW in the private sphere and as these approaches interrelate, it was pivotal
to clarify why and how AI dealt with issues of VAW during the mandate and
in the post-mandate period. The study thus also intended to answer the fol-
lowing research questions: 2) Why has AI integrated VAW into its activities?
3) How has AI integrated VAW into its activities? How has AI’s human rights
policy changed and how was this transformation assimilated and integrated
by AI’s officials and activists? Relatedly, the book explored two sub-questions:
What was the role of female activists and officials in the integration process?
and Has there been any resistance from activists and/or from officials and, if
so, what kind of resistance?
The study explored in detail how VAW developed from an ephemeral con-
cern reflected in the adoption of cases of female prisoners of conscience, ini-
tiated at the end of the 1980s by female activists at the local level, to the central
issue of AI’s first global long-term campaign under the mission at the begin-
ning of the 2000s. Female activists and officials substantially contributed to
the integration of VAW into AI’s work and to the decision to launch a first
global long-term campaign on the issues of VAW in the private sphere in a
bottom-up process.They did so in a beneficial international political environ-
ment marked by the fourth WCW in Beijing and using strategies of parallel
networking and analogous framing.Nevertheless, AI wasn’t successful inmaking
VAWan integral part of its work through the SVAW campaign. Long-standing
women’s rights activists and officials lost their influence on AI’s work on VAW
and some activists and officials strongly resisted the campaign and, relatedly,
the adoption of AI’s first policy on abortion. These factors are key in explain-
ing AI’s failure to transform women’s rights into part of its DNA through the
SVAW campaign.
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9.1.1 New insights into the mandate period
Female activists played a central role in initiating AI’s work on women’s rights
at the end of the 1980s and in the subsequent bottom-up process of integrat-
ing VAW into AI’s activities, which culminated in the SVAW campaign at the
beginning of the 2000s. AI’s growing interest in issues of VAW and, relatedly,
the decision to make VAW the topic of AI’s first long-term thematic campaign
under the mission must mainly be seen as the result of the feminist strategies
of parallel networking and analogous framing. These strategies were successful
because the first was adapted to the overall structure and functioning of AI,
while the second conformed to the organization’s overall human rights policy.
Because analogous framing did not challenge the organization’s traditional
understanding of human rights, which, at this time, essentially focused on
civil and political rights, members or officials did not resist it.
While these feminist strategies are key to understanding developments
at the international level, female activists and officials in different sections
organized in accordance with the structure of their sections’ voluntary mem-
bers into local, regional, or thematic groups or networks in the 1990s. The
subsequent professionalization of each section’s work on VAW also followed
the overall organization of the section’s thematic work. While in the German
section, the MaF pursued a strategy that sought to influence decision-making
at the international level, female activists in the Swiss section first organized
into four local groups and formed a national women’s network in 2000, which
focused primarily on their section’s work. While the Swiss section started to
professionalize its work on women’s rights in the late 1990s, in the German
section issues of violations of women’s rights remained in the MaF’s hands.
Women activists and officials thus appear to have played a key role in the
initiation of AI’s work on VAW and its subsequent increase in the 1990s.
However, this does not mean that male activists and officials did not con-
tribute to the integration process. While the data clearly indicate that it was
predominantly women who had agency in this change process, we cannot
conclude that men were not involved, as well. Both female and male ICM sec-
tion delegates decided upon the adoption of resolutions.Therefore, it is worth
assuming that men must at least have supported the issue from the moment
the demand for more work on issues of women’s rights became integrated
into AI’s policy at the 1989 ICM. Further, as the examples of the former SG
Pierre Sané and the former ED of the Swiss section Daniel Bolomey show,
men also played a positive role. Using a feminist research approach that fo-
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cuses primarily on comparatively powerless actors, I have paid less attention
to comparatively powerful actors, most of whom were men during this pe-
riod. It is plausible that the study has somehow underestimated the contri-
bution of men (particularly male officials) to the change process. In fact, as
demonstrated by Kelleher and Bhattacharjya, Pierre Sané was committed to
women’s rights and took a leading role in enunciating AI’s increasing interest
in women’s rights issues.1
Aside from the positive stance of the SG, it is possible that the increase
in the proportion of women in the organization’s leadership positions may
also have contributed to making AI consider issues of VAW more seriously.
Nevertheless, while these numbers indicate a relationship, they do not suffice
to fully clarify the transformation process, as they tell us nothing about the
agency of the women behind it.
We know that external factors influenced AI’s interest in women’s rights
issues as well. For example, human rights violations’ changing pattern ampli-
fied at the end of the bipolar world order. It made AI rethink its state-focused
mandate and contributed to making AI consider violations of women’s hu-
man rights during the 1990s more seriously.2 More important, the growing
international awareness of gender equality (initiated during the UN Decade
for Women 1975-1985), which was reflected in the WCWs, did not leave AI
unaffected. Relatedly, the international women’s rights movement – or the
Transnational Feminist Networks,3 as Moghadam calls them – challenged AI
and other human rights organizations to expand their mandate to violations
of human rights in the private sphere.4 In particular, the 1995WCW in Beijing
provided those within AI who wanted the organization to increase its work
on VAW with an important momentum, and it can therefore be interpreted
as a window of opportunity facilitating the integration process within AI.
In light of the internal and external factors that must have positively im-
pacted AI’s work on VAW in the 1990s, the results of the present study, with
their emphasis on female activists’ and officials’ strategies, may at first glance
seem too reductionist. It is therefore important to acknowledge the results in
light of the book’s specific focus and approach. In fact, the emphasis on AI’s
1 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
2 Thakur 1994; Pack 1999.
3 Moghadam 2010, p.294.
4 Bahar 1996.
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inner life and the focus on women as competent actors within the organiza-
tion, which follows from the theoretical paradigm of feminist constructivism,
entail that the study has not concentrated on the role of more powerful ac-
tors and of potential external factors. Thus, we can assume that Pierre Sané’s
positive stance, the increase in the proportion of women in AI’s leadership,
and the favorable global political climate must have contributed to making
AI increase its work on VAW as well. Nevertheless, the following reflections
attribute AI’s increasing interest in women’s rights issues to feminist strate-
gizing. In fact, events such as the WCW in Beijing, can only open windows of
opportunities for actors exploiting them to their advantage.
In that sense, it is worth assuming that without women’s appropriate
strategizing within AI, AI would probably have integrated issues of VAW into
its work as a result of an international bandwagon effect. Yet, the process of
integrationwould probably have taken a different path and VAW in the private
sphere would not necessarily have become the central theme of AI’s first global
long-term campaign under the mission. Consequently, although I have not
demonstrated the interplay of all of the factors that eventually contributed to
making AI increase its work on VAW during the 1990s, I have clearly demon-
strated the existence of two feminist strategies – parallel networking and anal-
ogous framing – and their significance for the process of change.
9.1.2 New insights into the post-mandate period
The 2001 decision to launch the first thematic long-term campaign under the
mission on the issue of VAW in the private sphere marked the end of the bot-
tom-up process and the beginning of a top-down approach to the integration
of VAW issues into AI’s work. In fact, between 2002 and 2010, the organiza-
tion’s leadership initiated the majority of the ICM decisions concerning the
work on violence against women. It also established campaign-machinery at
the IS for the effective implementation of the organization’s first global the-
matic long-term campaign. In contrast to the activities related to VAW in the
1990s, the SVAW campaign sought to change the organization from within by
enhancing its members’ and officials’ awareness of gender equality. AI con-
sidered its staff ’s and activists’ commitment to gender equality pivotal for AI’s
public credibility.The SVAW campaign was embedded in the major change of
policy and working methods. It naturally followed from the adoption of the
mission and combined an internal and an external aspect. It therefore was a
highly ambitious and challenging endeavor.
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It is thus not surprising that the campaign’s flagship role and its struc-
ture and setting provoked the opposition of some members and officials. The
Review of the SVAW Campaign5 highlights that these elements certainly ham-
pered the implementation of the campaign. However, my findings suggest
that two other elements are key to explaining why AI did not succeed in mak-
ing women’s rights part of its DNA through the SVAW campaign. First, were
the activists’ and officials’ content-related resistance to the SVAW campaign
at the international and the national levels and the members’ opposition to
the adoption of a policy on abortion. Second, with the top-down campaign,
female activists and officials who initiated and pushed the work on VAW in
the 1990s lost their influence on the organization’s work in this area.
My national-level analysis demonstrates that the Swiss section succeeded
in integrating the issue of VAW into its work at least partially. Meanwhile, the
German section did not succeed in integrating issues of VAW into its overall
work through the SVAW campaign. This difference can be explained with the
general differences between the two sections. The facts that there had always
been more women in the Swiss section’s EC and that the Swiss section had
generally been more open to mandate modifications than its neighbor help
account for this. Nevertheless, AI’s grassroots democratic structure, which
gives members the right to have a say, suggests that the reason for the differ-
ence is most likely to be found in the membership. An important indication
of the conservative attitude of the German section’s members is their relative
closeness to the church. Data indicate that the German section’s members
are generally closer to the church than their colleagues at the Swiss section.
However, this is a very general observation, and in order to better understand
themembers’ attitudes, this connection should be further explored withmore
interview data. Moreover, German members have comparatively more power
than their Swiss counterparts, which must have amplified the opposition to
the SVAW campaign and to the adoption of the abortion policy. Furthermore,
to reach a definite conclusion on the differences between the two sections, it
would be worthwhile to take into account the societal contexts and, especially,
the legislation processes related to VAW that took place in Switzerland and in
Germany during the same period.
The analysis of the data on the German section reveals that, while the Ger-
man section is representative of other big Western AI sections members- and
funding-wise, it differs from the rest of the AI sections because of its special
5 Wallace and Baños Smith 2010b.
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history. For a long time, the section developed in parallel with the interna-
tional movement, on its own andwithout amodel of how to organize its work.
This implies that the internal generalizability of my findings is somehow lim-
ited. Because these two characteristics distinguish the German section not
only from the Swiss section, but also from many other AI sections, and be-
cause other Western AI sections must therefore more closely resemble the
Swiss section in terms of membership and structure, it is worth assuming
that the extent to which other sections succeeded in integrating VAW into
their overall work is similar to that observed at the Swiss section. To verify
this assumption, it would be interesting to more closely explore how other
European AI sections dealt with the issue of VAW in the frame of the SVAW
campaign.
The study provides an internal explanation for AI’s failure to make
women’s rights part of its DNA through the SVAW campaign by highlighting
the content-related resistance to the latter and the opposition to the adoption
of an abortion policy and by demonstrating the female activists’ and officials’
loss of influence on AI’s work on issues of VAW in the frame of the top-down
campaign.We should assess these findings keeping in mind that the feminist
constructivist theoretical paradigm underpinning the book entails focusing
on AI’s inner life and on the role of female activists and officials. However,
in order to understand AI’s difficulties in making women’s rights part of its
DNA through the SVAW campaign, it is worth contextualizing the findings
within the global climate on women’s rights in the 2000s. With the 1993 UN
Human Rights Conference in Vienna, the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development in Cairo, and the 1995 WCW in Beijing, the
1990s had witnessed major progress in the area of women’s rights and the
international context for advancing the issue within AI was beneficial.
The global situation was different in the 2000s. A backlash against
women’s rights achievements took place in the post-Beijing period and
especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.6 Fundamentalist forces,
including the Vatican, US Christian right organizations, and several African
and Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and Sudan,
had already organized around the UN conferences in the 1990s to counter
the developments in women’s rights, particularly with respect to sexual and
reproductive rights. However, with a global climate changing away from
6 Müller et al. 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006; Elisabeth Jay Friedman 2003; Reilly 2007.
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multilateralism towards a US unilateralism and a “disregard for interna-
tional norms,” these fundamentalist forces really gained momentum in the
beginning of the 2000s.7 For example, at a meeting of the UNCHR in 2003,
the Vatican and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) countries
strongly opposed a resolution calling governments to recognize discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation as a violation of human rights.8 At the
same time, “the global consensus that VAW is a violation of human rights
was also called into question”9 at a meeting of the CSW. Aware of the rise
of these anti-feminist forces, and in fear of losing the achievements gained
since Beijing, the CSW deliberately decided not to call for a fifth WCW.10
This particular global climate must therefore be considered another ele-
ment explaining AI’s failure to make women’s rights part of its DNA, as it
strengthened the traditionalist voices within AI. Thus, similar to what I dis-
cussed in relation to the mandate period, it is important to take into account
the global political climate in order to fully understand the developments in
AI’s work on VAW in the 2000s. Consequently, even though my analysis has
downplayed these external factors and was not able to highlight the interac-
tion of the internal and external elements, all of which must have played a
role in AI’s failure to make women’s rights part of its DNA, I have nonethe-
less demonstrated the existence of content-related opposition to the SVAW
campaign and to the adoption of the abortion policy, as well as its harming
influence on AI’s ability to integrate VAW into its work. Furthermore, I have
also highlighted the loss of influence of those women activists and officials
who pushed for the increase in AI’s work in the 1990s in the frame of the top-
down SVAW campaign and its potentially negative influence on AI’s ability to
make women’s rights part of its DNA.
In consideration of the above, the study has largely answered the under-
lying research questions. Research question 3 is the only exception. In fact,
I could not fully answer the research question How has this transformation
been assimilated and integrated by AI’s officials and activists? The fact that
AI did not succeed in making women’s rights part of its DNA through the
SVAW campaign suggests that AI’s officials and activists did not fully assimi-
late and integrate the transformation from a human rights approach centered
7 Reilly 2009, p.156.
8 Reilly 2009, p.156.
9 Reilly 2009, p.157.
10 Müller et al. 2007, p.35.
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on violations of human rights in the public sphere to an approach consider-
ing abuses of human rights in the private domain.While I could demonstrate
that women’s rights issues were not paramount for the activists interviewed
at the Swiss section, I was not able to describe in more detail exactly how ac-
tivists and officials effectively assimilated and integrated issues of VAW. One
of the reasons for this shortcoming is the limited number of interviews at the
German section and at the IS. In order to fully answer this question, more
interviews with activists and officials at the German section as well as with
IS staff would have been necessary.
9.2 Implications for other human rights NGOs
I defined AI as a transnational network because of its structure with a central
headquarters and a broad grassroots membership organized in country sec-
tions. However, as far as AI’s work is concerned, the relevant literature and
the media commonly refer to AI as a human rights NGO.11 It is thus worth it
to present the implications of the study for other human rights NGOs rather
than for transnational networks, as this term refers first and foremost to the
structure of a given organization and not to the focus of the organization’s
work. In fact, the findings offer several general recommendations on how to
successfully integrate issues of women’s rights into everyday work that are
potentially useful for human rights NGOs.
Nevertheless, when we look at the following recommendations and think
about applying them to other organization, we have to bear in mind that the
findings are based on AI - an institution characterized by a networked organi-
zational structure. Given that AI’s approach to integrating issues of VAW was
different before and after the adoption of the mission in 2001, my findings
allow me to make recommendations on how human rights NGOs can suc-
cessfully integrate issues of women’s rights into their work in two situations:
Eitherwhen an organization intends to integrate issues of women’s rights into
its public activities (such as campaigns or reports) or when an NGO chooses
a gender-mainstreaming approach, implying an internal change process as
well. In the first case, a favorable global climate and a window of opportunity
11 Similarly, when we consider the work of human rights NGOs, we speak about them as
organizations rather than as networks, even though someof theseNGOs are structured
as transnational networks.
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are important but not sufficient. While the commitment of an organization’s
leadership matters, the presence of women pursuing strategies for pushing
their claims forward that are adequate to the organization is key.These strate-
gies can be parallel networking or analogous framing.
However, the successful use of these strategies is subject to certain condi-
tions. The strategy of parallel networking seems to be effective when the orga-
nization is structured as a network composed of a powerful central node and
a large grassroots movement, when the internal decision-making process is
based on democratic principles, and when a certain number of individuals,
disseminated more or less equally across the basic network, become mem-
bers of the parallel network. Further, the strategy of analogous framing seems
to depend on the topics the NGO works on.
The case of AI showed the effectiveness of women’s networking beyond the
formal organizational units. When they frame their concerns in a way that is
oriented towards this fundamental policy rather than in contradiction to it,
women are likely to influence their organization’s agenda. In a democrati-
cally organized network, where the members are involved in the decision-
making process, such as AI, linking up with other like-minded individuals
beyond the formal organizational units allows women to purposefully and ef-
ficiently influence the decision-making processes. However, given the myriad
of very different organizations, other feminist strategies are conceivable as
well. Further, a certain proportion of women in leadership positions seems to
be important, too.This seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
for successful integration.
In the second situation, when the issue of women’s rights is embraced by
the organization’s management and promoted from the top, it is important
to keep in mind that if a bottom-up process preceds the top-down approach,
those who first initiated the issue and pushed it from the bottom be ade-
quately involved in the ongoing process of integration. This means that the
organization is able, if possible, to build upon preexisting (informal) organi-
zational structures instead of (only) establishing new ones. If the organiza-
tion decides to create new entities, it is pivotal to provide them with suffi-
cient financial and personal resources and to embed them in the preexisting
organizational structure, clearly defining their responsibilities and ensuring
internal accountability. The management’s commitment is important but not
sufficient in this case either.
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9.3 The study’s theoretical contribution
This section relates the results of the analysis back to the relevant literature on
norm diffusion and dynamics. It starts with a discussion of the new theoret-
ical insights into the ways comparatively powerless actors within a transna-
tional network are able to cause a new norm to emerge. The section then
elucidates the study’s contribution to a better understanding of the causes of
limited norm diffusion.
9.3.1 Ways that comparatively powerless actors can influence
norm emergence
Female activists and officials successfully used the strategies of parallel net-
working and analogous framing to make AI increase its work on VAW in the
1990s. The employment of these strategies was one of the factors that led
AI to choose the issue of VAW in the private sphere as the topic of its first
global long-term campaign, the SVAW campaign. The use of these strategies
can thus be considered to have played a pivotal role in causing a new norm
to emerge within AI: recognizing VAW as a human rights violation, whether
it occurs in the private or in the public sphere and whoever the perpetrator.
Since the integration of VAW into AI’s work followed a bottom-up process and
female activists and officials who were not part of AI’s leadership spurred AI
to work on VAW, I consider these women comparatively powerless actors. My
results thus show that by using the strategies of parallel networking and anal-
ogous framing, comparatively weak actors in a transnational network are able
to cause a new norm to emerge.
As such,my findings relativize the headquarters’ essential role as the prin-
cipal norm entrepreneur within AI as well as the IS’s influence on AI’s pol-
icy and thematic orientation that have both been highlighted by different
authors.12 Furthermore, my study confirms Hertel’s (2006) findings on the
influence of comparatively powerless activists on norm dynamics.13 In her
studyUnexpected Power Conflict and Change among Transnational Activists, she has
pointed to various ways in which comparatively powerless activists can al-
ter the content of a transnational campaign. By differentiating between the
12 Welch 2001; Hopgood 2006; Lake and Wong 2009.
13 Hertel 2006.
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senders framing the campaign from the North and the receivers of the cam-
paign in the South, Hertel (2006) demonstrates that local activists at the re-
ceiving side of a transnational campaign could alter its content by employing
two mechanisms: Blocking or Backdoor-moves. Powerless members of a nor-
mative community are thus able to change the content of a norm and influ-
ence its dissemination.
However, Hertel’s study does not demonstrate if and how comparatively
weak actors may affect norm emergence. My study’s theoretical contribution
departs from this point, as my research identifies the strategies of parallel
networking and analogous framing, which comparatively powerless members
of a transnational network can employ in order to influence their network’s
agenda and, consequently, norm emergence.
Nevertheless, the results of my study also suggest that the effectiveness
of these strategies is linked to specific conditions. The strategy of parallel net-
working depends on three conditions. The first is the transnational network’s
overall structure; second - it’s functioning; and third - the number and dis-
tribution of the people involved in the parallel network. A transnational net-
work composed of a powerful central node and a large grassroots movement
has been fruitful for comparatively powerless actors’ use of the strategy of
parallel networking. Parallel networking can be a successful strategy for weak ac-
tors within a transnational network if the network’s decision-making process
follows democratic rules.
Lastly, the strategy of parallel networking also needs a certain number of
individuals to become network members and to be distributed more or less
equally throughout the actual transnational network. Otherwise, they are less
able to influence decision-making. In fact, a certain number of female ac-
tivists and officials were present at various sections as well as at the IS. They
were thus more or less broadly disseminated within AI. This enhanced the
likelihood of constructing an effective intersectional network as it allowed
them to reach out to the whole AI network and build majorities for their de-
mands at the ICMs.
In contrast, the strategy of analogous framing seems to mostly depend on
the transnational network’s policy framework or, said differently, on the top-
ics on which the basic network is focused. In order for this strategy to be ef-
fective, it must therefore conform to the themes of the basic network. In fact,
because analogous framing did not challenge AI’s traditional understanding of
human rights, which, at the time, focused on civil and political rights, it did
not result in major resistance from members and officials, and it was there-
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fore successful. Consequently, my study’s theoretical contribution to norm
emergence comes down to the insight that norm entrepreneurs are not the
only actors key to the emergence of new norms; comparatively powerless ac-
tors can create a new norm, as well. By using the strategies of parallel network-
ing and analogous framing, comparatively powerless activists within a transna-
tional network can influence the network’s agenda and cause a new norm to
emerge within the network under certain conditions.The deployment of these
strategies, however, seems to depend on the network’s structure, functioning,
the number and distribution of those using the strategy of parallel networking,
and on the network’s overall policy framework.
9.3.2 Reasons for limited norm diffusion
I have provided evidence for two main arguments why AI failed to make
women’s rights a part of its DNA. Translating these findings into the termi-
nology of norm diffusion allows me to highlight two reasons why the norm
did not diffuse further within AI. First are activists’ and officials’ content-re-
lated resistance to the SVAW campaign and their opposition to the adoption
of an abortion policy. Second is the loss of influence that female activists and
officials who initiated and pushed the work on VAW in the 1990s went through
as far as the organization’s work on VAW in the frame of the top-down cam-
paign is concerned. These outcomes confirm Wiener’s (2007) and Müller and
Wunderlich’s (2013) findings about the importance of contestation for under-
standing norm compliance or non-compliance and norm diffusion.14 Wiener
(2007) demonstrated that the likelihood of norm contestation increases when
a norm is transposed into a different context. In fact, when a norm is im-
planted into a new environment, its meaning becomes contested as differ-
ently socialized actors interpret it.15 This process took place within AI with
the norm that recognizes VAW as a violation of human rights. In my two case
studies, the members’ closeness to the church attested to their different so-
cialization. Contestation was more important in the German section, where
the membership was generally closer to the church, than in the Swiss section.
That resistance against women’s rights is widespread among church-related
groups is not new. The Catholic Church is widely known for its conservative
14 Müller and Wunderlich 2013.
15 Wiener 2007, p.12.
274 Amnesty International and Women’s Rights
and patriarchal values, having always opposed women’s sexual and reproduc-
tive rights.16 The Vatican was particularly active in restricting these rights in
the 2000s.
Norm diffusion is also described as a permanent process of negotiation,
throughout which norm entrepreneurs have to continually work to further
consolidate the norms and to defend them against norm challengers.17 If
norm entrepreneurs fail to defend a norm, we observe norm regression. In
the case of AI and VAW, I have shown that comparatively weak actors - female
activists and officials - were the primary drivers of norm diffusion. How-
ever, the book has not provided information about whether these women’s
rights advocates defended the norm from internal norm challengers.The fact
that members’ participation in sections’ decision-making processes may hin-
der the integration of VAW into AI’s overall work indicates that norms in-
terpreters’ influence within a normative framework, as well as socialization,
matters for norm contestation. In fact, my results about the consequences
of members’ participation in decision-making processes suggest that when
the latter offer extensive power to norm interpreters, norm contestation is
more effective and the likelihood of norms’ continued diffusion decreases.
Consequently, two main factors account for norm decay in a transnational
network. First, are differently socialized actors who contest the norm; second
is the norm contesters’ power in terms of their access to decision-making
processes.
To sum up my contribution to the understanding of norm diffusion: In
addition to norm entrepreneurs, comparatively powerless actors within a
transnational network are also able to cause a new norm to emerge by using
the strategies of parallel networking and analogous framing. Second, beside the
norm interpreters’ socialization or norm entrepreneurs’ capacity to defend
their norm against norm challengers, the latter’s power to access decision-
making processes matters for norm degeneration.
9.4 Outlook
The present study has deliberately focused on the period between 1989, when
AI first started to work on women’s rights, and 2010, marking the end of
16 Strahm 2017.
17 Müller and Wunderlich 2013.
9. Discussion and outlook 275
AI’s first global long-term thematic campaign focusing on VAW in the pri-
vate sphere. I have shown that AI’s work on issues of VAW evolved tremen-
dously within this period, even though the organization did not succeed in
making women’s rights part of its DNA through the SVAW campaign. Broad-
ening the time frame, it becomes evident that AI has not stopped working
on issues of VAW after the end of the SVAW campaign. In fact, the Demand
Dignity campaign, the integration of the principle of a balanced representa-
tion of men and women within the organization, and the anchoring of gender
mainstreaming in the 2010-2016 strategic plan all indicate that women’s rights
issues have remained relevant after the closing of the SVAW campaign.More-
over, AI underwent important changes with regards to its internal structure
in the 2010s. The following paragraph briefly highlights the most important
developments concerning AI’s structure and functioning as well as its work
on issues of VAW since 2010.
AI’s “Moving Closer to the Ground” initiative, launched in the early 2010s,
sought to create a bottom-up approach of human rights work that would en-
able the organization to work closely with local human rights organizations
and to respond more quickly to human rights violations.18 It must be con-
sidered the most important transformation in the functioning of the NGO.
This structural shift entailed the delocalization of the regional programs from
the headquarters to key regional hubs, such as Dakar, Johannesburg, Hong
Kong, and Mexico19 It has modified and continues to alter the power rela-
tions among sections, as new sections were founded in the Global South and
already existing Southern sections grew.
This modification is also likely to have altered the direction of the move-
ment’s work on issues of VAW over the past years. Although AI has not
launched an endeavor comparable to the SVAW campaign as far as length
and resources are concerned, the organization has continued its activities in
the domain of VAW and women’s rights since 2010. Relatedly, its policy and
its internal structure in these domains have continued to evolve since 2010.
Activity-wise, AI has integrated VAW into the Demand Dignity campaign (its
second thematic campaign under the mission), which was launched at the
end of 2009 and focused on maternal mortality, forced eviction, discrim-
18 Shetty 2015.
19 Shetty 2015.
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ination, and exclusion.20 From 2014 to 2015, in reaction to the backlash
against sexual and reproductive rights, AI organized the My Body My Rights
campaign, seeking to promote people’s rights to decide upon their bodies
and a life free of coercion.21 Today, AI’s website shows a wide range of topics
in which the organization is engaged, including sexual and reproductive
rights.22 Thus, sexual and reproductive rights have become a central topic of
AI’s work on women’s rights over the past several years.
At the same time, as the examples of the Swiss and the German sec-
tions show, women’s groups have continued to take action on issues such
as FGM, trafficking, domestic violence, women human rights defenders, and
forced marriage.23 Concerning policy developments on women’s rights, gen-
der mainstreaming became of one of the central objectives of AI’s ISP 2010-
201624 as a consequence of the integration of the principle of gender equality
in the nominations for IECmembers and other international elected positions
at the 2009 ICM.25
In addition, it is worth mentioning the recently adopted new policy on
abortion calling for a decriminalization of abortion, which replaced the 2007
policy on the issue. Indeed, on July 9, 2018, the Deputy Europe Director at
AI announced on Twitter: “Excited to announce @amnesty global movement
has decided to trust women –we are fully pro-choice organization.”26 He was
referring to AI’s new abortion policy that guarantees “access to safe and legal
abortion in a broad way that fully respects the rights of all women, girls, and
people who can get pregnant”27 adopted at the ICM in Warsaw in July 2018.
AI has also continued to pursue its commitment to human rights viola-
tions against women with the establishment of the Gender, Sexuality, and
Identity Program at the IS in 2010. The organization has made gender one
of the categories to consider when analyzing human rights abuses and how
20 Amnesty International: AI’s global Campaign for Human Dignity: a strategy to end human
rights abuses that keep people poor, 2008.
21 Amnesty International.
22 Amnesty International.
23 Amnesty International Sektion Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Amnesty International.
24 Amnesty International: Amnesty International's Integrated Strategic Plan 2010 to 2016,
2010.
25 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: 29th International CouncilMeeting Cir-
cular 46 ICM Decisions 2009, 16.08.2009.
26 Van Gulik 2018.
27 Amnesty International, International Secretariat.
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best to face them. As one of my interviewees explained, the restructuring of
the Gender Unit into the Gender, Sexuality, and Identity Program also occurred
because of the recommendations resulting from the SVAW campaign. The
latter advised that AI not limit its gender or women’s rights work only to a
campaign but apply gender lenses to various aspects of its work.28 Whereas
AI slightly increased the human resources devoted to its work on women’s
rights issues by creating the Gender, Sexuality, and Identity Program, these
resources were not sufficient to actually ensure that intersectionality is taken
into consideration in each of AI’s projects.29
The foundation of the International Women’s Human Rights Network
(IWHRN) in 2011 can be considered another recent, important structural
change with respect to AI’s work on VAW. In fact, by creating this network,
former section SVAW campaign coordinators reconstituted the IWN. Their
goals were to strengthen AI’s work on women’s rights and gender equality
at all stages and to support and follow up on the process of gender main-
streaming formalized in the ISP 2010-2016 through the organization.30 At
the national level, one can observe a continuity in the structural entities
responsible for the work on violence against women within the Swiss and
the German sections. In fact, a permanent position at the secretariat of the
Swiss section has been responsible for women’s rights issues since the SVAW
campaign.The national women’s network, composed of a coordination group
linking the women’s groups (Geneva, Zürich and Bern) to the secretariat and
to the IS, has continued to coordinate the section’s work on women’s rights.
In the German section, the work on women’s rights violations has continued
to be primarily in the hands of the thematic expert group MaF.
At the same time, women’s rights issues have continued to challenge the
organization from within. The head of the Gender Unit’s departure from the
IS,31 can be mentioned as one example of such internal challenges.32 Later,
the adoption of an official position in favor of decriminalizing prostitution in
28 Ganzfried: Interview with B.C., 24.06.2012.
29 Ganzfried: Interview with B.C., 24.06.2012.
30 C.: AI International Women’s Human Rights Network, 2011.
31 The departure followed a public dispute with AI’s senior management in 2011 for pub-
licly endorsing a survivor of torture at Guantanamo Bay who was also supposedly
linked to violent fundamentalist groups.
32 Kelleher and Bhattacharjya 2013.
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May 2016 apparently led to important internal debates, provoking the with-
drawal of many long-term activists and causing huge opposition from other
organizations in the field of women’s rights, human rights, and trafficking.33
As the example of one of my informants who left AI shows, the newly adopted
pro-choice position on abortion must have also provoked internal discussion
and withdrawals. In fact, the informant explained that she was very happy to
have left AI before this policy change, as she could no longer identify with this
new direction.
This outline of the developments that have taken place since 2010 shows
that the internal structures responsible for women’s rights issues, which were
established during the 1990s and the 2000s, have remained beyond the SVAW
campaign and that AI has continued working on VAW, among other issues
the organization is focusing on. Since the SVAW campaign, AI has mainly
addressed VAW by framing it as an issue of sexual and reproductive rights.
This emphasis reflects a growing awareness of the gendered nature of hu-
man rights and a willingness to consider violations of human rights equally,
whether occurring in the private or the public sphere and whoever the viola-
tor.
However, if sexual and reproductive rights are addressed as the rights of
every individual regardless of their identity, then this focus bears the risk of
ignoring the gendered power relations that put women in a subordinated po-
sition in most societies. Further, the adoption of the pro-choice position on
abortion could be interpreted as a significant advancement for the progres-
sive feminist voices within AI, as such a policy change would not have raised
a majority of the ICM delegates ten years before. It can thus be assumed that
focusing on the 2010s would have given amore positive picture of AI’s work on
women’s rights. Given AI’s democratic decision-making process, it is worth
assuming that this development is also the result of a change in the mem-
bership, not only due to the organization’s age but also as a consequence of
the AI’s “Moving Closer to the Ground” initiative that has only recently come
to an end. In fact, a younger, more global and diverse generation of activists
has joined the movement over the past decade and is therefore unaware of
AI’s former limited mandate. Instead, they have identified with a broader
understanding of human rights. Such activists have increasingly shaped the
organization and its thematic directions, and it is they who must have made
policy changes, such as the one on abortion, possible.
33 Geist 2016.
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On account of these structural modifications and the continuing emer-
gence of new human rights challenges, AI’s work will continue to evolve in the
future. What this means in terms of AI’s work against VAW and the respect
of women’s rights remains to be seen. As the recently adopted pro-choice po-
sition on abortion demonstrates, however, it is likely that AI will continue to
evolve in a progressive direction, addressing human rights violations equally
wherever they occur and whoever the perpetrator is. At the same time, due
to the empowerment of local activists, the decentralization process could also
lead to an increase in internal debates on the positions that AI should take
on particular women’s rights issues. These hypothetical considerations lead
to the question of whether and how the recent internal change process has
affected AI’s work on VAW. Are there new or different feminist demands ar-
ticulated due to the decentralization of the organization? Does the “Moving
Closer to the Ground” facilitate feminist strategizing, or does it hamper fem-
inist demands?
In conclusion, I would like to highlight a few points about the study’s sig-
nificance and contributions to our knowledge of AI’s work on women’s rights
and beyond. By closely following AI’s work in the field of VAW over a period
of 20 years, the book has shed light on a little-known part of the work of the
one of the most important human rights organization worldwide. By giving a
voice to AI’s female activists and officials, whose actions have often remained
unnoticed by the overall organization and by the public, I have made them
visible as important internal actors and showed that female activists and of-
ficials were key to leading AI’s growing interest in women’s rights issues and
to the decision to launch the organization’s first global thematic long-term
campaign on the issues of VAW in the private sphere.
Additionally, the study has provided a comprehensive picture of the func-
tioning of two of the most important AI sections in terms of members and
funding, thereby making a major contribution to the documentation of AI
Switzerland and AI Germany, as well as to their work on VAW. In this en-
deavor, I have consulted and analyzed a wide range of largely unknown, first-
hand archive material. In addition, the book has facilitated the further de-
velopment of knowledge on norm dynamic, as it has provided evidence that
both comparatively powerless actors and norm entrepreneurs can cause a new
norm to emerge under certain conditions.
Moreover, my findings indicate that in addition to norm interpreters’ so-
cialization and norm entrepreneurs’ capability to defend their norm from
norm challengers, norm challengers’ ability to access the decision-making
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process helps explain why a norm ceases to diffuse. The constructivist and
feminist theoretical paradigm underpinning my work, my qualitative case
study approach, and the use of GT research techniques were essential for
gaining new insights into why and how AI integrated women’s rights into
its work between the late 1980s and 2010 and contributed greatly to the de-
velopment of new theoretical insights. Consequently, diversifying the focus
away from the mainstream approach of cross-national research towards the
micro level, placing individuals in the center, is worthwhile for the production
of knowledge in the area of norm dynamics. Further, analyzing processes of
norm diffusion with gender lenses can be fruitful, as this allows for the dis-
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Appendix 2: Additional graphs and figures
Graph 6: Evolution of AI sections, 1964-2011
Source: http://www.amnesty-chronik.de/
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Graph 7: AICH’s evolution in terms of number of groups, 1970-2011
Source: Amnesty International Schweiz, 1991; Amnesty International
Schweiz, 1995; Amnesty International, 11/8/2011, Steffen, 26/8/1997*
*Amnesty International: Die Gründng von Amnesty International in der
Schweiz, April 2001.
Graph 8: AI Germany’s evolution in terms of number of groups,
1964-2009
Source: Deile et al. 2015
The “Chronik der Deutschen Sektion von Amnesty International” pro-
vides figures only for the years presented in the table. Groups include
local groups, thematic and country groups called Ko-gruppen.
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Figure 16: Origins of the resolutions preceding an ICM decision directly concerning
AI’s work on VAW
Source: ICM reports
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Appendix 3: AI’s statute, mandate, and mission
Prior to 2001, AI oriented its work towards the fulfillment of its mandate,
defined in its statute as amended by the 1995 ICM:
 
The object of AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL is to contribute to the observance
throughout the world of human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. In pursuance of this object, and recognizing the obligation
on each person to extent to others rights and freedoms equal to his or her
own, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL adopts as its mandate:
To promote awareness of and adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other internationally recognized human rights instru-
ments, the values enshrined in them, and the indivisibility and interdepen-
dence of all human rights and freedoms; To oppose grave violations of the
rights of every person freely to hold and to express his or her convictions and
to be free from discrimination and of the right of every person to physical
and mental integrity, and, in particular, to oppose by all appropriate means
irrespective of political considerations:
a. The imprisonment, detention or other physical restrictions imposed on
any person by reason of his or her political, religious or other conscien-
tiously held beliefs or by reason of his or her ethnic origin, sex, color,
language, national or social origin, economic status, birth or other status,
provided that he or she has not used or advocated violence (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ‘prisoners of conscience’; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL shall
work towards the release of and shall provide assistance to prisoners of
conscience);
b. The detention of any political prisoner without fair trial within a reason-
able time or any trial procedures relating to such prisoners that do not
conform to internationally recognized norms;
c. The death penalty, and the torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of prisoners or other detained or restricted per-
sons, whether or not the persons affected have used or advocated violence;
d. The extrajudicial execution of persons whether or not imprisoned, de-
tained or restricted, and “disappearances”, whether or not the persons
affected have used or advocated violence.1
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After 2001, AI realized its activities according to the mission:
1. Amnesty International’s vision is of a world in which every person enjoys
all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and other international human rights standards. In pursuit
of this vision, Amnesty International’s mission is to undertake research
and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to
physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and
freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work to promote
all human rights.2
1 Amnesty International: Statute of Amnesty International as amended by the 22nd Interna-
tional Council, meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12-20 August 1995, 1995.





AIDAN Search, AI’s electronic archive, with access restricted to AI members
only, https://intranet.amnesty.org/wiki/display/Portal/Home1
ACT 77 – Outreach: Women
IOR 41 – UN: Sessions and meetings
ORG 50 – International Council Meeting (ICM): General
ORG 51 – ICM: Agenda/Working papers/Resolutions (Biennial)
ORG 52 – ICM: Records of (ICM) Decisions/Reports (Biennial)
ORG 53 – ICM: Implementation of Decisions
ORG 70 – International Executive Committee (IEC): General
ORG 72 – IEC Meetings: Reports
ORG 80 – International Consultation: General
ORG 81 – International Meetings
POL 20 – Statute
POL 21 – Mandate
POL 38 – Women
POL 50 – AI Planning
POL 51 – Action Planning Bulletin
1 Amnesty International, International Secretariat: Update to the Amnesty International
Index (revised), 27.09.2011.
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Archive of the Swiss section of Amnesty International, Bern
 
Catalogued folders
052.001 – 015       Kampagnen Frauen 1991-2001
052.017 – 021       Kampagnen Frauen 1998-2003
052.023 – 026      Kampagnen Frauen 2002-2005
052.028 – 033      Kampagnen Frauen 2005
052.046                   Kampagnen Frauen 2003-2006
052.048 – 066      Kampagnen Frauen 2002-2009
006.006                  Generalsekretariat Internationale Kommission 2004, 2005
010.052 – 061       Vorstand Protokolle und Sitzungsunterlagen 2003-2005
010.067                   Vorstand Protokolle 2003-2006
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AI.A.001-008 – 040       Delegiertenversammlung 1986-2001
AI.A.002-019 – 032       Vorstand Unterlagen 1990-2002
AI.A.003-001                     Geschäftsleitung 1991




AI.C.012-088                   Groupe AU femmes Chêne-bourg
D.001-045                         SVAW – Aktionen 2008-2009
D.001-122                          Diverse Korrespondenz Stella Jegher 2004-2011
D.001-124                          SVAW Frauenhandel Followup 2008-2009
D.001-131                          Kampagne Frauenhandel 2006-2009
D.001-132                          SVAW Tagungs- /Weiterbildungsunterlagen Sje 2005-
2015
D.001-133                          SVAW Abschluss 2008-2010
 
Not catalogued electronic folders
Minutes of meetings Delegiertenversammlungen 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006,
2007
Minutes of meetings General Assemblies 2008, 2009, 2010
Minutes of meetings Ko-Gruppe Women’s Rights 2006-2011
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